1	COURT OF APPEALS					
2	STATE OF NEW YORK					
3						
4	MATTER OF SOARES,					
5	Respondent,					
6	-against-					
7	CARTER,					
·	Appellant.					
8	20 Eagle Street Albany, New York 12207					
10	March 23, 2015					
11	Before: CHIEF JUDGE JONATHAN LIPPMAN					
12	ASSOCIATE JUDGE SUSAN PHILLIPS READ ASSOCIATE JUDGE EUGENE F. PIGOTT, JR.					
13	ASSOCIATE JUDGE JENNY RIVERA ASSOCIATE JUDGE SHEILA ABDUS-SALAAM					
14	ASSOCIATE JUDGE EUGENE M. FAHEY					
15	Appearances:					
16	JAMES C. KNOX, ESQ. E. STEWART JONES HACKER MURPHY					
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18	Troy, NY 12180					
19	CHRISTOPHER D. HORN, ADA ALBANY COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE					
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25	Sara Winkeljohn Official Court Transcriber					

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Let's go to number 70, Matter of Soares v. Carter.

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Counselor, would you like any rebuttal time?

MR. KNOX: One minute, Your Honor, please.

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: One minute. Go

ahead.

MR. KNOX: James Knox of the E. Stewart

Jones Hacker Murphy Law Firm on behalf of Judge

Carter. Your Honors, I'd like to draw your attention

to the amendments that happened to the operative CPL

provisions, or the ones that Judge Carter thinks are

the operative CPL provisions in this case. In 1970,

CPL 170.40 and its counterpart, 210.40, were modified

to add a provision that allows a judge, the

defendant, or the district attorney to make a motion

to dismiss in the interest in justice, required that

the judge set forth the reasons for granting such a

motion on the record.

But this court, in 1976, in People v.

Belge, which is 41 N.Y.2d 60, gave voice to the fact that it was uncomfortable with the fact that the statute didn't provide any criteria by which to analyze whether that review was - - - that motion would properly be granted.

1 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Counsel, what's -2 what's underlying this - - - this whole proceeding? 3 Where - - - where - - - talk to us. 4 MR. KNOX: Sure. 5 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Cut to the quick 6 here. 7 MR. KNOX: Well, the quick - - -8 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: You got a judge - - -9 an unusual situation where the judge and the district 10 attorney's office are sparring about a well-11 publicized sit-in, the - - - here in Albany. What -12 - - what has created this - - - do you - - - do - - -13 is your argument on behalf of the judge that his 14 interest of justice power has been marginalized? Is 15 it that the district - - - or is the district 16 attorney not just doing what you want him to do or 17 what your client wants him to do? 18 MR. KNOX: The district attorney is not 19 doing what the law requires him to do, Your Honor. 20 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yeah, how - - - how 2.1 so? What - - - what's the underlying - - - you got a 22 thing where the district attorney doesn't want to prosecute the case. Putting aside the - - - the - -23 24 - the - - - the legal merits, which we're going to

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talk about - - -

MR. KNOX: Sure. 1 2 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: - - - obvious 3 extensively, what is this, a test of wills between the DA and the judge? What's really underlying all 4 5 of this? 6 MR. KNOX: Judge Carter is committed to the 7 rule of law. He is committed to requiring - - -8 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: To the rule of law of having the D - - - the DA prosecute a case that he 9 10 doesn't believe is worth prosecuting? 11 MR. KNOX: Absolutely not, Your Honor. that's not - - - that's a mischaracterization of 12 13 Judge Carter's position. 14 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So what is the right 15 characterization? 16 MR. KNOX: The right characterization has 17 always been that Judge Carter is requiring either go 18 forward with the hearing or make a motion to dismiss 19 in the interest of justice. 20 JUDGE PIGOTT: If I - - - if I could 2.1 compartmentalize this. As I was reading it all, it 22 seems to me that your argument is that outside the 23 courtroom, outside, you know, where a judge presides, 24 DA does what he wants or she wants. If they want to

prosecute, they can. If they don't, they don't, et

cetera. But once they come in within - - - within the courtroom and within the jurisdiction of the judge - - - and I think he makes the point that informations were filed subsequent to the police original charges here - - - that there are rules.

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And the rules are - - - and he - - - the - - - the judge has spelled them out here and feels that that's the - - - that's the limit for both as to what can be done within the court. And - - - and therefore someone cannot simply not show up at court and have a case disposed of that way. It has to be disposed of within the confines of the CPL?

MR. KNOX: Exactly. And I know they're going to point they did show up. They always showed up. But I - - I think what started, if you want to call it a contest of wills, were these letters from the district attorney saying we decline to prosecute in this case.

JUDGE READ: Well, let me ask you this. I thought the issue in this case was whether the court could compel the prosecutor to - - let's say the court wants him to comply with the CPL. Isn't the issue whether he could compel the prosecutor to move to dismiss or to - - - to - - to go forward through his contempt threat? Isn't that that the issue?

1 MR. KNOX: I think that that is the issue, 2 Judge Read. I - - -3 JUDGE RIVERA: No. But isn't it even more narrow than that? Isn't the issue whether or not he 4 5 can compel through the threat of contempt to the DA 6 to call witnesses if the DA chooses not to call 7 witnesses? 8 MR. KNOX: I think the two - - -9 JUDGE RIVERA: At that hearing. 10 MR. KNOX: I think the - - - the two 11 statements that both of you have made dovetail to one 12 another, and Judge Read's question is directly 13 implied by the - - - the narrow issue that you have 14 re - - - recited. That is the issue that - - - I 15 think that we are - - - we have before this court. 16 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: What could the 17 possible contempt be on the part of the DA's office? 18 MR. KNOX: The - - - the failure to obey a 19 -- - a lawful order to follow the Criminal Procedure 20 Law and elect from one of the possible avenues of 2.1 disposition allowed thereunder. 22 JUDGE RIVERA: All right, but this is my 23 question, again. Isn't it - - - I understand that -

- - that you wish to present it that way. But isn't

the legal question that's really come up, given the

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posture of the case, whether or not Judge Carter could use the threat of contempt to require them to call witnesses at the hearing?

MR. KNOX: Yes.

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JUDGE RIVERA: He may view it differently. I understand. But if the AD has made a finding that that is the way it reads the record, aren't we bound to that reading?

JUDGE READ: And wouldn't we have to find that the Supreme Court abused its discretion in deciding that Judge Carter exceeded his authority? I mean, to find in your favor - - -

MR. KNOX: No.

JUDGE READ: - - - don't we have to decide that?

MR. KNOX: I dis - - - I don't agree with that. I think that this court can find without going to the abuse of direction standard that the writ didn't lie in the first place. Because Judge Carter's decision as to whether or not he could, at that moment in time, have held them in contempt for failing to call a witness, because they had gone through this procedure. He had said several times follow the procedure in the CPL. They had issued these letters saying we decline to prosecute. They

were the ones that had occasioned the occurrence of this hearing.

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JUDGE PIGOTT: Well, I - - - I was curious and I - - - and - - - and neither one of you addressed it, and I don't blame you, but when the judge turned down the ACD saying there - - - it - - - it's going to be conditioned on community service - - - and generally speaking, I think defendants expect that if they're convicted of something they have a - - - they would have a sentence.

But to say it's going to be adjourned in contemplation of dismissal, which at that point would mean there is no charge, that for some reason I've got to work my way into that. I've got to - - - I've got to pay a penalty to get an adjournment in contemplation of dismissal is an interesting question. But the judge decided that he was not going to go along with an ACD and - - unless there was community service. And there's - - and the record's kind of - - kind of thin on that. And I - - I suppose it should be. But isn't that where - - if - - if the - - if the ACD had been granted we - - we wouldn't be here.

MR. KNOX: That's true.

JUDGE FAHEY: So really what we have - - -

1	to follow up on Judge Pigott's point, the what
2	what I understand that was in the record is the
3	judge said no ACD unless they do six months of
4	community service at the veterans' house. Is that
5	correct?
6	MR. KNOX: It no. It was I
7	believe it was forty hours for the defendants who
8	were charged with violations only and
9	JUDGE FAHEY: And six months for the
10	misdemeanor charge?
11	MR. KNOX: 180 right. Yeah.
12	JUDGE FAHEY: Yeah. I was in city court
13	for a couple years. I can't ever recall a case where
14	an ACD was given with that much community service.
15	That that is unusual.
16	MR. KNOX: I, speaking from personal
17	experience, don't find it to be unusual.
18	JUDGE FAHEY: I I do.
19	MR. KNOX: I practice in all local courts
20	and I know that in this in this district that -
21	our capital district
22	JUDGE FAHEY: Um-hum.
23	MR. KNOX: that's an ordinary thing.
24	JUDGE FAHEY: You know, well, Buffalo's not
2.5	the far side of the moon, and and I really

don't find it - - - I find it a little unusual, that amount of community service, for basically a - - - a protest argument where the AC - - - where the ACD's being's offered by the district attorney. It seems to me that legally this case is a case of the laws of physics where an irresistible force meets an immoveable object, and we're dealing here with - - - with issues that really are not even properly before the court.

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And I think the arg - - - the questions that the court have given seem to have really, correctly, narrowed it down to the writ of prohibition and the - - - the interest of juris - - - the interest of justice jurisdiction questions, which I'd ask - - I'd ask you to briefly address, because it seems to me since that issue was not decided we shouldn't be addressing that at all, even given when the Appellate Division said.

MR. KNOX: I think what the Appellate

Division said is why you have to address that,

because they have - - - their decision leaves open

this avenue for any district attorney that wants to

dismiss a case now - - -

JUDGE FAHEY: Yeah. But it's tough to address something that hasn't be decide - - - really

been decided. I think if the issue was - - - if
there was a request to dismiss in the interest of
justice and then the court ruled on it or the court
said I was going to do it within this forum, then
we'd have something to deal with in front of us. But
we really don't at this point, and it's - - - it's - - sometimes the less you say the better off you
are, I think, in my limited experience here so far.

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MR. KNOX: I don't have much to say to that. But I - - - I understand that you want to constrain the issue, but I - - - the implications of what's going to occur if you don't decide that the writ does not apply are - - - are dramatic.

JUDGE FAHEY: Well, and that's a good point. I think if you - - - you follow up on the implications, it seems that, really, what you do is over time there'll be a motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute, or there will be a scheduled hearing and a - - or a scheduled trial and the DA will offer no proof and the court will be compelled to dismiss. Either one of those options are going to end you up in the same place without creating a situation where an argument is being made that the court should not have the authority to exercise interest of justice jurisdiction, which I agree with

1 That's - - - that's contrary to the statute. 2 At the same time, we - - - we solve this impossible 3 quagmire. It seems to me one of those two - - -MR. KNOX: I - - -4 5 JUDGE FAHEY: - - - one of those two 6 options are going to end up how this thing resolves 7 itself. 8 MR. KNOX: It is, and it's easy to jump 9 from where we are now, if you take the snapshot of 10 the case when this litigation began, to - - -11 JUDGE FAHEY: Sure. 12 MR. KNOX: - - - what - - - what's the end 13 result? I mean that's - - - something as lawyers we 14 like to do is just say what's - - - where are we 15 really headed here, right? 16 JUDGE FAHEY: Um-hum. 17 MR. KNOX: But the implications for what's 18 occurred in this case have broader application - - -19 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: I think case is - - -20 MR. KNOX: - - - all over. 2.1 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: - - - highly unusual. 22 And - - - and I - - - I really don't - - - it seems 23 to be a - - - a personal issue back and forth. While 24 I agree with you if you take it's to its logical 25 legal implications or conclusion, you could have a

1 broad effect. But I - - - it just seems like this 2 became a very confrontational divide between the DA 3 and the judge, and both want to prevail. And - - and I don't know if there's great majestic legal 4 5 issues here that - - - that we're dealing with. Or 6 it's - - - it - - - or it's a case that never should 7 have come here. 8 JUDGE RIVERA: And I - - -9 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: And should have been 10 able to be resolved. 11 JUDGE RIVERA: And, counsel, in the interim 12 you have defendants who have these charges over their 13 head when they are happy to have the DA decide not to 14 continue with the case and want the case to go away. 15 It's not - - - it's not like you have the defendants, 16 for some strange reason, saying no, no, we want 17 the prosecution to move forward. There's no 18 suggestion here, right, of any incorrect conduct - -

20 MR. KNOX: No.

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JUDGE RIVERA: - - - by - - - by the DA in the sense of something that's unconstitutional or - - or suspect, right?

MR. KNOX: But we're never going to have those things on the record, though. If there was

some sort of collusion to get rid of criminal charges 1 2 - - - and there is a criminal charge here of 3 resisting arrest. And I understand that, as people 4 who support the First Amendment, I and everyone 5 probably in this room can sympathize with the 6 criminal defendants in this case. But the 7 ramifications are larger than that. 8 ramifications are that if you are saying, as the 9 Appellate Division did, that under these circumstance 10 Judge Carter is compelled to dismiss in the interest 11 of justice, that denigrates 170.40 which lists 12 specific criteria, none of which are - - -13 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: But you're saying 14 that the judge - - -15 MR. KNOX: - - - just send me a letter 16 saying they don't like the case. 17 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: - - - should exercise 18 his options under the law the same way you're saying 19 that the DA should exercise whatever options they 20 have. 2.1 MR. KNOX: Not - - - not exactly, if I 22 could just clarify briefly. 23 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Quickly. Go ahead. 24 MR. KNOX: CPL 180.85 provides for the 25

exact procedure the People tried to follow here with

the felony complaint. It allows them to file an - -1 2 - a motion, an application to dismiss. And if the 3 defense consents it shall be granted. That's what the legislature said. They didn't provide a similar 4 5 procedure for misdemeanor cases. 6 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, counsel. Let's 7 hear from your adversary. 8 MR. KNOX: Thank you. 9 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: And then you'll give 10 us your rebuttal. 11 Counselor? 12 MR. HORN: May it please the court. This -13 14 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Counsel, what's - - -15 what's really going on here? I'll ask you the same thing. What - - - well, how did all this come about? 16 17 We have this case in front of the high court on what 18 seems like a regular, ordinary, run-of-the-mill - - -19 not that I'm characterizing the protests that way, 20 but you have a protest. They come in. DA doesn't 2.1 want to prosecute. What - - - what - - -22 MR. HORN: I think - - - I think the court 23 has laid it out pretty well. I mean we had these - -24 - this is the capital of New York State. We tend to

attract a few protestors now and then.

1 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: We've noticed. Go 2 ahead. 3 MR. HORN: Yeah. And we've - - - we've had some experience in dealing with them. We have 4 5 chosen, in our discretion, to be quite respectful of 6 their First Amendment rights, exercising their First 7 Amendment rights. 8 JUDGE READ: So why didn't you just move to 9 dismiss? 10 MR. HORN: In the interest of justice? 11 JUDGE READ: Yeah. 12 MR. HORN: Well, the judge has made it very 13 clear he was not going to grant a motion to dismiss 14 the case in this - - -15 JUDGE PIGOTT: I - - - I'm not sure of that at all. I - - - I - - - you may - - - you may 16 17 absolutely believe that, and it might absolutely be 18 true. But even if it is, I mean, I hope there's 19 adults in this thing. I - - - I'm - - - I'm - - -20 there's sixty-two counties, sixty-two DAs, who knows 2.1 how many judges. And for some reason, this case, as 22 Judge Lippman is saying, gets all the way to the 23 Court of Appeals over who struck John. And - - - and 24 I - - - I'm befuddled by it. I would have thought at

some point somebody would say look, file the damn

motion and we'll get out of here. 1 2 MR. HORN: I agree. And - - - and, 3 generally speaking, a motion to dismiss in the interest of justice comes from the defendants, not 4 5 generally from us. In our view, he was not going to 6 grant it, and I am relying on his words when I say he 7 wasn't going to grant it. 8 JUDGE PIGOTT: Would you say - - - wouldn't 9 10 JUDGE READ: Why wouldn't you test it? 11 JUDGE PIGOTT: Wouldn't that have played -12 JUDGE READ: Why wouldn't you test it? 13 14 JUDGE PIGOTT: Yeah. 15 MR. HORN: I - - - to be honest, I sort of 16 suspected that the defendants would make that motion 17 at some point in time. JUDGE PIGOTT: Well, you're sitting with 18 19 them. Didn't you talk to them? 20 MR. HORN: Well, we don't usually do all 2.1 that much. Usually, we're negotiating a disposition. 22 JUDGE PIGOTT: Right. JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Well, when you 23 24 negotiated the ACD, did you think about taking it a 25 step further to a motion to dismiss in the interest

of justice?

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MR. HORN: We did consider that. We did not ultimately do that because we were confident the judge was not going to grant it, because he said he was not going to grant it.

JUDGE PIGOTT: As Judge Read just suggested, that - - - that - - - that would have teed it up for you. If you guy - - - if you guys wanted to get into this kind of a contest you say go ahead, judge, deny it in the interest of justice, and we'll see what the Appellate Division does.

MR. HORN: Sure. Look, I wish we had made a - - had made that motion so I wouldn't have to answer this question. Okay. I've said that all along. I wish we had done that. But we would have been - - -

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Good answer. Go ahead.

MR. HORN: We would have been banging our head against a wall. If you look at pages 7 and 8 of Judge Carter's brief, he says he would not have granted the motion to dismiss in the interest of justice if he had been presented with one. I'm taking him at his word. He wrote it in two decisions.

JUDGE FAHEY: Yeah, all - - - all that - - - all that's true. But you still should have made the motion.

MR. HORN: Sure.

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JUDGE FAHEY: There's no sense - - - no sense - - - no sense abusing you any more about it.

If it's - - it's self-evident you should have made the motion. And the way I read the statute, he had a right to refuse to grant it. It seems to be quite clear that he makes that determination. You may have a different argument.

But I think the point that was made before is that with the writ of prohibition, if it applies the way the Supreme Court said, you have two resolutions that are perfectly acceptable, that are legal alternatives that resolve this case, without a determination in your favor on the interest of justice jurisdiction. And that would have been the way to resolve it rather than go all the way here.

MR. HORN: I agree with that. But there are many ways to resolve this. He - - - he is insisting that we're not following the CPL, as if the only way to resolve it is by a motion to dismiss in the interest of justice. But that's not true.

There's - - - you can have a - - - he can have a

trial order of dismissal if we don't sustain our 1 2 burden. You can have a speedy trial, dismiss in 3 court. JUDGE PIGOTT: We know all of that. We 5 know all of that. Of course. Of course. 6 MR. HORN: Well, you know, that - - -7 that's what we were relying on. And to the extent 8 that he's accusing us of not following the CPL, it 9 was Judge Carter who was not following the CPL. 10 JUDGE PIGOTT: That's why you can appeal 11 when you make a motion and he denies it. What do you 12 think of People v. Reardon? Kinderhook. 13 MR. HORN: Oh, all of the - - - all of the 14 Kinderhook cases? We're doing something different 15 from what - - - from what's happening in Kinderhook 16 with regard to claiming that our statement that we're 17 not going to prosecute removes it from the court's 18 jurisdiction. We're - - - we're - - - we're not 19 making that claim. 20 JUDGE PIGOTT: Well, the point - - - my - -2.1 - my - - - my thought about it is that this case has 22 generated a decision out of - - - out of Columbia 23 County now that is going to probably generate more of 24 these things. And - - - and I - - - I - -

- I'm just befuddled. I - - - I - - - I don't know.

1 DA's generally get along with the court system, and 2 they generally work hand-in-hand with defense counsel 3 to get justice done. But apparently it's not - - -4 not working here. MR. HORN: Well, we - - - we thought an ACD 5 6 would have resolved all of this, you know, very 7 neatly and it should have. We resolved over a 8 hundred other of these Occupy Albany cases, and they 9 all ended in dismissal with us declining to sustain 10 our burden or go - - - go forward and - - - go 11 forward. 12 JUDGE RIVERA: Was the community service 13 unusual? 14 MR. HORN: It - - - well, it was with 15 regard to all of the Occupy Albany cases. As far - -16 - as far as the political protest cases go, we were 17 not handling - - - handing out community service - -18 19 JUDGE RIVERA: Um-hum. 20 MR. HORN: - - - unless there was some sort 2.1 of property damage or if there was some sort of 22 violence involved. 23 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Are you suggesting 24 that these cases were resolved before other judges, 25 not Judge Carter?

MR. HORN: It was the same court but another judge. Yes.

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CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, anything else, counsel?

MR. HORN: Well, the - - - the main thing that we're relying on here - - - and, you know, I'll rely upon Schumer v. Holtzman where this court said that the DA has the discretion to determine whom, whether, and how to prosecute. That's what we're doing right here.

And also in Council 82 v. Cuomo, that discretion extends to the ordering of priorities and decisions about how to allocate staff and resources to best carry out our duties. When it comes to Albany City Court, our priorities where we're allocating our staff is prosecution of domestic violence, DWI, any sort of crime that has some element of violence. That's - - -

JUDGE PIGOTT: You could have put all of that in a motion and dis - - - and you wouldn't be here. I think what - - - what - - - what gets kind of aggravating about this is you're try - - - you - - - you're citing the Holtzman case and - - - and they're big cases. They were important case - - - you're trying to raise this whatever-it-is, whether

it's an argument between two people or what, to the level of those kind of cases, and I just don't think it's there. I - - I just don't know what's going on here. But to ask the seven of us to make some grand pronunc - - pronunciation on this is difficult.

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MR. HORN: Fair enough. Well, okay.

Leaving all of that aside, ultimately, the entire procedure has been unfair to the criminal defendants in this case. Separation of powers is not an end unto itself. It is intended to safeguard liberty.

It ensures that no one is convicted of a crime without the concurrence of all three branches of government.

JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Counsel, what standard do you think we should use in deciding this? Is it abuse of discretion by the Supreme Court or is it something else?

MR. HORN: You would have to find that the Supreme Court abused its discretion. It - - - because it really is a very narrow issue. We're - - - we relied on our discretion on the question of whether we're going to call witnesses in the suppression hearing. And - - and, you know, that - - that's another thing. Under 710.60(2)(b) the

court was required to summarily grant the suppression 1 2 motion. We repeatedly said that we were not opposing 3 the suppression motion. That is a stipulation. Under the language of that statute, if we - - - if we 5 stipulate that the evidence should be suppressed, 6 there's to be no hearing. There's nobody to call as 7 a witness. So it's that particular statute that we 8 rely on in addition to our discretion not to call any witnesses. As every student of the law knows - - -9 10 JUDGE PIGOTT: Well, I wish you'd filed 11 some papers to that effect. I - - - I mean 12 everybody's alluding to the - - - to the transcripts 13 and things like that. I - - - I am missing - - - I14 mean a 170 motion is pretty standard and there's 15 formbooks on them. 16 MR. HORN: Well, so is 710.60(2)(b). And -17 18 JUDGE PIGOTT: Yeah. 19 MR. HORN: - - - as David Rossi said in the 20 court, the court should grant the motion because 2.1 we're not opposing it. 22 JUDGE PIGOTT: You can file it. You can 23 file a motion to that effect. 24 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, counsel. 25 Thanks, counsel.

1 MR. HORN: Thank you. 2 MR. MISHLER: Good afternoon. May it 3 please the court Mark Mishler representing the - - what I think of as the central players in the 4 5 process. 6 JUDGE PIGOTT: You could have made the 7 motion too. 8 MR. MISHLER: But they've been shunted to 9 the side. 10 JUDGE PIGOTT: The DA makes a great 11 argument for the defense, which we don't see too 12 often up here. 13 MR. MISHLER: Well, and we appreciate the 14 DA's support. 15 JUDGE PIGOTT: But you could have made a motion at any time, true? 16 17 MR. MISHLER: And, Your Honor, we did, in 18 fact. After the Appellate Division issued its 19 decision we submitted a motion to dismiss in 20 furtherance of justice. 2.1 JUDGE PIGOTT: How'd you do? 22 MR. MISHLER: Even at that point it would 23 have been very easy for Judge Carter, at that point, 24 to say okay, I'll accept this motion. I'll make a

decision on this motion. And, in fact, he refused to

even - - - I mean literally refused to accept the
motion which had been filed.

JUDGE PIGOTT: Was that - - - that wasn't
the speedy trial motion, was it?

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MR. MISHLER: No. The speedy trial motion was made prior to the suppression hearing. And in fact, you know, the - - - we believed that was a motion that should have been granted. And, again, the People explicitly indicated that they were not opposing the speedy trial motion. As the court is aware, in 30.30 motions the People - - - once - - - once the issue's raised, the People have the burden of - - -

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Counsel, let me ask you what I asked your - - - your other two colleagues. What's really going on here? How did this happen? We're all kind of asking in our own way. Why is this case here? From the defendants' perspective, why is this case here?

MR. MISHLER: Your Honor, we're as - - the defendants are perhaps even more puzzled than the
court. I mean this was a relatively routine protest.
In fact, as the record indicates, it was the exact
same march in the exact same location that took place
the prior week. Nobody was arrested. There were no

- 1							
1	issues. This particular week the police officers						
2	there decided to make some arrests. The practice had						
3	been very clear all along. All of the Occupy-related						
4	arrests in Albany the DA's office declined to						
5	prosecute.						
6	JUDGE FAHEY: Well, let me let me ask						
7	this. If the ACD was offered without any community						
8	service, would we be here?						
9	MR. MISHLER: No, absolutely not.						
10	JUDGE FAHEY: Okay.						
11	MR. MISHLER: No.						
12	JUDGE FAHEY: So that's why you're here.						
13	MR. MISHLER: Right.						
14	JUDGE FAHEY: Right. Okay. I got it.						
15	Thank you.						
16	JUDGE PIGOTT: Well, that and the DA						
17	the DA filed informations subsequent to the police						
18	making their charges, right?						
19	MR. MISHLER: I mean that's in the record.						
20	There really was little or no change I mean,						
21	basically, they were informations prepared						
22	complaints prepared by the police officers. There -						
23	there were some documents indicating a						
24	superseding informations that were filed by the DA's						

office.

JUDGE PIGOTT: Do you know why he did that?

MR. MISHLER: I - - I don't. No. But, I

mean, so - - I mean we certainly agree with what I

think the members of the court have expressed that

this is an unusual case. We don't believe there's

any real reason for it to be in the Court of Appeals.

The only thing I would say that counters that is since we are here, this case does implicate what we believe are very serious issues of separation of powers and issues of separation of powers that go directly to the rights of criminal defendants. And we have a concern about criminal defendants, not just in this case, facing what, in essence, are two prosecutors. I mean we have one - - - one prosecutor who's supposed to be doing the job as a prosecutor. And then in this case we have the court, the judge, Judge Carter, taking on the role of prosecutor.

the - - - the concern here, at least the way I look at it now that this is such a high-visibility case, let's assume for a minute that you've got a domestic violence case and that, for one reason or another, the DA decides that he or she doesn't want to prosecute it. And the judge is very concerned about that particular issue and perhaps even this

particular - - - these particular respondents or - -1 2 - or people in the court. Is he just supposed to 3 take the - - - a district attorney's - - - say we're 4 not prosecuting and say okay, fine; I'm dismissing 5 it? 6 MR. MISHLER: Yes. I - - -7 JUDGE PIGOTT: I don't think so. I - - - I 8 - - - I - -9 MR. MISHLER: It is not up to the court. 10 But let - - - excuse me, Judge. I just want to say -11 12 JUDGE PIGOTT: Certainly. 13 MR. MISHLER: This was a hearing where the 14 People had a burden. 15 JUDGE PIGOTT: I'm giving you - - - I'm giving you my hypothetical, and I'm saying that 16 17 there's a high - - - there's a - - - there's a 18 serious case - - - I won't say high visibility - - -19 but involving a serious matter like domestic 20 violence. And can a district attorney simply call up 2.1 the judge or appear the next day and say judge, we're 22 choosing not to prosecute, without letting the public 23 - - - it's a public trial and a public proceeding - -24 - know the reasons why that's happening because in -

- - in many cases it could be very important.

1 Wouldn't you agree? 2 MR. MISHLER: I - - - I agree. Except I 3 don't think the judge has a right to do that. I 4 think if the People are not going to prosecute the 5 case that, inevitably, and it should happen sooner 6 rather than later, lead to the dismissal of the case. 7 JUDGE PIGOTT: If - - - I - - - I'm 8 sorry, Judge. 9 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Go ahead. 10 JUDGE PIGOTT: I'm thinking of one other 11 one where - - - where a district attorney loses 12 valuable evidence, loses the gun, loses, you know, 13 the DNA, loses something. And they are embarrassed. 14 They don't know what to do now. And so they just 15 call up the judge and say we're not prosecuting. 16 Does the judge have a right to know why this murder, 17 this rape, this some - - - is not going forward, or 18 does he simply say thanks for your call, Mr. or Ms. 19 I'll strike it off my calendar? 20 MR. MISHLER: I think the hypothet - - - it 2.1 doesn't exactly match - - -22 JUDGE PIGOTT: They get better, don't they? MR. MISHLER: - - - this situation, of 23 24 I - - - I think the - - - the issue is the course.

bottom line is the prosecutor has to have the power

I don't

and discretion to decide not to continue with a case. 1 2 That - - - that's - - -3 JUDGE PIGOTT: Should they put it on the 4 record? 5 MR. MISHLER: I can say as a matter of 6 public policy, yes, I think that makes sense. Is it 7 required under the law? No. I don't believe it is. 8 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, counselor. 9 Thanks, counsel. 10 MR. MISHLER: Thank you. 11 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Counselor, rebuttal. 12 MR. KNOX: Thank you. I want to note one 13 thing about those hundreds of cases that - - - that 14 were dismissed. Those were cases under - - - to 15 another judge in which straight adjournments and 16 contemplation of dismissal were offered and approved 17 by the judge. But the procedure is that when an ACD 18 is offered, the judge has the discretion to approve 19 or not approve it and put whatever conditions on that 20 ultimate dismissal that he wants. 2.1 And, yes, there were other ways this could 22 have been resolved. For instance, the defendants 23 could have waived that hearing altogether and asked 24 the judge to set down a trial date and had a trial

where the DA declined to present witnesses.

know why that didn't happen.

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CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: That wouldn't have achieved much, would it have?

MR. KNOX: It wouldn't have achieved much, but they could have done that. And - - - but they elected to go through this process. And we - - - we didn't just get here simply because we got to this hearing that you have a transcript of and that's what this is all about. It also is about the fact that before that the criminal defendants, they commenced their own Article 78 action to compel Judge Carter to dismiss these cases based on the motions he'd already denied. And they sought temporarily relief to bar that hearing, that you have the transcript from, from going forward.

That motion for temporary relief was denied. And then literally several days later, we have the district attorney commencing their own Article 78 that's brought us here today. And I think that's - - that's what implicates the concern that Reardon illustrates. When you have a district attorney that wants to dismiss something and won't put it on the record.

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay.

MR. KNOX: Thank you, Judge.

1	CHI	EF JUDGE LIPPMAN:	We'll	take it	under
2	advisement.	Thank you.			
3	(Co	ourt is adjourned)			
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## CERTIFICATION

I, Sara Winkeljohn, certify that the foregoing transcript of proceedings in the Court of Appeals of Matter of Soares v. Carter, et al., No. 70 was prepared using the required transcription equipment and is a true and accurate record of the

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Date: March 24, 2015