1	COURT OF APPEALS
2	STATE OF NEW YORK
3	DEODI E
4	PEOPLE,
5	Respondent,
6	-against- No. 165
7	NUGENE AMBERS, (papers sealed)
8	Appellant.
9	
10	20 Eagle Street Albany, New York 12207 October 15, 2015
11	Before:
12	CHIEF JUDGE JONATHAN LIPPMAN
13	ASSOCIATE JUDGE EUGENE F. PIGOTT, JR.
14	ASSOCIATE JUDGE JENNY RIVERA ASSOCIATE JUDGE SHEILA ABDUS-SALAAM
15	ASSOCIATE JUDGE LESLIE E. STEIN ASSOCIATE JUDGE EUGENE M. FAHEY
16	Appearances:
17	MARK W. VORKINK, ESQ. APPELLATE ADVOCATES
18	Attorneys for Appellant 111 John Street, 9th Floor
19	New York, NY 10038
20	ANASTASIA SPANAKOS, ADA QUEENS COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
21	Attorneys for Respondent Renaissance Plaza
22	125-01 Queens Boulevard Kew Gardens, NY 11415
23	
24	
25	Karen Schiffmiller Official Court Transcriber

1	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: 165, People v.
2	Ambers.
3	Counselor, go ahead.
4	MR. VORKINK: Good afternoon, Your Honors.
5	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Do you want any
6	rebuttal?
7	MR. VORKINK: Two minutes, Your Honor.
8	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Two minutes, sure, go
9	ahead.
10	MR. VORKINK: Good afternoon, Your Honors,
11	may it please the court, Mark W. Vorkink of Appellate
12	Advocates for appellant Nugene Ambers. The
13	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So what's the Turner
14	deal here?
15	MR. VORKINK: The facts in this case are
16	distinguishable as to the Turner issue, Your Honor,
17	and
18	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Go ahead.
19	MR. VORKINK: to to address
20	that specifically, in this case, counsel
21	affirmatively took the position that he did not want
22	the jury to compromise and to simply convict solely
23	on the mis the two misdemeanor counts here.
24	The defense at trial, consistently
25	throughout, was actual innocence. It was that the

two complainants in this case were simply not credible and that none of the claims the People had put forward were - - - were supported by the evidence. As a consequence of which, during summation, counsel specifically asked the jury that the only just verdict in this case was an acquittal on all counts.

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Thus, like in Turner, and unlike in Evans and other type of Turner-like cases, counsel here affirmatively rejected to the compromise, which could have only been the only conceivable strategic reason to leave those time-barred misdemeanor counts in here. Thus, because counsel failed to seek dismissal of those counts, counsel was ineffective - - -

JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Are you saying, counsel, that even though defense counsel at trial didn't say I don't want to compromise, but his strategy was to get an acquittal on all counts, that he effectively said, I don't want to compromise?

MR. VORKINK: Absolutely, Your Honor.

JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Okay.

MR. VORKINK: Absolutely, Your Honor. And

- - - and I - - - and I think that there's no other

read - - - way to read counsel's action in this case,

is to seek an outright acquittal and no compromise on

1 the misdemeanor counts. 2 JUDGE PIGOTT: Did - - - are you saying 3 that that's never a good strategy? 4 MR. VORKINK: No, absolutely not, Your 5 I think in some case, it could be a strategy, 6 but it was not the strategy advanced here. JUDGE PIGOTT: Why - - - why was it a bad 7 8 strategy here? 9 MR. VORKINK: Well, I think because the 10 strategy advanced here was that the client - - - that 11 Mr. Ambers - - - was factually innocent of the 12 charges the People had brought. And that strategy 13 entailed seeking an acquittal on every single count of the indictment, which is precisely what counsel 14 15 did. 16 And I think - - - I think that's why, in 17 many respects, Evans is actually sort of helpful in understanding the Turner issue in this case, 18 19 precisely because in Evans, counsel did precisely 20 that, Your Honor. Counsel sought a compromise as an 21 alternative disposition that the jury could consider 22 asking them to drop down - - -23 JUDGE PIGOTT: I - - - this is what I keep 2.4 saying. You can't - - - you can't ever ask for an

outright acquittal as a defense lawyer?

1 MR. VORKINK: I'm sorry, Your Honor? 2 JUDGE PIGOTT: You can't ask for an 3 outright - - - what am I missing? You're - - -4 you're saying that because he didn't ask them for a 5 compromise verdict, he was ineffective. MR. VORKINK: Yes, Your Honor. 6 7 JUDGE PIGOTT: All right. Why couldn't he 8 just ask for an outright acquittal? 9 MR. VORKINK: Well, I think - - - I think 10 counsel did ask for an outright acquittal. JUDGE PIGOTT: I'm sorry, yeah. Why - - -11 12 what - - - what's wrong with that? Why - - - why 13 wouldn't you not - - - why would you not do that? MR. VORKINK: I - - - I don't think there 14 15 was anything wrong with that in this context. 16 JUDGE PIGOTT: Oh, okay. 17 JUDGE RIVERA: I think - - - I guess the 18 question perhaps that - - - that Judge Pigott's questioning leads me to think of is, if indeed, 19 20 that's what he's sin - - - thinking, why can't he 21 hedge - - - why can't - - - why can't defense counsel hedge bets in favor of the defendant and keep them 22 23 all - - - keep all those counts, thinking, I may not 2.4 be able to persuade them of innocence, but maybe I

can get them to find him guilty on the lowest count.

1 MR. VORKINK: You know, and - - -2 JUDGE RIVERA: Why isn't that an 3 appropriate strategy? And can we even discern that from the record? 4 5 MR. VORKINK: Well, I think the record - -- I think the record affirmatively disproves that 6 7 strategy here. And I think - - -JUDGE FAHEY: Well, let me ask this about 8 9 the record, then. 10 MR. VORKINK: Yes. JUDGE FAHEY: And I don't - - - I know you 11 12 want to get that point, but - - -13 MR. VORKINK: Yes, Your Honor. JUDGE FAHEY: The Turner issue and the 14 15 statute of limitations blown on the EWOC - - - on the 16 endangering the welfare of a child, we're talking 17 about, right? 18 MR. VORKINK: Yes, Your Honor. 19 JUDGE FAHEY: All right. So it's not 20 dispositive of the case, because this is only a 21 partial Turner - - - much - - - kind of like the 22 previous case was, the same kind of problem we had 23 before; Turner talks about you being able to dismiss 2.4 it if it's dispositive, otherwise, then we have to

look at whether or not counsel was effective.

1 MR. VORKINK: Right. 2 JUDGE FAHEY: But here there's no 440 3 motion. Has there been? 4 MR. VORKINK: There's no 440 motion, Your 5 Honor. JUDGE FAHEY: So we don't have any record 6 7 at all of what counsel was thinking or wasn't 8 thinking, and so, forgetting about if there - - - so 9 - - - so we're - - - we basically have to discern 10 whether or not there was a legitimate strategy in the 11 absence of a - - - of a - - - any kind of record on 12 the issue. 13 MR. VORKINK: In the absence of any, I think, "off the record" record that would come about 14 15 in a 440 context, but I think, Your Honor, our 16 position would have to be is, and I think that 17 counsel's summation in this context makes clear that 18 he did not want a compromised verdict, and - - -19 JUDGE FAHEY: Yeah, you see, I - - - maybe 20 I different than ev - - - I'm not sure that - - - I -21 - - I don't think there's anything wrong with saying 22 I don't want a compromised verdict, but I'd be happy 23 if I get it. You know, that's a - - he - - he 2.4 goes for everything. If he doesn't get it, he takes

what he gets, but he's doing the best he can for his

1 client. I understand that strategy. That doesn't 2 seem - - - that just seems to be good advocacy for me 3 - - - to me, but - - -MR. VORKINK: Well, except I think that 4 5 many other things occurred in this case which demonstrate counsel's ineffectiveness, separate and 6 7 apart from the Turner issue. JUDGE FAHEY: Well, you could go to the 8 9 prosecutor's summation; I think that you might have a 10 stronger argument for that, but - - -11 MR. VORKINK: Exactly, Your Honor. That 12 would be our principal argument as to counsel's 13 ineffectiveness, would be his failure to object 14 effectively to a barrage of prosecutorial misconduct 15 during the summation. 16 JUDGE STEIN: Well, he did object numerous 17 times, did he not? MR. VORKINK: Well, counsel said the word 18 19 "objection" several times, repeatedly. But as this 2.0 court has held time and again in Love and Medina and 21 Gray and other cases, simply saying the one word 22 "objection" does not constitute an objection simply -23 2.4 JUDGE STEIN: Well, that may be, but when -25 - - when there are so many objections that you're

making, and - - - and in fact, you do state the basis for some of them, might it not be a reasonable strategy to say, you know, gee, if I - - - if I keep repeating myself over and over again as to the basis for my objection, A, I may be focusing the jury on what the prosecutor's saying, and B, I - - - you know, I - - - I may be annoying them, so I'll just get my objection on the record, and you know, the court knows what to do.

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MR. VORKINK: And - - - and this court has held that in Taylor, for example, but Taylor is not this case. I think that in this case, this is a counsel who did not fear interrupting the judge, as I think as Your Honor said. Counsel did interrupt those few times where he actually identified the prejudice that was occurred to the client.

JUDGE STEIN: Right, but I'm talking about the sheer amount of times that - - - that he would have had to have done this.

MR. VORKINK: I - - - I think that all counsel had to do here, Your Honor, was articulate the basis for his objection. And I think - - - I would urge the court to look at the colloquy after the prosecutor's summation, because I think - - - counsel, yes, he makes these standing sort of

objections, these general objections, which are no objections at all, but then when he's given an opportunity to articulate the basis for why he interrupted previously, he limits it to two discrete issues: the affirmative misstatement regarding the testimony of Hoff (ph.) and Rosenfeld (ph.), which in and of itself is extremely problematic in this case, where you have uncorroborated allegations of two young complainants - - -

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JUDGE STEIN: But you had pretty strong curative instructions on that, though, didn't you?

MR. VORKINK: There was a curative instruction, but again, it - - it fell after the fact, and did not occur, and the mistrial motion was denied during the course of the summation, and it only went to whether or not the record supported the prosecutor's - - which he later admitted was not supported by the record - - that the client was intoxicated when the abuse occurred.

Counsel did not - - - as he could have done and as he should have done, because he sim - - - he surely realized how prejudicial that type of misconduct was to point out to the court and to ask for a curative instruction or a mistrial on the ground that all of the propensity arguments

1 concerning the fact that the client was drinking and 2 thus, he must have abused the complainants in this 3 case - - -4 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Counsel, you - - - you 5 mentioned the mistrial. I - - - I believe trial counsel asked twice for a mistrial and one of those 6 7 times was around the statement that the defendant committed these crimes while he was drunk when there 8 9 was no support in the record for it. 10 MR. VORKINK: That's true, Your Honor. 11 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: And there was - - -12 there were curative instructions in - - - as Judge 13 Stein said, there were a number of objections here -14 - - thirty, I think, in total - - - and half of those 15 were sustained. So are you saying for the half that 16 weren't sustained the - - - that counsel was 17 ineffective because he didn't articulate some sort of 18 basis for the objection? MR. VORKINK: Well, let me clear here. I 19 20 think that - - - and our brief lays out this in far

MR. VORKINK: Well, let me clear here. I think that - - and our brief lays out this in far more detail, but there is a variety of misconduct that took place in this case.

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Yes, counsel did say the word "objection" in response to misstatements about the record concerning the drinking, concerning Hoff and

Rosenfeld's testimony. Counsel made absolutely no objection to not interrupt at all regarding inflammatory remarks about the client being a predator, preying on these girls, shifting the burden of proof, concerning how appellant testified on the stand, and that of course, he did it - - - this is one remark that the prosecutor made during the course of the summation.

And then, of course, never getting to the propensity issue, which really is I think the most problematic form of misconduct that occurred in this case, by which the prosecutor focused on the client's criminal history and urged that because he struggled with alcohol at a period of his life, he was the type of person who would commit this type of abuse. That was never raised by defense counsel in this case; no curative instruction was given - - -

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay.

MR. VORKINK: - - -and - - -

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: okay, counsel.

MR. VORKINK: - - - and it's that type of misconduct that this court has particular focused on, especially in child sex abuse cases as this court recognized in - - -

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, you'll have

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1 your rebuttal. 2 MR. VORKINK: - - - Fisher and Wright. 3 Thank you. 4 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Let's hear from your 5 adversary. MS. SPANAKOS: Good afternoon, Your Honors. 6 7 May it please the court, Anastasia Spanakos on behalf of Richard A. Brown, the respondent. 8 9 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Counsel, what about 10 the - - - the applications for the mistrial over and over again? Did the judge abuse his discretion in 11 12 not granting them when clearly, so much of this was 13 propensity, the alcoholism? Do you think there were no legitimate grounds for a mistrial here? 14 15 MS. SPANAKOS: I would - - - I would urge Your Honor to - - - to look at the record in totality 16 17 here, and what the court did here and the court cured 18 any potential error that occurred. CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: You think they cured 19 2.0 the error? 21 MS. SPANAKOS: Completely. CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: You don't think there 22 23 was - - - there was a propensity of the worst kind of 2.4 argument being made here and over and over again, and

not necessarily because counsel was ineffective.

Maybe because the opposite, because counsel was - - -was in their face all the time and maybe pushing the prosecutor, and the prosecutor took the bait, and basically - - - it's all about propensity, isn't it? MS. SPANAKOS: No, Your Honor. CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Why not? MS. SPANAKOS: The trial prosecutor did not

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make a propensity argument here. What defendant does on this appeal is he's - - he labels some of the prosecutor's comments and he takes them - - and - - and he uses labels like "propensity", "shifting the burden", but that's not what occurred here.

When you look at the summation in totality and when you look at the comment made in the context that they were made, the prosecutor was not making a propensity argument.

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: What about the alcoholism? Is there any proof to support all the things he said about - - all the - - all the - - the - - the things that the prosecutor said about alcoholism causing each of these things? Is there anything that supports that?

MS. SPANAKOS: The prosecutor's comments were fair comment on the evidence that was educed here at the trial.

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CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: But I'm asking you, on the evidence that was educed, is there any basis for this over and over again? This business with alcoholism, that each one of these mileposts caused this. Where does that come from?

MS. SPANAKOS: That comes from various places during the trial, Your Honor. That comes from defendant's written statement where he said - - - and this was admitted into evidence - - "I used to drink a minimum of 200 ounces of beer right after work".

JUDGE PIGOTT: Yeah, but wait a minute. I

- - - there - - - there's - - - it's hard to sort

out. There's so many objections and I think one of
- - one of your defenses to that is it was fair

comment and what the defense said in its - - - in its

summation, am I correct?

MS. SPANAKOS: Yes, it is, because - - -

JUDGE PIGOTT: And that - - - and that it always seems problematic to me. Why don't you object when they make inappropriate comments in their summation? I mean, do you - - - can you - - - can you not do that? Can you sit back and say, ah, here's another opportunity for me, fair comment to

call the guy a two-time felon, a drunk, a pervert, et

cetera? I mean, I - - - it - - - it always seemed to me that the - - - that the People ought to be on their feet when there's a - - - when there's something to object to in the defense state - - -summation. MS. SPANAKOS: And the People did object a few times, but there also is a theory that objecting when defendant - - - defense counsel is up there

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when defendant - - - defense counsel is up there trying to make a summation could, you know, make the jury look like you're trying to hide something, you're trying to stop that - - -

JUDGE PIGOTT: Which is your way of saying, how come they didn't object during yours. I mean, I - - - I don't get that. You're saying well, he didn't object to this, he didn't object to that, he didn't preserve this; maybe he didn't want the jury to think that he was trying to hide something. This - - - this back - - -

MS. SPANAKOS: That is - - -

JUDGE PIGOTT: - - - this back and forth on - - - on summations gets a little troubling like that, because you want to say he didn't object to some parts of the DA's summation, therefore it's not preserved. I want to say that you ought to preserve objections to the defense, and you say, well, no,

we're not going to do that. That's good trial strategy on us; we're not going to. And I don't get that.

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I don't - - - don't understand why that you wouldn't object if there's an objectionable thing in the defense summation and ask for the appropriate instruction, rather than sa - - - saying I can - - - I can comment on that on my own and - - - and call it fair comment. You under - - am I making sense?

MS. SPANAKOS: I - - - I think I understand where you're going with this, Judge, but I - - - I don't think that that was - - - that the trial prosecutor looks at it that way. They - - - they object when - - - when they think something is that egregious. But there - - - there is a large plain, you say, you know, where the, you know, a prosecutor and a defense attorney can go in their summation.

There are evi - - - there's comments they can make based on evidence, comments they can make that based on the inferences from the evidence, and there, you know, the - - - the rhetoric that you're allowed can go pretty far. A prosecutor, I don't think, looks at it that I'm going to let them go so far so I can go that far. I think you're presuming a bad intent on the prosecutor's part, which you

1	shouldn't do.
2	JUDGE PIGOTT: No, no, what I'm what
3	I'm saying is that you're you're justifying
4	what may be out of bounds on your summation by saying
5	they were out of bounds on theirs.
6	MS. SPANAKOS: It is proper for us to
7	respond to their comments.
8	JUDGE PIGOTT: Right.
9	MS. SPANAKOS: This court has always said -
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11	JUDGE PIGOTT: I'm saying that maybe you
12	should be objecting to their comments if they're
13	inappropriate.
14	MS. SPANAKOS: We did object to a few of
15	them
16	JUDGE PIGOTT: Right.
17	MS. SPANAKOS: but we didn't object
18	to all of them.
19	JUDGE PIGOTT: And you're saying you didn't
20	object to all of them, because you didn't want to
21	appear to be trying to hide something in front of the
22	jury.
23	MS. SPANAKOS: That that could be a
24	strategy
25	JUDGE PIGOTT: Okay. Now, this is

MS. SPANAKOS: - - - that the trial prosecutor had.

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JUDGE PIGOTT: And my point on the other side is, yet you're saying about the defendant, he did not object to what we were saying in our summation. So why wouldn't you apply the same rationale that maybe he didn't want it to appear that he was trying to hide something from the jury?

MS. SPANAKOS: What I'm arguing that defense counsel - - - he did object several times.

JUDGE PIGOTT: Right.

MS. SPANAKOS: And his failure to object doesn't demonstrate that he was ineffective, okay. When you look at counsel's representation, you have to look at the totality of the representation from the onset all the way to the end.

JUDGE PIGOTT: I looked at one of them in - in terms of applying - - appealing to the
emotions of the jury rather - - and - - - and as
defense counsel pointed out where the prosecutor
called him "a two-time felon, a drunk, a predator who
had stolen the complainants' innocence, scarred them
for life, saying the complainants deserved an Oscar
if they lied, and there was no evidence that they
would lie, and misrepresenting the People's child sex

abuse expert's testimony, it failed to seek dismissal 1 2 on two clearly time-barred counts". 3 MS. SPANAKOS: Judge, you're taking a lot 4 of comments that were made sporadically in different 5 parts of the summation and you're putting them all 6 together, and when you do that, of course, it doesn't 7 8 JUDGE PIGOTT: Yes. 9 MS. SPANAKOS: - - - sound very good. And 10 they're - - -11 JUDGE PIGOTT: Right. 12 MS. SPANAKOS: - - - they're - - - they're 13 very bad sound bites. But when you put them - - -14 it's a thirty-three page summation - - - when you put 15 them through the summation and most of the arguments 16 she was making were proper, and most of the arguments 17 that she was making were responsive to defense 18 counsel's argument. 19 He had only one avenue to take here, 2.0 defense counsel. And he had argued that the victims 21 were incredible. He had argued that basically they lied. He didn't use the word "lie", but that was his 22 23 argument. They fabricated this. They were angry. 2.4 They had motive. He had all these reasons.

JUDGE PIGOTT: Do you consider it vouching

1 for the truth of a - - of a witness when you say 2 they deserve an Oscar? 3 MS. SPANAKOS: That - - - Judge, actually 4 that comment was proper and responsive. In voir dire 5 6 JUDGE PIGOTT: What - - - no, I think you 7 misunderstood my question. 8 MS. SPANAKOS: Okay. 9 JUDGE PIGOTT: Do you consider that 10 vouching for the truthfulness of a witness? 11 MS. SPANAKOS: No, that's not vouching - -12 13 JUDGE PIGOTT: It's not? 14 MS. SPANAKOS: No. 15 JUDGE PIGOTT: Okay. 16 MS. SPANAKOS: The prosecutor - - - when 17 defense counsel says that the - - - that these 18 victims are fabricating everything, that they've 19 actually completely made the story up, that this 2.0 never occurred - - - and he said this several times -21 - - this never occurred, okay, the girls basically 22 colluded with each other, and were angry over other 23 things, minor things - - - their sister, not getting 2.4 toys from him, whatever it might be, and that they

had the seed planted by the friend about the story

that they learned in the Bible study class.

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When you say all of that, what defense counsel is arguing is that they got up there and their testimony was completely credible, okay, as the trial court noted and said at sentencing, "their testimony was compelling, impressive, and very believable". Okay.

The girls got up there - - - another thing that the prosecutor commented on summation is that the girls were very emotional during their testimony. They were crying and they were breaking down, okay. So the prosecutor's comment that they would have to be actresses if - - - if they - - - if this was all, you know, a show, if this was all false, is not vouching for them. It's explaining to the jury why the victims were credible, why they should find them credible.

Defense counsel discredited them completely in his summation, and we're allowed to turn around and respond to that and explain to the jury why we find them credible.

JUDGE PIGOTT: Yeah, I get the explaining.

I just didn't - - - I thought, you know, saying they

deserve an Oscar is kind of - - -

MS. SPANAKOS: Well, Judge - - -

1 JUDGE PIGOTT: - - - vouching for their 2 credibility. 3 MS. SPANAKOS: - - - I'd like to point out to you also that in voir dire, counsel questioned a -4 5 - - an actress, and asked her about being able to put 6 on emotions on cue, cry on cue. And the trial 7 prosecutor's comment about the Oscar - - -JUDGE PIGOTT: So when you objected to that 8 9 at voir dire, what was the Judge's ruling? 10 MS. SPANAKOS: I don't believe that was 11 objected to at voir dire, Your Honor. 12 Both the errors here that you have to 13 consider, there has to be clear error. There also 14 has to be some prejudice to defendant. And when you 15 view the totality of the record, okay, defendant received a fair trial. 16 17 His attorney was effective throughout, did 18 many, many good things throughout, and nothing that 19 he raises here rises to the level that counsel did 2.0 not provide meaningful representation. And if there 21 was any error here by any of the prosecutor's 22 comments, that was completely cured by the incredibly 23 thorough, thorough curative instructions that the 2.4 court gave during the final jury charge.

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, counsel.

1	you.
2	MS. SPANAKOS: Thank you very much, Your
3	Honors.
4	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Counselor, rebuttal.
5	MR. VORKINK: Thank you, Your Honors. Just
6	a few brief points.
7	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Go ahead.
8	MR. VORKINK: I would urge Your Your
9	Honors to look at Wright People v. Wright. It
10	was decided this past summer. I think Your Honors
11	spoke very eloquently about how a serial failure to
12	object to misconduct, in and of itself, where there's
13	no strategic rationale to do so, is tantamount to
14	ineffective assistance, notwithstanding the fact that
15	counsel may have pursued a rather effective defense
16	strategy otherwise. And I think this case is sort of
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18	JUDGE RIVERA: But but in Wright, the
19	prosecutor, of course, was com misleading the
20	jury as to the nature of the scientific evidence,
21	which is not this case.
22	MR. VORKINK: Absolutely, Your Honor. I
23	think I think the type of misconduct is
24	slightly different because of the DNA

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Couldn't we find an

1 abuse of discretion by the judge and still find that counsel was effective? 2 3 MR. VORKINK: You could, Your Honor. could, Your Honor. I think that's prob - - -4 5 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Do you argue that? MR. VORKINK: We - - - we did, Your Honor. 6 7 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So, why - - -8 MR. VORKINK: We - - - we argued that - - -9 that the misconduct in and of itself and the court's 10 failure to give - - - to essentially grant the 11 mistrial motions that counsel made as to the issues 12 that he did preserve. 13 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: And you don't believe 14 that - - - that everything was cured by the judge? 15 MR. VORKINK: No, we do not, Your Honor. 16 We - - - these were objections that were made during 17 summation. Mistrial motions were denied repeatedly 18 by the judge during the course of that summation. 19 And yes, a curative instruction was later given, but 20 as this court recognized in Calabria and in Riback, 21 curative instructions may not be sufficient where the 22 misconduct at issue is sufficient egregious as it was 23 in this case. 2.4 I just one want to add one quick point

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about - - -

	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Go anead, counsel.
2	MR. VORKINK: about the Turner issue.
3	I I really think ineffectiveness always turns
4	on whether or not the defendant received a
5	fundamentally fair trial. It is fundamentally unfair
6	for a defendant to be convicted of time-barred counts
7	and for that conviction to stand. Thus, as the
8	Turner issue, we seek dismissal of the misdemeanors
9	on that principle.
10	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, thank you both.
11	MR. VORKINK: Thank you.
12	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Appreciate it.
13	(Court is adjourned)
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CERTIFICATION

I, Karen Schiffmiller, certify that the foregoing transcript of proceedings in the Court of Appeals of People v. Nugene Ambers, No. 165, was prepared using the required transcription equipment and is a true and accurate record of the proceedings.

Hour Laboffmills.

Agency Name: eScribers

Signature:

Address of Agency: 700 West 192nd Street

Suite # 607

New York, NY 10040

Date: October 22, 2015