1	COURT OF APPEALS
2	STATE OF NEW YORK
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4	PEOPLE,
5	Respondent,
6	-against-
7	No. 65 PERNELL A. FLANDERS,
8	Appellant.
9	
10	Syracuse University College of Law
11	950 Irving Ave Syracuse, NY 13244
12	March 25, 2015
13	Before: CHIEF JUDGE JONATHAN LIPPMAN
14	ASSOCIATE JUDGE SUSAN PHILLIPS READ ASSOCIATE JUDGE EUGENE F. PIGOTT, JR.
15	ASSOCIATE JUDGE JENNY RIVERA ASSOCIATE JUDGE SHEILA ABDUS-SALAAM
16	ASSOCIATE JUDGE LESLIE E. STEIN
17	Appearances:
18	JOHN J. RASPANTE, ESQ. THE LAW OFFICE OF JOHN J. RASPANTE
19	Attorney for Appellant 102 Lafayette Street
20	Suite 203 Utica, NY 13502
21	STEVEN G. COX, ADA
22	ONEIDA COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE Attorneys for Respondent
23	235 Elizabeth Street Utica, NY 13501
24	Penina Wolicki
25	Official Court Transcriber

1	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Let's go to number
2	65, People v. Flanders.
3	Okay, counsel. We're going to go to 65.
4	Do you want any rebuttal time, counsel?
5	MR. RASPANTE: No, thank you, Your Honor.
6	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: No rebuttal time. Go
7	ahead. You're on.
8	MR. RASPANTE: Your Honor, John may
9	it please the court. John
LO	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yes.
L1	MR. RASPANTE: Raspante on behalf of
L2	Pernell Flanders in the case of People of the State
L3	of New York v. Pernell Flanders, appealing
L4	convictions for attempted murder in the second
L5	degree, reckless endangerment, and attempted assault
L6	in the first degree, Your Honor.
L7	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: What's the problem
L8	here with the two guns and all of this? What's
L9	what is the heart of your argument?
20	MR. RASPANTE: Your Honor, the People
21	should have proven what they indicted him for. The
22	indictment was clear
23	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Does it really matter
24	which weapon they used based on that that
25	indictment?

1	MR. RASPANTE: Absolutely, Your Honor.
2	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Why?
3	MR. RASPANTE: Because this jury had to
4	make a determination as to whether one gun was used
5	or another gun was used or both. They should not
6	_
7	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Why did they have to
8	make that determination, and why isn't it just the
9	same vengeful impulse that treated and why
10	shouldn't we treat it as just one transaction? Why
11	is this not in sync with the indictment?
12	MR. RASPANTE: It's it's not a case
13	where this defendant had a a gun in his hand,
14	and a rifle strapped to his back. There was an
15	intervening incident there where he went back to the
16	vehicle to retrieve the rifle. There's a serious
17	question as to whether the gun created a serious
18	physical injury or whether it was the rifle.
19	JUDGE RIVERA: How long did it
20	JUDGE READ: That's a question.
21	JUDGE RIVERA: how long did it take
22	to go get the rifle?
23	MR. RASPANTE: Actually
24	JUDGE RIVERA: Or does that not matter?
25	MR. RASPANTE: I don't think it matters. I

think the case law is clear that - - - that the time 1 2 is not dispositive, but whether - - -3 JUDGE STEIN: But does the case law say that if he stops to - - - to reload his - - - the 4 5 same gun, that it's - - - it's two different - - -MR. RASPANTE: I think we're dealing with 6 7 two different - - -8 JUDGE STEIN: - - - acts? 9 MR. RASPANTE: - - - instances, in that 10 when he used his pistol, he was engaged in - - - in a 11 physical contact with the victim. He was losing ground. And the - - - also the victim's fiancee was 12 13 involved there. That's when he used the pistol. Then he went back to the vehicle to 14 15 retrieve his rifle. 16 JUDGE STEIN: But I'm talking about the 17 time frame. When is that - - - why is that different 18 from if he stops whatever he's doing and reloads his 19 ammunition and then continues to shoot, let's say it 20 was the same gun? 21 MR. RASPANTE: Um-hum. 22 JUDGE STEIN: There was a break in the 23 action, so to speak, but we don't say that those are 2.4 two different acts.

MR. RASPANTE: And for that reason, because

1	there's that break that break, the - the
2	the jury had to make this determination. And they
3	shouldn't have to be burdened by that. We don't know
4	if
5	JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Counsel, what was the
6	jury charged?
7	MR. RASPANTE: Pardon?
8	JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: What was the jury
9	charged?
10	MR. RASPANTE: They were
11	JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Don't they have to
12	make a determination
13	MR. RASPANTE: They were
14	JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: in light of the
15	charge given to them?
16	MR. RASPANTE: They were told an
17	instruction that mirrored the indictment, that the
18	People had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
19	the defendant used the gun and the rifle. And then
20	the judge constructively amended that when the jurors
21	asked could it be the gun, could it be the rifle,
22	could it be both?
23	That constructive amendment was improper.
24	That such an amendment required application by
25	the People, notice to the defendant, and there

1	shouldn't be any prejudice. And he was, in fact,
2	prejudiced by this. So
3	JUDGE PIGOTT: How was he prejudiced?
4	MR. RASPANTE: Because the jurors had to
5	make a determination as to whether did the gun
6	create serious physical injury, or the rifle, or
7	both. They should not have been put in that
8	position, Your Honor.
9	JUDGE PIGOTT: Well, your defense was
10	justification.
11	MR. RASPANTE: Well, you know, the
12	circumstances were different from the time he had to
13	use the pistol and he had to use the rifle.
14	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Anything else,
15	counselor?
16	MR. RASPANTE: No, Your Honor.
17	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Thank you.
18	MR. RASPANTE: Thank you.
19	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Appreciate it.
20	Counsel, come on up. Let's hear your
21	argument.
22	MR. COX: Thank you. May it please the
23	court, Steve Cox for the People, from Oneida County.
24	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Why doesn't it make a
25	difference which gun it is? What about unanimous

1	verdict and that kind of thing?
2	MR. COX: Because some of the cases this
3	court's had in the past in this area, I think focus
4	more on what a deadly weapon is. And here in
5	fact, Kaid, for instance.
6	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So as long as it's a
7	deadly weapon, it doesn't really matter?
8	MR. COX: Sure. So long as he possessed
9	the intent initially going in to cause serious
10	physical injury and death by use by means of a
11	deadly weapon, and that injury was caused by means of
12	a deadly weapon. The close causal connection
13	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Consistent enough
14	with the indictment, you believe?
15	MR. COX: I believe, yes. The close causal
16	conn
17	JUDGE RIVERA: So if he went if he
18	went back to get a machete?
19	MR. COX: I'm sorry?
20	JUDGE RIVERA: If he went back to get a
21	machete instead of a rifle?
22	MR. COX: If that
23	JUDGE RIVERA: Does it matter.
24	MR. COX: ended up sure. If
25	there was assuming there was evidence that a

1 machete was - - - or - - or - - or handgun caused 2 serious physical injuries, then yes. 3 So he possessed - - - he was in possession 4 of - - -5 JUDGE RIVERA: Regardless of the difference in the wounds? 6 7 MR. COX: I - - - well, in your 8 hypothetical, then, are there gunshots or machete 9 wounds? 10 JUDGE RIVERA: If - - - well, that's the 11 question, isn't it? MR. COX: So that would - - - that would be 12 13 a question of fact, then, for what is before the jury. Here we have fact - - - the facts spell out 14 15 that we have three casings found from a .380, a hand 16 gun, five from a rifle. The - - - Mr. Thorington is 17 wounded at least seven times. So - - - but you're 18 unable to determine forensically which bullet caused 19 which wound, or necessarily - - - you know, I don't 20 think that the statute requires the specificity of 21 knowing which bullet caused serious physical injury. JUDGE PIGOTT: Well, but it - - - it can be 22 23 argued, and I think defense counsel is arguing that, 2.4 you know, I don't want to say you overcharge people,

but you know, the - - - the number of charges - - - I

1 mean, it was, you know, a street fight - - - granted, 2 it was a street fight with - - - with weapons. 3 to charge all of those, and then - - - and then the 4 jury gets confused, and the court gave the 5 instruction that was different than the trial proof. 6 Because he said you can - - - you can convict him of 7 one or the other. MR. COX: Well, that's the - - -8 9 JUDGE PIGOTT: But you're arguing and - - -10 both. 11 MR. COX: I guess that's the concept I have 12 trouble with. I don't know that he changed anything 13 when he answered that question. I think he was 14 illuminating the charge he'd given them. The charge 15 was that you - - - the defendant had to be in 16 possession of a deadly weapon. 17 JUDGE PIGOTT: Is there a - - -18 MR. COX: Here it's a loaded firearm. 19 JUDGE PIGOTT: - - - what - - - but is it 20 conceivable that if you want - - - if you were trying 21 the case saying it was one or the other, and they 22 wanted to bring in forensics to say under no 23 circumstances was it the rifle - - -2.4 MR. COX: Sure, if - - -

JUDGE PIGOTT: - - - that would be a

defense they could have. And they didn't have - - -1 2 they didn't have that opportunity, because you're 3 arguing "and", you're trying "and" all the way through. So you know, it could be any number of 4 5 shell casings out there. And then the judge says, well, you don't 6 7 really have to find two, you can find one. MR. COX: There could have been - - - given 8 9 that - - - at the outset, let me say, this was not a 10 well worded indictment. I would not have put an 11 "and" and joined these two weapons. You could have 12 said and/or. You could have merely said "a loaded 13 weapon", and had - - - had a sufficient indictment. JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: And that's what the 14 15 judge actually gave - - - that's the instruction the 16 judge gave to the jury in response to their note, 17 isn't it? 18 MR. COX: Yes, I think so. 19 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Have we allowed that? 2.0 MR. COX: I'm sorry, what? 21 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Has - - - has this 22 court allowed that? 23 MR. COX: I think the judge simply 2.4 interpreted the "and" to mean that either of them

constituted - - - it's a little Zen here - - - but

1 either of them or together, they constituted a deadly 2 weapon under the definition of a loaded firearm. 3 doesn't - - - the statute doesn't make clear that the 4 loaded firearm you possess has to be singular. 5 Kaid, for instance, where this court's - -- I'm sorry - - - the Third Department said, but this 6 court didn't take up, whether - - - were there three 7 8 knives involved, whether they had to demonstrate 9 whether it was one or two of, or all three knives 10 that caused the injuries. But the fact that you were - - - someone was attacked with three knives and 11 caused - - - and they - - - and therefore resulted -12 13 14 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Were there any Court 15 of Appeals - - -16 MR. COX: - - - in serious physical injury. 17 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: - - - cases that say 18 the same thing or something similar? 19 MR. COX: Yes. 2.0 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: And what's your best 21 case for that? 22 MR. COX: I'm sorry, could you say that 23 again? 2.4 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Are there any Court of 25 Appeals cases that say something similar to the Kaid

case from the Third Department, and what's your best case for that?

MR. COX: Well, the logic, I think, is from Wells, where there was a charge of attempted murder, a singular charge of attempted murder of a police officer, but the defendant was firing at two police officers. The indictment didn't specify which police officer the defendant was trying to kill, but this court said that wasn't necessary.

And here, I don't think - - - I think it's the same thing. It doesn't matter which weapon - - the defendant didn't intend to cause serious physical injury with the .380 but not the .22, and it's not necessary to find that he joined the two and only intended to cause serious physical injury if he hit him with both. It's that he possessed these two wea - - - instruments, these two loaded firearms, and as a result of that attack, serious physical injury was inflicted by means of a loaded firearm, which is a deadly weapon.

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Counselor, anything else?

> Thank you. MR. COX: No.

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, thank you.

(Court is adjourned)

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CERTIFICATION I, Penina Wolicki, certify that the foregoing transcript of proceedings in the Court of Appeals of People v. Pernell A. Flanders, No. 65 was prepared using the required transcription equipment and is a true and accurate record of the proceedings. Penina waich. Signature: Agency Name: eScribers Address of Agency: 700 West 192nd Street Suite # 607 New York, NY 10040 Date: April 2, 2015