1	COURT OF APPEALS
2	STATE OF NEW YORK
3	
4	SIERRA,
5	Appellant,
6	-against-
7	No. 216 4401 SUNSET PARK, LLC, et al.,
8	Respondents.
9	
10	20 Eagle Street Albany, New York 12207
11	October 22, 2014
12	Before:
13	CHIEF JUDGE JONATHAN LIPPMAN ASSOCIATE JUDGE VICTORIA A. GRAFFEO
14	ASSOCIATE JUDGE SUSAN PHILLIPS READ ASSOCIATE JUDGE ROBERT S. SMITH
15	ASSOCIATE JUDGE EUGENE F. PIGOTT, JR. ASSOCIATE JUDGE JENNY RIVERA ASSOCIATE JUDGE SHEILA ABDUS-SALAAM
16	Appearances:
17	
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24	
25	Karen Schiffmiller Official Court Transcriber

1	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: 216, Sierra v. 4401
2	Sunset Park.
3	Counselor, do you want any rebuttal time?
4	MR. LERNER: Two minutes, Your Honor.
5	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Two minutes, sure.
6	Go ahead. You're on.
7	MR. LERNER: May it please the court, my
8	name is Matthew Lerner and I represent Scottsdale
9	Insurance Company. It is our position that
10	Scottsdale Insurance Company met and complied with
11	Insurance Law 3420(d). Notice to GNY was noticed to
12	4401 and to Sierra Realty.
13	JUDGE PIGOTT: Aren't aren't we, you
14	know, almost not not quite the opposite of what
15	we just went through, but this whole business about
16	who you who you who are you going to call
17	and who do you write to is at the bottom of this too
18	right? I mean, they're saying you you may have
19	told our carrier; you didn't tell us.
20	MR. LERNER: That's exactly it. The
21	the argument of my opposing counsel is you notified
22	GNY, the primary insurer of
23	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yeah, but don't you
24	have to notify real parties-in-interest? Is that
25	_

MR. LERNER: Well, there's an agency 1 2 relationship between - - -3 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: I understand. 4 MR. LERNER: - - - GNY and the 5 policyholders. So in this case, if you notify the agent, you're essentially - - - not essentially - - -6 7 you are notifying 4401 and Sierra Realty. So in this 8 case we complied with Insurance Law 3420. 9 And the important part of this is that this 10 court has stated, time and time again, that the whole 11 purpose of Insurance Law 3420(d) is to stop dilatory 12 practices by insurance companies, and to inform the 13 claimant or the injured party or the insured that there's been a disclaimer of coverage. That's not 14 15 this case here. 16 This case deals with one insurance company 17 trying to shift their obligation to another insurance company. That's not what - - -18 19 JUDGE SMITH: And you're not saying the 20 insured had no interest? 21 MR. LERNER: No, not at all. The insured 22 was the purported additional insured. 23 JUDGE SMITH: So that makes this different 2.4 from that Excelsior case, where the - - - where the

Excelsior - - - where the claim had already been paid

1 and Excelsior was the only - - - I guess, whoever it 2 was - - - the carrier, the primary carrier, was the 3 only party left. 4 MR. LERNER: Part - - - yeah, yes. The 5 Insurance Home (ph.) was the nominal party and the 6 Fireman's Fund, in the Excelsior case, was the real 7 party-in-interest. But there was still the discussion about 3420(d) and how - - -8 9 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yeah, but it's a 10 different case, though, you'd admit that? 11 MR. LERNER: It's - - - it's different 12 facts. And there was - - - there was a settlement. 13 But the cog - - -CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: But it's different in 14 15 terms of its meaning and who you're serving and what 16 their relationship is, right? 17 MR. LERNER: No, I don't - - - I don't 18 believe so. And the reason why I say this is 19 because, who is the real party-of-interest in this 20 case? We have GNY, who benefits from the shifting of 21 the obligation of the defense and the indemnity - - -22 JUDGE PIGOTT: Were you - - - were you 23 going to be coinsurers? Or - - - or are you an 2.4 access?

MR. LERNER: We were going to be - - - we

1	would be the primary insurer.
2	JUDGE PIGOTT: Primary.
3	MR. LERNER: We would be covering the
4	there would be additional insureds, essentially named
5	insureds on our pol
6	JUDGE PIGOTT: So GNY would be out?
7	MR. LERNER: GNY would be out, correct.
8	JUDGE GRAFFEO: How did you know that GNY
9	was going to tell 4401 and Sierra that you had sent
LO	notice?
L1	MR. LERNER: They have an obligation to
L2	them that they're their insurance company. They're
L3	an agent acting on the behalf of their insurers
L4	I'm sorry, insureds.
L5	JUDGE GRAFFEO: And wh is there a
L6	provision of the Insurance Law that places that
L7	obligation on them? Is it is it in 3420(d)?
L8	MR. LERNER: No, it
L9	JUDGE GRAFFEO: I mean, I don't see it.
20	MR. LERNER: I don't think it's statutory.
21	It's at the agency
22	JUDGE GRAFFEO: I don't see it there.
23	MR. LERNER: It isn't
24	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Why did why did
25	they send the notice, the primary insurer?

1	MR. LERNER: Why did
2	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Why did
3	MR. LERNER: why did GNY send
4	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Why are they the one?
5	Yeah, why were they the one to send?
6	MR. LERNER: Well, that's they're the
7	real party-in-interest. If 4401 and Sierra Realty
8	had
9	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yeah, but the real
10	party-in-interest in a very different context.
11	MR. LERNER: I'm sorry?
12	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: They're the real
13	parties-in-interest in a different context. They're
14	not the parties-in-interest in this case.
15	JUDGE GRAFFEO: They're not the ones who
16	are going to be sued.
17	MR. LERNER: I'm so they're the ones
18	being sued; that's correct. But they have insurance.
19	This is a
20	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yeah, but that
21	it's a consequence of whether these people, you know,
22	are are responsible, yes, there's a
23	consequence. But the primary insurer is not the real
24	party-in-interest.
25	MR. LERNER: Sure it is. It's it's

trying to - - - it's taking their obligation and trying to shift it to Scottsdale Insurance. 4401 and Sierra Realty will have insurance, whether it's going to be GNY or it's going to be Scottsdale. The real party-in-interest here is GNY. They sent this letter, because they wanted to shift their obligation of defense and indemnification to another insurance carrier.

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Well, no, that's already shifted. They wanted to send it to the person maybe, or the company, that was responsible.

MR. LERNER: That's right. And they're the ones, GNY is - - - they're going to bear the majority or the whole of the financial implications of defending 4401 and Sierra Realty.

JUDGE READ: Is there any public policy reason or any practical reason why we should interpret the statute the way you're asking us to do?

MR. LERNER: I think there is. Because if you have a situation where you have the insurer, the primary insurer, sends - - - send - - - in this case, sends to Scottsdale. Now if the court rules against me, the disclaiming insurer is now wondering if the clock for disclaiming under a 3420(d) starts.

And there's also confusion in this case.

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There are two different entities with the same 1 address. So will there be a rule? I think there are 2 3 some cases where if Scottsdale would send to one address, does that count for both 4401 and Sierra, or 4 5 does it count just for 4401? There's - - -JUDGE SMITH: But don't you have - - - I 6 7 mean, you - - - you have a contract which - - - which says this - - - these people are additional insureds. 8 9 MR. LERNER: Yes. There's a - - -10 JUDGE SMITH: I mean, should - - - don't -11 - - don't you have the obligation to find out their 12 names and addresses and send them a notice? It's not 13 that hard. MR. LERNER: Well, and this is a mistake 14 15 that the Second Department made. We did not issue 16 the certificate of insurance. That's a - - - that's 17 a mistake in the court below. We learned - - - we had the certificate of insurance when it was sent to 18 19 us by GNY. 20 JUDGE PIGOTT: You didn't know that they 21 were an additional insured until GNY served you with the notice? 22 MR. LERNER: No, because what we - - - what 23 2.4 we have in our CGL policy is called a blanket

additional insured endorsement, so it basically has

1	broad language that says anyone who
2	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: But then you knew,
3	right?
4	MR. LERNER: We knew once we
5	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Once they served you,
6	you knew.
7	MR. LERNER: Yes. Yes, Your Honor.
8	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So again, as Judge
9	Smith indicated, what's so difficult here? Why, from
10	a policy perspective, shouldn't you serve the real
11	parties-in-interest, which is a relatively simple
12	task, isn't it?
13	MR. LERNER: It's a relatively simple task
14	if you want to have a rule where you have an
15	insurance company send out all letters to anybody
16	who's carbon-copied
17	JUDGE SMITH: Why
18	MR. LERNER: on the letter.
19	JUDGE SMITH: Could you have written back
20	to GNY and said give me the name and address of your
21	of the of our additional insureds?
22	MR. LERNER: We cou I mean, we could
23	have, but I think that it wouldn't
24	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: It anyway you
25	don't need to do that. You need you knew them,

1	right?
2	MR. LERNER: We knew
3	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Who the real parties-
4	in-interest were?
5	MR. LERNER: Well, the real party-in-
6	interest
7	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: The additional
8	insureds, you knew who they
9	MR. LERNER: One well, once we were
10	served with the
11	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yeah.
12	MR. LERNER: the tender letter. But
13	by sending sending a disclaimer to GNY, we were
14	sending to the agent of 4401 and Sierra.
15	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, let's
16	let's hear from your adversary and then you'll have
17	your your rebuttal.
18	MR. LERNER: Thank you, Your Honor.
19	MR. REICHARDT: Good afternoon, may it
20	please the court, Corey Reichardt, on behalf to the
21	respondents, 4401 Sunset Park and Sierra Realty.
22	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Counsel, what's the
23	policy considerations here?
24	MR. REICHARDT: The policy
25	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Why should we rule

for you?

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MR. REICHARDT: The policy considerations here are that specifically in the tender letter that was sent by GNY, GNY stated that counsel had been appointed to represent the additional insureds. They had - - - they had lawyers already. This is not a matter of who do I respond to, GNY, do I respond to them. They had attorneys already. And GNY had its own interest in sending a tender letter to - - - so that they didn't have to pay for a defense and indemnity. So that's - -

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Well, but their interests, so they're not really adverse to your interests, right?

MR. REICHARDT: They're - - - they're not adverse at that time, but they have their own interest. They're not doing so solely as an agent of the additional insureds. They're doing it so, because they don't want to have to pay a defense and indemnity here. And in the case law, in the industry - - -

JUDGE PIGOTT: Were you - - - were you copied on the letter that GNY sent to Sierra - - - sent to Scottsdale?

MR. REICHARDT: We were not copied on that

1 letter. 2 JUDGE PIGOTT: All right. So - - - so they 3 get a letter from - - - from GNY saying we're 4 tendering the defense, and they write back, and say, 5 you're too late; we're not doing it. I mean, what -6 - - that - - - that makes commercially logical sense. 7 MR. REICHARDT: Yes, however, the statutory 8 - - - the statute provides that 3420(a)(3) says 9 anyone can give notice. The legislature has decided 10 that anyone - - -11 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: But - - - but why is 12 13 MR. REICHARDT: - - - the injured party can 14 give notice - - -15 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: - - - more fair - - -16 why is it fairer for - - - for them to have to notify 17 you? These guys are your agent. They think they're 18 responding to the people who - - - who sent the 19 notice to them. 20 MR. REICHARDT: The - - -21 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Why is - - - why is -22 - - again, from a policy perspective, your argument 23 is that - - - that the primary insurer's interest is 2.4 not necessarily yours, that's why it's - - - it's - -

- it is, you know - - - you should - - - you should

get the notice directly?

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MR. REICHARDT: Well, from - - - from a policy point of view here, the insurer is not always aligned in interest with its insured. There's policy limits. There's exclusions.

JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: But they - - - they did, as the Chief Judge said, choose your counsel. So if they weren't aligned in interest with you, wouldn't it be unethical for their lawyer to continue to represent you?

MR. REICHARDT: I'm saying that at the time when the tender is made, their interests are aligned, but if we're going to start calling an insurance company an agent in fact, when there are many situations where their ere many situations where their interests will not be aligned, especially when there's counsel already appointed.

JUDGE GRAFFEO: Well, if they have this general clause about additional - - - they cover additional insureds, in other fact patterns, is that company always going to know who the additional insureds are?

MR. REICHARDT: Well, yes, because when the tender is made, the tender is made usually with the summons and complaint. It says here are the

defendants. Usually they provide - - - and
especially when you're dealing with construction
contracts. Owners bargain for additional insured
coverage.

JUDGE PIGOTT: Right, but it - - - but can
you see the point? I mean, LM Interiors has got

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you see the point? I mean, LM Interiors has got

Scottsdale. You've got GNY. All right? LM

Interiors says we'll name you as an additional

insured. They don't know that. Scottsdale doesn't

know that. They just have this general - - -

MR. REICHARDT: Well, Scottsdale - - Scottsdale provides a - - an additional insured, a
blanket endorsement that's purchased.

JUDGE PIGOTT: I know. I'm almost done.

So - - - so they don't know that you're - - - that
you're one of the additional insured until GNY writes
and says we've got this situation. We don't think we
cover it; you do, because you've named them as an
additional insured. They write back to them, and
say, no, we're not, because it's untimely. What's - - who's missing in the notice?

MR. REICHARDT: Well, when Scottsdale offers a blanket additional insured endorsement, it's on notice that they were insuring the contractor, and that contractor is going to enter into construction

1 contracts with owners that are going to become additional insureds on their policy. 2 3 JUDGE PIGOTT: Exactly. 4 MR. REICHARDT: So at that point then, 5 Scottsdale's on notice by the fact that they offer 6 that endorsement. That when they get a tender from a 7 primary insurer, that there are additional insureds 8 and that they need to act pursuant to 3420(d) and 9 disclaim directly to those additional insureds. 10 Otherwise why - - - they get the benefit of selling 11 that endorsement to - - - to contractors. 12 Contractors purchase insurance from Scottsdale - - -13 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So should they not 14 even bother to - - - to get back to the primary 15 insurer? 16 MR. REICHARDT: They don't have to. And 17 actually, this is the same reason why - - -18 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So they don't really 19 matter in your perspec - - - from your perspective. 2.0 The primary insurer really doesn't matter. They're 21 on notice of this whole business. They know who the 22 - - - the real party-in-interest is. They serve 23 them, and it really doesn't matter what they do or 2.4 don't do with the primary insurer.

MR. REICHARDT: It doesn't matter, and

1 actually the - - - the law recognizes that, because 2 3420(d) doesn't apply between insurers. So the law 3 already recognizes that. JUDGE SMITH: But why - - - why is the 4 5 letter - - - the primary carrier's letter not show a copy to it - - - to its end, Scottsdale's insureds? 6 7 MR. REICHARDT: I don't know why it's not -- - it wasn't copied to their named insureds and the 8 9 additional insureds - - -10 JUDGE SMITH: It might have solved the whole problem. Then they could have - - - they could 11 12 have CC'd the same people on the reply, and we 13 wouldn't be here. 14 MR. REICHARDT: But - - - but the letter -15 - - in the body of the letter itself, it said that 16 there was already counsel appointed for the 17 additional insureds. So they already had the lawyers for the additional insureds. They had an answer - -18 19 20 JUDGE SMITH: Would that have been adequate 21 notice, to send it to the - - - that lawyer? MR. REICHARDT: Ab - - - I don't know what 22 23 could be more adequate notice than we have retained 2.4 counsel to answer the complaint. Please acknowledge

our tender, and we'll arrange to have the coun - - -

1 have counsel substituted to your counsel. 2 JUDGE SMITH: No, I mean, would that have 3 been an adequate disclaimer, if they had said - - if they had disclaimed to the law - - -4 5 MR. REICHARDT: To the attorneys? Yes, 6 under the law that - - - to the attorneys, that would 7 have been an adequate disclaimer. And the attorney's 8 information was right there on that piece of paper, 9 and I submit that this is a clerical error that 10 Scottsdale is looking to - - - to throw 3420(d) on 11 its head due to a clerical error by a claims person 12 here. 13 JUDGE PIGOTT: Well, was - - - was LM 14 Interiors rep - - - being represented by Scottsdale 15 at this point? 16 MR. REICHARDT: They were insureds. 17 Scottsdale disclaimed to LM Interiors for late 18 notice. JUDGE PIGOTT: Right. So - - - so 19 20 Scottsdale was not in this case at this point. 21 MR. REICHARDT: At - - - at the time, I do not believe so. I think that was their first notice 22 23 of the loss, when GNY sent a tender letter. 2.4 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, what else, 25 counselor, anything?

MR. REICHARDT: Just - - - just in terms of the real party-in-interest, as I was saying before, the - - - well, the Excelsior case, as Your Honor corrected noted, is completely different. And actually in Greater New York v. Chubb, that came out of the First Department last year, it specifically said that Excelsior doesn't apply here, because in Excelsior, when the 3420(d) argument was made - - - which was made, by the way, on the eve of trial, which was one of the reasons why the - - - the court rejected it. They said, at this point, Fireman's Fund had funded - - had funded the settlement and they were solely going to get - - they were solely looking to recoup their money.

But the First Department in Greater New

York v. Chubb said this case is different, because

right now there's a potential verdict in excess of

the policy. So the real party-in-interest, arguably,

must fail as a matter of law, and the 3420(d) is

specific that it is not a two-way street like

3420(a)(3) that allows anyone to give notice. The

legislature said no, anyone could give the notice,

but if you want to disclaim, there's only one way to

do it, and that's the insurer.

JUDGE PIGOTT: If Scottsdale had sent you

1 the notice, what would you have done - - - you, being 2 your client? 3 MR. REICHARDT: If Scottsdale had sent us the notice? We could have challenged the - - - we 4 5 could have challenged the late notice disclaimer. We 6 could have - - -7 JUDGE PIGOTT: You could do that - - - you 8 could do that afterwards too, right? I mean - - -9 MR. REICHARDT: We can do it afterwards, 10 but this legislature has said that as - - - as an 11 insured, we're entitled to know that immediately. 12 JUDGE PIGOTT: So the on - - - the - - -13 your - - - your defense is ha - - - we would have 14 challenged Scottsdale's disclaimer had we been timely 15 told. GNY was timely told. However long it took GNY 16 to tell us, it doesn't make any difference. We just 17 - - - we - - - that letter had to be directed to us and not them, and therefore, we need not challenge 18 19 the disclaimer, because they can't - - - they didn't 20 properly disclaim. 21 MR. REICHARDT: Well, yes, we could have challenged the disclaimer. We also could have 22 23 potentially sought other recourse against LM 2.4 Interiors if they violated any - - - any - - -

because LM Interiors was also disclaimed upon for

1 late notice, and there's - - - if there's a 2 contractual indemnity provision, there may be 3 recourse then against LM Interiors for not complying 4 with its insurance obligation which would provide it 5 for no indemnification for contractual indem - - -6 for a contractual indemnity claim by the owners. 7 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay. 8 MR. REICHARDT: Thank you. 9 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Thanks, counsel. 10 Counselor, rebuttal? 11 MR. LERNER: Yes. Talk about turning 12 3420(d) on its head. This court stated in Zappone, 13 this is not going to be a technical trap for 14 insurers, and that's exactly what's happened here. 15 This wasn't a clerical - - -16 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Did you make a 17 clerical error here? That's the way your adversary 18 describes what happened. 19 MR. LERNER: We did make - - - not make a 2.0 clerical error. The - - -21 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: What happened? 22 MR. LERNER: What happened was is that the 23 claims exam - - - the claims examiner or the person 2.4 in the position who wrote that letter believed that

when he was writing it to GNY, GNY was the agent of -

1 - - of 4401 and Sierra Realty. In the GNY tender 2 letter, it's stated - - -3 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Their point is that 4 the - - - the primary insurer's interest is not 5 necessarily theirs, and at some point, clearly, it 6 may not be necessarily theirs. 7 MR. LERNER: At that point the primary - -8 - I didn't hear that; I'm sorry. 9 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: I'm saying their 10 point is that the primary insurer's interests are not 11 necessarily their interests, and at some point that 12 may be decidedly the case. 13 MR. LERNER: They have a fiduciary duty to 14 their policyholder to pass on information that's 15 dealing with coverage. I - - - I disagree with that. 16 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Why didn't you just 17 send a disclaimer to their lawyer, the - - - a lawyer had been appointed for them. Why didn't you just 18 19 send it to them - - - to the lawyer? 20 MR. LERNER: In this case, the lawyer was 21 staff counsel, but I - - - to answer the question, we sent it to GNY. The staff counsel and GNY had the 22 23 same address, but our argument is not - - - our 2.4 argument was that sending it to G - - - our argument

is that sending it to GNY was sufficient.

1 JUDGE SMITH: Suppose - - - I mean - - -2 JUDGE GRAFFEO: Mr. Lerner, what would be 3 the rule you want us to state in this case? 4 MR. LERNER: A disclaiming insurer complies 5 with Section 3420(d) in response to a tender letter 6 when it timely sends the written disclaimer letter to 7 the tendering insurer rather than the purported additional insureds. That would be the rule. 8 9 JUDGE SMITH: And that would - - - I mean, 10 in this case, that rule would - - - would the - - - I 11 don't see any great inequity in applying that rule, but isn't there - - - if we'd make that the universal 12 13 rule, aren't there going to be some cases where there 14 are insureds out there with real interest, who might 15 have - - - may have exposure well beyond their policy 16 limits and may be good for the money, who never hear 17 about the disclaimer? MR. LERNER: That, again - - -18 19 JUDGE SMITH: Should - - - shouldn't we 2.0 have a rule that avoids that dan - - - I mean, isn't 21 - - - isn't it best to have one rule, fits all, 22 everybody knows what the rule is. And isn't the best 23 rule do what the statute says, send it to the insured? 2.4

MR. LERNER: I - - - I don't believe so.

1	When you have an agency relationship, it's the same
2	thing as if Scottsdale would have sent it to if
3	Scottsdale would have sent it to 4401 and Sierra
4	Realty's attorney. There's a there's an
5	obligation there to pass it on to either your client
6	or the policyholder.
7	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: But you're depending
8	on that application, rather than your own acts that
9	make clear that you meet your responsibilities?
10	MR. LERNER: I don't understand, Your
11	Honor.
12	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: You're depending on
13	them to pass it on, instead of you doing what you're
14	suppose to under the statute?
15	MR. LERNER: It's not
16	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Why?
17	MR. LERNER: I don't read the statute as -
18	as being not being able to have that agency
19	relationship. If you're if you're sending it
20	to the attorney, the attorney has an obligation to
21	tell
22	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: No, but you didn't
23	send it to the attorney, right?
24	MR. LERNER: But I'm saying,
25	hypothetically, if you send it to the attorney, the

attorney has an obligation to tell his clients that 1 there's - - - that there's been a disclaimer - - -2 3 JUDGE GRAFFEO: You're saying it's 4 comparable to sending it to the attorney, if you send 5 it to the primary insurer? MR. LERNER: Yes, Your Honor. 6 7 Just one last thing, again, going to the 8 policy of why the 3420 was enacted. It wasn't 9 enacted to have - - - be a technical trap to 10 insurers. It was - - -JUDGE PIGOTT: Well, yeah, but you're 11 12 almost making it one. In other words, if we stick 13 with insured, which is what it says, it seems to me 14 we're in a safe harbor protecting the insureds. I 15 think lawyers would get upset if insurance companies 16 were communicating with their clients unbeknownst to 17 them. 18 So including the lawyer within that makes 19 some sense, but saying that an agent or a broker or 20 someone else's notice - - - you know, we've got so 21 many cases going the other way, saying that that 22 doesn't work. 23 MR. LERNER: We're not - - I'm not saying 2.4 agent or broker. I'm saying primary insurance

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company.

1	JUDGE PIGOTT: Okay.
2	MR. LERNER: The primary insurance company.
3	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, counsel.
4	MR. LERNER: Thank you.
5	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Thanks. Thank you
6	both, appreciate it.
7	(Court is adjourned)
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CERTIFICATION

I, Karen Schiffmiller, certify that the foregoing transcript of proceedings in the Court of Appeals of Sierra v. 4401 Sunset Park, LLC, No. 216, was prepared using the required transcription equipment and is a true and accurate record of the proceedings.

Hour Schoffmille.

Signature: _____

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