1	COURT OF APPEALS
2	STATE OF NEW YORK
3	
4	MATTER OF KILDUFF,
5	Respondent,
6	-against-
7	No. 192 ROCHESTER CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT,
8	Appellant.
9	
10	20 Eagle Street
11	Albany, New York 12207 October 16, 2014
12	Before:
13	CHIEF JUDGE JONATHAN LIPPMAN ASSOCIATE JUDGE VICTORIA A. GRAFFEO
14	ASSOCIATE JUDGE VICTORIA A. GRAFFEO ASSOCIATE JUDGE SUSAN PHILLIPS READ ASSOCIATE JUDGE ROBERT S. SMITH
15	ASSOCIATE JUDGE EUGENE F. PIGOTT, JR.
16	ASSOCIATE JUDGE JENNY RIVERA ASSOCIATE JUDGE SHEILA ABDUS-SALAAM
17	Appearances:
18	CARA M. BRIGGS, ESQ.
19	GENERAL COUNSEL, ROCHESTER CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT Attorneys for Appellant
20	131 West Broad Street, 2nd Floor Rochester, NY 14614
21	ANTHONY J. BROCK, ESQ.
22	NYSUT OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL Attorneys for Respondent
23	800 Troy-Schenectady Road Latham, NY 12110
24	
25	Karen Schiffmiller Official Court Transcriber
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1 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: 192, Matter of 2 Kilduff v. Rochester City School District. 3 Counselor, you're on. You can have water 4 before you go on. 5 Do you want any rebuttal time, counsel? 6 MS. BRIGGS: Yes, please, two minutes. 7 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Two minutes, sure, go 8 ahead. 9 MS. BRIGGS: Okay, thank you very much. 10 Good afternoon, Cara Briggs on behalf of the 11 Rochester City School District, the appellant in this 12 matter. 13 In reviewing the arguments of both sides, 14 and looking at the language of 3020(1), it's either -15 16 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: What's the pur - - -17 what's the purpose of the - - - of the statute? What - - - forget - - -18 19 MS. BRIGGS: There's - - -CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: - - - what it says. 20 21 MS. BRIGGS: Yes. 22 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: What were they trying 23 to say? 2.4 MS. BRIGGS: Here's what we're trying to 25 say. It's - - - it's changing the abilities of

school districts and unions' abilities to bargain for 1 2 disciplinary proceedings. And I know I'm not 3 summarizing it very well, but it is an attempt to reform what was the existing law at that time. 4 What 5 the focus of this statute is, is not in the 6 collective bargaining agreement, it is on the 7 disciplinary proceedings. 8 So as you read the language - - -9 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Counsel, isn't - - -10 isn't the language - - -11 MS. BRIGGS: Yes, ma'am? JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Isn't the statute 12 13 designed to give teachers a choice - - -MS. BRIGGS: It - - -14 15 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: - - - about how they 16 want to be - - - how they want to go through the 17 disciplinary process that - - -18 MS. BRIGGS: Yes. 19 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: - - - they either want 20 to have a hearing or they can deal with the 21 collective bargaining agreement. Isn't that 22 basically what it's about? MS. BRIGGS: It is. It - - - it also 23 24 includes, and again, this is part of why I'm going 25 back to not only the language in the statute, but the

1 legislative history. 2 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yeah, but if the 3 Judge is right that the purpose is - - -MS. BRIGGS: Yes. 4 5 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: - - - to give a choice, how does that impact on the case in front of 6 7 us. MS. BRIGGS: It - - - that is one of the 8 9 purposes. One of the other purposes is to allow 10 districts and unions to collectively bargain for 11 alternative procedures. JUDGE SMITH: Maybe - - - maybe I - - -12 13 what about a narrower question. What's the purpose of the grandfather clause? 14 15 MS. BRIGGS: The purpose of the grandfather 16 clause is to allow districts and unions who have 17 already collectively bargained for alternative disciplinary procedures, who have found those 18 19 procedures to be useful and agreeable to both of 20 them, to continue to use them, until such time as 21 they rebargain for something different. 22 JUDGE SMITH: And not - - - not just until 23 such time as the contract expires. 2.4 MS. BRIGGS: Correct. 25 JUDGE SMITH: And that's - - - that's what

1	the case is about. You say it's
2	MS. BRIGGS: Correct.
3	JUDGE SMITH: for as long as they
4	choose to keep the procedures. He says it's only
5	until the contract runs out.
6	MS. BRIGGS: Exactly.
7	JUDGE SMITH: So why and he says
8	- he says if you read the sentence grammatically, the
9	in the statute, it says that it's the
10	it's the contract that has to be renegotiated, not
11	the not the disciplinary procedures. So why
12	isn't he right about that?
13	MS. BRIGGS: He's not right, because if
14	you're focusing essentially, what he's focusing
15	on is subject-verb agreement. If you're making the
16	subject and verb of "was effective on or before
17	September 1st, 1994 and has been unaltered", if you
18	make that agree with the nouns there, then that makes
19	the following phrase superfluous. If you're looking
20	at $3020(1)$
21	JUDGE SMITH: The following phrase, which
22	you mean, which has not been reno
23	MS. BRIGGS: "And has been unaltered by
24	renegotiation"
25	JUDGE SMITH: Okay.

MS. BRIGGS: "or in accordance" et
cetera. So
JUDGE SMITH: So why why can't that
mean that the existing contract has not been altered
by renegotiation?
MS. BRIGGS: If the legislature wanted it
to mean what the union says it means, the sentence
would have ended after "was effective on or before
September 1st, 1994".
JUDGE SMITH: You're saying that on his
reading, the words "which has been altered by
renegotiation" add nothing to the sentence?
MS. BRIGGS: Correct. And we all know that
meaning and effect needs to be given to any verbiage,
any language that the legislature includes, so they
included that for a reason. We need to assume they
included that for a reason.
JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: What do you think the
reason is for the date, September 1st, 1994?
MS. BRIGGS: That's when the statute, as I
recall, goes into effect. So if if they
intended if the legislature intended for any
renegotiation of a contract, of any aspect of a
contract a pay increase, or just changing the
dates to alter the disciplinary practices in

the contract, it could be - - -

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JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: But could it also mean that because the statute was going into effect September 1st, 1994, then maybe the school district had just negotiated a contract that went into effect August 30th, 1994. And so, they - - - that contract would already exist; the statute goes into effect September 1st.

9 And don't you think that perhaps they were 10 trying to give that school district that already had 11 a contract in effect, maybe an out to try to 12 renegotiate so that they could come into compliance 13 with the law to give teachers a choice? So they 14 wouldn't be stuck for - - - with a three-year 15 contract with no choice? Is that a possibility?

MS. BRIGGS: I don't believe they would have used this language to create that possibility. I think it could have been done more simply.

 19
 JUDGE SMITH: Well, if - - - if the

 20
 language weren't there - -

MS. BRIGGS: Yes.

JUDGE SMITH: - - - would anything stop - -I mean, if they renegotiate to take out the disciplinary procedures, then - - then the statute, yeah - - then the grandfather clause would not

apply on its face, would it? 1 2 MS. BRIGGS: I'm sorry; I didn't understand 3 the question. JUDGE SMITH: I mean, you've got - - -4 5 you've got a contract which says in it, we have alternate disciplinary procedures that don't involve 6 7 a hearing. That's the kind of contract that was good before 1994, and is not any good after 1994, to 8 9 simplify it, right? 10 MS. BRIGGS: Yes. 11 JUDGE SMITH: Okay. Now, dur - - - before 12 the contract expires, the union and management want 13 to make a deal to take that out. They take it out. You don't need a - - - yeah. Why - - - the words of 14 15 the statute which has not been renegotiated don't govern anything, it seems to me, because if - - - if 16 17 it's taken out, it's taken out. They're not going to 18 - - - no one's going to say you can enforce language 19 that has been taken out. 20 MS. BRIGGS: I am so sorry. I'm still not 21 following. 22 JUDGE SMITH: Okay, okay Sorry. JUDGE READ: Well, let the - - -23 2.4 JUDGE SMITH: Let me rephrase the question. 25 MS. BRIGGS: Okay.

1 JUDGE SMITH: The statute on its face 2 applies to disciplinary procedures contained in a 3 collective bargaining agreement, right? MS. BRIGGS: Yes. 4 5 JUDGE SMITH: I think what Judge Abdus-6 Salaam was asking you was suppose - - - shouldn't the 7 - - - the labor and management be able to negotiate to take something out of their contract? 8 9 MS. BRIGGS: Yes. 10 JUDGE SMITH: But if they've taken it out, 11 it's no longer contained in, and so you've already defeated the grandfather clause. You don't need the 12 13 language that says, "which has not been altered by renegotiation". You with me? You should be with me 14 15 MS. BRIGGS: I - - - I - - -16 17 JUDGE SMITH: - - - the question is 18 favorable to you. MS. BRIGGS: Thank you, yes. I got it. 19 So 20 21 JUDGE READ: Can - - - can you tell me what 22 do you point to in the legislative history that 23 supports your position? 24 MS. BRIGGS: If - - - if you look at the -25

1	JUDGE READ: Because frankly, I found the
2	legislative history not helpful either way.
3	MS. BRIGGS: It it wasn't terribly on
4	point, because frankly, the I don't think the
5	legislature envisioned that this particular conundrum
6	would occur, but if you were to look at the memo for
7	the Governor's Office of Employee Relations. That
8	particular memo contains a sentence that says,
9	"Collective bargaining agreements containing
10	disciplinary procedures which are effective after
11	September 1st, 1994, the employee must be able to
12	elect", et cetera.
13	So that verbiage, the way that sentence is
14	structured
15	JUDGE READ: It's a negative it's a
16	negative implication?
17	MS. BRIGGS: It it talks about
18	collective bargaining agreements containing
19	disciplinary proceedings which are effective. So the
20	the disciplinary proceedings are effective
21	after September 1st, 1994.
22	JUDGE GRAFFEO: So why is your
23	interpretation of these provisions the better
24	resolution?
25	MS. BRIGGS: Unions and districts have

bargained - - - you know, in this particular case, 1 2 we've bargained for our procedure which been - - -3 has been in effect for quite some time, which has been used for quite some time. And I don't believe 4 5 that the legislature intended to abridge the ability of districts and unions to continue using something 6 7 which has been working fairly well until such time as 8 we are both free to negotiate with one another to - -9 - at the next negotiation of the contract to change 10 those proceedings. 11 JUDGE READ: Of course, they would never -12 13 MS. BRIGGS: It's something which has been bargained for. 14 15 JUDGE READ: They would never want to 16 negotiate. I mean, they've - - - they've already got 17 fallback that's pretty good, right, in 3020, so their 18 incentive would never be to negotiate a provision 19 that's less favorable, certainly. 20 MS. BRIGGS: Well, when - - - when we're at 21 the table, when we negotiate, we obtain one benefit 22 by giving up another. 23 JUDGE READ: Yeah. MS. BRIGGS: So this is something which was 24 25

JUDGE READ: Could be traded off? 1 MS. BRIGGS: Yeah. So this is something 2 3 which was negotiated for and - - -4 JUDGE RIVERA: You're saying it's all up 5 for grabs, is that what you're saying? MS. BRIGGS: As part of the negotiation - -6 7 8 JUDGE RIVERA: Potentially? 9 MS. BRIGGS: - - - process. 10 JUDGE RIVERA: Yes. 11 MS. BRIGGS: But if - - - if it changes 12 going forward, we all know what our constraints are 13 with respect to the manner in which - - -14 JUDGE RIVERA: Then you know what the law 15 says, yeah. 16 MS. BRIGGS: Yes. 17 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, counsel. MS. BRIGGS: Thank you very much. 18 19 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: You'll - - - you'll have rebuttal. Let's - - -20 21 MS. BRIGGS: Thank you. 22 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: - - - hear from your 23 adversary. 2.4 MR. BROCK: Good afternoon, if it would 25 please the court, Anthony Brock on behalf of

respondent, Roseann Kilduff.

2 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Counsel, the same 3 question that Judge Graffeo asked your adversary: why is your interpretation of this language better, 4 5 fairer, make more sense? Why? MR. BROCK: It's consistent with the clear 6 7 language of the statute, it's consistent with the legislative intent in drafting this statute, and it's 8 9 consistent with the intent of the parties in the 10 collective bargaining agreement that they ended up 11 with. CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: 12 What was the 13 legislative intent and what was the intent of the 14 parties? 15 MR. BROCK: The legislative intent was to speed up the Education Law section 3020-a process, as 16 17 it existed prior to 1994. And the legislature put in certain things to speed up the process. 18 That 19 included going from a three-person panel to a single 20 hearing officer, which eliminated the need to 21 coordinate three arbitrator calendars with everybody 22 else's calendars. 23 It also put in, for the first time, a 2.4 requirement that there be a pre-hearing conference 25 within fifteen days of the charges being filed. Ιt

also included that the final hearing date take place 1 2 within sixty days of that pre-hearing conference. Ιt 3 also included - - -4 JUDGE SMITH: How - - - how does any of 5 this affect - - - how does any of this enlighten us 6 about the meaning of the grandfather clause? MR. BROCK: The grandfather clause is 7 8 inconsistent with that, because, as you see here, if 9 - - - if you take the district's interpretation that 10 this process was grandfathered from pre-1994 all the 11 way until 2014, you ignore the - - - the effort of 12 the legislature in 1994, and yet again in 2008 - - -13 JUDGE SMITH: But what you're saying, if I 14 - - - if I understand you - - -15 MR. BROCK: - - - 2010, and 2012. 16 JUDGE SMITH: - - - you're saying that the 17 wider scope you give the grandfather clause, the less effective the reforms are. 18 19 MR. BROCK: Correct. 20 JUDGE SMITH: Fair point. What about her 21 argument that - - - that the - - - the phrase on your 22 reading - - - the phrase "which has not been" - - -23 "which has not been altered by renegotiation" - - -24 or "has been unaltered by renegotiation" loses all -25 - - loses all its meaning, might as well be left out

1 of the statute? MR. BROCK: Well, I think if you read 2 3 3020(1) in its entirety, that it refers to the 4 collective bargaining agreement being unaltered, but 5 you also have to read the two words "provided however", that are right in the middle of that. And 6 7 the "provided however" takes everything that - - -8 that comes before it, and modifies it, and requires 9 two things. One, that you give your tenured educator 10 a choice between the two processes, and two, and - -11 - and going back to the time frames - - -12 JUDGE SMITH: Let me make sure - - - just 13 be sure I'm following you. 14 MR. BROCK: - - - that any alternate 15 procedure comply with the new requirements - - - time 16 requirements. 17 JUDGE SMITH: Just to be sure I'm following what you're saying. The "provided however" precedes 18 the clause that says from now - - - for anything you 19 20 negotiate from now on, has to give the employee a 21 choice of a hearing. 22 MR. BROCK: That's right. 23 JUDGE SMITH: Okay. What - - - I still 2.4 don't quite see how that gives - - - gives meaning on 25 your reading to the words, "which have" - - - in the

1	previous grandfather clause, "and has been unaltered
2	by renegotiation". Do you see what I mean?
3	MR. BROCK: There's unaltered by renego
4	-
5	JUDGE SMITH: Do you take a
6	take a pen take a pencil and cross out "and has
7	been unaltered by renegotiation" from the words
8	the clause we're talking about. On your reading of
9	the clause, have I changed the meaning by crossing
10	that out?
11	MR. BROCK: I don't think so. I think you
12	need to read it all in its entirety. And the
13	legislature specifically chose certain words in
14	drafting this. The singular verbs, which could only
15	refer to a collective bargaining agreement and not to
16	the plural, "alternate procedures", and they chose to
17	insert that language "unaltered by renegotiation"
18	after the term "collective bargaining agreement", not
19	after the term, "alternate disciplinary procedures".
20	JUDGE SMITH: Okay, I see I see your
21	grammatical point. It's a it's a strong point.
22	But I'm still not seeing why they put those words in
23	at all on your view.
24	MR. BROCK: On my view? Because it gives
25	the parties that are going to use this process

1	practical information on how to implement it.
2	And let's assume we're you're a
3	district superintendent on September 1st, 1994, and
4	you've got a collective bargaining agreement that is
5	in place until, let's say, August 30th, 1995. You
6	know what to do on August or on September 1st,
7	1994, if you want to bring disciplinary charges. You
8	can use that alternate procedure that is in place.
9	What by using that language, the
10	legislature made it clear to the users of the process
11	that on September 1st, 1994, they didn't know how
12	- now have to go out and renegotiate their collective
13	bargaining agreements if they wanted to keep the
14	alternate procedures that were there at that time.
15	But when they did go back to renegotiate,
16	the parties knew that they had to do two things to be
17	consistent with the statute
18	JUDGE SMITH: What do you mean
19	MR. BROCK: give the choice
20	JUDGE SMITH: what do you mean by
21	renegotiate? You mean to negotiate for a new
22	agreement, or negotiate to change the old one?
23	MR. BROCK: I think it's the same thing.
24	When that contract expires, you renegotiate
25	JUDGE SMITH: Isn't she wait, that's

1 her argument, if it's the same thing. You're say - -2 - you're say - - - you're - - - are you conceding 3 that to negotiate a new contract that's going to 4 succeed the old one is a renegotiation within the 5 meaning of this statute? 6 MR. BROCK: To renegotiate the - - -7 JUDGE SMITH: In other words, if - - -8 yeah. Contract ends in 1995. Management and labor 9 sit down, and say, let's make this quick; we're going 10 to give - - - we're going to have a contract 11 absolutely identical with the old one, just change 12 the date. Does the grandfather clause apply to that 13 new contract on your view? 14 MR. BROCK: No. 15 JUDGE SMITH: Okay, why not? MR. BROCK: Because it - - -16 17 JUDGE SMITH: Because they - - - they - - was - - - isn't it a clause that was not altered by 18 19 renegotiation? 20 MR. BROCK: Once you extend the contract, 21 you've renegotiated every provision. 22 JUDGE SMITH: Okay. 23 MR. BROCK: You've given new life - - -24 JUDGE SMITH: That's what - - - that's what 25 I thought your position was. Okay.

1	JUDGE GRAFFEO: You mean, once the previous
2	contract expires?
3	MR. BROCK: Yes. Even if you just extend
4	the dates, you've renegotiated and agreed to
5	everything within that contract. And I think
6	JUDGE SMITH: I'm still having a hard time
7	seeing what meaning the clause has.
8	MR. BROCK: The "unaltered by
9	renegotiation" clause?
10	JUDGE SMITH: Yeah, yeah.
11	MR. BROCK: I think when you read all of
12	the language taken together, it refers to two
13	situations. Perhaps a collective bargaining
14	agreement that expired on June 30th, 1994 and had not
15	been fully renegotiated, and then it also applies to
16	those collective bargaining agreements that were
17	going to end sometimes after September 1st, 1994,
18	such as June 30th, 1995.
19	And that, reading everything together, I
20	believe is with why the Appellate Division
21	found that Ms. Kilduff had the right to choose. It's
22	
23	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, counselor.
24	Anything else, counsel?
25	MR. BROCK: No, that's it. Thank you, Your

1	Honor.
2	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Thanks.
3	Counselor, rebuttal?
4	MS. BRIGGS: Thank you. I know you're all
5	enjoying reading the statute over and over, so I'm
6	going to direct your attention to the fact that it
7	says, "disciplinary procedures contained in"
8	almost parenthetical "contained in a collective
9	bargaining agreement". So we know where those
10	disciplinary procedures are.
11	So throughout this statute, the the
12	focus the real topic is disciplinary
13	procedures, not so much the collective bargaining
14	agreement, just the fact that this is where we find
15	them, and when that collective bargaining agreement
16	is in effect, on or after September 1st, 1994, or is
17	renegotiated on or after September 1st, 1994, those
18	disciplinary procedures
19	JUDGE SMITH: Okay, okay. But if but
20	if you have the right meaning, shouldn't they have
21	written disciplinary procedures contained which
22	are which are contained in a collective
23	bargaining agreement and which have not been altered
24	by renegotiation? In other words, doesn't he have a
25	point that "has" doesn't mean "have"?

1	MS. BRIGGS: Yes, we're talking about the -
2	the subject-verb agreement?
3	JUDGE SMITH: Yeah.
4	MS. BRIGGS: So it's either there's subject
5	for disagreement or there's superfluous language.
6	Which is it? So
7	JUDGE RIVERA: But, but I'm sorry.
8	MS. BRIGGS: Yes, go ahead.
9	JUDGE RIVERA: Alternate disciplinary
10	procedures, aren't they I mean, I thought you
11	guys were arguing that they're always in a collective
12	bargaining agreement. They're not independent of the
13	collective bargaining agreement. Is that or am
14	I misunderstanding that part of your arguments?
15	MS. BRIGGS: I'm I'm pointing out
16	that I believe
17	JUDGE RIVERA: No, no, I'm asking you.
18	MS. BRIGGS: No, if they're they're
19	in the collective bargaining agreements
20	JUDGE RIVERA: Right, so why why
21	would I talk about the that referred that
22	covers the conditions of employment that was
23	effective on such-and-such a date. I'm talking about
24	the document that is the vessel for these alternate -
25	alternative disciplinary procedures. The
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procedures are not freestanding.

2 MS. BRIGGS: Exactly. But I'm seeing it 3 the other way. That - - - that the focus is that 4 these are the disciplinary procedures, and this is 5 where you find them in the collective bargaining agreement. This is the vessel which carries them. 6 JUDGE SMITH: The whole - - -7 JUDGE GRAFFEO: What are - - - what are the 8 9 negative ramifications of the Appellate Division's 10 decision? What is it that troubles your district so 11 much with the Appellate Division's resolution? 12 MS. BRIGGS: We - - - we have a process 13 that we have been using for years, both sides, as you can tell from the record. The - - - the 3020-a 14 15 process is actually a longer process than a grievance and arbitration process, because it requires the 16 17 board of education to proffer charges. It requires the district to enlist New York State's Education 18 19 Department in assigning a hearing officer, and 20 there's much more to it. 21 JUDGE GRAFFEO: It's a more cumbersome 22 process - - -23 MS. BRIGGS: It is. 2.4 JUDGE GRAFFEO: - - - is that what the 25 problem is?

1	MS. BRIGGS: It is. And and it is a
2	process which has been serving both sides well for
3	years. And it is a process which both sides
4	bargained for. There was something which was given
5	up in order to reach this agreement. It's been
6	working for us for years.
7	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, counsel.
8	Thanks.
9	MS. BRIGGS: Thank you.
10	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Thank you both.
11	(Court is adjourned)
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2	CERTIFICATION
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4	I, Karen Schiffmiller, certify that the
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6	Appeals of Matter of Kilduff v. Rochester City School
7	District, No. 192, was prepared using the required
8	transcription equipment and is a true and accurate
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