Rovensky v Tamar Transp. Corp.
2013 NY Slip Op 04322 [107 AD3d 779]
June 12, 2013
Appellate Division, Second Department
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
As corrected through Wednesday, July 31, 2013


Lena Rovensky, Respondent,
v
Tamar Transportation Corp. et al., Appellants.

[*1] Cobert, Haber & Haber, Garden City, N.Y. (David C. Haber of counsel), for appellants.

Eric H. Green, New York, N.Y. (Marc Gertler and Hiram Anthony Raldiris of counsel), for respondent.

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendants appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Partnow, J.), dated July 3, 2012, which denied their motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject accident.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

The defendants met their prima facie burden of showing that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject accident (see Toure v Avis Rent A Car Sys., 98 NY2d 345 [2002]; Gaddy v Eyler, 79 NY2d 955, 956-957 [1992]). The defendants submitted, inter alia, competent medical evidence establishing, prima facie, that the alleged injuries to the plaintiff's right shoulder were not caused by the subject accident (see Jilani v Palmer, 83 AD3d 786, 787 [2011]).

In opposition, however, the plaintiff submitted evidence raising a triable issue of fact as to whether she sustained a serious injury to her right shoulder that was caused by the accident (see Perl v Meher, 18 NY3d 208, 218-219 [2011]). Thus, the Supreme Court properly denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. Angiolillo, J.P., Balkin, Austin and Miller, JJ., concur.