1	COURT OF APPEALS
2	STATE OF NEW YORK
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4	PEOPLE,
5	Respondent, (Papers Sealed)
6	-against-
7	No. 152 WILLIE L. WRAGG,
8	Appellant.
9	
10	20 Eagle Street Albany, New York 12207 October 13, 2015
11	October 13, 2015
12	Before:
13	CHIEF JUDGE JONATHAN LIPPMAN ASSOCIATE JUDGE EUGENE F. PIGOTT, JR.
14	ASSOCIATE JUDGE JENNY RIVERA ASSOCIATE JUDGE SHEILA ABDUS-SALAAM
15	ASSOCIATE JUDGE LESLIE E. STEIN
16	
17	Appearances:
18	SHIRLEY A. GORMAN, ESQ. LAW OFFICES OF SHIRLEY A. GORMAN
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20	Brockport, NY 14420
21	GEOFFREY KAEUPER, ADA
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24	
25	Sara Winkeljohn Official Court Transcriber

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Number 152, People v.

Wragg.

One second, counsel.

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Counsel, go ahead. Would you like any rebuttal time?

MS. GORMAN: Yes, Your Honor, one minute.

Shirl - - -

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: One minute, go ahead.

MS. GORMAN: Shirley Gorman for Mr. Wragg, if - - - Willie Wragg, if it please the court. This case demonstrates two things that are unfortunately not uncommon in child sex crime cases, and that is when a prosecutor's tactics and misconduct go unchecked, that constitutes the ineffective assistance of counsel, and that was true in the Fisher case and true in this court's Wright decision from July 1st of this year. And this case also demonstrates that the legislature gives prosecutors discretion in child sex crime cases to avoid the worst sentences, gives them a safety valve. This legislation started out as mandatory for all second child sexual abuse offenders, assault offenders, and it was a life sentence. It was to be sentenced as an A-1, and this is the statute that - - -

JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Are you talking about

1 the CPL now, counsel, or the Penal Law? 2 MS. GORMAN: The Penal Law. 3 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: The Penal Law. MS. GORMAN: The Penal Law. But that's - -4 5 - the - - - the Penal Law section came in with the CPL section, and the CPL section said what all of the 6 7 other laws say which is, if information available to 8 the court or to the prosecutor prior to sentencing 9 shows this person might be a second offender, a 10 persistent violent felony offender, the People must 11 file a statement. This statute was changed; that 12 language was deleted to say before trial commences, 13 if information's available to the People, they may file, and that - - -14 15 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So we have to 16 strictly construe that? 17 MS. GORMAN: I believe you do because I believe it was a deliberate choice and it was for 18 19 legitimate reasons. Because these sentences are so 20 harsh, if a prosecutor wants to prosecute someone 21 without using that status, it gives them the ability 22 to do that. 23 JUDGE STEIN: But doesn't the Penal Law say 2.4 that if the requirements are met of the - - - the

previous crimes, previous convictions, that they must

be sentenced - - - receive an enhanced sentencing? 1 2 MS. GORMAN: It says they must be sentenced 3 if the procedure in 400.19 is used, and the procedure 4 in 400.19 is the process that says it may be filed. 5 So I submit that if a prosecutor looks at a case and says I want a plea out of this case and I know I'm 6 7 not going to get it if this person is treated as a second child sexual assault offender, so I'm not 8 9 filing that thing, I am going to arrange a plea 10 bargain where he's treated as an ordinary second 11 offender. 12 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Was Mr. Wragg offered 13 a plea in this case or did he seek one? 14 MS. GORMAN: No, and it's clear on - - at 15 the record on page 591 - - -16 JUDGE RIVERA: No - - - no to which? 17 MS. GORMAN: Hum? JUDGE RIVERA: No to which? Does he want -18 19 20 MS. GORMAN: No, neither. There was no 21 mention at any point in this record about any plea 22 from arraignment until sentencing. 23 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: So he wasn't 2.4 evaluating anything about whether to take a plea or 25 to go to trial?

1	MS. GORMAN: Right, but his attorney
2	JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: He was always planning
3	to go to trial?
4	MS. GORMAN: Yes.
5	JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: And and your
6	position is 70.07 of the Penal Law says he must be
7	sentenced as a a predicate offender for this
8	type of crime only if the prosecutor abides by CPL
9	400.19?
10	MS. GORMAN: And files before a trial.
11	JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: And where's this
12	JUDGE STEIN: Well, why does that I'm
13	sorry.
14	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Judge Abdus
15	Judge Abdus-Salaam.
16	JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: I I just, you
17	know
18	MS. GORMAN: And again, in at 591 in
19	the record, this lawyer says this never came up, we
20	never talked about this status at all. And there are
21	reasons to require the People to provide that notice
22	before the trial commences.
23	JUDGE STEIN: But how does your how
24	does your your theory of this apply if
25	because the stat 400.19 says "any time before

1 trial commences." So what if the plea bargaining 2 process has already taken place and there's a plea 3 and - - - and it's never mentioned or anything, do -4 - - when - - - when does this come into play then? 5 MS. GORMAN: For - - - for a plea, I submit 6 they don't have to file it, and for a trial they 7 don't have to file it. They may file it, they may 8 choose not to file it to treat this offender that 9 way. But - - -10 JUDGE STEIN: But what if they - - - what 11 if they make an offer, it's rejected, and they say 12 okay, now we're going to trial and now we're going to 13 --- we're --- we're --- we're going to ---14 MS. GORMAN: Perfectly appropriate, and I 15 think that's a safety valve. 16 JUDGE STEIN: But how does that - - - how 17 does that effectuate the purpose that you say is for the timing of all this? 18 19 MS. GORMAN: That's the safety valve for 20 them to work a plea if they need one with regular 21 status, but if they have to go forward with trial, to 22 use the higher stakes and it puts the defendant on 23 notice and it avoids retaliation after the trial. JUDGE PIGOTT: Well, there's - - - there's 2.4

two questions that arise with that, Ms. Gorman.

of them is that if - - - if the plea isn't being worked out, they can file it at any time before jury selection, so if the plea falls apart and they say, hey, your loss, we're filing it, you - - - you have nothing to say. I - - - I - - - I get concerned that you say it's - - - it's a - - - it's a - - - I don't want to say a tactic, but it's a - - - it's a weapon that the People can use, but - - - and you're insisting that they - - - they use it. You're saying from now on, if the Court of Appeals says so, file that notice every single time, because, you know, if you - - - if you don't, the Court of Appeals is going to say you can't. So if I was the DA if - - - and we were to find your way, I'd - - - I'd photocopy them.

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MS. GORMAN: Well, I think that's the People's argument is that it's required in every single case. My argument, it's never required. It's discretion for the People like sexual misconduct versus rape.

JUDGE PIGOTT: No, but what I'm saying is you're - - - you're suggesting to us that we make a decision favorable to your client that will then tell the People, under no circumstances are you not to file, because even though it says discretionary, the Court of Appeals is going to throw you out of court

1 if you don't file it. You can always withdraw it, 2 but file it. And I'm not sure that that's what we 3 want to do. 4 MS. GORMAN: Well, I'm not sure they can 5 withdraw it; there's no statutory authority to withdraw it. 6 7 JUDGE PIGOTT: Why would you object? MS. GORMAN: Well, of course, no one would 8 9 object, but - - -10 JUDGE PIGOTT: So yes, they can withdraw 11 it. MS. GORMAN: Well, I would submit they have 12 13 to file it before trial to show that they're not 14 being vindictive; to make sure that the attorney's 15 behavior, the defense attorney - - - if I'm a defense 16 attorney and they haven't filed this notice but they 17 can and I'm in a middle of a trial and I'm worried 18 that my decisions somehow are going to result in them 19 invoking that power, I would be very concerned. 20 JUDGE RIVERA: But counsel let - - -21 MS. GORMAN: I think that's a good reason 22 23 JUDGE RIVERA: Counsel, let me just ask 2.4 you; let - - - let's just stay with the text as

opposed to speculating about anything. So let - - -

as I take it, some of - - - some of what you've said strikes me as a little bit of speculation, but let me just stay with the text. So tell me why this - - - this attempt to harmonize these two sections does not make sense.

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70.07 is mandatory; once someone is convicted who falls in this category, it's mandatory enhancement, you have to follow the procedures to get this mandatory enhancement, and that means that they have to file the statement. And all that 419 - - - 400.19 does is set out the procedure, but it allows the possibility for the prosecutor to file the statement before someone is convicted, because 70.07 only applies to someone who's convicted. All that 400.19(2) - - I believe it's (2) - - does is allow for them to file this statement before someone is convicted. Why - - why can't you harmonize these two statutes this way?

MS. GORMAN: Well, because the legislature changed the language that's in every other statute like this. And they used language that is in no other statue, "may". And so they were changing the law, they were allowing the People - - nothing would prevent the People from filing it in a second felony offender now before a trial. So why use may?

1 JUDGE RIVERA: Well, no, but - - - but no, 2 no, no - - - but - - - well, okay, I'm sorry. 3 Doesn't it say it has to be for someone who's convicted? Have I misread the statute? How can you 4 5 file it if someone's not yet been convicted if there's still a trial? What did I miss in the 6 7 statute? 8 MS. GORMAN: Well, I think the - - - again, 9 they changed this law as it was going along, and is 10 it inartfully written? Yes, clearly, because - - -JUDGE RIVERA: Well, all I'm suggesting is 11 12 that there might be very well a way to look at the 13 text and say no, there's not a mistake, it - - - it -14 - - it is clear. When someone's convicted, this is 15 what happens, but there is this one opportunity for 16 the prosecution to proceed before conviction. And 17 they may, but that doesn't mean you don't enhance the statute; that doesn't mean you don't have to have the 18 19 statement before the sentencing. 20 MS. GORMAN: But there - - - the statute 21 says, before trial commences. It doesn't say before 22 - - - right, I know. 23 JUDGE RIVERA: I understand, because at 2.4 that point, there's no one convicted.

MS. GORMAN: Right, right. And that's the

1 People's argument. 2 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, counsel. 3 MS. GORMAN: Thank you. 4 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: You'll have your 5 rebuttal. Counsel. 6 7 MR. KAEUPER: Yes, Your Honor, Geoffrey Kaeuper for the People, and that - - - that is indeed 8 9 my argument and - - - and said better than - - - than 10 I've managed to say it. 11 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: But what's the purpose, counsel, of - - - of the "may" or the 12 13 discretion as opposed to "must file"? MR. KAEUPER: Right, I think - - - I think 14 15 it - - - it has to do with the fact that these are very harsh punishments, and so this - - - this allows 16 17 for a procedure where you can adjudicate that before 18 the trial so the defendant then - - - you know, if -19 - - if there's a question about whether or not the -20 - - these provisions would apply to - - - to the 21 defendant after a conviction, the defendant can 22 figure that out ahead of time and - - - and he can 23 have an accurate assessment of his exposure before

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going to trial.

JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: But that didn't happen

here because no statement was filed before the trial.

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MR. KAEUPER: That's - - - that's correct, and if - - - and - - - and so - - - I mean, that is -- - the - - - the prosecutor, by not filing a statement - - - and this - - - this is true regardless of what predicate says - - - the prosecutor, by not putting the defendant's exposure on the record, leaves - - - leaves herself open to a potential - - - what is it, Lafler v. Cooper and Missouri v. Frye problem. We get those 440s all the time where the defendant says, hey I - - - I was misadvised about my exposure ahead of time, and so that can be a problem. Here, I don't think there was any - - - any consideration on either side about a -- - about a plea. So I think that didn't really come in - - -

That's this case. The - - - the - - - you know, the - - - the - - - we - - - we've got to deal with this statute and it seems to suggest that you do it before trial, and in fact it says so. So Ms. - - - Ms. Gorman had a - - - a look at it that's a little bit different and - - - and I - - - and I can see that. You know, halfway through the trial, you guys decide, you know, I think we really got this case in the bag, we're now going to

file it, and we're going to put this guy away for a lot longer than we would have at the beginning when we weren't sure we had a - - - as strong a case.

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I pictured it - - - I don't know if I'm thinking like a legislator or what - - - as saying, if that first one is not like the second one, if, for whatever reason, the - - - the - - - the child was - - - the circumstances were much different, they say we're - - - we're not going - - - we're not going to press this, you know, we're - - - we're just going to go for the - - - you know, for the one, they make that determination early and then - - - then they're done.

MR. KAEUPER: But that's only if it's discretionary. I mean, I - - I don't think it's discretionary. So if it's not discretionary, then - - I mean, the defense attorney has an obligation to - - and that's - - that's the Coop - - - the Lafler v. Cooper - - - the - - - the defense attorney has an obligation to inform his client about his - - his accurate exposure and so forth, so you just don't have to adjudicate it necessarily beforehand.

JUDGE PIGOTT: I'm missing that. You said it's not discretionary?

MR. KAEUPER: I - - - I don't think it is

1 discretionary. I think 70.07 makes it mandatory. 2 --- if you are a predicate, it --- you --- you 3 must be sentenced as predicate. And I think counsel 4 - - - counsel says that it says something like you 5 must if the CPL provisions apply. If you look at - -6 - if you compare 70.07 versus the other predicate 7 sentencing statutes in - - - in Article 70, the other 8 ones actually say something closer to that. This one 9 starts out and it says, if - - - if you have a 10 predicate - - - some - - - something like if you have 11 a predicate conviction, you must be, whereas the 12 other ones say, if the CPL procedures in 400-whatever 13 it is for each one are met, then you must be. Here 14 it's more emphatically this - - - a - - - a predicate 15 must be sentenced as a predicate. 16 JUDGE PIGOTT: But - - -17

JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Counsel also said - - - I'm sorry.

JUDGE PIGOTT: No, please.

JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Counsel also said that 70.07 applies if the statement has been filed under 400.19, but I didn't see that anywhere in the statute. Are - - are - - is that anywhere in the statute? I don't see it.

MR. KAEUPER: No, no, I don't think - - -

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1	no, I don't think the the that that
2	it says that it has it has the
3	- he has to be sentenced as a predicate if the People
4	have filed a a pre-trial statement, no.
5	JUDGE RIVERA: Well, 70.07(3) says "The
6	provisions of section 400.19 of the CPL shall govern
7	the procedures that must be followed to determine
8	whether a person who stands convicted"
9	MR. KAEUPER: Right.
10	JUDGE RIVERA: Right?
11	MR. KAEUPER: Right, yeah. And
12	JUDGE RIVERA: You still got the must there
13	and the shall.
14	MR. KAEUPER: Right.
15	JUDGE RIVERA: Yeah, it's saying these are
16	the procedures you've got to follow.
17	MR. KAEUPER: Right. Right, but but
18	again, we have that you have that may in
19	400.19. I mean, I think if
20	JUDGE STEIN: So is subdivision 3 talking
21	about, you know, what in order to make the
22	determination of whether you're a predicate
23	MR. KAEUPER: Right.
24	JUDGE STEIN: those are the
25	procedures you follow?

1	MR. KAEUPER: Right, ab absolutely,
2	and I think if if the if the import here
3	is that the People get to choose and the and
4	so, I mean, this is a very strange way to construct a
5	statute that has that that outcome. I I
6	I certainly wouldn't argue that this is the
7	- the most perfectly crafted statute that makes it
8	super easy, but but I think that the
9	JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: The other statutes,
10	counsel, where the the People are required or
11	may file prior to sentencing, is there anything
12	precluding the People from filing a statement before
13	a trial, pre-trial?
14	MR. KAEUPER: What what do you mean?
15	JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: In in one of the
16	statutes that says it must be filed before
17	sentencing.
18	MR. KAEUPER: You could file a statement
19	but but the court wouldn't do anything with it.
20	Whereas whereas as I read 400.19, you the
21	the court can then adjudicate that question.
22	JUDGE RIVERA: It trigger it triggers
23	the possibility of a hearing and so forth
24	MR. KAEUPER: Correct.
25	JUDGE RIVERA: if there's a challenge

1	from the defendant.
2	MR. KAEUPER: Correct, and that's and
3	that's, I think, the the difference really in
4	the in the CPL procedures on on those
5	points.
6	JUDGE RIVERA: Just to clarify, it may be a
7	a request for you to be repetitive.
8	MR. KAEUPER: Okay.
9	JUDGE RIVERA: What would be the reason
10	that a prosecutor would indeed do this before the
11	trial commences?
12	MR. KAEUPER: Try to get a plea.
13	JUDGE RIVERA: So to negotiate the plea?
14	MR. KAEUPER: Yeah.
15	JUDGE RIVERA: So the two of you
16	MR. KAEUPER: Yeah, yeah.
17	JUDGE RIVERA: agree on that that
18	that's
19	MR. KAEUPER: Yeah.
20	JUDGE RIVERA: that's really to try
21	and encourage the plea agreement?
22	MR. KAEUPER: Yeah, yeah. And I think in
23	that sense allowing that to be adjudicated ahead of
24	time can can be efficient. You
25	JUDGE RIVERA: To avoid the trial?

1	MR. KAEUPER: Right.
2	JUDGE PIGOTT: Well, let's suppose you
3	didn't have this law, this CPL section. Are you
4	suggesting that that that somehow the DA
5	couldn't say hey, by the way, you know, your client
6	was convicted of of of this this
7	same felony charge three years ago and if and
8	if you can take a plea now or if you don't, you
9	know, he's going to get sentenced as a second felony
10	offender?
11	MR. KAEUPER: I mean, the the
12	prosecutor could say that, sure.
13	JUDGE PIGOTT: Sure, so why so
14	so I don't understand why we we would put a
15	section in the law that says the DA can do what it's
16	always done?
17	MR. KAEUPER: No no, because
18	because the hearing is the is the issue, you
19	can adjudicate it at a hearing which you otherwise
20	wouldn't be able to.
21	JUDGE PIGOTT: Well, before the
22	before the
23	MR. KAEUPER: With with the court
24	making a determination. When they're
25	JUDGE PIGOTT: Before the trial.

1	MR. KAEUPER: What?
2	JUDGE PIGOTT: Before before the
3	trial.
4	MR. KAEUPER: Correct.
5	JUDGE PIGOTT: And you're saying that we
6	can ignore that?
7	MR. KAEUPER: I I'm sorry, I guess I
8	mis
9	JUDGE PIGOTT: You're saying you're
10	saying we can ignore that; that that the DA can
11	say, we're not doing that because we don't want to
12	have a hearing, we want to convict the guy and then
13	we'll have you know, then we'll say he's a
14	second felony offender.
15	MR. KAEUPER: Right.
16	JUDGE PIGOTT: So we go back to, why is the
17	statute there then?
18	MR. KAEUPER: I guess I'm I guess I'm
19	not understanding the the question, because I
20	don't
21	JUDGE PIGOTT: If if you can always
22	take a plea, you don't need it for a plea. If you
23	can al
24	MR. KAEUPER: No, no. I'm I'm saying
25	I I think you do you

1	JUDGE PIGOTT: Stick with me.
2	MR. KAEUPER: I'm sorry.
3	JUDGE PIGOTT: If you if if you
4	can always use it at sentencing, you don't need it,
5	so there's no reason in the world for 400.19 to be in
6	there, it seems to me, other than the fact that
7	everyone knows at the beginning of the trial that
8	we're talking about a second felony offender on a sex
9	abuse case.
10	MR. KAEUPER: Yeah, and and to allow
11	you to to potentially adjudicate the question
12	of of predicate status before before
13	trial at at a hearing presided over by the
14	judge.
15	JUDGE RIVERA: Well, it provides some
16	benefit if if perhaps the defendant has some
17	credible challenge
18	MR. KAEUPER: Right, exactly.
19	JUDGE RIVERA: to the fact that
20	they're a predicate off offender.
21	MR. KAEUPER: Exactly, I mean the
22	JUDGE RIVERA: And they want to clarify
23	this beforehand because that may change the plea
24	negotiation posture of the case.
25	MR. KAEUPER: Abs absolutely, most -

1 2 JUDGE PIGOTT: So if that's the ca - - -MR. KAEUPER: I'm sorry. 3 4 JUDGE PIGOTT: If that's the case, then, 5 then it's a very important benefit to the defendant 6 that you should not be ignoring. 7 MR. KAEUPER: Well, I mean, no, because the 8 - - - the - - - again, I go - - - go back to the 9 defense attorney has an obligation to his client to 10 exp - - -11 I know, but if I'm JUDGE PIGOTT: 12 understanding what Judge Rivera asked you was, it 13 gives a benefit to the defendant to find out, you 14 know, what - - - what's going to be coming by 15 challenging that - - - that - - - that first offense, 16 and you said, exactly, you can challenge - - - you 17 know, they can challenge the first offense before they get into the trial. So it's a benefit to them 18 19 and you're saying, but we don't have to do that at 20 all, we don't have to file at all, because it's just 21 there. 22 MR. KAEUPER: Right, but - - - but we do -23 - - but if we don't file it, we do it as some risk is

JUDGE PIGOTT: What's the risk?

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- - - is my point.

1 MR. KAEUPER: He - - - that he may have a -- - an ineffective assistance claim on a 440 by 2 3 saying I didn't know I was - - - I was going to be 4 facing predicate. I mean, we get those claims all 5 the time. JUDGE PIGOTT: So we should - - - we should 6 7 protect you by - - - by finding in favor of Ms. 8 Gorman. 9 MR. KAEUPER: I - - - I think - - - I think 10 you should interpret 70.07 the way I think it was 11 intended, which is to make this mandatory and to not 12 give - - give discretion on - - I mean, these - -13 - you know, we're talking about people who repeat 14 sexual abuse of children. I mean, we are - - - we 15 are talking - - -16 JUDGE RIVERA: Let - - - let me ask you, 17 counsel, 400.19(2) says, "When information available to the people prior to the trial against a child 18 19 indicates that a defendant may have", is there any -20 - - any point in time when you do not have such 21 information before trial? 22 MR. KAEUPER: Geez, I mean, I - - - you 23 know, I - - - I would think we would generally know 2.4 the criminal history of the defendant before trial

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and certainly should.

1 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: And in this case, there was a Sandoval hearing so there you would - - -2 3 MR. KAEUPER: Right. 4 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: - - - everybody knew, 5 correct? 6 MR. KAEUPER: Correct, correct. 7 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: But what - - - then 8 why was it such - - - why was it so hard for the 9 court to get you to file - - - the People to file the 10 statement? 11 MR. KAEUPER: I - - - I can't answer that 12 why - - - and why, you know, there's that - - - that 13 appearance after the adjournment and it's still not 14 filed and I - - - I can't explain that at all. 15 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: 16 MR. KAEUPER: Thank you. 17 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Thanks, counsel. Rebuttal, counsel. 18 MS. GORMAN: If I may address the 19 20 ineffectiveness, this attorney did what the attorney 21 did in Wright, which is undermine his own strategy, 22 his own theory of defense, by proving - - - by tell -23 - - allowing proof, by telling jurors that this child 2.4 witness had made an identification three weeks after 25

the crime, when they should not have heard that.

1	JUDGE STEIN: Why isn't that legitimate
2	strategy? I mean, is isn't is sort of assumed
3	that there must have been an identification made?
4	Otherwise
5	MS. GORMAN: I
6	JUDGE STEIN: how would we know it
7	was him?
8	MS. GORMAN: I'm not sure jurors would
9	assume that, particularly when you have the neighbor
10	daycare provider saying, I gave them a name when they
11	gave me a
12	JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: So Tiffany (ph.)
13	didn't testify here that when they went to the
14	greenhouse and knocked on the door, the victim said
15	that's him, initially?
16	MS. GORMAN: Yes.
17	JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: So she testified
18	so there was that may you know, defense
19	counsel knew that that might come out and
20	MS. GORMAN: Well, that
21	JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: that was an
22	_
23	MS. GORMAN: that was a different
24	person.
25	JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: I understand.

1	MS. GORMAN: That was not my client.
2	JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: That's the point.
3	MS. GORMAN: Right.
4	JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: The whole defense was
5	a misidentification.
6	MS. GORMAN: Right.
7	JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: And if the victim
8	initially identified someone else, then wouldn't it
9	be strategic for defense counsel to bring up the jury
10	well, you know, you can't believe this child because,
11	you know, she's she's going to misidentify
12	_
13	MS. GORMAN: But you're telling
14	JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: my client.
15	MS. GORMAN: them you're
16	telling them that three weeks after the crime, she
17	picked your client, and that's something they would
18	not know because it was only by photo array, and that
19	testimony was wholly inadmissible.
20	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, counsel.
21	MS. GORMAN: Thank you, Your Honor.
22	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Thank you. Thank you
23	both.
24	(Court is adjourned)

## CERTIFICATION

I, Sara Winkeljohn, certify that the foregoing transcript of proceedings in the Court of Appeals of People v. Willie L. Wragg, No. 152 was prepared using the required transcription equipment and is a true and accurate record of the proceedings.

Carolwhill as

Signature: \_\_\_\_\_

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