1	COURT OF APPEALS
2	
3	STATE OF NEW YORK
4	MATTER OF
5	NEW YORK CITY ASBESTOS LITIGATION,
6	MARY ANDRUCKI,
7	Appellant,
8	-against-
9	No. 185 ALUMINUM COMPANY OF AMERICA, ET AL.,
10	Respondents.
11	20 Eagle Street
12	Albany, New York 12207 October 15, 2014
13	Before:
14	CHIEF JUDGE JONATHAN LIPPMAN ASSOCIATE JUDGE VICTORIA A. GRAFFEO
15	ASSOCIATE JUDGE SUSAN PHILLIPS READ ASSOCIATE JUDGE ROBERT S. SMITH
16	ASSOCIATE JUDGE EUGENE F. PIGOTT, JR. ASSOCIATE JUDGE JENNY RIVERA
17	ASSOCIATE JUDGE SHEILA ABDUS-SALAAM
18	Appearances: ALANI GOLANSKI, ESQ.
19	WEITZ & LUXENBERG, P.C. Attorneys for Appellant
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21	CHRISTIAN H. GANNON, ESQ.
22	SEGAL MCCAMBRIDGE SINGER & MAHONEY, LTD. Attorneys for Respondent, Port Authority
23	of New York and New Jersey 850 Third Avenue
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25	Sara Winkeljohn

1 Official Court Transcriber CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: 185, Matter of New 2 York City Asbestos Litigation. 3 Counsel, wait one second until the 4 courtroom clears. 5 MR. GOLANSKI: Yes, Your Honor. 6 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, counsel. 7 You're on. 8 Thank you, Your Honor. MR. GOLANSKI: 9 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: You want any rebuttal 10 time? 11 MR. GOLANSKI: One minute, please, Your 12 Honor. 13 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: One minute, go ahead. 14 MR. GOLANSKI: Thank you. The first point 15 I would make is that we can separate - - - separate 16 out the survival and personal injury part of the 17 judgment from the wrongful death part of the 18 judgment. I think the wrongful death part is the - -19 - is the trickier part, and we definitely win for a 20 number of reasons on that. On the personal injury 21 survival part, it's clear that subject matter 22 jurisdiction does not end with the death of the 23 plaintiff. If - - - if you - - - under EPTL 11-3.2, 2.4 no cause of action is lost and the person whom - - -

1	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: What was there
2	was there a pending action here at the time of the
3	death?
4	MR. GOLANSKI: At the time of the death,
5	there was no pending action yet. There was a notice
6	of claim that was that strictly complied with
7	7108. It was a
8	JUDGE GRAFFEO: It was timely?
9	MR. GOLANSKI: It was timely, and it was a
10	perfect notice of claim. Subsequently, the the
11	plaintiff died. And the a valid complaint was
12	then filed pursuant to 7107, no problem there. The
13	first complaint that was filed was a nullity and
14	_
15	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Wait a minute, but
16	does the was the was the notice of claim
17	good enough for the after the death, for the
18	wrongful death?
19	MR. GOLANSKI: That's exactly the issue
20	here.
21	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yeah.
22	JUDGE SMITH: Could you I'm sorry,
23	could you take me a little more slowly through the
24	point where you began? You distinguished between the
25	survivorship claim and the death claim?

1	MR. GANNON: Yes, I'm distinguishing that
2	for for basically analytic reasons. I think
3	there's no issue whatsoever that the that when
4	we get to the survivor and the personal injury claim
5	that that certainly continues. This court's
6	decision in Winbush in 1954, in the education law
7	cases
8	JUDGE SMITH: Okay, I I I
9	I got the I get the idea.
10	MR. GOLANSKI: No, you don't
11	JUDGE SMITH: You you got through the
12	second time.
13	MR. GOLANSKI: Right, the the
14	the identical
15	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So what are you
16	doing? You're enlarging the complaint? Is that
17	- is that what happened here?
18	MR. GOLANSKI: Well, for the personal
19	injury side the identical claimant does not in
20	in the in the action that's actually
21	filed does not have to file the notice of claim.
22	That's Winbush and Baker (ph.). You can have a next
23	of kin. So the so the the personal
24	injury survival component should be reinstated.
25	That's the first point. Now

1	JUDGE GRAFFEO: What what about our
2	precedent in Heslin that indicates these are two
3	separate causes of action, different parties,
4	different damages?
5	MR. GOLANSKI: Well, in Heslin it's very -
6	
7	JUDGE GRAFFEO: Because we're looking at -
8	we're looking at personal injury versus wrongful
9	death.
10	MR. GOLANSKI: Yes, okay.
11	JUDGE GRAFFEO: Correct?
12	MR. GOLANSKI: Let's let's look at
13	that issue. That's the trickier issue. On that
14	issue, in Heslin, there was a very particularized
15	claim involved or or issue involved. And
16	that's whether an infancy toll, which applied in
17	wrongful
18	JUDGE GRAFFEO: Right, we know. I
19	I'm wondering why the same rationale would not apply
20	in this type of situation?
21	MR. GOLANSKI: Because the underlying
22	consideration here, the reason for having the notice
23	of claim, as the defendant admits in their brief at
24	page 4, and as numerous cases say, is is to

give the Port Authority the opportunity to

1 investigate the claim and possibly to settle. Now here there - - - the - - -2 3 JUDGE GRAFFEO: So your posture is they were adequately notified, they knew about the 4 5 accident? MR. GOLANSKI: That's not just - - -6 7 JUDGE GRAFFEO: Not accident, I mean they 8 knew about his workplace contracting the disease? 9 MR. GOLANSKI: Yes, that's not just my 10 That's - - - that's what this court said in posture. 11 Caffaro v. Trayna, that personal injury claim gives 12 notice of the exact same transaction and occurrence 13 as the wrongful death claim for purposes of the - - of the statute of limitations. 14 15 JUDGE SMITH: Why - - - why is - - - isn't 16 - - - your position is that Holmes is directly on 17 point, isn't it, that this is Holmes? 18 MR. GOLANSKI: Holmes is - - - yes, is 19 directly on point. It was prior to any substantial 20 compliance provisions in the municipal law or 21 anything like that. The statute was for all 22 structural and in - - - intents and purposes exactly what it is here. And this court in Holmes affirmed 23 2.4 two decisions - - -

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: But there was a valid

1 pending complaint in that case, right? 2 MR. GOLANSKI: There was valid com - - -3 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Holmes. 4 MR. GOLANSKI: There was a valid pending 5 complaint in the case that had been - - - that had been litigated. But that is really a small - - - a 6 small difference. Here you can - - - you can file a 7 8 - - - a complaint and - - - a summons and complaint 9 for wrongful death and personal injury adding a new -10 - - adding a new party. It's done all the time. 11 There's no reason that there has to be a prior 12 personal injury existing complaint for the - - -13 JUDGE READ: Now I - - - I see the 14 Appellate Division - - - the Appellate Division noted 15 that when they decided this case, that there was a 16 limited exception to the notice provision that you 17 still could have moved for leave to serve a new 18 notice and commence a new suit. Is that right? 19 MR. GOLANSKI: I - - - I think that's a 20 very tricky issue. It's definitely not right with 21 respect to the personal injury side of things. 22 year - - -23 JUDGE READ: I take it you didn't do that? MR. GOLANSKI: We didn't do that. More 2.4 25 than three years had passed. But under - - -

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1
                    JUDGE READ: Not at the time the Appellate
          Division decision came down?
 2
 3
                    MR. GOLANSKI: Yes, more than three years
 4
          had passed - - -
 5
                    JUDGE READ: Three years - - - three years
 6
 7
                    JUDGE SMITH: That's not what they said.
 8
                    MR. GOLANSKI: - - - on the personal injury
 9
          - - - on the personal injury - - -
10
                    JUDGE READ: On the personal injury?
11
                    MR. GOLANSKI: - - - side of things. For -
12
13
                    JUDGE SMITH: But you - - - but you didn't
          do it on either - - -
14
15
                    JUDGE READ: They didn't - - - yeah.
16
                    JUDGE SMITH: - - - either cause of action?
17
                    MR. GOLANSKI: No, we didn't do it on
18
          wrongful death.
19
                    JUDGE SMITH: Why - - - why not? They
20
          invited you to.
21
                    MR. GOLANSKI: Well, we thought that that
22
          would invite a lot of wasteful litigation, because
23
          there's a state - - - under the CPLR, once your
2.4
          personal injury claim is extinguished, you don't have
25
          a wrongful - - - a right to a wrongful death cause of
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1	action. And that's exactly what the what the
2	defendant would have would have raised at the
3	time. We felt that the Appellate Division's decision
4	was legally wrong and we had a right to appeal and
5	seek appeal to this court and this court granted
6	that.
7	JUDGE RIVERA: But coun can I just
8	clarify on the
9	JUDGE READ: Can you
10	MR. GOLANSKI: Can I clarify on the
11	wrongful excuse me, on the wrongful death.
12	This is her independent claim?
13	MR. GOLANSKI: No, the wrong well,
14	the wrongful death is not her independent claim.
15	That's that's wrapped into the personal injury
16	survival claim. That's
17	JUDGE RIVERA: As the administrator
18	MR. GOLANSKI: Yeah, she is.
19	JUDGE RIVERA: of the estate? She
20	steps into his shoes. I understand that.
21	MR. GOLANSKI: She in the wrongful
22	death she has been appointed the executrix. And
23	- and that and that's the wrongful death side.
24	JUDGE RIVERA: So it's I'm sorry. So
25	it's the it's the estate's wrongful death

1	MR. GOLANSKI: Yes.
2	JUDGE RIVERA: claim? Not her
3	independent wrongful death claim.
4	MR. GOLANSKI: Well, it's not her
5	independent.
6	JUDGE RIVERA: Just to clarify. I'm
7	MR. GOLANSKI: It's the it's the
8	distributees of the of of the estate.
9	JUDGE SMITH: The the
10	the
11	JUDGE RIVERA: I see. I see.
12	JUDGE SMITH: fiduciary that he
13	JUDGE RIVERA: Okay.
14	JUDGE SMITH: on behalf of the
15	distributees
16	JUDGE RIVERA: Okay.
17	JUDGE SMITH: is the way it sounds.
18	Is that right?
19	MR. GOLANSKI: Yes, exactly.
20	JUDGE RIVERA: Okay.
21	MR. GOLANSKI: That's the wrongful death.
22	JUDGE GRAFFEO: Do we have to adopt a
23	substantial compliance rule in order to agree with
24	your position?
25	MR. GOLANSKI: We absolutely do not have to

do that. If - - - if the court does that, certainly, the defendant admits on that - - - on that ground, we would certainly win. But there is no reason at all to even reach the issue of substantial compliance.

And I know substantial compliance was in the briefs.

It's not necessary. There was a strict compliance here with - - - with the statute.

Let me - - - if I can make one point about 7108, about the words of the statute, the - - - the statute itself contemplates that a notice of claim may have preceded the death of the - - - of the claimant and - - -

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Where - - - where does it contemplate that?

MR. GOLANSKI: In 7108 it says, "If there's a death, the - - - that prevents either the filing of the notice of claim or of - - - of the suit, the plaintiff can apply for leave to sue and serve the notice of claim up to three years," and then - - - and then it specially charts out, "if the notice of claim has not yet been served." By saying, "If the notice of claim has not yet been served," it - - it particularly contemplates that a notice of claim may have been served before the death.

JUDGE SMITH: And - - - and - - - and - - -

2.4

JUDGE GRAFFEO: What about earlier that 1 says leave - - - to seek leave of court? 2 3 MR. GOLANSKI: Yes, to seek - - - to seek leave of court to file per - - - for permission to 4 5 file a notice of claim if one has not been filed previously or to file the lawsuit, if one has not 6 7 been filed, within the one-year period. 8 JUDGE SMITH: So you're saying implicit in 9 that is that one could have been filed previously and 10 would not lose all its forth - - - force at death? 11 MR. GOLANSKI: Absolutely. That's the only 12 possible interpretation of the - - - of the word if 13 in - - - in 7108. I have one other point that's - -- that - - -14 15 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Make it quick, 16 counselor. 17 MR. GOLANSKI: Yeah. 18 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Your light's on. 19 MR. GOLANSKI: Very important point which 20 is that the interpretation of wrongful death versus 21 personal injury here is a federal issue. That's what 22 this court decided in American Sugar in 1982. 23 what the Supreme Court decided in Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Commission in 1959. And therefore, 2.4

we have to look at wrongful death versus pers - - -

1	personal injury as it's seen in the federal
2	federal common law, not necessarily in in the
3	New York New York common law, which, as I said,
4	New York common law totally supports our position.
5	But the federal common law does even
6	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, counselor.
7	MR. GOLANSKI: even tenfold. Thank
8	you.
9	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Let's hear from your
10	adversary and then we'll get you some
11	MR. GOLANSKI: Thank you, Your Honor.
12	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: rebuttal.
13	MR. GANNON: Good afternoon, Your Honor.
14	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Counselor.
15	MR. GANNON: Chris Gannon on behalf of the
16	Port Authority of New York and New Jersey. Your
17	Honor, the statute is very clear. The fact that the
18	Port Authority gave up their immunity in order to be
19	subject to suit, there were conditions precedent that
20	were set
21	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Do we have to allow
22	substantial compliance, in your view, to
23	MR. GANNON: You do not have to have
24	no, they got it wrong. It's simple as that. When
25	they filed their initial notice

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JUDGE SMITH: Would you say that any - - -
 1
          any typo in the notice would be fatal?
 2
 3
                    MR. GANNON: Yes, Your Honor. They got the
          claim wrong. They got the - - - the name of the
 4
 5
          party wrong.
                    JUDGE SMITH: No, I'm talking
 6
 7
          hypothetically. Supp - - - yeah, suppose they got -
 8
          - - yeah, suppose somebody typed - - - typed the year
 9
          wrong or typed the month wrong. You can't - - - you
10
          can - - - that's it?
                    MR. GANNON: Yes, Your Honor.
11
12
                    JUDGE SMITH: You can't go forward with
13
          that?
14
                    MR. GANNON: Yes, it has to be strictly
15
          compliant under - - -
                    JUDGE SMITH: Mis - - - mis - - -
16
17
          misspelling the - - -
                    CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Strict compliance and
18
19
          they didn't do it.
20
                    MR. GANNON: And they didn't do it.
21
                    JUDGE SMITH: If they misspelled the name
22
          of the - - - misspelled the name of the Port
23
          Authority?
2.4
                    MR. GANNON: Your Honor, I - - - I think in
25
          those situat - - -
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1	JUDGE SMITH: Hit hit a Q instead of
2	an O in Port Port Authority.
3	MR. GANNON: I think in those situations,
4	Your Honor, the Port Authority would have to look at
5	the actual language of the notice of claim. And
6	obviously, an error like that I I think
7	obviously would pass. But we're talking about a
8	totally new claim, totally new party. The first pers
9	
10	JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Counsel, why doesn't
11	that work in New Jersey where they have substantial
12	compliance?
13	MR. GANNON: Your Honor, I I think
14	the
15	JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: The same?
16	MR. GANNON: I think the
17	JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: The Port Authority is
18	in New Jersey
19	MR. GANNON: Yes, they are. And I think
20	the
21	JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: and they would
22	also
23	MR. GANNON: I think the case law in New
24	Jersey was incorrectly decided. Because by
25	introducing substantial compliance what you're doing

1 is essentially saying the Port Authority has received 2 as much information as they need to know to 3 investigate the claim. And by saying that you're 4 raising a prejudice argument that the Port Authority, 5 therefore, is not prejudiced by the language, and 6 that's wrong. 7 JUDGE SMITH: Well, what's - - - what's 8 wrong with the New Jersey court's reasoning? They 9 say that the substantial compliance is a just 10 doctrine that's generally - - - generally followed. 11 There's no evidence that the legislature intended to exclude it. 12 13 MR. GANNON: Your Honor, I think in New 14 York the legislature could have included it. They'd 15 included it in 50-e, they included substantial 16 compliance. 17 JUDGE SMITH: Okay, doesn't - - - doesn't 50-e - - - doesn't 50-e really go beyond substantial 18 19 compliance? Doesn't - - - doesn't 50-e say even if

you haven't got substantial compliance, if there's no prejudice you can overlook the error?

MR. GANNON: Yeah, it's - - - if there's a mistake you can make a motion to fi - - - to correct it or to file a notice of claim out of time.

JUDGE SMITH: Or the - - -

20

21

22

23

2.4

1 MR. GANNON: And it also says - - -2 JUDGE SMITH: Or the error can be ignored? 3 MR. GANNON: Or - - yes, but it also - -4 - also introduces into 50-e the - - - the concept of 5 prejudice, that you have - - - that you have to show 6 the party receiving the notice of claim was not 7 prejudice. We don't have that in this situation. The notice - - -8 9 JUDGE GRAFFEO: Well, why is it that if we 10 have two identical plaintiffs, one in New Jersey and 11 one in New York, the one in New Jersey can have a 12 lawsuit that goes forward; the one in New York ends 13 up with a dismissal? Does that - - - I mean there's a certain inherent unfairness there. 14 15 MR. GANNON: Your Honor, I think in the - -16 - I think the situation that's currently facing the 17 Port Authority in New York and New Jersey, on the New 18 Jersey side, requires a legislative reform is what -19 20 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: What's - - - what's 21 What's fair in this? Why isn't the New Jersey fair? 22 view of this fair? I mean this is a very, very 23 serious injury that results in death. Why isn't it 2.4 fair the position that - - - that they take?

MR. GANNON: Your Honor, when you read the

1 case law - - -2 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Putting aside whether 3 you're right or wrong - - -4 MR. GANNON: I agree. 5 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: - - - if you read 6 strict compliance, what's - - - what's the policy 7 argument as to why we should do what you want us to 8 do? 9 The policy argument, Your MR. GANNON: 10 Honor, is that prior to 1951, the Port Authority's 11 immune from suit. And in order to now be subject to 12 suit, there were conditions precedent that were set 13 up. That - - -JUDGE SMITH: But aren't - - - but aren't 14 15 you assuming your conclusion that they - - - that - -16 - that when they set up those conditions they 17 intended that every tiny failure, no matter how harmless, would - - - would - - - would - - - would 18 19 nullify their consent? 20 MR. GANNON: Your Honor, we have cases in 21 New York where a plaintiff has filed a complaint 22 fifty-four days after filing a notice of claim and 23 not sixty. 2.4 JUDGE SMITH: Well - - - well, aren't - - -

MR. GANNON: The case was dismissed.

_	JUDGE SMITH: the time periods
2	different? The time I mean I I
3	yeah, sure, when they say sixty days they may mean
4	sixty days. But when they say give notice of the
5	claim, couldn't they be reas reasonably read to
6	mean give such notice as will make the reader
7	understand what the claim is?
8	MR. GANNON: Your Honor, there there
9	are cases that have been dismissed where the notice
LO	of claim was filed and not verified. There have beer
L1	cases where, in recreation of
L2	JUDGE GRAFFEO: But certainly here you knew
L3	you knew the nature of this illness.
L4	MR. GANNON: Well, no
L5	JUDGE GRAFFEO: This
L6	MR. GANNON: Your Honor. What we
L7	knew was that there was a personal injury complaint.
L8	That that's what we knew.
L9	JUDGE SMITH: Were were you surprised
20	that the man died and you got a wrongful death claim?
21	MR. GANNON: Your Honor, I it
22	it doesn't matter. Amendments are required all the
23	time under New York law.
24	JUDGE PIGOTT: No, you're missing the
25	T think there's there's several questions here

saying does this make any sense? Is this fair? And you - - - and you say well, we were immune before and now we're not immune so it must be fair. And that - - - that doesn't really answer the question. The - - - you - - - you're not prejudiced. You knew this - - - you knew the case was pending. The guy dies and now you want your - - and - - - and now you want to say we win on a technicality.

2.4

MR. GANNON: Well, it's not a technicality,
Your Honor, because what you're - - -

JUDGE PIGOTT: It certainly is. And you - you even say it's a technicality.

MR. GANNON: What you're asking, though, is to say that now let's introduce prejudice into this scenario. And because the Port Authority - - -

what I'm saying is that - - - that Judge Smith was asking you if they put in a Q instead an O and you're - - - and you're fencing. You think maybe that's not good enough. And - - - and your point being we win on almost any technical possibility. And what we're asking you is does that make sense. And when you have a death and you know everything about the death, to say, well, you know, because there was a Q instead of an O, we win.

1 MR. GANNON: Your Honor, where would it end then? If - - - if we - - -2 3 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Counsel, what he means is in - - - and the context is you're on 4 5 notice. That's - - - that's the context for all of 6 this. So when these - - - you're - - - we're asking 7 you these questions, we're trying to figure out, 8 you're on notice; why - - - why does it make any 9 sense to be - - - whether you are going hyper-10 technical, when you're going to call it strict 11 compliance, why does that make sense when you know 12 about this injury? There's nothing new here. 13 MR. GANNON: But, Your Honor, because the 14 statute re - - - is set up to require this. And it's 15 not a matter of what the Port Authority could have 16 known. There are cases where the Port Authority's 17 actually - - -18 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Not what you could 19 have known. MR. GOLANSKI: - - - negotiating - - -2.0 21 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: It's what you know. 22 MR. GANNON: No, there are cases where the 23 Port Authority's actually negotiating with the 2.4 claimant during the sixty-day period. And they file

the suit and the case is dismissed.

1 JUDGE PIGOTT: You're - - - you're - - -2 you're saying we have - - - we have screwed people 3 for the last thirty years - - -4 MR. GANNON: No, Your Honor. 5 JUDGE PIGOTT: - - - and now you're telling 6 us we can't. I mean you keep bringing up examples of 7 how people have tried to get it adjusted - - - things 8 adjusted and guess what, they didn't file a notice of 9 claim while we're negotiating. They lose. 10 MR. GANNON: But, Your Honor, from the time 11 Mr. Andrucki died in November 2011, Weitz & Luxenberg 12 had one year to comply with the statute. 13 JUDGE PIGOTT: Here's the point, as Judge 14 Graffeo said, if this guy died in New Jersey, he 15 wins. He dies in New York, he loses, right? 16 MR. GANNON: Right. 17 JUDGE PIGOTT: Okay. 18 MR. GANNON: Right, so that - - - I think 19 that's a legislative - - - and I think the problem 20 was any change in the statute should not be done 21 judicially. It should be done by the legislature, 22 and I think the problem in New Jersey is that they 23 did that. They introduced that into the statute when 2.4 it didn't exist before.

JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Counsel, what's your

1 response to the Holmes case where there was a - - - a 2 survivorship claim even though a new notice of claim 3 was not filed after the death? MR. GANNON: Your Honor, in this case there 4 5 is no preceding complaint. There's no preceding 6 action. When they filed their notice of claim 7 October 4th and then - - -8 JUDGE SMITH: Why - - - why does that make 9 a difference? 10 MR. GANNON: Because - - - because under -11 - - under EPTL there has to be a pending action in 12 order to get the enlargement of time for the wrongful 13 death and the survivor action. 14 JUDGE SMITH: So you're - - - so if - - -15 if this case were exac - - - you - - - you say the 16 Holmes would apply if we had exactly the same facts? 17 MR. GANNON: It does not apply and should 18 not apply. And we - - - we're not dealing with that in this situation because we don't have a prior 19 20 pending complaint in this case. We have nothing up 21 until they file a complaint in January of 2011. JUDGE SMITH: So - - - so if - - - if they 22 23 did - - - you - - - you would concede that if they 2.4 did have a prior pending complaint for - - - and a

valid complaint for personal injury, the - - - the

1	plaintiff died and they began a new action for a
2	wrong or added or added a cause of
3	action, either one, for wrongful death, they could
4	rely on the previous notice?
5	MR. GANNON: No, Your Honor. I think what
6	they would rely upon at that
7	JUDGE SMITH: That is Holmes, isn't it?
8	MR. GANNON: They would rely on the EPTL
9	which gives them the enlarg enlargement of time
10	but there's a prior pending complaint.
11	JUDGE SMITH: Well, but it doesn't
12	Holmes say they can rely on the previous notice?
13	MR. GANNON: Yeah, under and it's
14	- it turns out it's a municipal law case.
15	JUDGE SMITH: And also, would that apply if
16	in this case if the facts were identical? In
17	other words, does it make a difference that Holmes
18	wasn't under wasn't under 7107?
19	MR. GANNON: Yes, Your Honor. I think
20	because
21	JUDGE SMITH: It does?
22	MR. GANNON: Yes, because it's a separate
23	statute. We're dealing with not general
24	municipal law, we're dealing with 7107. And
25	and this all could have been taken care of. The

1	- the First Department invited them to file a motion.
2	JUDGE RIVERA: Do counsel, do you
3	agree that the real issue is over the wrongful death?
4	MR. GANNON: I think the real issue
5	JUDGE RIVERA: On the personal injury
6	they've satisfied the requirements? He's even
7	he's not even arguing substantial compliance.
8	MR. GANNON: No, Your Honor. I I
9	think they got it wrong on both. I think the fact
10	that they filed their complaint one day after they
11	filed their notice of claim means that that action
12	was never commenced properly, did not exist. It's
13	not an amended complaint against the Port Authority
14	when they
15	JUDGE RIVERA: But then they filed the
16	- the next complaint after the sixty days.
17	MR. GANNON: Right, and it doesn't
18	JUDGE RIVERA: Why why doesn't that -
19	the why doesn't then the personal injury
20	survive? What's what's your issue with that?
21	MR. GANNON: Because the notice of claim -
22	all they had to do was file a new notice of claim
23	when they learned that
24	JUDGE RIVERA: But why would they have to
25	do that

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1
                    JUDGE SMITH: Why - - - why - - -
 2
                    JUDGE RIVERA: - - - is what I'm saying.
 3
                    MR. GANNON: To identify the - - - the
 4
          proper party, to identify the new nature of the claim
 5
          under 7108-2.
                    JUDGE SMITH: Why - - - why - - -
 6
                    JUDGE RIVERA: Is it because the - - - the
 7
8
          - - - the gentleman died they've got to - - -
9
                    MR. GANNON: Yes.
10
                    JUDGE RIVERA: - - - refile?
11
                    MR. GANNON: Yes.
12
                    JUDGE RIVERA: Um-hum.
13
                    JUDGE SMITH: Is that - - - is that - - -
14
          that - - - that generally the case that when a - - -
15
          when you - - - you've got a personal injury - - - if
          you have a - - - a valid personal injury claim
16
17
          pending with the proper notice of claim and the - - -
          the - - - the plaintiff dies and for some - - - let's
18
19
          for some - - - let's say for some reason you don't or
20
          you don't want or you decide not to bring a death
21
                 You want to just stick with your survivorship
          claim.
22
          claim. You still have to file a new notice of claim?
23
                    MR. GANNON: No, Your Honor. You'd - - -
2.4
          you'd have that - - - oh, I see. No, you would not.
25
                    JUDGE SMITH: Well, why isn't - - - why
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doesn't that - - - I don't understand why then his -1 2 - - his notice of claim isn't perfectly good here for 3 the survivorship claim? 4 MR. GANNON: I see your point, Your Honor. 5 I - - - I - - - I - - - I'll retract. You do need -6 - - what you need to do is you need to notify the Port - - - the Port Authority of the new party in the 7 8 action, who the new estate is. And that - - - that 9 could easily have been done by - - - by Weitz & 10 Luxenberg in this case. 11 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, counsel. 12 MR. GANNON: Thank you, Your Honor. 13 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Thanks. Rebuttal? 14 MR. GOLANSKI: Thank you, Your Honor. 15 Counsel says that for the purposes of the wrongful 16 death claim we got the name of the party wrong. As I 17 said earlier, Winbush - - - this court's decisions in 18 Winbush and Baker say that that's not relevant or important. The next of kin can file a notice of 19 20 claim and it can carry over. In Baker an architect 21 can file the notice of claim. And even though the -22 - - the suit is brought by the architect's firm, 23 there's no failure to strictly comply based on the 2.4 name of the - - - of the party being here George and

Mary Andrucki instead of Mary Andrucki as executrix.

1 It simply is not an important distinction. Counsel -2 3 JUDGE GRAFFEO: It may not be important in this case, but what about a case where someone 4 5 doesn't have a spouse or a next of kin and it's going to be someone that the Port Authority has no contact 6 7 or knowledge of is becoming the administrator of the 8 estate? Should you seek leave of court in that 9 instance? 10 MR. GOLANSKI: The - - - the question is 11 always whether the notice of claim sufficiently 12 allows the Port Authority to investigate the claim 13 and to settle the claim prior to the parties - - -14 JUDGE GRAFFEO: So is that a yes or no in 15 the example I gave you? 16 MR. GOLANSKI: It - - - it would - - - it 17 would depend on whether the four prongs of the - - of 7108 were satisfied. And I can't answer that in 18 the abstract without knowing. 19 20 JUDGE GRAFFEO: They don't - - - they - - -21 they have no idea who this administrator is. It's 22 not any person - - - it's not any named individual 23 that's on the existing notice of claim or the 2.4 complaint.

25 MR. GOLANSKI: If they have no idea to the

1 point that they cannot investigate the claim and they cannot negotiate a settlement and settle it, then - -2 3 - then the plaintiff would have to refile. JUDGE SMITH: Well, I understand the 4 5 question that Judge Graffeo's asking is you get - - -6 you get a notice with the name of a live person. 7 Then the person dies and someone you've never heard 8 of becomes administrator. Do you have to serve a new 9 notice to warn them they're going to be sued by the 10 administrator? 11 MR. GOLANSKI: No, because the underlying 12 transaction and occurrence has been adequately 13 conveyed, assuming that all the other portions of the statute are - - - are fulfilled. 14 JUDGE GRAFFEO: Well, how do they know who 15 16 to send anything to? MR. GOLANSKI: Well, they - - - the - - -17 18 the plaintiff would have to - - - would have to take 19 care of that and notify the - - - the Port Authority 20 one way or the other - - -21 JUDGE PIGOTT: Well - - -22 JUDGE RIVERA: Well, they got to let them 23 know and they're going to file the - - - the claim, 2.4 right? They're going to file a complaint or they're 25 otherwise going to let them know.

1	MR. GOLANSKI: Yes.
2	JUDGE RIVERA: Without necessarily
3	not in the format of a notice of claim.
4	MR. GOLANSKI: Yeah, exactly.
5	JUDGE RIVERA: I take it as your argument
6	that they don't need to do it again as a notice of
7	claim.
8	MR. GOLANSKI: No, exactly. It's just a
9	common sense, I think, response response to
10	that. And
11	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, counsel.
12	MR. GOLANSKI: Thank you very much.
13	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Thank you. Thank you
14	both. Appreciate it.
15	(Court is adjourned)
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CERTIFICATION

3

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