MATTER OF RICHARD W. KOZLOWSKI, AN ATTORNEY, RESIGNOR. – Voluntary resignation accepted and name removed from roll of attorneys (see Matter of Manown, 240 AD2d 83). PRESENT: PINE, J.P., HAYES, HURLBUTT, KEHOE, AND BURNS, JJ. (Filed Nov. 15, 2002.)

MATTER OF HARVEY FREDERICK STRAUSS, AN ATTORNEY, RESIGNOR. – Voluntary resignation accepted and name removed from roll of attorneys (see Matter of Manown, 240 AD2d 83). PRESENT: PINE, J.P., HAYES, HURLBUTT, KEHOE, AND BURNS, JJ. (Filed Nov. 15, 2002.)

MATTER OF KENNETH L. BENNETT, A SUSPENDED ATTORNEY, PETITIONER. GRIEVANCE COMMITTEE OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT, RESPONDENT. – Order entered denying reinstatement and granting cross motion for contempt. Per Curiam Opinion: Petitioner was admitted to the practice of law by this Court on February 20, 1979. By order entered February 16, 2000, he was suspended for a period of two years, effective October 27, 1999, and until further order of the Court, for misconduct that included depositing personal funds into his attorney trust account and converting clients’ funds by allowing the balance in the trust account to fall below the amount of his clients’ interests. At the time that the misconduct occurred, petitioner was suffering from depression and Crohn’s disease. Petitioner was personally served on February 18, 2000, with a certified copy of the suspension order and a copy of this Court’s rule governing the conduct of suspended attorneys. Petitioner filed an application for reinstatement on April 22, 2002. Respondent filed papers in opposition to the application and moved for an order punishing petitioner for contempt of court on the grounds that he violated the suspension order of this Court by engaging in the practice of law, holding himself out as an attorney, and failing to close and continuing to use his attorney trust account. Petitioner admitted, in a responding affidavit, that he failed to close his attorney trust account and that he issued checks on behalf of clients after hissuspension in order to assist the clients in finalizing pending matters. Petitioner’s admissions establish that he finalized a personal injury matter on behalf of relatives, who agreed to accept a settlement that had been offered prior to petitioner’s suspension. Additionally, he settled a debt to a funeral home on behalf of a disabled client who had relocated after her son’s suicide. Finally, petitioner delivered to new counsel checks drawn on his attorney trust account for filing fees on behalf of clients. We note that, although the conduct of petitioner constitutes contempt of court, he acted out of a desire to assist his clients and the clients were aware that he was suspended. Accordingly, we grant respondent’s motion and impose a fine in the amount of $250 as punishment for petitioner’s contempt of court, and we deny petitioner’s application for reinstatement with leave to renew upon submission of proof that the fine has been satisfied. PRESENT: PINE, J.P., HAYES, HURLBUTT, KEHOE, AND BURNS, JJ. (Filed Nov. 15, 2002.)

MATTER OF MICHAEL E. BRYANT, A SUSPENDED ATTORNEY, RESPONDENT. GRIEVANCE COMMITTEE OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT, PETITIONER. – Order of disbarment entered. Per Curiam Opinion: Respondent was admitted to the practice of law by this Court on January 11, 1990. On December 18, 2001, respondent was convicted after ajury trial in the Superior Court of Worcester County, Massachusetts, of three felony counts of conspiracy to commit larceny, in violation of Massachusetts General Laws, ch 274, § 7. Respondent was sentenced on January 2, 2002, to three concurrent terms of imprisonment of 2½ years, with 1½ years suspended, and a five-year term of conditional probation. The execution of sentence has been stayed pending the determination of respondent’s appeal. Respondent has been suspended from the practice of law in Massachusetts and further disciplinary proceedings in Massachusetts have been deferred pending the determination of respondent’s appeal. This Court, upon receipt of proof of respondent’s conviction, suspended respondent by order entered May 31, 2002, and directed respondent to show cause why a final order of discipline should not be entered pursuant to Judiciary Law § 90(4) (a) and (e). Respondent waived his appearance in writing and submitted papers in lieu of an appearance. Respondent requests that we defer further proceedings in this matter pending the determination of his appeal in Massachusetts. Respondent was convicted of conspiring with his law partners, a client, and a physician to commit larceny by presenting to insurance companies fraudulent claims for damages. There is no corresponding felony in New York. Respondent, however, has been convicted of a serious crime pursuant to Judiciary Law § 90 (4) (d). We deny the request of respondent to defer further proceedings in this matter pending the outcome of his appeal. Should respondent’s conviction be reversed on appeal, respondent may move to vacate our order of discipline (see Judiciary Law §90 [5] [a]). Respondent used his law license to commit crimes and to aid others in the commission of crimes. Accordingly, we conclude that respondent should be disbarred (see Matter of Scott, ___ AD2d ___ [Nov. 15, 2002]). PRESENT: PINE, J.P., HAYES, HURLBUTT, KEHOE, AND BURNS, JJ. (Filed Nov. 15, 2002.)

MATTER OF MARY E. FEINDT, AN ATTORNEY, RESPONDENT. GRIEVANCE COMMITTEE OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT, PETITIONER. -- Order of censure entered. Per Curiam Opinion: Respondent was admitted to the practice of law by this Court on January 10, 1991. The Grievance Committee filed charges against respondent, a former assistant district attorney, following her arrest on January 28, 2002, on a charge of petit larceny (Penal Law § 155.25) arising from the theft of a witness fee payment. The criminal charge was adjourned in contemplation of dismissal on April 11, 2002, and respondent was directed to make restitution and perform community service. Respondent filed an answer admitting the material allegations of the petition, and appeared before this Court to submit matters in mitigation. We conclude that respondent violated the following Disciplinary Rules of the Code of Professional Responsibility: DR 1-102 (a) (3) (22 NYCRR 1200.3 [a] [3]) - engaging in illegal conduct that adversely reflects on her honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer; DR 1-102 (a) (4) (22 NYCRR 1200.3 [a] [4]) - engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation; andDR 1-102 (a) (7) (22 NYCRR 1200.3 [a] [7]) - engaging in conduct that adversely reflects on her fitness as a lawyer. We note in mitigation, that respondent made full restitution and exceeded the amount of required hours of community service. She cooperated with the Grievance Committee’s investigation, admitted the misconduct and expressed extreme remorse. Additionally, we note that the misconduct occurred at a time when respondent was suffering from depression, for which she has received counseling. Finally, we have considered respondent’s previously unblemished record and that respondent voluntarily discontinued practicing law following her arrest. Accordingly, we conclude that respondent should be censured (see Matter of Schell, 286 AD2d 56). PRESENT: PINE, J.P., HAYES, HURLBUTT, KEHOE, AND BURNS, JJ. (Filed Nov. 15, 2002.)

MATTER OF WILLIE E. FELTON, FOR REINSTATEMENT TO THE PRACTICE OF LAW. -- Order entered dismissing application for reinstatement (see Matter of Felton, 294 AD2d 961). PRESENT: PINE, J.P., HAYES, HURLBUTT, KEHOE, AND BURNS, JJ. (Filed Nov. 15, 2002.)

MATTER OF WILLIAM S. GORDON, AN ATTORNEY, RESPONDENT. GRIEVANCE COMMITTEE OF THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT, PETITIONER. -- Order of suspension entered pursuant to 22 NYCRR 1022.20 (e). PRESENT: GREEN, J.P., WISNER, SCUDDER, GORSKI, AND LAWTON, JJ. (Filed Nov. 15, 2002.)

MATTER OF DOUGLAS WILLIAM RHODES, AN ATTORNEY, RESPONDENT. GRIEVANCE COMMITTEE OF THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT, PETITIONER. -- Order of suspension entered. Per Curiam Opinion: Respondent was admitted to the practice of law by this Court on June 25, 1992. By order entered February 13, 2002, respondent was disbarred by the Supreme Court of the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands and ordered to pay a sanction in the amount of $10,000 for failing to disclose in an application for limited admission to the Northern Mariana Islands Bar that he had been convicted of a felony in Michigan in 1979. After practicing law in the Northern Mariana Islands for a period of four years pursuant to his limited admission, respondent disclosed the felony conviction on an application for permanent admission to that bar. This Court, upon receipt of a certified copy of the judgment and order of disbarment, directed respondent, by order entered August 22, 2002, to show cause why reciprocal discipline should not be imposed pursuant to 22 NYCRR 1022.22. Respondent appeared before this Court, pro se, and argued that the imposition of reciprocal discipline would be unjust. Respondent also submitted matters in mitigation. Specifically, respondent contends that his failure to disclose the felony conviction in the application for limited admission was an oversight and that the subsequent disclosure of the conviction in his application for permanent admission demonstrates that he lacked the intent to deceive. Additionally, respondent notes that he disclosed the felony conviction to this Court when he applied for admission to the New York State Bar. Pursuant to 22 NYCRR 1022.22, an attorney disciplined in another jurisdiction may be disciplined by this Court for the underlying misconduct unless we find that the procedure in the foreign jurisdiction deprived the attorney of due process of law, that there was insufficient proof that the attorney committed the misconduct or that the imposition of discipline would be unjust. Upon our review of the record, we find that respondent was not deprived of due process of law in the proceeding in the Northern Mariana Islands. Respondent was given notice of the charges against him and he appeared, with counsel, for a hearing. Additionally, we find that the material facts, which are not disputed, constitute sufficient proof that respondent committed the misconduct. We find, however, that the imposition of the sanction of disbarment in the circumstances of this case would be unjust. Although we do not condone the failure of respondent to respond truthfully to the question in the application for limited admission regarding his criminal history, we note that he disclosed his felony conviction in the application for permanent admission filed in the Northern Mariana Islands and in the application for admission filed with this Court. Accordingly, after consideration of all of the factors in this matter, we conclude that respondent should be suspended for one year and until further order of the Court. PRESENT: PINE, J.P., HAYES, HURLBUTT, KEHOE, AND BURNS, JJ. (Filed Nov. 15, 2002.)

MATTER OF RUSSELL J. SCIANDRA, FOR REINSTATEMENT TO THE PRACTICE OF LAW. -- Order entered terminating suspension and reinstating petitioner to the practice of law. PRESENT: PINE, J.P., HAYES, HURLBUTT, KEHOE, AND BURNS, JJ. (Filed Nov. 15, 2002.)

MATTER OF ROGER C. SCOTT, A SUSPENDED ATTORNEY, RESPONDENT. GRIEVANCE COMMITTEE OF THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT, PETITIONER. -- Order of disbarment entered. Per Curiam Opinion: Respondent was admitted to the practice of law by this Court on February 21, 1978. On February 8, 2000, he was convicted in the United StatesDistrict Court for the Western District of New York (District Court) of conspiracy to defraud the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and filing a false income tax return, in violation of 18 USC § 371 and 26 USC § 7206 (1), respectively. Both crimes are Federal felonies. Respondent was sentenced on November 2, 2000, to a 27-month term of imprisonment and was directed to forfeit cash in the amount of $20,000. By order entered March 8, 2000, this Court suspended respondent and directed him to show cause why a final order of discipline should not be entered pursuant to Judiciary Law § 90 (4) (a) and (e). Respondent appeared before this Court in response to the order to show cause and argued that the crimes of which he was convicted were not essentially similar to New York felonies and that disbarment was not mandated pursuant to statute. This Court determined that there was no corresponding felony in New York and that respondent was entitled to a hearing prior to disposition pursuant to Judiciary Law § 90(4) (h). After the completion of his sentence, respondent waived his right to a hearing and appeared before this Court and submitted matters in mitigation. The plea agreement entered into by respondent in District Court establishes that in order to assist a client engaged in drug trafficking to conceal from the IRS income obtained through drug trafficking, respondent arranged for deeds for parcels of real property that had been purchased by the client to be placed in respondent’s name or in the names of others, and, falsely reported on an income tax form that respondent had realized a gain from the sale of real property when, in fact, the property had been purchased by the client. We have considered the matters submitted by respondent in mitigation. Respondent, however, used his law license to commit crimes and to aid another in the commission of crimes. Accordingly, given the gravity of respondent’s crimes, we conclude that respondent should be disbarred (see Matter of Gawel, 219 AD2d 338). PRESENT: GREEN, J.P., HAYES, WISNER, SCUDDER, AND LAWTON, JJ. (Filed Nov. 15, 2002.)