1	COURT OF APPEALS
2	STATE OF NEW YORK
3	
4	PEOPLE,
5	Respondent,
6	-against-
7	No. 63 CLIFFORD GRAHAM,
8	Appellant.
9	
10	Syracuse University College of Law 950 Irving Avenue
11	Syracuse, New York 13244 March 25, 2015
12	Before:
13	CHIEF JUDGE JONATHAN LIPPMAN
14	ASSOCIATE JUDGE SUSAN PHILLIPS READ ASSOCIATE JUDGE EUGENE F. PIGOTT, JR.
15	ASSOCIATE JUDGE JENNY RIVERA ASSOCIATE JUDGE SHEILA ABDUS-SALAAM
16	ASSOCIATE JUDGE LESLIE E. STEIN
17	Appearances:
18	PIOTR BANASIAK, ESQ. HISCOCK LEGAL AID SOCIETY
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20	Syracuse, NY 13202
21	JAMES P. MAXWELL, ADA ONONDAGA COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
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24	Karen Schiffmiller
25	Official Court Transcriber

1 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Let's do number 63, 2 People v. Graham. 3 MR. BANASIAK: May I reserve - - -CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Counsel, do you want 4 5 any rebuttal time? 6 MR. BANASIAK: Yes, two minutes, please, 7 Your Honor. 8 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Two minutes, go 9 ahead, counsel. 10 MR. BANASIAK: Good afternoon, Your Honors, 11 and may it please the court, my name is Piotr 12 Banasiak, and I represent Mr. Clifford Graham in this 13 case. 14 The right against self-incrimination has 15 been called the hallmark of our democracy. It's 16 const - - -17 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Counsel, what's the 18 significance in this case as to the counsel arranging 19 for this session with the police, where he was going 20 to be interrogated? I know at the time, the counsel 2.1 believing that it was in the best interests of the 22 defendant, but what is the significance that he 23 arranged it, even though - - - and - - - and during a 24 period, maybe twenty minutes later - - - whatever it

is - - - left from the room when the police were

1	interrogating the defendant. Is that significant in
2	terms of the the alleged failure to to
3	give the Miranda warning?
4	MR. BANASIAK: I don't think it is, Your
5	Honor, because
6	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Why not? Why not?
7	MR. BANASIAK: Because because the
8	trial court found that Mr. Graham was in custody, and
9	so Miranda applies when there is custodial
10	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yeah, but if you have
11	advice from counsel, does that change the dynamic?
12	MR. BANASIAK: Our position is that
13	that it does not. Counsel in and of
14	counsel's presence, in and of itself, does not
15	substitute
16	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Under what cases do
17	we know that, that that that the
18	counsel's presence is not a substitute for a Miranda
19	warning? What cases?
20	MR. BANASIAK: Our position is that Miranda
21	stands for that proposition, but we've also cited
22	out-of-state cases from from West Virginia
23	
24	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Have we dealt with
25	this case in New York?

1	MR. BANASIAK: I don't
2	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: This this
3	situation in New York?
4	MR. BANASIAK: I don't think this court has
5	dealt with this precise issue and
6	JUDGE PIGOTT: Do doesn't it sound
7	kind of funny if if somebody's a
8	defendant is sitting there with his lawyer, and
9	and he wants to talk, because he's trying to get a
10	better deal out of something, for the police to say,
11	now, you know you're entitled to an attorney?
12	MR. BANASIAK: Well, Your Honor,
13	respectfully, we're we're not we're
14	I guess I should be clear. We're not saying that the
15	police have to read the panoply
16	JUDGE PIGOTT: And if you can't afford an
17	attorney, we'll appoint one for you.
18	MR. BANASIAK: I I - I understand
19	your point, Your Honor, but we're not saying that
20	that specific warning is required. All
21	JUDGE PIGOTT: What should they have done
22	then?
23	MR. BANASIAK: All we're saying is that if
24	an attorney is present, the police should at
25	the at minimum, warn a suspect that he has the

right to remain silent, as well as the consequences 1 2 of foregoing that right - - -3 JUDGE READ: Does that happen in every case, or is it just because the attorney left after 4 5 so many minutes in this case that you make that 6 argument? 7 MR. BANASIAK: Our primary contention is 8 that it should happen in - - - in every case, but our 9 alternative is that, at the very least, it should - -10 11 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Can there ever be an 12 equivalent to Miranda? I guess that's the kind of 13 issue that some of the federal courts have dealt with 14 and other state courts have dealt with. Can you ever 15 have that equivalent? Is there something that 16 substitutes for the Miranda warning, i.e., counsel 17 being there or arranging it? 18 MR. BANASIAK: I think there are 19 substitutes, but the presence of counsel by - - - by 20 itself is not an adequate substitute. 2.1 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Right, I get - - - I 22 get it that that's your main argument, that - - -23 that presence of counsel is not enough. What would 24 be an equivalent? What would be a situation where it

would be equivalent? I see that some of the cases

talk about maybe if the police don't do the Miranda 1 2 warning exactly right. They do it, but they kind of 3 mix up some of the language or botch it a little bit. Is that what we're talking about when we're talking 4 5 about equivalents, that maybe you could have a 6 warning that doesn't say every magic word, but is the 7 equivalent? Is that where it could be equivalent, 8 but nothing else? 9 MR. BANASIAK: I think that could be an 10 equivalent and I suppose the police could also obtain 11 confirmation from counsel that - - - have you advised 12 your client of his rights and the - - - and the 13 Constitutional - - -14 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: And that could be the 15 equivalent? If you ask counsel - - - you tell - - you know, et cetera, that could be enough? 16 17 MR. BANASIAK: I think that would be 18 affirmative proof that the suspect was actually aware 19 of his - - -20 JUDGE PIGOTT: Had he - - - had he waived 2.1 his rights previously? 22 MR. BANASIAK: He did nearly three weeks 23 ago, and - - -24 JUDGE PIGOTT: All right. So - - - so the 25 police had him, gave him his Miranda warnings; he

signed off. So they've got him, and then he starts 1 2 talking about this forgery. The next thing that 3 happens, at least in the record, unless there's something in between, is that his lawyer brings him 4 5 to the cops, and said, look, he's willing to 6 cooperate, so have at him. 7 Is - - - is the three weeks a big deal? Do you think if it would been a day before or do you 8 9 think that it's got to be like when you sign on to an 10 app on your computer, and you always have to agree? 11 MR. BANASIAK: Two points with respect to 12 that. First, the trial court admitted the August 13 22nd warnings specifically with respect to August 14 22nd alone, so at least in this case, that - - - the 15 relevance of that evidence doesn't go beyond August 22nd. But also generally, as a matter of law, the 16 17 Appellate Divisions have - - - have roundly held that 18 interrogation has to occur within a reasonable time 19 after a suspect is warned - - -20 JUDGE PIGOTT: That's the measure, right, 2.1 reasonable time? 22 MR. BANASIAK: Reasonable time, yes. 23 JUDGE PIGOTT: So it's - - -24 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Also we - - - I'm

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sorry; go ahead.

1 JUDGE PIGOTT: No, please go ahead. 2 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Go ahead, negotiate -3 4 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Finish your point. 5 JUDGE PIGOTT: Well, I was just going to 6 say you - - - so - - - so reasonable time. 7 you've got Miranda warnings, a time, which you say is 8 unreasonable, three weeks, I assume. But in the - -9 - in the mix is the lawyer saying, he's going to talk 10 to you now. What - - - what - - - what are the 11 police officers supposed to do? 12 MR. BANASIAK: Your Honor, when somebody's 13 read their rights three weeks prior to, there - - -14 there's no - - - at least taking that by itself - - -15 there's absolutely no assurance that the suspect still remembers what he was told or still understands 16 17 the implications of those warnings. With respect to 18 the presence of - - -19 JUDGE RIVERA: Maybe he acted on them, 20 right? Maybe getting a lawyer and deciding I want to 2.1 have a conversation, maybe that's based on that 22 information of what the warnings are, deciding, okay, 23 I want to talk; I want my lawyer in the room. 24 MR. BANASIAK: But - - - but in - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: Why isn't that an

appropriate inference based on the - - - the unique 1 2 facts of this case? 3 MR. BANASIAK: I think that's not an appropriate inference here because we know that 4 5 counsel was assigned at arraignment, so this wasn't Mr. Graham going out and - - - and seeking an 6 7 attorney. It was just as a matter - - -8 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Counsel, we've - - -9 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Judge Abdus-Salaam? 10 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: - - - we've been 11 talking - - - we've been talking about the merits, 12 but did you ever make or did your client ever make 13 the argument below that he was entitled Miranda 14 warnings in that second interview in September? 15 MR. BANASIAK: I - - - I think - - - I 16 think he did make that argument, and I think the 17 court's decision may - - - or the court's decision 18 makes that apparent, starting from the omnibus 19 motion, which might have been general, I would - - -20 I might concede that in terms of did Mr. Graham arque 2.1 that his rights under the U.S. Constitution, the New York Constitution, and CPL 60.45 were violated. 22 23 But the court in granting the motion 24 understood that this specific issue was going to be

whether his rights under Miranda v. Arizona were - -

- were violated. And then when the court made its decision, it made a Miranda-specific finding of Mr. Graham being in custody and then also relying on People v. Farrell, from the Fourth Department, which was a case principally concerned about whether a - - - a suspect could - - - could waive - - - or whether police could infer that a suspect has waived his Miranda rights.

other than that reference to Farrell, I don't find any reference to Fifth Amendment rights in - - - in the suppression hearing or decision or in the request. I mean, the defendant was talking about probable cause and the judge kept redirecting him and saying this isn't a probable cause hearing. And then when we get to the very end, the judge says that the "defendant was in custody, represented by counsel, and therefore couldn't waive counsel unless counsel was present", and it seems that the - - - the court was referring to the indelible attachment of - - - of counsel, and the fact that counsel had left.

And then, yes - - - and then says all of that and cites Farrell. So it's - - - it's questionable, I think, as to really what the court was - - was addressing.

1 MR. BANASIAK: I would respectfully point 2 Your Honor to - - - to - - - to two places. The - -3 - the first place is at page 168 in the record when Mr. Graham was asking the irrelevant questions about 5 probable cause. The - - - the court pointed out that 6 he was not going into the circumstances surrounding 7 his Miranda rights, and I think that demonstrates 8 that the court was on notice that the issue here was 9 whether Miranda had been complied with by police. 10 And again the second - - -11 JUDGE STEIN: Well, do we make a distinct -12

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- - do we talk about Miranda generally? Do we make a distinction here? Are we talking about right to counsel? Are we talking about Fifth Amendment or are we - - -

MR. BANASIAK: Mr. Graham's omnibus motion never argued that his right to counsel specifically was violated, nor did the court's pre-hearing order on motions acknowledge that the issue was right to counsel but - - -

JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: But isn't that the point, that it wasn't specific and - - - and that Farrell - - - as you started to say, counsel - - - is primarily about waiver of the attorney-client privilege or waiver of an attorney, not so much

1 waiver of the Miranda warnings? 2 MR. BANASIAK: I - - - I would respectfully 3 disagree. The - - - the trial court in People v. Farrell held that the - - - the defendant's rights 5 under People - - - under Miranda were - - - were 6 violated, and in that regard, the issue was compliance with Miranda, not - - - not compliance 8 with - - - with this court's indelible right to 9 counsel case law. 10 JUDGE PIGOTT: Do you - - - do you want a 11 bright-line rule that says anytime the police are 12 going to talk to anyone, that they should run - - give them the Miranda warnings even in - - - in the 13 14 presence of counsel? 15 MR. BANASIAK: I - - - I - - - our position 16 is that there should be a bright-line rule that there 17 should be affirmative proof that a defendant was aware of his right to remain silent - - -18 19 JUDGE READ: And that would have required 20 what here, again? To put - - -2.1 MR. BANASIAK: It would either require the 22 police advising Mr. Graham that he - - - that he had 23 this right, the police confirming with counsel that 24 he had advised Mr. Graham of this right, or - - -25

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: And your - - - your -

1	your rule adds to it that the subtext is
2	presence of counsel, in and of itself, is not enough.
3	MR. BANASIAK: Yes.
4	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay.
5	MR. BANASIAK: And and if if
6	that's
7	JUDGE RIVERA: Even even when the
8	meeting is requested by the defendant?
9	MR. BANASIAK: I think so. I you
10	know, there there might be cases where the
11	court holds that a defendant isn't in custody where
12	he he arrives with his attorney, but but
13	that's not what we're have here.
14	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, counsel. Let's
15	hear from your adversary, and then you'll have your
16	rebuttal time.
17	MR. MAXWELL: Good afternoon. James
18	Maxwell for the People, may it please the court.
19	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Counsel, can there
20	ever be a - a - a - an equivalent of Miranda?
21	What's what is what is an equi is
22	there an equivalent and if there is, what is it?
23	MR. MAXWELL: What happened here is, for
24	example. If you read
25	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: The presence of

1 counsel? 2 MR. MAXWELL: Yes. CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: That's enough in and 3 4 of itself. 5 MR. MAXWELL: Yes, and I'd - - -6 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Why? Go ahead. 7 MR. MAXWELL: Well, I'd ask you if you'd 8 look at page 466 of the Miranda decision, it talks 9 about that if counsel had been present in any of the four cases in front of the court when Miranda was 10 11 decided, counsel's presence would have been adequate. 12 It goes on to say that the presence of an attorney -13 14 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: What about Dickerson? 15 What does that case do? 16 MR. MAXWELL: Dickerson had to do with a 17 specific federal statute that tried to limit the 18 voluntariness inquiry, and on that score, I - - - I 19 can't explain it as well as the case from 20 Massachusetts, the Simon case, cited in the brief, 2.1 where it talks about - - - about Dickerson and it 22 says that - - -23 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yeah, isn't Dickerson 24 raising certainly red flags about equivalents to

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Miranda?

MR. MAXWELL: It does, but it - - -1 2 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: It - - -3 MR. MAXWELL: - - - also says - - - if you look at footnote 6 of that case, it says that we're 4 5 not - - - we're not looking at - - - that there's 6 only way one to do it. And here it was done 7 properly. 8 And you asked earlier to my opponent 9 whether your court had dealt with this, and I believe 10 you have. And I rely on People v. Beam, B-A-M (ph.) 11 12 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Did that deal with -13 14 MR. MAXWELL: - - - B-E-A-M. 15 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: - - - this issue? 16 Was that about Miranda right or the attachment to the 17 right to counsel? MR. MAXWELL: Well, I - - - I think it was 18 19 about both, and I'd refer to you to page - - - it's 20 at 57 NY2d 241, and the key page is page 254, where 2.1 your court wrote that "When a person has the benefit 22 of counsel and they choose to waive" one of his - - -23 "one of his rights, the police are not required to 24 question the validity of that decision as long as 25 they are assured" - - -

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: How do we know what -1 2 - - in these kinds of cases, how do we know what the 3 advice of counsel is? MR. MAXWELL: We don't with great 4 5 precision, although - - -6 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: I mean, I quess we 7 place a great premium - - -8 MR. MAXWELL: Right. 9 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: - - - on the, you 10 know, confidentiality privilege - - -11 MR. MAXWELL: Right. 12 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: - - - between the 13 attorney and client. So we didn't even know what the 14 advice is, so how could say that presence of counsel 15 itself is sufficient? 16 MR. MAXWELL: Because if there is an issue, 17 it's a - - - it's ineffective assistance of counsel 18 issue, and in a case like this, where the attorney 19 who represented him, who set up the meeting, 20 testified at the hearing, the defendant could have 2.1 asked him any of this, could have said, didn't you 22 sell me down the river? Didn't you tell me I had to 23 talk to the police? 24 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Counsel, I - - -25 MR. MAXWELL: But instead he asked no - - -

1 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: I'm sorry, counsel. 2 MR. MAXWELL: - - - I'm sorry. 3 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: You mentioned Beam, but didn't the defendant in Beam receive Miranda 4 5 warnings, even though he had counsel present, and 6 that's not what we have here, is it? 7 MR. MAXWELL: Well, here's what we had in 8 Beam. The defendant spoke to his attorney, knowing 9 the police wanted to speak to him. He then - - - the 10 attorney says, go ahead and talk to them. He goes 11 down and speaks to the Binghamton Police. They give 12 him a Miranda form, and before he signs it, the - - -13 the attorney's on the phone. The attorney tells the 14 police, it's okay for him to sign it. He just can't 15 sign a statement. It's okay for him to talk. And so 16 the attorney in that case had much less involvement 17 in - - - than - - - than here, and still, that was 18 sufficient as a - - - as a waiver. 19 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Well, I'm not talking 20 about the attorney's involvement. I'm talking about 2.1 the police giving this defendant Miranda warnings, 22 and that didn't happen here, at least the September 23 11th - - -24 MR. MAXWELL: Right.

JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: - - - session.

1 MR. MAXWELL: But what happened here is 2 they gave him Miranda warnings, which he waived on 3 August 22nd, and the last word was, you know, if you change your mind, and you want to help us, you know, 5 figure out who's distributing this counterfeit money, 6 go through your attorney. And that's exactly what he 7 did. 8 And so the police did nothing wrong at all 9 in when the - - - the - - - twenty days later the 10 attorney arranges to have this meeting - - -11 JUDGE STEIN: What - - - what if he never 12 got those original Miranda warnings? 13 MR. MAXWELL: I think the - - -14 JUDGE STEIN: Would it be a different 15 story? MR. MAXWELL: I think there would be - - -16 17 I think we would still have a compelling argument to 18 affirm in that - - -19 JUDGE STEIN: But you think it makes a 20 difference that he got the - - - the warnings three 2.1 weeks earlier. 22 MR. MAXWELL: I think it's something that 23 shouldn't be ignored. It's certainly is tremendously 24 in the People's favor.

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Are there any cases

1	that think that that's reasonable, three weeks?
2	MR. MAXWELL: Well, the
3	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Any cases that
4	support that?
5	MR. MAXWELL: the cases that talk
6	about the time changes or time limits are
7	usually when
8	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: They got them all
9	like twenty-four hours or something like that?
10	MR. MAXWELL: Yes, but but the
11	difference here is, that this was this was not
12	just a change of mind. It was is a
13	actually a concerted effort by the attorney to get
14	the person a better deal. And I think that you can't
15	ignore
16	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: The the
17	attorney didn't even stay for the whole proceeding.
18	MR. MAXWELL: Right, and that's what we
19	thought the issue was at the hearing. The the
20	court who handled this hearing, who the judge
21	who literally wrote the book on New York confessions
22	would have probably loved to write about this.
23	JUDGE PIGOTT: Does he have a pocket part?
24	No, never mind.

MR. MAXWELL: He'll do a new edition.

1 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Go ahead.

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MR. MAXWELL: But what we thought was a - - and he kept trying to steer the defendant towards,
well, let's talk about your Miranda rights, and
defendant didn't go there. And he's - - - and when
we came up to how long does the last - - - do the
rights last that were read in August - - - August
20th - - well, they last that day, and the People
may have to make a more sophisticated argument if - - if needed, but he never got to that.

JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: So you would agree with - - - you would agree with your adversary, then, that there was no preservation problem?

MR. MAXWELL: Oh, there's tremendous perseveration problem, because what - - - he made a general motion for a hearing. We get to the hearing, and he raises none of this - - - this by - - -

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Wasn't there an acknowledgement by the court that the warning on the first meeting is not enough?

MR. MAXWELL: The acknowledgement or the discussion of it was, for - - - for right now, we're going to say that that's what - - - that was a valid waiver of that day or that - - - the question was whether that was good that day. And if a - - - a

greater issue comes up, the People may have to make a more sophisticated argument.

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He then proceeds to do nothing with that.

He instead asks the officers things that really don't have to do with Miranda, and at the end of it, he makes a reasonable cause - - - a probable cause argument, and the judge cites Farrell. I believe he cited Farrell for the issue of the attorney leaving twenty minutes into the interview. Although, Farrell does - - - and I think correctly - - - interpret Beam as holding that it's very - - - it's completed.

JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Well, it's obviously that the defendant handled this himself. He was prose.

MR. MAXWELL: Yes.

JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: And so should he get any break because of that, or should we view this differently because he was pro se?

MR. MAXWELL: You should not view it differently. He made that decision. The court accepted that decision, doesn't raise that as an issue, other than I think in his reply brief now to your court, he - - - he makes some request that he be granted more slack or something. It - - - that's not appropriate. He made his decision, and he - - - he

1	decided what he wanted to argue, and his trial
2	testimony shows that he met with the attorney and
3	knew he didn't have to talk to them, but he but
4	he decided, after talking to the attorney, to do so.
5	So there this is not a real problem.
6	And it's not a preserved problem. And if I may, it's
7	also harmless. And if I may be just go on to explore
8	that for a moment?
9	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Why is it why
LO	is that harmless
L1	MR. MAXWELL: All right.
L2	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: if let's
L3	do that.
L4	MR. MAXWELL: The first time you talk to
L5	him, August 22nd, he mentions all kinds of things. I
L6	got money from my family, and I got friends.
L7	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Right, but counsel,
L8	what are the what are the
L9	MR. MAXWELL: And one of the people he
20	mentions
21	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Right, but then he
22	goes to the meeting
23	MR. MAXWELL: he mentions a character
24	named Taz.

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Right, right.

1 MR. MAXWELL: Between the two meetings - -2 3 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Go ahead. MR. MAXWELL: - - - the officers who work 4 5 these cases figure out that Taz (ph.), Cor - - -6 whose actual name is Cornealis (sic) Johnson, is 7 distributing the money with this serial number. All 8 the twenties he was using had the same serial number. 9 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Right, but why 10 doesn't that go to the argument that it is - - - is 11 harmless if you have the particular serial numbers 12 whether it's about the first usage - - - you know, 13 the motel or the convenience store, why - - - why 14 isn't that show that it - - - it's just the opposite 15 of harmless? That that's what nails this - - - this 16 case? 17 MR. MAXWELL: Because - - -18 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: The serial numbers, 19 yeah. 20 MR. MAXWELL: Because two things. One, 2.1 they had that information before the second 22 interview, and the thing he said at the second 23 interview was to say, well, yeah, I did meet with 24 Taz, but I didn't get money from him, so exculpatory

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thing to add on.

1	And more importantly, the the way the
2	verdict was delivered. The if they had
3	believed he had purchased the fake money and knew all
4	along it was fake, the jury wouldn't have acquitted
5	him of the first, the motel incident. But
6	instead, they ac they gave him the benefit of
7	the doubt on that, but in at least a little bit, to -
8	
9	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yeah, but why did
10	they convict them on the other piece
11	MR. MAXWELL: Because
12	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: the convenience
13	store?
14	MR. MAXWELL: Because when the police
15	officers from DeWitt says, you're spending phony
16	money here; don't do that. And two days later, he's
17	down at the convenience store and he spends one
18	twenty, and that seems to work, so he takes out
19	another one to buy some toothpaste, so he can walk
20	away with real money.
21	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: And that has nothing
22	to do with the serial numbers?
23	MR. MAXWELL: It does not have anything
24	_

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: We can pretty much be

assured of that?

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MR. MAXWELL: Yes, because it shows they gave him the benefit of the doubt, and when he knew the jury would know - - - he had no excuse for not knowing the second day under all these circumstances. So they gave him the benefit of the doubt on whether he had actually purchased the money and knew right away it was fake, or whether he had obtained it not knowing it was fake, and then used after a police officer said you're spending fake money here.

And --- so --- so it was --- it was unpreserved, without merit, and harmless. So I'd ask you to affirm.

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, thanks, counselor.

Counselor, rebuttal? Counselor, start with the harmless error.

MR. BANASIAK: Sure. I - - - I - - - well, first this is a Constitutional error, so it would have to be found harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, in other words, there's no reasonable possibility that this might have affected the verdict. And here we - - we have a key piece of evidence that connects Mr. Graham directly to - - -

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: The serial number?

1 MR. BANASIAK: The - - - the serial
2 numbers, actual contact with - - - with this
3 individual, so I think even if the jury didn't
4 believe that he actually obtained the money from him,
5 it would have shown that he very well had knowledge
6 that the money he possessed was - - - was
7 counterfeit.

JUDGE PIGOTT: Isn't Mr. Maxwell right in - when he cites to Beam, where it - - - and I'm

quoting - - it says, "The police in this case did

everything required to honor the defendant's right to

counsel. When told that he had been instructed by

his attorney to come and answer their questions, but

not sign anything, it was permissible for the police

to infer from the defendant's conduct that he agreed

with his attorney's advice. The attorney then cannot

be said to have waived the defendant's right to

counsel, but rather to have confirmed defendant's

waiver of his right to remain silent and the waiver

was made on the advice of counsel."

MR. BANASIAK: I respectfully submit that

Beam is - - - is - - - it's a right to counsel case.

I think - - - you know, Mr. Maxwell mentioned it - -

JUDGE PIGOTT: Well, that's right, but

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they're saying it's not a waiver of the right to

counsel, it's - - - the police had the right to

assume if you have your counsel, that - - - that with

his advice you've waived your right to remain silent

and - -
MR. BANASIAK: But - - but in Beam the -

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MR. BANASIAK: But - - - but in Beam the - - the defendant was actually read his rights, and - - and - - - which distinguishes it from this case.

The - - -

JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: But Beam was also cited in Farrell, which you say is a Miranda case, instead of a right - - - a waiver of counsel case.

MR. BANASIAK: That - - - that's true and our position is that Farrell mistakenly relied on Beam, and Farrell itself was - - - was incorrectly - - incorrectly decided, to the extent that the defendant there wasn't read his rights.

I think one point that maybe I did - - - I didn't address enough in - - in my brief, was the fact that - - - what - - - what Mr. Maxwell mentioned about the People had - - - or the defendant had the opportunity to question his attorney at the suppression hearing, but it's the People who have the burden to prove a knowing and voluntary waiver of - - - of a defendant's privilege against self-

incrimination. They called the attorney. They were 1 2 in a position to ask him whether he advised his client of his Constitutional rights. They - - -3 JUDGE READ: Aren't you kind of - - -5 aren't you kind of in a way - - - I mean, isn't this 6 sort of redundant? Or aren't you kind of - - - kind 7 of expanding Miranda? So you give the warning and then somebody shows up with the attorney and you ask 8 9 now, is this really what you - - - you know, you - -10 - you do it again, in effect? 11 MR. BANASIAK: I don't - - -12 JUDGE READ: Does that make any common 13 sense, I quess, is my question? 14 MR. BANASIAK: I - - - I respectfully 15 disagree. I think there's - - - there's an absence of proof here that he was advised by his attorney in 16 17 the first place of his rights. And I think if he - -18 - if he had been, the People could have easily 19 elicited that testimony from the - - - from the 20 attorney - - -2.1 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Isn't that what's 22 always hard to know, what he advised him? What I asked your adversary. Do we know what advice that 23 24 counsel gave him? Can we know?

MR. BANASIAK: I think as a general matter

1	we we probably wouldn't because a
2	hopefully if somebody's represented by counsel, they
3	would object at the suppression hearing based on the
4	attorney-client privilege, but I I think this
5	case demonstrates why we shouldn't infer that an
6	attorney advised his client. If an attorney doesn't
7	take the basic steps of of staying in an
8	inherently coercive environment with his client, I
9	don't think that we could infer that he took the
10	basic step of advising him of his rights in the first
11	place.
12	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, counsel.
13	Thanks, counsel.
14	MR. BANASIAK: Thank you.
15	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Thank you both.
16	Appreciate it.
17	(Court is adjourned)
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CERTIFICATION

I, Karen Schiffmiller, certify that the foregoing transcript of proceedings in the Court of Appeals of People v. Clifford Graham, No. 63, was prepared using the required transcription equipment and is a true and accurate record of the proceedings.

Hour Laboffmille.

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