1	COURT OF APPEALS
2	STATE OF NEW YORK
3	
4	PEOPLE
5	Respondent,
6	-against-
7	
8	JAFARI LAMONT
9	Appellant.
10	20 Eagle Street
11	Albany, New York 12207 March 26, 2015
12	Before:
13	CHIEF JUDGE JONATHAN LIPPMAN ASSOCIATE JUDGE SUSAN PHILLIPS READ
14	ASSOCIATE JUDGE EUGENE F. PIGOTT, JR. ASSOCIATE JUDGE JENNY RIVERA
15	ASSOCIATE JUDGE SHEILA ABDUS-SALAAM ASSOCIATE JUDGE LESLIE E. STEIN
16	Appearances:
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25	Sharona Shapiro Official Court Transcriber

1	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Number 68, People v.
2	Lamont.
3	Counselor, do you want any rebuttal time?
4	MS. SOMES: Good afternoon. I'd like three
5	minutes, please.
6	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Three minutes. Go
7	ahead.
8	MS. SOMES: Janet Somes on behalf of Jafari
9	Lamont.
10	JUDGE PIGOTT: I was tempted to ask, and I
11	guess I will ask, where's the beef?
12	MS. SOMES: Where's the beef?
13	JUDGE PIGOTT: I'm sorry.
14	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Proceed, counselor.
15	JUDGE READ: Don't encourage him.
16	MS. SOMES: I'm not sure what to do now.
17	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: The best the
18	best solution is
19	JUDGE PIGOTT: Just ignore it.
20	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: keep going.
21	JUDGE READ: Keep going.
22	MS. SOMES: I'm going to keep going.
23	JUDGE READ: Keep going.
24	MS. SOMES: It's probably well, it
25	might be fair to say that my client and his companion

were up to no good behind the Wendy's in the early 1 morning hours of November 1st. Precisely what kind -2 3 4 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: And why can't we 5 determine what no - - - or why couldn't the jury 6 determine what no good they were up to by the way 7 they did it, as opposed to the way your client says 8 that they were - - - they could have been doing any 9 number of things, like raping somebody or assaulting 10 an employee or something else, at the back door, when 11 people come in the front door - - - when the 12 employees come in the front door. 13 MS. SOMES: Because there's just no - - -14 there's no evidence that - - - that gets you over the 15 line to saying that there is an intent to steal here. 16 What we've got is activity that is - - - is 17 absolutely equivocal. And we've got circumstances -18 19 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yeah, but why can't 20 you - - -2.1 MS. SOMES: - - - that are clearly 22 equivocal. 23 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: - - - infer it? Why 24 can't you infer it? I mean, I don't know what the

hell else they might be doing there.

MS. SOMES: Well - - -

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CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: I understand what you say, as Judge Abdus-Salaam just said, but why can't you infer this most basic crime that - - - that one would, looking at, you know, when they were there, what they were wearing, how close they were to the restaurant, why couldn't you just infer it? Why is that different than Bracey or, you know, other cases along these lines, where you infer a particular crime?

MS. SOMES: Because in Bracey, there was - - there was at- - - there was conduct that was
unique and common to - - - to robberies that took it
over the line. The people in Bracey actually went
into the store, they walked around, they looked
around, they bought two cents' worth of gum and then
they, you know, looked at the register - - -

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yeah, but you - -
MS. SOMES: - - - they left, they came back

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: But you could make a pretty good case, as was made, that - - - that they're there at some ungodly hour where they know that they're - - - they might know that people are there but they haven't opened yet. They're very

1	close to so close they're they're
2	knocking on the door. Why why is that so
3	remote?
4	MS. SOMES: Because they have to
5	JUDGE RIVERA: They've got ski masks,
6	they've got gloves, the car is parked a certain
7	distance away, they've got the fake firearms. It
8	sounds pretty
9	MS. SOMES: Because it has to be
10	JUDGE RIVERA: good there.
11	MS. SOMES: it has to be proven
12	beyond a reasonable doubt, and here there is doubt.
13	There's doubt primarily because or in part
14	because
15	JUDGE RIVERA: As a matter of law.
16	MS. SOMES: As a matter of law there's
17	doubt here. There are all sorts of other things that
18	they could have been doing. And as this court has
19	said, on Appellate review, the court must look and
20	see whether or not the fact finder could rationally
21	have excluded the innocent explanations. In in
22	our case it wouldn't be an innocent explanation; it
23	might be some other
24	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Nefarious.
25	MS. SOMES: malfeasance. But

1 but that's the - - - that's what needs to happen - -2 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Well, couldn't - - -3 MS. SOMES: - - - here in order - - -4 5 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: On that point, counsel, couldn't the jury have excluded the 6 7 explanation of assaulting any of the employees 8 because each employee got on the stand at trial and 9 said, I don't know him from Jack, you know, so - - -10 MS. SOMES: What the employees were 11 actually asked were do you know an individual by the 12 name of Jafari Lamont? And they said no. 13 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: But he was sitting 14 right there at counsel table. 15 MS. SOMES: No one asked him if - - - if -16 - - have you ever seen this guy before, and there was 17 - - - his companion was never apprehended. So we have no idea whether or not the employees - - - there 18 19 might have been some sort of prior relationship; 20 there might have been some sort of prior beef between 2.1 the two. 22 JUDGE RIVERA: Well, they could have been 23 hired also. 24 MS. SOMES: Or they - - - they could have 25 been hired, yes, absolutely. So we don't - - - we

don't know. In - - - in Bracey, that has been - - that was excluded, because they asked - - - they
asked the - - - the two men were apprehended, they
were seen by the complainant in that case, and there
was no prior relationship. And so therefore, in
Bracey, you could exclude that; it was reasonable to
exclude that other - - - other possibility. And here
we don't have that.

I would argue that Bracey - - - if - - - if you look at the spectrum, from proof - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: Well, Bracey is - - - those particular defendants attempting something in - - - in the open space, in - - - in a particular time of day. But this is just a crime that's, as the chief has already mentioned, at a different time of day. So the - - - what you're calling the - - - the commonality of a particular way of conducting yourself to commit the crime in Bracey, because of the time of day, because of the space, is different, because you're committing the crime in a different time and in a different space in a different way. But there's a commonality to it, right, the ski mask, the banging at the door at a certain hour, the car parked the way, the - - -

MS. SOMES: That's a - - -

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JUDGE RIVERA: Why isn't that a commonality to that crime?

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MS. SOMES: Because it can be a commonality to so many other things. I mean, it could be a commonality to - - - the car was parked in a parking lot next door, as opposed to - - - so - - - so that doesn't really tell us anything. I mean, if these two had - - you know, were being chased by somebody, they ditched the car, they wanted to be hiding, they'd leave it there. You know, it would make more sense, if they were going to rob someone, that one of them would stay in the car and be ready, as in Bracey, to drive by, and after the deed was done, hop in - - so that he could hop in the car and they could get away. So we really are so far away from - - - from the facts in Bracey.

And Bracey, I think, really is the - -
the extreme on the spectrum. It's - - - it's the -
- the outer boundary when it comes to speculation -
- you know, that spectrum of speculation to - - - to

solid facts to support an inference. We've got

Bracey that's - - - that's way over here as the outer

bound. And if - - - if - - - under the facts of this

case, if - - - if this is found to be legally

sufficient, I would argue that we then muddy the

water and - - - and we're putting a lot of cases at
risk where - - - where we're going to have
convictions where there is no intent proven beyond a
reasonable doubt.

And in People v. Castillo, the - - - this

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And in People v. Castillo, the - - - this court has said that the foundation for the findings, and the facts and the inferences that are drawn, must be so reasonable that they cannot be confused with mere conjecture or suspicion. And here that's all we have is conjecture or suspicion.

The other alternatives here are real, unfortunately. There are a lot of threats with guns. There are people - - - you know, they want to get their way, they want to send a message. There is an awful lot of use of violence and guns. And therefore, we cannot rule out something other than - - we can't rule out something other than a larceny being the - - being the intent here.

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, thanks, counsel.

MS. SOMES: Thank you.

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Counselor?

MS. MERVINE: Thank you. May it please the court. Leah Mervine on behalf of the People of Monroe County.

I would just note to this court that this 1 2 case is the 2008 equivalent of 1977's Bracey. And as 3 Judge Rivera was speaking about, in terms of Bracey -- - and they term it reconnoiter because there is 4 5 this casing of the store - - - you need that, in that 6 case, because all you have in Bracey is a storeowner 7 who's already reported conduct to the police that he 8 deems somewhat - - -9 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: What about your 10 adversary's contention that they could be doing a lot 11 of things? Why is it particularly that they're going 12 to rob - - - rob this or steal? What - - - why - - -13 why do we - - - why can we infer that, rather than, I 14 don't know, they're waiting to beat up one of the 15 workers, or who knows what - - - what deviants they 16 might be? Why - - - why do we assume that they're 17 stealing? 18 MS. MERVINE: We are not assuming anything. 19 We are looking at the facts and making the inferences 20 that logically flow - - -2.1 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yeah, but that's what 22 I'm asking you; isn't there - - -23 MS. MERVINE: Correct. 24 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: - - - just as - - -

as strong inferences that they're doing something

1 else? So how do we know it's stealing? 2 MS. MERVINE: This is how we know it's 3 stealing: because they're at a store at 6:30 in the 4 morning, before the store is open to the public. 5 There is an employee who knocks on the back door, 6 He's entered into the restaurant by the 7 other employees inside. A short time later, these 8 two men are standing at the back door of a commercial 9 establishment that is closed to the public, carrying 10 nonlethal weapons, as was carried in Bracey as well. 11 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Maybe they want to 12 beat up Justin. Maybe that's what they were doing; 13 they were following Justin and they want to beat him 14 up - - -MS. MERVINE: And if that was the case - -15 16 17 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: - - - assault him. 18 MS. MERVINE: - - - then the evidence would 19 have showed that they would have intercepted him, 20 perhaps, before he went in. 2.1 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Maybe he was too 22 quick; he got inside before they could - - - I'm just 23 24 MS. MERVINE: Right - - -25 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: - - - trying to - - -

1	MS. MERVINE: but the
2	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: say that
3	aren't there other explanations, not as your
4	adversary admits, not necessarily innocent
5	expectations, given
6	MS. MERVINE: Right.
7	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: the masks and
8	all that business, but why why isn't it just
9	as, you know why couldn't we just as easily
LO	suggest lots of other scenarios here?
L1	MS. MERVINE: The strongest reason is
L2	because it fits the fact pattern of commercial
L3	robberies.
L4	JUDGE PIGOTT: It struck me too that it fit
L5	the pattern of attempted burglary.
L6	MS. MERVINE: And again, that was a charge
L7	that was charged, the
L8	JUDGE PIGOTT: It was charged
L9	MS. MERVINE: the fact finders
20	JUDGE PIGOTT: and he was found not
21	guilty, so I was
22	MS. MERVINE: did not
23	JUDGE PIGOTT: curious, he's found
24	not guilty of attempting to enter or remain
25	unlawfully on in a building, and yet, he's

convicted of attempted robbery. I - - - I don't 1 2 know, you know, maybe - - - maybe he was a disappointed job seeker and he wanted to go beat up 3 the manager. Could you have charged him with 4 5 attempted rape? 6 MS. MERVINE: 7 JUDGE PIGOTT: Why not? 8 MS. MERVINE: You don't have the facts to 9 support an attempted rape. That would - - -10 JUDGE PIGOTT: What's missing? 11 MS. MERVINE: You are missing any nexus 12 between those two individuals and the restaurant. 13 And I would point out - - -14 JUDGE PIGOTT: Well - - -15 MS. MERVINE: - - - in Bracey - - -JUDGE PIGOTT: - - - were there any females 16 17 in the restaurant? 18 MS. MERVINE: Not at the time the two had 19 initially arrived; there were not. 20 JUDGE PIGOTT: Is that the reason why? 2.1 MS. MERVINE: No, not necessarily. Rape 22 could be perpetuated against males. But again, that 23 would call for sheer speculation. Here they have 24 nonlethal weapons with them, they've parked their car 25 quite a distance away. There's no evidence of a

kidnap, for instance. They're not seeking to pull 1 2 somebody into a vehicle. 3 JUDGE PIGOTT: Well, you're talking 4 attempted. 5 MS. MERVINE: Correct. 6 JUDGE PIGOTT: It could be attempted 7 kidnapping. 8 MS. MERVINE: It could not be, under these facts. And that would call for sheer speculation, 9 10 and you can't do that. What you have to do is take 11 the facts that we have. We have - - -12 JUDGE PIGOTT: Suppose, suppose they were 13 hungry. 14 MS. MERVINE: Then they should have waited 15 till 10 o'clock when the restaurant opened and went to the front door. And that's - - -16 17 JUDGE RIVERA: And not worn the ski mask. 18 MS. MERVINE: And not worn the ski masks. 19 They're there in masks, covered head to toe in 20 clothing, dark clothing. They both have nonlethal 2.1 weapons. 22 JUDGE RIVERA: So if we disagree with you, 23 what, if anything, could you - - - another - another 24 - - - the same scenario, the day after the decision

comes down, agreeing with - - - with defense - - -

defendant. What, if anything, could you charge that next group that does the exact same thing?

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MS. MERVINE: And I think that's a public policy concern. And in Miller, this court said that attempted criminal conduct is a danger to organized society, and therefore, independently culpable, even though the intended result does not ensue. And I think that's really critical here. What we have are all of the facts that fit an attempted robbery. only thing that stopped or thwarted them was the ingenuity of the two people inside knowing that they were both there and no further employees were coming. So they checked the monitors before opening the door. Had they opened that door, there would have been a robbery. And for us to say that those facts don't fit the robbery, for the police then to respond and see two gentlemen in ski masks at 6:30 in the morning, when the restaurant doesn't open till 10:30, and say, oh, yeah, you were up to no good, but we'll just let you go home now, it doesn't comport with a civilized society. It doesn't provide justice.

Here, there is proof beyond a reasonable doubt, as found by a fact finder. This case fully comports with Bracey. And I just really wanted to point out, in Bracey, there was a third codefendant

that got away, and the store owner said that he was not familiar with that person. So we don't know, in Bracey, maybe there was some attenuated - - - or some goal to - - to have some type of assault or some other thing. And in Bracey they considered all of those things, but what they looked at were the most obvious things. And here this fits the fact pattern of a commercial robbery. You have the consciousness of guilt, of flight of the defendant, who flees across a highway and then through a commer - - - or through a residential neighborhood and over another highway. He's found with a backpack in which he could collect the goods. He's found with, again, two nonlethal weapons.

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JUDGE PIGOTT: He's found with a backpack to do what?

 $$\operatorname{MS.}$ MERVINE: To collect the - - - the goods from the robbery, the proceeds.

JUDGE PIGOTT: I thought it was full of clothing.

MS. MERVINE: It was not full of clothing.

The only item of clothing that was recovered in the backpack was one spare pair of gloves. And again, why wear gloves if you're there for another purpose?

You're there because you're going to be touching

1	things; you're going to be taking the cash. And we
2	would ask this court to uphold the Appellate
3	Division.
4	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay. Thank you,
5	counselor.
6	MS. MERVINE: Thank you.
7	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Counselor, rebuttal?
8	MS. SOMES: Very quickly. First, this does
9	not fit the pattern of a of a commercial
10	robbery.
11	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: What about it does
12	not fit that pattern?
13	MS. SOMES: Because we we don't have
14	what exactly that pattern is, I I don't
15	think is is established at all. You know, we
16	had a pattern of of basic
17	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: She's just explained
18	the different things that she thinks leads one
19	MS. SOMES: We had
20	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: to infer that
21	that's what they were doing.
22	MS. SOMES: First of all, this was
23	this was a these guys there were two guys
24	hanging out in back of the - the the Wendy's.
25	They they did it they were there for at

1	least twenty-five, thirty-five minutes. That is not
2	a typical pattern of a robbery that you go and you
3	hang out and you look at then you look at what
4	they're doing. They're looking through the door.
5	They keep going back. I mean, if you look at the
6	video, it's it's kind of curious. They
7	they go, they look through the window, and then
8	they're looking away. And at one point, one of the -
9	one of the peo one of the guys actually
10	gets down on the ground, and he's looking outwards,
11	away from the building, like he's looking for someone
12	you know, is someone coming after
13	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Well, you know,
14	robbers are not necessarily the smartest people in
15	the world. Maybe they can't figure out exactly how
16	to do it, you know?
17	MS. SOMES: We just their conduct
18	here just doesn't even come close to the line. I do
19	agree with
20	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: To what line?
21	MS. SOMES: To the line where that it
22	that it's no longer speculation.
23	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: I see.
24	MS. SOMES: That it doesn't
25	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay.

1	MS. SOMES: come there.
2	JUDGE PIGOTT: You're saying it's
3	conceivable they could have been waiting for somebod
4	to come, that they were then going to, let's assume,
5	rob, I mean, the manager or, you know, somebody else
6	MS. SOMES: They could have been doing
7	anything; we don't know. That's that's the
8	whole point. They could have doing
9	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: They could have been
10	
11	MS. SOMES: anything.
12	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: going skiing,
13	right?
14	MS. SOMES: We don't know.
15	JUDGE READ: Well, that
16	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: What month of the
17	year was it?
18	MS. SOMES: the ski mask
19	JUDGE READ: Does it make does it
20	make any difference, in your view, that it was
21	Halloween?
22	MS. SOMES: Well, I think that's curious,
23	because there are a lot of prank there's a lot
24	of pranking going on, and maybe they were just a
25	little delayed and it's a few hours later. But I

1	think that that's
2	JUDGE RIVERA: Full firearms.
3	MS. SOMES: interesting. Well, they
4	
5	JUDGE RIVERA: And the gloves too?
6	MS. SOMES: they had BB guns. They -
7	they were BB guns, and you know, as someone who
8	gets a lot of trick-or-treaters, we see guns coming -
9	coming by.
LO	But the statement that had had the
L1	door opened there would have been a robbery is one
L2	that I just don't see sustained by the proof at all.
L3	JUDGE PIGOTT: Well, and the one thing we
L4	do know, because of the acquittal, is they weren't
L5	hamburglars.
L6	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay. Thank you
L7	both.
L8	MS. SOMES: Thank you.
L9	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Appreciate it.
20	(Court is adjourned)
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$\texttt{C} \; \texttt{E} \; \texttt{R} \; \texttt{T} \; \texttt{I} \; \texttt{F} \; \texttt{I} \; \texttt{C} \; \texttt{A} \; \texttt{T} \; \texttt{I} \; \texttt{O} \; \texttt{N}$

I, Sharona Shapiro, certify that the foregoing transcript of proceedings in the Court of Appeals of People v. Lamont, No. 68, was prepared using the required transcription equipment and is a true and accurate record of the proceedings.

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