[*1]
Comfort Supply, Inc. v Clarendon Natl. Ins. Co.
2011 NY Slip Op 52018(U) [33 Misc 3d 135(A)]
Decided on October 28, 2011
Appellate Term, Second Department
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.


Decided on October 28, 2011
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

APPELLATE TERM: 2nd, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

PRESENT: : PESCE, P.J., WESTON and RIOS, JJ
2009-2463 K C.

Comfort Supply, Inc. as Assignee of ANDRE HAYDEN, Respondent,

against

Clarendon National Insurance Co., Appellant.


Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Peter Paul Sweeney, J.), entered November 5, 2009. The order, insofar as appealed from, denied defendant's cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.


ORDERED that the order, insofar as appealed from, is reversed, without costs, and defendant's cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant appeals from so much of an order as denied its cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

The affidavit of defendant's claims division employee established that defendant had timely mailed its denial of claim form, which denied the claim on the ground that the assignor had not submitted proper notice of the accident to defendant within 30 days of the accident, in accordance with its standard office practices and procedures (see St. Vincent's Hosp. of Richmond v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 50 AD3d 1123 [2008]; Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C. v Chubb Group of Ins., 17 Misc 3d 16 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]). The affidavit further stated that defendant had first learned of the accident when it had received an NF-2 form, thereby demonstrating that defendant first learned of the accident more than 30 days after it had occurred. As defendant established its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, the burden shifted to plaintiff. In opposition, plaintiff did not proffer any proof, but merely speculated that defendant had learned of the accident prior to receiving the NF-2 form. Despite being informed by the denial of claim form that it had the opportunity to "submit[] written proof providing clear and reasonable justification for the failure" to timely advise defendant of the accident (Insurance Department Regulation [11 NYCRR] § 65-1.1; § 65-2.4 [b]), plaintiff did not present any evidence that it had availed itself of the opportunity. In light of the foregoing, plaintiff failed to demonstrate the existence of a triable issue of fact.

Accordingly, the order, insofar as appealed from, is reversed, and defendant's cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted. [*2]

Pesce, P.J., Weston and Rios, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: October 28, 2011