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1	COURT OF APPEALS
2	STATE OF NEW YORK
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4	MATTER OF KIGIN,
5	Appellant,
6	-against- No. 181
7	NO. 181 NEW YORK STATE WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD,
8	Respondent.
9	
10	20 Eagle Street Albany, New York 1220
11	October 14, 2014
12	Before:
13	CHIEF JUDGE JONATHAN LIPPMAN ASSOCIATE JUDGE VICTORIA A. GRAFFEO
14 15	ASSOCIATE JUDGE SUSAN PHILLIPS READ ASSOCIATE JUDGE ROBERT S. SMITH
16	ASSOCIATE JUDGE EUGENE F. PIGOTT, JR. ASSOCIATE JUDGE JENNY RIVERA ASSOCIATE JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM
17	ASSOCIATE TODGE ABDUS-SALIAAM
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2	Appearances:
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24	Sara Winkeljohn
25	Official Court Transcriber

1	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: 181, Matter of Kigin
2	Kigin.
3	Counselor, would you like any rebuttal
4	time?
5	MR. GREY: One minute, please, Your Honor.
6	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: One minute. Sure, go
7	ahead.
8	MR. GREY: May it please the court, my name
9	is Robert Grey. I'm appearing on behalf of Appellant
10	Maureen Kigin in this matter. The issue before the
11	court fundamentally is whether the state workers'
12	compensation board has issued a regulatory scheme
13	that is in conflict with the statute that the board
14	is charged with the obligation to administer.
15	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Why why would
16	it be conflict? Give us your basic kernel of your
17	argument.
18	MR. GREY: The basic kernel of the
19	argument, Your Honor, is that, as it's presently
20	written, the statute provides that the employer or
21	carrier can deny treatment, before the treatment is
22	rendered, provided that they meet two conditions.
23	One is that the treatment has to cost in excess of
24	1,000 dollars. And the other is that they must have

a doctor saying that the treatment is not necessary.

1 JUDGE SMITH: Actually, what it says is a 2 second conflicting opinion from a physician. 3 MR. GREY: From a physician authorized by the board. 4 5 JUDGE SMITH: But doesn't that - - doesn't that sort of assume there's got to be a first 6 7 opinion before there's a second opinion? MR. GREY: It assumes that there's a 8 9 request from a treating doctor for treatment that 10 costs in excess of 1,000 dollars, thus implicating 11 13-a(5). JUDGE SMITH: I mean, implicit in it is the 12 13 physician's opinion that that's appropriate and 14 necessary treatment? 15 MR. GREY: Yes, sir. 16 JUDGE SMITH: And why can't the workers' 17 compensation boards for - - - for - - - and you - - -18 you agree that the - - - that's subject to dispute, 19 obviously, and the board can say it's not appropriate 20 and necessary? 21 MR. GREY: Well, un - - - under - - -22 JUDGE SMITH: You - - - you say they have 23 to have a conflicting opinion from a doctor. And 2.4 maybe you're - - - of course, in this case you do.

MR. GREY: Well, under the - - - well, with

1 regard to the conflicting opinion from a doctor in 2 this case, the matter below is not decided based on 3 the opinion of that doctor. The matter below, in this case, was decided based on the board's 4 5 guidelines. And the medical opinion that was 6 proffered was also based on the guidelines. So the 7 fundamental question here - - -JUDGE SMITH: Well - - - well - - - well, 8 9 why - - - why - - - why isn't - - - why can't the 10 guidelines be read to say, in effect, we're 11 regulating the first opinion, the first opinion in 12 which the second one is conflicting? And we're 13 saying you've either got to be within the guidelines 14 or show us a good reason - - - a good enough reason 15 for a variance? Why is that inappropriate? 16 MR. GREY: Because it's contrary to what 17 the statute says, Your Honor. 18 JUDGE SMITH: What does the statute say 19 about what the first opinion has to say? 20 MR. GREY: Well, you - - - you'd have to 21 read, I believe, together Sections 13-a, 13-a(5), and 22 21(5). 13-a establishes the broad obligation of the 23 employer and carrier to provide medical treatment. 2.4 13 - - -

JUDGE SMITH: But - - - but my - - - my

question is what does the opinion, the - - - what

does the - - - there's obv - - - there's clearly some

implicit burden on the - - - on the recipient, on the

- - - the claimant to do something. You can't do -
- you - - - you don't just get money by saying send

me a check. You have to have a doctor saying this is

- - - this is appropriate treatment. We agree so

far?

MR. GREY: Yes.

2.4

JUDGE SMITH: Why can't the workers'

compensation board, by regulation, define the extent

of that burden, say we're going to consider an

application adequate when it's either within these

guidelines or shows us a good reason for being

outside the guidelines?

MR. GREY: Because, Your Honor, the legislature's already defined that burden. The legislature has already written a statute, 13-a(5). And what that statute says is that treatment in excess of 1,000 dollars can be pre-authorized or predenied based on a conflicting medical opinion. The necessary interpretation - - -

JUDGE SMITH: Okay, but - - - but I - - - I
- - - I keep coming back to it. Suppose 500 dollars,
and the statute doesn't apply at all. You can't say

1	I would like 500 dollars for a rain dance. You have
2	to have a doctor who says I want to get this -
3	this this guy has a 500-dollar treatment
4	that will work.
5	MR. GREY: The there is a bifurcation
6	of issues here, Judge, between treatment and payment.
7	The way the statute is written, the injured worker is
8	entitled to receive the treatment and the physician
9	submits the bill. The carrier still reserves the
10	right to dispute the bill. And then whether the bill
11	is payable is a matter to be adjusted between the
12	provider and the car and the insurer. But in
13	the interim, the injured worker has been treated.
14	The problem with the regulatory scheme that you have
15	here
16	JUDGE SMITH: How can how can
17	MR. GREY: is that the injured worker
18	now
19	JUDGE SMITH: How can how can a
20	worker be
21	MR. GREY: cannot get
22	JUDGE SMITH: Wait a minute, how can a
23	worker be entit entitled to treatment that no
24	one's going to pay for? What good does that do?

MR. GREY: That - - - that's the nature of

1 the system, Your Honor. It's been that way for a 2 hundred years. 3 JUDGE PIGOTT: But it's better now. 4 JUDGE GRAFFEO: I thought the - - - I 5 thought the - - -Isn't it? 6 JUDGE PIGOTT: 7 JUDGE GRAFFEO: - - - benefit of these new regs is that the injured worker doesn't have to get 8 9 pre-approval. The injured worker can get ten 10 treatments. And then if they want additional medical treatment of this nature, say acupuncture, then 11 12 they've got to request the variance. So for the vast 13 majority of injured workers, it's eliminated that 14 first step that they've got to wait to get a medical 15 opinion. They can get ten treatments. Am I - - - am 16 I wrong? 17 MR. GREY: There - - - there are two 18 problems with it, Your Honor. 19 JUDGE GRAFFEO: Am - - - am - - - but is 2.0 that how it works? Am I right or wrong about that? 21 MR. GREY: Under the guidelines? 22 JUDGE GRAFFEO: Yes, under the guidelines. 23 MR. GREY: Under the guidelines the injured 2.4 worker gets the treatment that the guidelines 25 prescribe.

1	JUDGE GRAFFEO: So you get ten treatments,
2	and then you decide whether you want to request a
3	variance?
4	MR. GREY: Correct.
5	JUDGE GRAFFEO: Correct?
6	MR. GREY: That's the guideline process.
7	JUDGE GRAFFEO: So doesn't that benefit the
8	vast majority of people? It eliminates having to go
9	in and get pre-approval.
10	MR. GREY: The the short answer to
11	your question, Your Honor, is no because with the
12	- with the increase in the pre-authorization
13	threshold from 500 dollars to a 1,000 dollars, that
14	sweeps in all of this treatment anyway. So when the
15	when the pre-authorization limit was 500
16	dollars, yes, there were people that had
17	JUDGE SMITH: But you're you're
18	MR. GREY: this sort
19	JUDGE SMITH: talking specifically
20	about this acupuncture?
21	MR. GREY: I'm talking about this
22	acupuncture or physical therapy or chiropractic.
23	JUDGE SMITH: But in in in
24	- in general, presumably, there's some benefit to
25	having a long list of procedures that the the

claimant doesn't have to go to the trouble of asking 1 2 pre-authorization for? 3 MR. GREY: Indisputably so, Your Honor. And we have no objection to the medical treatment 4 5 guidelines to the extent that they pre-authorize 6 treatment. You know, the - - - the legislature 7 clearly directed the board - - -CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Under that scheme - -8 9 10 MR. GREY: - - - to pre-authorize. 11 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Under that scheme, 12 though, doesn't it set up a situation where you're 13 saying the next step makes them out of step with the - - - with - - - out - - - out of compliance with the 14 15 statutory purpose? 16 MR. GREY: That's exactly so, Your Honor. 17 The - - - the portion of the guidelines to which we 18 object is not the portion of the guidelines that pre-19 approves - - -CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: That says you can get 20 21 ten treatments? 22 MR. GREY: - - - treatment. It's that once 23 the - - - the injured worker has gotten the pre-2.4 approved treatment, the guidelines now automatically 25 pre-deny the treatment - - -

1	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: What would be an
2	appropriate scheme after you get past the ten
3	treatments?
4	MR. GREY: After you get back after
5	you get past the treatment that's authorized by the
6	medical treatment guidelines, whatever that is
7	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yes.
8	MR. GREY: the appropriate scheme
9	would be to follow the existing statutory procedures.
10	JUDGE READ: Well, doesn't the existing
11	statutory procedure always make it an obligation to
12	show that the treatment's medically necessary? So I
13	I don't understand what you mean by pre-deny?
14	MR. GREY: The the the existing
15	statutory procedure, Your Honor, has a presumption in
16	favor of the request of the treating physician. And
17	it imposes an obligation
18	JUDGE READ: But what would what
19	would that be? That would be
20	MR. GREY: That's the Section 21(5)
21	presumption. And
22	JUDGE RIVERA: But isn't 21(5) just a
23	presumption that the facts, as set out in the medical
24	records, are assumed to be prima facie?
25	MR. GREY: But tho those

MR. GREY: But tho - - - those - - -

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JUDGE READ: You don't have to bring your
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 2
          doctor in - - -
 3
                    MR. GREY: Those - - - those facts would be
          the diagnosis - - -
 4
 5
                    JUDGE RIVERA: Um-hum.
                    MR. GREY: - - - the level of disability
 6
 7
          and the treatment request. That's the purpose of
          having - - -
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 9
                    JUDGE SMITH: Treating - - - is the
10
          treatment request a fact?
11
                    MR. GREY: - - - treating doctor's reports.
                    JUDGE RIVERA: That's not a fact.
12
13
                    MR. GREY: Pardon?
14
                    JUDGE RIVERA: Of what - - - okay, okay.
15
                    JUDGE SMITH: Is - - - is the treatment
16
          request a fact?
17
                    MR. GREY: That the treatment is being
18
          requested is a fact, yes, sir.
19
                    JUDGE SMITH: Yeah, okay - - - well, no, I
20
          have no doubt whatever that the treatment's being
21
          requested.
22
                    MR. GREY: Okay.
23
                    JUDGE SMITH: But - - - but - - - but - - -
2.4
          but the question isn't - - - isn't whether it's
25
          requested. It's whether it's reasonable and
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1 appropriate. Is that a fact that's - - - that - - -2 that - - - that - - - that's subject to the Section 3 21 presumption? 4 MR. GREY: Well, if - - - again, if you go 5 back to the 13-a(5), under 1,000 dollars there's no mechanism for the carrier to deny the treatment 6 7 before it's rendered. JUDGE SMITH: Okay, so Section 21 has 8 9 nothing to do with it? 10 MR. GREY: Well, we - - - we believe that Section 21 and - - - and the purpose of the law, 11 12 which this court has outlined in many, many 13 decisions, is to create a presumption in favor of the 14 injured worker and in favor of the injured worker's 15 doctor's report. 16 JUDGE SMITH: Judge - - - Judge Cardozo 17 says that it's bas - - - that the purpose of the 18 presumption is to - - - just to get rid of the stuff 19 that's not controverted and not put any burden on the 20 claimant to have to prove stuff that's not going to 21 be fought about anyway. Is - - - is - - - isn't that 22 right? 23 MR. GREY: Correct, and the statute, as it 2.4 exists, provides that the treatment requests gets

granted unless the carrier comes forward with a

1 contrary medical opinion. The issue with the 2 quidelines is that the board has substituted the 3 statutory requirement that the carrier produce a 4 contrary medical opinion with a relief for the 5 carrier from its obligation to do that and 6 arbitrarily deciding - - -7 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So after the ten 8 treatment - - - after the ten treatments, what should 9 happen? You come in. You say I request whatever. 10 And basically, unl - - - unless they come back and 11 say a good reason why it's - - - it's - - - it's - -12 - you shouldn't have it, you get it? The presumption 13 is with the claimant. 14 MR. GREY: The presumption and the - - -15 and the - - - and the text of Section 13-a(5), Your 16 Honor, both - - -17 JUDGE PIGOTT: But isn't it still with you? 18 In other words, you get - - - you - - - your doctor 19 knows you're getting up to the - - - to the ceiling -20 21 MR. GREY: Um-hum. 22 JUDGE PIGOTT: - - - and she writes in and 23 say, you know, the - - - I - - - I'm - - - it's an 2.4 ongoing treatment and she's - - - the claimant's

going to need another twenty-five treatments. I - -

1 - unless somebody's got a good reason to - - - to 2 deny that, it's not automatically denied, is it? 3 MR. GREY: No, Your Honor. What happens is if it's under 1,000 dollars - - -4 5 JUDGE PIGOTT: I'm - - - I'm over that. 6 I'm - - -MR. GREY: I - - - but if it's under 1,000,7 8 the injured worker gets it. If the carrier then has 9 an objection to the bill - - - to the bill when they 10 receive it, it goes to an arbitration panel which is 11 the way it's been forever. If it's over 1,000 12 dollars, the burden shifts to the carrier. 13 JUDGE PIGOTT: You say burden, but what I'm 14 suggesting to you is if the doctor even picked up the 15 phone and said, you know, he did lose a leg and it's 16 going to take more than this. And so I'm - - - it's 17 an ongoing treatment. No one's going to deny it. It 18 - - - I'm - - - I'm searching for the - - - I mean -19 20 MR. GREY: Your - - - Your - - - Your 21 Honor, having practiced in this area for twenty-seven 22 years, I have to respectfully disagree with you on 23 that point. 2.4 JUDGE READ: Well, are you arguing that the

pre - - - that there's a presumption that what the

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1
          treating doctor says is required is medically
 2
          necessary? Is that - - -
 3
                    MR. GREY: In the absence of a contrary
 4
          opinion - - -
 5
                    JUDGE READ: - - - what you're arguing?
                    MR. GREY: - - - from the carrier's doctor,
 6
 7
          yes.
                    CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So in the normal
 8
 9
          course in these kind of what happens practically?
10
          You - - - the doctor comes back and says - - - and
11
          you see this all the time with all kinds of covered
12
          treatments. You had ten sessions. Now I need
13
          another - - - another ten or the doctor says he needs
          anoth - - - he or she needs another ten to continue
14
15
          the progress that they've made. And then what
16
          happens in practical terms? At that point the
17
          carrier says wait, wait, let me look at that. And
18
          then comes back and either says fine, it's approved,
19
          or comes back with a contrary view of it, and then
20
          it's not approved?
21
                    MR. GREY: I - - - I can - - - the answer's
22
23
                    CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Counselor, what
2.4
          happens in practice?
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MR. GREY: I can answer that for you two

1 ways, in the pre-guideline condition - - -2 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Go ahead. MR. GREY: - - - and the post. 3 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: 4 Do it. 5 MR. GREY: In the pre-guideline condition, 6 if the treatment was under 500 dollars, or now 1,000, 7 the injured worker got all of the treatment, because 8 no pre-approval was necessary. If the carrier felt 9 that the treatment was unnecessary or that it was 10 overbilled, they would file objection to the bills. 11 And the bills - - - billing dispute between the 12 provider and the doctor would go to arbitration, the 13 injured worker having already received the treatment. 14 If the treatment request was for over 500 15 dollars, or now over 1,000, the treating doctor has 16 to submit a written request and the carrier has 17 thirty days to either authorize it or to produce a 18 contrary medical opinion denying it. If they deny 19 it, then there's litigation. If they approve it, 20 there's no problem. 21 JUDGE RIVERA: But let me ask you - - -22 MR. GREY: Under the guidelines regiment -23 2.4 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yeah? 25 MR. GREY: - - - once the injured worker

1 has gotten the treatment that the guidelines 2 prescribed, if the treating doctor sends in a 3 request, the carrier need do nothing, because the 4 guidelines have been established by the board as the 5 quote/unquote "standard of care." If the - - -6 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: You're saying that's 7 where the presumption has - - - has flipped or the 8 burden has flipped and that's the problem. 9 MR. GREY: And the regulation expressly 10 flips the presumption and says that the burden of 11 proof is on the provider. JUDGE SMITH: Now the - - -12 13 JUDGE GRAFFEO: Is that - - - is that why 14 it didn't happen here? Because I thought - - - maybe 15 I'm reading your client's doctor's submission or 16 deposition differently, but I thought she didn't find 17 necessarily functional improvement. It was more pain 18 management. 19 MR. GREY: That - - - that's an issue with 20 the guidelines, Your Honor. The - - - the guidelines 21 focus on functional improvement as opposed to 22 palliative care. The board issued - - -23 JUDGE GRAFFEO: That - - - that could last

forever. So is the system required to pay forever?

Is that a concept of workers' comp?

2.4

1 MR. GREY: Yes, Your Honor. 2 JUDGE SMITH: But - - -3 MR. GREY: The claimant - - - the injured 4 worker's right to medical care is not time limited 5 and continues - - -JUDGE SMITH: But let - - - let me - - -6 7 MR. GREY: - - - as long as causally 8 related treatment's required. 9 JUDGE SMITH: Let me ask if I could, you -10 - - you - - - you told us how it's supposed to work. 11 Let's take an extr - - - an extreme case. A rid - -12 - a ridiculous case but it's to make a point. A - -13 - I have a - - - I have - - - my doctor's a witch. And - - - and he or she thinks he can cure my 14 15 ailments by burning bats' toes in a cauldron and he's 16 going to charge me 5,000 dollars. And I ask for - -17 - for pre-approval. You're saying I - - - you're 18 saying that the carrier has to - - - has to either 19 fork out the 5,000 or get a contrary medical opinion 20 from a physician? 21 MR. GREY: That's what the law says, Your 22 The - - - the other point I would make to 23 you, though, is that these guidelines are not the 2.4 board's sole means of reigning in what it believes is

inappropriate treatment. A physician can only treat

1	an injured worker if that physician is coded by the
2	compensation board. The board has power over coding,
3	and the board has power over billing disputes. So
4	this regulatory scheme is taking a a
5	blunderbuss to a problem
6	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: You're probably not
7	going to have
8	MR. GREY: that requires a small
9	pistol.
10	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: the doctors
11	that Judge Smith is talking about be on the coded
12	list?
13	MR. GREY: Yes, the problem is that
14	JUDGE SMITH: But but it is it
15	is
16	MR. GREY: if you have a doctor like
17	that they shouldn't be coded, yes.
18	JUDGE GRAFFEO: If if the
19	JUDGE SMITH: But there are doctors who are
20	a little bit aggressive sometimes in what they're
21	willing to charge for. Has such things happened?
22	MR. GREY: Absolutely, Your Honor. And
23	that's why the carrier has recourse to to
24	disputing the bills and going to arbitration.
25	JUDGE RIVERA: And and if the carrier

1 - - - I'm sorry. 2 JUDGE GRAFFEO: So if the legislature 3 adopted this as opposed to this being a regulation quideline? 4 5 MR. GREY: The legislature, Your Honor, certainly could have amended 13-a(5) to direct the 6 7 board to pre-determine treatment requests. 8 legislature did not do that. The legislature 9 directed the board to pre - - - to issue a list of 10 pre-authorized procedures - - -11 JUDGE GRAFFEO: It's part of a - - -12 MR. GREY: - - - with which we agree. 13 JUDGE GRAFFEO: It's part of a reform 14 package to try to keep the costs down of workers' 15 compensation. 16 MR. GREY: Well, if - - - if you - - - if 17 you - - -18 JUDGE GRAFFEO: So I guess we'd be telling 19 them they have to be more specific. 20 MR. GREY: I - - - I believe, Your Honor, 21 their list of - - - of desired outcomes was to remove 22 impediments to diagnosis and treatment, to create a 23 list of pre-authorized procedures to reflect best 2.4 medical practices, to reduce litigation costs, and to

increase benefits, so to the extent that the

1 guidelines pre-authorize diagnostic tests and 2 fundamentally necessary surgeries and - - - and basic 3 courses of physical therapy, they achieve all of 4 that. 5 The problem is that the second you go 6 beyond the guidelines, you now have a stoppage of 7 treatment until the variance is approved - - -8 JUDGE PIGOTT: Not necessarily. 9 MR. GREY: - - - if it's approved. 10 JUDGE PIGOTT: Not necessarily, right? 11 - - I mean you - - -MR. GREY: Yes, Your Honor. 12 13 JUDGE PIGOTT: - - - you can anticipate 14 that you're getting to the end of whatever the 15 guideline is and you can go in and get an approval 16 before treatment stops. 17 MR. GREY: Only if the variance application 18 is granted. The problem - - -JUDGE PIGOTT: Of course, of course. 19 20 MR. GREY: - - - Your Honor, what the - - -21 what the regulations provide and what the board has 22 done is if the person reaches the end of their 23 therapy and the doctor puts in for a variance, and 2.4 while the variance is pending, the doctor does the

right thing and continues to treat the patient and

1 then the variance gets granted six weeks later, the 2 board will not approve payment to the doctor for the 3 six weeks of treatment that it agrees were necessary, 4 because it was performed without a variance. That's 5 the problem. JUDGE PIGOTT: Well, that's a different 6 7 fight. CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yeah. 8 9 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: What happens - - -10 what happens when - - -11 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Judge Abdus-Salaam. 12 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: - - - currently, 13 because the guidelines were changed recently, I think 14 last year, for this kind of treatment. Is your 15 client still getting ten additional - - - or was she 16 able to get ten additional treatments? 17 MR. GREY: The - - - the board 18 issued chronic care guidelines. It still has not 19 issued palliative care guidelines, which the board 2.0 views as a - - - as a distinct issue because you go 21 back to the guidelines' focus on function. So you've 22 got chronic-care guidelines that focus on function 23 but we still have no - - -JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: So in other words the 2.4

- - - the answer is no.

1	MR. GREY: pain relief guidelines.
2	JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: She's not getting
3	- she didn't get additional treatment?
4	MR. GREY: No, Your Honor. You have a lady
5	here who's a court reporter who works and tries to
6	work and she needs something to manage her pain so
7	she can show up to work for the board by whom she's
8	employed.
9	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, counselor.
LO	Thank you, counselor.
L1	MR. GREY: Thank you, Your Honor.
L2	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: You'll have your
L3	rebuttal.
L4	Counselor? What's wrong, counselor, with
L5	the scheme that your adversary lays out that he says
L6	is is consistent with the statute itself?
L7	MR. GROENWEGEN: Well, I think there's a
L8	couple things I'd like to make clear. One is
L9	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: I know, but what's -
20	what's wrong with it?
21	MR. GROENWEGEN: Well, I think I
22	think the fundamental error is I I don't think
23	the statute creates this burden, this this
24	presumption that medical care that the
25	the claimant is entitled to any medical care desired

1	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So he's wrong as to
2	who has the burden?
3	MR. GROENWEGEN: Correct, correct.
4	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Under the statute
5	_
6	MR. GROENWEGEN: Correct.
7	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: as it exists,
8	irregardless of the guidelines?
9	MR. GROENWEGEN: That's right. We don't
10	think that the workers' compensation law reflects a
11	general presumption that that all that -
12	
13	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Isn't the presumption
14	you get treated while you need treatment? Isn't that
15	the basic thrust of the statute? As long as you
16	require treatment you get compensation?
17	MR. GROENWEGEN: If it's medically
18	necessary. But there's always been this basic issue
19	that you're only entitled to care
20	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So it all comes down
21	to who has the burden?
22	MR. GROENWEGEN: Correct. Correct, but
23	what
24	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Because the
25	assumption is you get treatment if it's medically

1 necessary. Who shows that it's medically necessary? MR. GROENWEGEN: Yeah, I mean, it - - -2 3 clearly, no one denies it. 4 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Or unnecessary. 5 JUDGE PIGOTT: Is there a - - is there a 6 difference, though, I mean has something changed? Or 7 ar - - is your argument that this argument is 8 totally specious, that nothing changed under the new 9 reform act? 10 MR. GROENWEGEN: Nothing has changed, in 11 our view, with respect to the burden of proof, which 12 is really their - - - their - - - their main 13 objection here which is the only thing that's really 14 changed. The board has provided a very detailed set 15 of guidelines for what is considered medically 16 appropriate care. 17 JUDGE SMITH: But what - - - what was the 18 claimant's burden? You - - - you say it's always been the same. So what is it? What - - - what was 19 20 it and still - - - what is it that it was and still 21 is? MR. GROENWEGEN: Well, the - - - the - - -22 23 the claimant would have had the burden in any 2.4 situation where there was a dispute as to whether or

not the care was medically necessary to meet that

1	burden and to show that the care was
2	JUDGE SMITH: Well
3	MR. GROENWEGEN: medically necessary.
4	JUDGE SMITH: Well, I guess, you don't
5	- you don't get a dispute until the claimant asks for
6	something, right?
7	MR. GROENWEGEN: That's correct.
8	JUDGE SMITH: And and and he -
9	and and the claimant ha he or she has
10	to presumably has to have a doctor saying this
11	is appropriate? Or or, yeah, he he can't
12	just say gee, I'd like to go spend a few hundred
13	thousand on on whatever I feel like.
14	MR. GROENWEGEN: You know, that that
15	that that's correct. I mean, presumably,
16	the the the claimant would have a care
17	provider that would say I think you should have more
18	acupuncture.
19	JUDGE GRAFFEO: But what sounds different -
20	
21	JUDGE PIGOTT: Is there is there any
22	difference then between the two? I I get the
23	impression from you opponent that that let's
24	assume there's ten under the guidelines
25	MR. GROENWEGEN: Um-hum.

1 JUDGE PIGOTT: - - - and this person needs 2 twenty. 3 MR. GROENWEGEN: Um-hum. JUDGE PIGOTT: And he's saying if we don't 4 5 ask for it they're going to cut us off at ten. We're 6 done. And unless we get a letter in or something, we 7 either can treat for free, if the doctor's willing to 8 do it, because you're never going to pay them, 9 because there's no letter there on that date, or stop 10 treatment. Is that true? 11 MR. GROENWEGEN: That's right. I mean, 12 they can't - - - they - - - I mean - - -13 JUDGE PIGOTT: Was that true before? MR. GROENWEGEN: Well, the - - - the - - -14 15 the care provider - - - one - - - one thing I'd like 16 to make clear is - - -17 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Answer the judge's 18 question. 19 MR. GROENWEGEN: Okay, that - - - that may 20 have been true before because, well, the care 21 provider would have been at risk of not being paid if 22 they proceeded with treatment that - - - that was not 23 medically necessary. There was a possibility the 2.4 carrier or the employer would come back and say that 25 care was - - - went beyond what was medically

1 necessary in this case. 2 JUDGE GRAFFEO: But that was a risk. 3 was a risk assumed by the medical care provider. 4 MR. GROENWEGEN: Correct. 5 JUDGE GRAFFEO: I think what your adversary 6 is saying is the injured worker got the treatment 7 that they needed depending on whether the provider 8 was willing to take the risk of getting payment or 9 not getting payment or partial payment. Whereas it 10 sounds like in this - - - under these guidelines 11 there can be a break in treatment while the worker 12 awaits approval of the variance if and when that may 13 ever come. 14 MR. GROENWEGEN: That's right. If - - -15 that's correct. I mean if they're - - -16 JUDGE GRAFFEO: So that - - - I mean, 17 that's a substantial change. MR. GROENWEGEN: Well, it - - - it - - -18 19 JUDGE GRAFFEO: Should that be something 20 that the legislature approved as opposed to a 21 regulatory act? 22 MR. GROENWEGEN: Yeah, because the - - -23 the board has always had the authority to regulate 2.4 not only the system generally, but to reg - - - adju 25 - - - adjudicate disputes as to the - - - as to

1	whether or not care was medically necessary. So
2	_
3	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Is it a good thing
4	from a a policy perspective that there be that
5	kind of break when someone really needs the
6	treatment?
7	MR. GROENWEGEN: Well, I think it's a good
8	
9	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: And and as
10	Judge Graffeo said, if it's not a good thing,
11	wouldn't you think the legislature should be the one
12	that's going to say that?
13	MR. GROENWEGEN: Well, the the
14	I think it's important to remember that the
15	guidelines provide a a to the extent they
16	apply, provide a comprehensive summary of what's
17	considered und under current medical thinking
18	what is appropriate care for particular types of
19	injuries. So so by
20	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Inappropriate that
21	you might need another ten treatments?
22	MR. GROENWEGEN: Well, the the
23	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: I mean in the
24	broadest context?
25	MR. GROENWEGEN: In the broadest context?

1 Not necessarily but - - - but it's true that the - -2 - the - - - the - - - the - - - the - - -3 the employee or their - - - if they felt that this was an unusual situation to - - -4 5 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yeah, but I - - - but 6 I think what your adversary is saying is that to do 7 it the way you contend the new schematic works - - -8 MR. GROENWEGEN: Um-hum. 9 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: - - - is contrary to 10 the whole purposes of the statute. Why is that not a 11 reasonable approach to this? It would seem that - -12 - that all of a sudden you could need treatment, 13 which is the whole idea of the statute, and now you 14 can't get it under this new scheme. That was not - -15 - it's not the legislative scheme. The legislative 16 direction was you can - - - you can say a certain 17 number of treatments that are just done. But beyond 18 that the rest of this is not what they're - - - what 19 they've laid out, is it? Or is it? 20 MR. GROENWEGEN: Well, remember that - - -21 that - - - that for - - - for the - - - the 22 -- - the great majority of -- of cases, the ---23 the employee's going to have an - - - an 2.4 incontrovertible entitlement to the care that's in

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the - - -

1	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Isn't it a typ
2	MR. GROENWEGEN: guideline. So
3	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Isn't it a typical -
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5	MR. GROENWEGEN: this is the
6	the extreme
7	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Counselor, isn't it a
8	typical circumstance, let's say with acupuncture or
9	so many other things, that you'd have the the -
10	the ten treatments and you're going to need more?
11	This is not an unusual circumstance, or is it?
12	MR. GROENWEGEN: Well, it it it
13	it the point is that they they
14	- they they're not precluded from obtaining it.
15	They just have to show they have to go in and
16	say
17	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: I know, but you're
18	just going to have a real break in your treatment.
19	MR. GROENWEGEN: You could. It's
20	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Until until
21	- under again, under his theory, your
22	adversary's theory, that that the legislature
23	didn't say that. And now you're radically changing
24	the way it works. And if you're going to radically
25	change the way it works, maybe the the

legislature should do that and not do it by kind of 1 2 this flipping of the burden that really is not a 3 necessary consequence of these pre-approved ten, you 4 know, treatments. That - - - isn't that his 5 argument? MR. GROENWEGEN: I - - - I - - - I think 6 7 that is essentially, you know, his argument. And I -8 -- I -- I can only say that I think the break in 9 treatment probably would have occurred under the pre-10 existing scheme because a care provider would have 11 been reluctant to - - - to say, in many cases, I'm 12 not sure that - - - that the comp system will pay for 13 this treatment. 14 JUDGE PIGOTT: That's the - - - that's - -15 - that's the - - -16 JUDGE SMITH: Well, you - - - you need - -17 18 JUDGE PIGOTT: I was go - - - that's the -19 - - when you - - - you two are arguing about burden 20 shifting. You say there is no burden shifting. He 21 says there is. It really comes down to that day, 22 right, the - - - the day that the comp board says no 23 more treatment. And that's now regulatory. You're 2.4 saying no more treatments after X, right? They're

saying before when that day came, we continued to get

treatment unless and until the board had a hearing or 1 made a determination that it's no longer necessary. 2 3 And in - - - and before, that treatment continued and sometimes we'd win, sometimes we'd lose. But at 4 5 least the - - - the treatment continued. That's - -6 - that's, it seems to me, is the burden issue that 7 we're talking about, isn't it? 8 MR. GROENWEGEN: Yeah, I mean, I don't 9 think there - - - there - - - there - - -10 there was ever an assurance that - - -11 JUDGE SMITH: Well - - - well, does it 12 depend on whether it's more - - -13 MR. GROENWEGEN: - - - the - - - that treatment would continue. 14 15 JUDGE SMITH: - - - or less than 1,000 16 dollars? I mean in the old days it was more than 17 1,000 dollars and you wanted your eleventh 18 acupuncture treatment you had to get pre-approval. 19 MR. GROENWEGEN: Yeah, I mean, one - - -20 one thing I think - - -21 JUDGE SMITH: The carrier - - - and if the 22 carrier said no then you - - - then - - - then there 23 was a proceeding at which different conflicting - - -2.4 they had to get a conflicting medical opinion, but 25 the - - - but the - - - but there could be a gap at

1 that point, I would think, even in the old days 2 before the guidelines. 3 MR. GROENWEGEN: That's right. Right, first - - - for - - - for - - -4 5 JUDGE SMITH: But on the other hand, if it's less than 1,000 - - -6 7 MR. GROENWEGEN: Um-hum. 8 JUDGE SMITH: - - - what would happen is 9 the provider would make the decision am I going to 10 take my chances on giving the eleventh acupuncture treatment and see if I'm going to get paid or not? 11 12 MR. GROENWEGEN: Correct. 13 JUDGE SMITH: And now - - - and now the - -14 - rather than the provider taking - - - taking 15 chances, the provider does an application for a 16 variance and finds out beforehand. 17 MR. GROENWEGEN: Correct. 18 JUDGE SMITH: And does that signif - - does that make a - - - does that make for a more 19 20 drawn out process in which the treatment is more 21 likely to be interrupted than it used to be? MR. GROENWEGEN: Well, the - - - the - - -22 23 the regulations have an expedited procedure for 2.4 resolution of these things. And one of the 25 advantages of the - - - of - - - of the guidelines

1 and the regulations, adopting them, was intended to 2 be resolving a lot of these disputes in advance by 3 having, you know, carefully thought out guidelines by 4 - - - by experts as to what is and is not appropriate 5 as opposed to the - - - the prior system where an 6 administrative law judge at the board would be 7 resolving these disputes based on conflicting 8 opinions of - - - of physicians, which led to 9 potentially inconsistent or unpredictable results. 10 Now there's a - - -11 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, counselor. 12 MR. GROENWEGEN: - - - lot more clarity.

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Thanks, counselor.

MR. GROENWEGEN: But - - -

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CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Appreciate it.

MR. GROENWEGEN: Thank you.

MS. SINGER: Good afternoon. I'm Jill
Singer for the Special Funds. The board has always
determined the med - - - medical necessity of
treatment as a trier of fact. The burden of proof
has always been on the claimant to show that
treatment was medically necessary in the face of a
challenge. And now, with the medical treatment
guidelines that challenge has been pre-determined.
And the variance process places the - - -

1 JUDGE SMITH: He says you're not allowed to 2 pre-determine it under the statute unless you have an 3 - - - an opinion of a physician? 4 MS. SINGER: Care - - - care is always 5 needed to be medically necessarily, though, or - - -6 or else it's on a - - -JUDGE SMITH: Well, in the old days - - -7 8 MS. SINGER: - - - case-by-case basis. 9 JUDGE SMITH: - - - if you had a treatment 10 that was more than 1,000 bucks, you had to ask the 11 carrier is this okay. And the carrier was not 12 allowed to say no unless - - - well, assuming you 13 start out with a physician's opinion saying it was 14 all right, the carrier had to have a second opinion, 15 a conflicting opinion, from a physician. And that's 16 in the statute, right? 17 MS. SINGER: Right, and that - - - but 18 that's already been - - -19 JUDGE SMITH: What happened to that second 20 conflicting opinion? Does the carrier not have to 21 get it anymore? 22 MS. SINGER: The carrier can get it. 23 - - the car - - - or the carrier can challenge on the 2.4 basis that the - - - the treatment is not appropriate 25 and medically necessary.

1	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yeah, but the carrier
2	can deny it without having a second medical opinion,
3	that's the question.
4	MS. SINGER: If it they don't meet -
5	
6	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Under the new
7	under the new scheme.
8	MS. SINGER: the burden of proof, if
9	they don't meet the burden of proof. But it's just
10	been pre-determined. It's the same
11	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yeah, but
12	JUDGE SMITH: Is isn't that contrary
13	to the statute?
14	MS. SINGER: But
15	JUDGE SMITH: Doesn't the statute say he's
16	got to have a doctor's opinion before he denies it?
17	MS. SINGER: But that doctor's opinion
18	would be challenging what the guidelines have just
19	pre-determined. In other words, it's just shifted
20	the timing. It the burdens haven't changed.
21	JUDGE PIGOTT: Well, if that if there
22	was if there were five treatments the carrier
23	could say we're not paying anymore; we think five's
24	enough. And and you would be saying under the
25	new guidelines, no. Up until ten we're not going to

1	we're not going to let you controvert?
2	MS. SINGER: Right, it's pre-determined to
3	be, in this case, ten. In the old days the carrier
4	would have had to get a medical opinion but now they
5	don't have to because it's been pre-determined by the
6	guidelines. It just makes the system more efficient
7	because
8	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yeah, but the
9	guidelines
10	MS. SINGER: because it's been
11	predetermined.
12	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: in essence, say
13	if it's more than ten then you presumptively don't
14	get it.
15	MS. SINGER: Then you
16	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Isn't that what it
17	means or
18	MS. SINGER: need to show
19	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Or I think that's
20	what it means, yeah.
21	MS. SINGER: Right, I think they're saying
22	that's what they can con the guidelines
23	consider that to be medically necessary and if you
24	want more then you have to
25	JUDGE SMITH: I I understand the new

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system might be more efficient. But isn't the old -
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 2
          - - I mean that you can't - - - the guidelines can't
 3
          amend the statute. The statute says that you can't
 4
          deny pre-approval without a second conflicting
 5
          opinion from a physician. What happened to that
 6
          statute?
 7
                    MS. SINGER: The guidelines just determine
 8
          on - - - initially what is medically necessary
 9
          treatment.
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                    JUDGE PIGOTT: You had that group that - -
11
          - that studied - - -
                    MS. SINGER: And that was - - -
12
13
                    JUDGE PIGOTT: - - - it and - - - and put
14
          all these things in place and that is the pre-
15
          determined - - - that it's not medically necessary
16
          after ten in certain situations?
17
                    MS. SINGER: They're - - - basically
18
          there's - - - they're - - - they're laying out what
19
          is and isn't medically necessary - - -
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                    CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So the question is -
21
22
                    MS. SINGER: - - - treatment.
23
                    CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: - - - can you do that
2.4
          or is that contrary to the statute?
25
                    MS. SINGER: You can - - -
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1	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Can you say that,
2	presumptively, since we've studied it, here's the
3	ten. This is what you get. Anything more than that,
4	presumptively, you don't need it and we don't have to
5	put any medical evidence to to say that you
6	don't need it?
7	MS. SINGER: That's that's part of
8	the board's
9	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: The answer to that is
10	yes, right? That's what
11	MS. SINGER: The it's under the
12	board's
13	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: the new
14	schematic does, right?
15	MS. SINGER: Because the board's always
16	been the trier of fact as to what is and isn't
17	medically necessary treatment. They're just doing it
18	ahead of time to make
19	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So in answer to Judge
20	Pigott's question
21	MS. SINGER: it efficient more.
22	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: once you do the
23	ten, you've studied it, right? That's it. You have
24	a right, in your view your position is you have
25	a right to say anything else is no good, and I don't

1 have to give you any kind of medical contrary 2 evidence. You - - - you can't get it presumptively? 3 MS. SINGER: Right, because it's already 4 been pre - - -5 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Right. MS. SINGER: - - - determined. 6 7 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Right, that's - - -8 okay, thanks. 9 Counselor, rebuttal? 10 MR. GREY: Your - - - Your Honor, what that 11 argument boils down to, which I think Judge Smith put 12 his finger on, is the respondent's contention is, 13 essentially, that the board believes the guidelines 14 are a good thing. That is, as Judge Smith pointed 15 out, not the office of the board. The question for 16 the court is whether the guidelines are lawful. 17 Otherwise, we run into - - -18 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yes. 19 MR. GREY: - - - U.S. v. Two Hundred 20 Barrels of Whiskey. With regard to your question, 21 Your Honor, about whether submitting variances is an 22 unusual circumstance - - -23 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yes. 2.4 MR. GREY: - - - since their inception, the 25 record at the Appellate Division will show the board

1 has been getting 20,000 variance applications per 2 So you're dealing with a quarter million 3 applications a year from doctors who do not believe 4 that the guidelines are adequate to treat their 5 patients. JUDGE PIGOTT: The alternative then would 6 7 be what? MR. GREY: The alternative would be the 8 9 system would be to uphold the guidelines, to the 10 extent - - -11 JUDGE PIGOTT: Well, the alternative would 12 be that you'd have 20,000 physicians treating without 13 authorization from the WCB, waiting for the WCB to 14 pay them because of oversights or whatever and - - -15 and/or someone to challenge them as opposed to 16 drawing a line in the sand and - - - as I think 17 they're trying to do, save money and get things 18 moving on the low - - - on the low end, right? MR. GREY: Well, I - - - there - - - there 19 20 are a few problems with that, Judge Pigott. One is 21 that it's not the board's job to draw - - - to draw 22 the line in the sand. 23 JUDGE PIGOTT: No, but if you look - - -2.4 MR. GREY: It's the carrier's job. 25

JUDGE PIGOTT: - - - at it another way, I

think of ALJs who don't believe in acupuncture at all.

MR. GREY: Um-hum.

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JUDGE PIGOTT: They think that's a joke.

They think that's an excuse. They - - - and they will not grant it. So now you're stuck with an ALJ somewhere who says I'm not - - I'm not authorizing this at all, and you're out. Now that's not going to happen anymore because there's a guideline that says it is a - - it is a good procedure and you've got to give it. So there are benefits to this that, on the whole, considering the number - - I - - you say 20,000 variances, I don't know how many cases there are a month in the workers' compensation board, but there's more than 20,000. And - - and somebody's got to - - to decide these things, right? You got to - -

MR. GREY: Right, and that implicates the due process issue, which is that if one individual worker runs into one individual ALJ who doesn't believe in a form of treatment or doesn't believe in a particular doctor, the ALJ - - - the - - - the worker gets to have their day in court on their treatment - - -

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So what's - - -

MR. GREY: - - - for the courts to make a 1 2 determination. 3 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: How is it going to work now under your interpretation of this - - - the 4 5 - - - the guidelines and the presumption that it makes after the guid - - - guidelines as being 6 7 contrary to the statute, how is it going to work now 8 9 MR. GREY: It - - - it would - - -10 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: - - - in those 20,000 11 cases? 12 MR. GREY: It would work the way the 13 legislature directed. The board can use its existing medical treatment guidelines as a list of pre-14 15 authorized procedures. And for any treatment in 16 excess of the guidelines, up to 1,000 dollars, 17 there's no pre-authorization. The carrier can always 18 object to the bill. Not the board, the carrier. 19 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Right. 20 MR. GREY: Over 1,000 dollars, if there's a 21 request, the carrier can deny the request based on 22 what the statute says to cover any medical payments. 23 JUDGE PIGOTT: Before you go - - -2.4 JUDGE GRAFFEO: So we don't have to

invalidate the entire guidelines if we agree with

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1 you? 2 MR. GREY: Yes, Your Honor, only the pre-3 denial portion of it. 4 JUDGE PIGOTT: Before you go on that, 5 though, because you say you - - - you - - - you spend a lot of time in workers' compensation boards, how 6 7 long does some of these hearings last when you've got 8 a - - - you know, an initial appearance and/or a 9 continuation? Sometimes ten seconds, sometimes 10 thirty? 11 MR. GREY: If counsel is well prepared, we can handle a hearing in about two minutes, Your 12 13 Honor. JUDGE PIGOTT: Right, and - - - and - - -14 15 and that's the way comp generally works? 16 MR. GREY: Yes, Your Honor. 17 JUDGE PIGOTT: So it's only - - - it's only 18 when you - - - when you run into a - - - a situation 19 that there's any type of a real hearing like you've 20 had here? 21 MR. GREY: Right, and then what happens in 22 this case is, from the day the variance request was 23 submitted until the day - - - day of the judge's 2.4 decision, was three months in which the lady got no

treatment. And then you had an appeal which took

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eight months, which is fast for the board -- they're 1 2 now running about a year -- during which she got no 3 treatment. 4 JUDGE SMITH: When - - - what would have 5 happened in the old days if it's more than 1,000 dollars? You - - - you - - - you would have 6 7 submitted your request to the carrier and the - - the carrier what - - - had a - - - had a - - -8 9 MR. GREY: Thirty days. JUDGE SMITH: - - - a limited - - - had 10 11 thirty days to get back. And if he got back with a 12 medical opinion you might wait forever? 13 MR. GREY: If they did nothing, then at the 14 end of the thirty days it was authorized as a matter 15 If they got an IME who said it was - - - it 16 was adeq - - - fine, then it was approved. If they 17 had a doctor who said it wasn't necessary then we 18 litigated. JUDGE SMITH: Okay, so - - - so you - - -19 20 MR. GREY: But then - - -21 JUDGE SMITH: So the - - -22 MR. GREY: But we litigate now. 23 JUDGE SMITH: So the occasion - - - the 2.4 occasion for litigation used to be the carrier saying 25 no with an IME to support them. Now the occasion is

1	it's a if it's outside the guidelines?
2	MR. GREY: That's exactly correct, Your
3	Honor.
4	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay.
5	MR. GREY: Thank you.
6	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Thanks, counselor.
7	Thank you all. Appreciate it.
8	(Court is adjourned)
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CERTIFICATION

I, Sara Winkeljohn, certify that the foregoing transcript of proceedings in the Court of Appeals of Matter of Kigin v. New York State Workers' Compensation Board, No. 181 was prepared using the required transcription equipment and is a true and

Considerich and

Signature: _____

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