MATTER OF HARRY L. BROWN, AN ATTORNEY, RESIGNOR. -- Resignation accepted and name stricken from the roll of attorneys. PRESENT: PINE, J.P., HURLBUTT, KEHOE, BURNS, AND HAYES, JJ. (Filed Jan. 23, 2003.)

MATTER OF PAUL R. BARBOUR, A SUSPENDED ATTORNEY, RESPONDENT. GRIEVANCE COMMITTEE OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT, PETITIONER. -- Order of disbarment entered. Per Curiam Opinion: Respondent was admitted to the practice of law by this Court on June 25, 1987. On May 31, 2000, he was convicted in the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York (District Court) of conspiracy to defraud Nationwide Insurance Company (Nationwide) through the use of the mails, in violation of 18 USC § 371, a federal felony. Respondent was sentenced on April 4, 2001, to an 18-month term of imprisonment and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $195,000. Upon receipt of proof of respondent’s conviction, this Court, by order entered July 17, 2000, suspended respondent and directed him to show cause why a final order of discipline should not be entered pursuant to Judiciary Law § 90 (4) (a) and (e). Respondent appeared before this Court in response to the order to show cause and argued that the crime of which he was convicted was not essentially similar to a New York felony and that disbarment was not mandated by statute. This Court determined that there was no corresponding felony in New York and that respondent was entitled to a hearing prior to disposition pursuant to Judiciary Law § 90 (4) (h). Respondent waived his right to a hearing, appeared before this Court and submitted matters in mitigation. The plea agreement entered into by respondent in District Court establishes that respondent, while employed as a claims attorney for Nationwide, agreed with another to defraud his employer by causing checks to be issued as payment for medical evaluations that were not performed. We have considered the matters submitted by respondent in mitigation. This Court has held, however, that, when an attorney uses his law license to commit crimes and to aid another in the commission of crimes, the appropriate sanction is disbarment (see Matter of Bryant, ___ AD2d ___ [Nov. 15, 2002]; Matter of Scott, ___ AD2d ___ [Nov. 15, 2002]). Accordingly, we conclude that respondent should be disbarred. PRESENT: GREEN, J.P., WISNER, SCUDDER, GORSKI, AND LAWTON, JJ. (Filed Feb. 7, 2003.)

MATTER OF BRADFORD JAY BARNEYS, AN ATTORNEY, RESPONDENT. GRIEVANCE COMMITTEE OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT, PETITIONER.-- Order of suspension entered. Per Curiam Opinion: Respondent was admitted to the practice of law by this Court on January 9, 1992. By order entered August 28, 2002, respondent was disbarred by the Court of Appeals of the State of Maryland for misconduct that included engaging in the unauthorized practice of law during the pendency of his application for admission in Maryland. This Court, upon receipt of a certified copy of the decision and order of disbarment, directed respondent, by order entered November 25, 2002, to show cause why reciprocal discipline should not be imposed pursuant to 22 NYCRR 1022.22. Respondent appeared before this Court, pro se, and argued that the imposition of reciprocal discipline would be unjust. Pursuant to 22 NYCRR 1022.22, an attorney disciplined in another jurisdiction may be disciplined by this Court for the underlying misconduct unless we find that the procedure in the foreign jurisdiction deprived the attorney of due process of law, that there was insufficient proof that the attorney committed the misconduct or that the imposition of discipline would be unjust. We find that respondent was not deprived of due process of law in the Maryland proceeding. He was given notice of the charges against him and was afforded a hearing. Additionally, the material facts are not in dispute and constitute sufficient proof that respondent committed the misconduct. We agree with respondent, however, that the imposition of the sanction of disbarment in the circumstances of this case would be unjust. Accordingly, after consideration of all of the factors in this matter, including the acceptance by respondent of responsibility for his misconduct and his expression of extreme remorse, we conclude that respondent should be suspended for one year and until further order of the Court. PRESENT: PINE, J.P., HURLBUTT, KEHOE, BURNS, AND HAYES, JJ. (Filed Feb. 7, 2003.)

MATTER OF DAVID H. WALSH, IV, FOR REINSTATEMENT TO THE PRACTICE OF LAW. -- Order entered terminating suspension and reinstating petitioner to the practice of law. PRESENT: PINE, J.P., HURLBUTT, KEHOE, BURNS, AND HAYES, JJ. (Filed Jan. 24, 2003.)