[*1]
Jiskra v Canesper
2008 NY Slip Op 51968(U) [21 Misc 3d 129(A)]
Decided on September 29, 2008
Appellate Term, Second Department
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.


Decided on September 29, 2008
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

APPELLATE TERM: 2nd and 11th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

PRESENT: : PESCE, P.J., WESTON PATTERSON and RIOS, JJ
2007-1593 Q C.

Dorothy Jiskra, Appellant,

against

Lillian Canesper, Heather Canesper, Eliot Canesper and Jose Doe, Respondents, -and- "John Doe" and "Jane Doe", Undertenants.


Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Bruce Marc Kramer, J.), dated April 2, 2007. The order, insofar as appealed from, granted so much of a motion by tenants as sought to compel landlord's attorney to release to their attorney the sum of $26,000 being held in escrow pursuant to a stipulation of settlement between the parties, and denied a cross motion by landlord for a declaratory judgment that tenants had failed to comply with the stipulation of settlement.


Order, insofar as appealed from, modified by providing that so much of tenants' motion as sought to compel landlord's attorney to release to their attorney the $26,000 being held in escrow, and landlord's cross motion for a declaratory judgment, are denied without prejudice to the parties seeking appropriate relief in a proper forum; as so modified, affirmed without costs.

In this nonpayment proceeding, the parties, by counsel, entered into a so-ordered stipulation, dated January 3, 2007, in which it was agreed that landlord would be awarded a final judgment of possession, which was entered that day, and that tenants would remove from the premises and surrender the keys to the premises by January 15, 2007, with time being of the essence. Landlord was to pay $26,000 to her attorney by January 10, 2007, to be held in escrow. Upon tenants' timely compliance with the stipulation, landlord's attorney was required to release the $26,000 to tenants' attorney. Tenants subsequently moved to, inter alia, compel landlord's [*2]attorney to release the escrow funds to their attorney, and landlord cross-moved for a declaratory judgment that tenants had failed to comply with the stipulation. Following a hearing on the issue of whether there was timely compliance, the court below found that tenants had complied with the stipulation and that "forfeiture" of the $26,000 being held in escrow would be unconscionable under the circumstances shown. Accordingly, it granted tenants' motion for the release of the $26,000 being held in escrow.

In a prior case involving similar facts (Topaz Realty Corp. v Morales, 9 Misc 3d 27, 28-29 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2005]), this court stated:

"Except for proceedings for the enforcement of housing standards and applications for certain provisional remedies, the New York City Civil Court may not grant injunctive relief. Inasmuch as the order directing landlord's attorney to release the funds being held in escrow was equitable and injunctive in nature and not within the limited equitable and injunctive powers of the Civil Court, the order was not within the jurisdiction of the court to make" (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (see also Yaakov v Kupershalayak, 17 Misc 3d 129[A], 2007 NY Slip Op 51968[U] [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]; World Realty Corp. v Consumer Sales, Inc., 9 Misc 3d 136[A], 2005 NY Slip Op 51696[U] [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2005]; cf. 952 Assoc., LLC v Palmer, 52 AD3d 236 [2008] [invoking CPLR 5221 (a) (3) and CCA 1508, the statutes empowering the Civil Court to enforce its money judgments, as a basis for finding that the Civil Court has jurisdiction to enforce a so-ordered stipulation providing for the payment of money by one party to another]).

Similarly, the Civil Court generally lacks jurisdiction to issue a declaratory judgment (CPLR 3001; see Bury v CIGNA Healthcare of N.Y., 254 AD2d 229 [1998]; Suarez v El Daro Realty, 156 AD2d 356 [1989]; cf. CCA 212-a). Moreover, even were we to deem the cross motion as, in effect, seeking to compel landlord's attorney to release the escrow funds to landlord, for the reasons stated above, such relief would not be available in Civil Court.

As the court below did not have the power to order landlord's counsel to release the escrow funds or to issue a declaratory judgment with respect to the parties' rights
thereto, both the motion and the cross motion should have been denied without prejudice to the parties seeking appropriate relief in a proper forum.

Pesce, P.J., and Weston Patterson, J., concur.

Rios, J., taking no part.
Decision Date: September 29, 2008