1	COURT OF APPEALS
2	STATE OF NEW YORK
3	GARCIA,
4	Respondent,
5	
	-against- No. 64
	NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND MENTAL HYGIENE,
	Appellant.
	20 Eagle Street
	Albany, New York June 6, 2018
	Before:
	CHIEF JUDGE JANET DIFIORE
	ASSOCIATE JUDGE JENNY RIVERA ASSOCIATE JUDGE LESLIE E. STEIN
	ASSOCIATE JUDGE EUGENE M. FAHEY
	ASSOCIATE JUDGE MICHAEL J. GARCIA ASSOCIATE JUDGE ROWAN D. WILSON
	ASSOCIATE JUDGE PAUL FEINMAN
	Appearances:
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	Sara Winkeljohr Official Court Transcriber



1	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Number 64, Garcia v. New
2	York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene.
3	MR. DEARING: Good afternoon. May it please the
4	court, I'm Richard Dearing for the City. I'd like to
5	reserve two minutes for rebuttal if I could?
6	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: You may, sir.
7	MR. DEARING: The Board of Health's flu vaccine
8	daycare rule here is of a piece with a long history of
9	vaccination requirements running all the way back to 1866.
10	All of them
11	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Is the flu vaccine require
12	in any other body of law?
13	MR. DEARING: It is required in in New Yor
14	State or outside of New York State?
15	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Both.
16	MR. DEARING: I'm not aware of its being require
17	in New York State otherwise. I mean there is a require -
18	- a State reg for healthcare workers that say they either
19	must be vaccinated or must wear a mask if they choose to b
20	unvaccinated.
21	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: So is that alone an
22	indication that the department was engaged in policymaking
23	MR. DEARING: No, I don't think so because the -
24	the deeper practice of of mandatory vaccine rule
25	is well-established not just in New York State but across

1	the country, and the Board of Health was, in fact, a leade
2	in those rules. It has enacted them, as I said, running
3	all the way back to 1866. It's had
4	JUDGE RIVERA: But the State has chosen not to d
5	it. So if they've chosen not to do it how are you able to
6	decide that you're going to impose this requirement?
7	MR. DEARING: That's the essence of power
8	of the existence of authority in New York City to
9	JUDGE RIVERA: Yeah, but but no, I'm sorry
10	But the question I that I'm trying to get to is if
11	the State has made a decision that that is that
12	mandating vaccines is not the appropriate way to respond to
13	a health concern, can the City decide otherwise?
14	MR. DEARING: Well, the State has has made
15	a decision in general that mandating vaccines is an
16	appropriate step. This is similar in the sense to the
17	- the point made in Acevedo that that strategy
18	JUDGE RIVERA: With respect to the flu vaccine.
19	MR. DEARING: With respect to flu, I think that
20	the the state of affairs is that the State has not
21	yet adopted a mandatory flu vaccine.
22	JUDGE STEIN: But isn't that true of almost ever
23	vaccine vaccination that the State has ultimately
24	adopted, that the City adopted it first?
25	MR. DEARING: Precisely. The City adopted

1	the City was in this space long before the State ever was.
2	The State modeled modeled what is now Public Health
3	Law 2164 on the City's prior efforts, including the
4	definition of daycare that is in was included in that
5	statute. The legislative history referred specifically to
6	the efforts of the Board of Health in that regard. The
7	point being that the Board of Health has led in this area
8	for over a century. And
9	JUDGE WILSON: So the State the State could
10	have expressly preempted the City, correct?
11	MR. DEARING: Yes, Your Honor.
12	JUDGE WILSON: And it could have impliedly also,
13	right?
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MR. DEARING: I don't think in this instance - -

JUDGE WILSON: No, no. I am ask - - - just as a theoretical legal matter.

MR. DEARING: In theory, yes, sir.

JUDGE WILSON: In theory, there is a - - -

MR. DEARING: Yes, Your Honor.

JUDGE WILSON: - - - doctrine of implied

preemption and they could have - - - and there's something

that would be implied preemption that is short of

expressed. So what more here than what the State did would

have been necessary to get to implied preemption without



getting to expressed preemption?

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MR. DEARING: Well, first, an observation, sort of a follow-up on the interjection I had a minute ago which is that this case comes in a little bit of a different posture which makes preemption not the right framework for looking at this. And the reason is that the State legislature - - the board's history of acting in this area is not - - did not occur in a vacuum. It occurred pursuant to an enactment of the State legislature in 1866. February 1866 the State legislature enacts a - - - a statute that creates the - -

JUDGE RIVERA: Yeah, but isn't the question whether or not in the more recent past, a more current century, New York State has acted in a way that, as I think Judge Wilson is asking you, falls somewhere between that impliedly and expressly preemptive - - -

MR. DEARING: Fair. Two points, and I - - - I apologize for building up to this point. I should start - - - I should have - - - I buried the lead on it and the point was that this isn't really a preemption question.

It's an implied repeal question, and that's because the Board of Health has - - is acting pursuant to an expressed legislative authorization. And there is abundant authority from this court - - and I cite the case of Plunkett and Burke, which are cited in our briefs, and a -

- - and a more recent Second Department case, Steinmann, that says that when you have a special law there is no concept of an implied repeal by a later General Law. And that - - and that makes perfect sense is that when the legislature has called its attention to the needs of a particular locality, as it has here, and it is seen the board repeatedly exercise that granted authority, any step it takes that is general and statewide is not - - without expressly saying we want to repeal that prior special law, does not do so. And that's sufficient to resolve this question.

If we move onto the second point, though, if - - even if we put that to one side and treat it like a preemption question, this is quite short of what you see in other preemption cases from this court in a couple key respects. The first is - - - and this is - - - the first point is less about what the State has done but - - - and more about the backdrop against which this occurs, is that here you do have this long history of action by the City in this area. You don't have that in these other preemption cases. It's not something that the State was unaware of. In fact, the State in 1966 acknowledged it. The State Board of Health in recent years has repeatedly said you - - you need to go follow the additional requirements of the City Board of Health. It did that in 2010 regarding the



1	number of doses for for diphtheria. It did it again
2	in 2015 when it enacted new vaccination rules. And in
3	fact, the legislature in Public Health Law
4	JUDGE RIVERA: You're basically suggesting
5	there's no way to see this as implied as an implied
6	preemption, so what would the State have to do for
7	expressed? Just expressly say we are now choosing to
8	decide that the flu vaccine will not be mandated?
9	MR. DEARING: I think you'd also have to say
10	- I mean the the State has never done even that.
11	JUDGE RIVERA: No, no. I that's why I'm
12	asking.
13	MR. DEARING: I think I think in this
14	instance if I if we go back to the implied repeal
15	point what would really need to happen is to say we hereby
16	repeal, in part, in appropriate part, you know,
17	Administrative Code 17-109. But even even if we put
18	all that to one side
19	JUDGE RIVERA: It has to go that far? Can
20	can it not be targeted
21	MR. DEARING: But that's what
22	JUDGE RIVERA: just to the flu vaccine?
23	MR. DEARING: That's what you're well,
24	insofar as it pertains to flu vaccines. I mean that
25	that would be the way it would be done. But even if we pu

all that to one side, we - - - what you see typically in an implied preemption case - - - and it's the Diack case and many other cases, you see some - - - you may not see it in a statute where there - - - where there is an expressed declaration that we hereby preempt local actions, but you - - - you usually see either in some declaration of policy or in some legislative material, whether it's a governor's statement, whether it's - - whether it's a legislative history or bill, you see at least some indication that either there was an importance placed on a uniform state rule, either there were problems that had arisen.

You know, the Consolidated Edison v. Red Hook case, which is relied on heavily by the petitioners, what the - - what the legislative record showed there is that there were problems with uncoordinated side - - - local activity in the siding of electric generating plants. You ordinarily see that. You don't - - you don't usually just see an enactment - - you know, a statutory enactment that establishes certain standards. You see something more.

And if I could just spend just a second talking about what I think is probably the - - - the nub of this argument, if you get past all of these steps, this clause that was added in 2004 that says, "Nothing in this subdivision shall authorize" - - really, two key points

to make about that. The first thing is that if you look at the bill jacket of that enactment, that was a purely status quo bill. The State Department of Health came to the legislature and said we've reviewed our programs, we've been engaging in programs for adult immunization, we looked at the statute, and we noticed we don't - - - we don't have explicit authorization for that. We would like you to authorize it. Codify something that we're already doing, and along with that adult immunization. Along with that, that statute added that language. "Nothing in this subdivision shall authorize mandatory immunization." It was a status quo bill. It was not a bill - - - there's no indication in anything related to that bill that it meant to reach out and abrogate a separate authority that the New York City Board of Health had.

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And the second point, if you - - - just a simple textual point about that clause. What it says is, "Nothing in this subdivision authorizes mandatory immunization." It does not say there shall be no mandatory immunization. It does not say any other statute that purports to do so is hereby abrogated. We are not relying on that - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: You're saying we have to read it as it's just saying we're not authorizing it.

MR. DEARING: This - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: It doesn't matter if someone else



has, some other entity has. We're not going to authorize 1 2 it. Is that what you're saying? 3 MR. DEARING: This - - - that's what it says. It 4 says, "This subdivision does not authorize" it. It does 5 not purport to abrogate independent authorization. 6 JUDGE RIVERA: And that - - - and that doesn't 7 reflect on some policy choice about whether or not any 8 other entity could? 9 MR. DEARING: There's no indication that it does, 10 and if you - - - if you really look at the legislative history, it suggests that there was no - - - no reflection 11 12 on that fact. And if you compare - - - if you - - -13 JUDGE RIVERA: So given under the City's choice, 14 because it's the only choice I think it could make, that 15 you're not mandating this for all children because they're 16 not all in your facilities - - -17 MR. DEARING: Right. 18 JUDGE RIVERA: - - - what - - - what is the 19 administrative expertise that's deployed to decide that 20 nevertheless that carries with it some - - - some health 21 value, some health policy value? That we don't need to do 22 everybody. 23 MR. DEARING: Right. 24 JUDGE RIVERA: How do you get to that point? 25 Because I know they raise that issue.

1	JUDGE FAHEY: Can can we before you
2	see, that goes to the one of the things I've been
3	concerned about is the Boreali Boreali analysis
4	that's been used throughout the case. And it falls
5	just to follow up on Judge Rivera's question on the opt-ou
6	policy and whether that undermines your claims in and of
7	itself for the individuals that come in and you're allowed
8	to opt out, to refine whether or not that's an actual opt
9	out. And then secondly, applying it to only a percentage
10	of the facilities and not to all the facilities seems to
11	underline the public health basis of your analysis, and it
12	undermines your program as far as Boreali, any Boreali
13	analysis, goes.
14	MR. DEARING: Well, I'll try to take those in
15	order.
16	JUDGE FAHEY: Yes.
17	MR. DEARING: And the second one obviously
18	JUDGE FAHEY: The red light's on. I wanted to
19	get them out there. You can you can even respond to

get them out there. You can - - - you can even respond to me later on if you can't get to them now.

MR. DEARING: I'm happy - - - well, I'm happy to take them now because they overlap - - -

JUDGE FAHEY: It's up to the judge.

MR. DEARING: - - - with Judge Rivera's question.

JUDGE RIVERA: Please. Please.

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MR. DEARING: The so-called opt-out is a - - - is 1 2 a complete misnomer. It is not an opt out. It is a 3 mandatory rule and the - - - and any daycare that permits a 4 child to attend after the date in the rule, December 31, 5 who has not been vaccinated will incur a fine of up to 6 \$2,000 for each day of that child's non-attendance. 7 - - the First Department - - - I do not understand how - -8 - how that - - -9 JUDGE FAHEY: So you're basically - - - you're 10 basically just saying they were wrong on that point because in effect it's not an opt-out because no one could 11 12 financially afford to do it. 13 MR. DEARING: They were flatly wrong on that 14 It is a mandatory rule. And even before that fine point. 15 structure went into effect - - -16 JUDGE FAHEY: Okay. So go to the second - - -17 MR. DEARING: - - - there were already - - -18 JUDGE FAHEY: Go to the second point. 19

MR. DEARING: - - - increasing levels of immunizations. The second point, the second point - - - the essence of this point as it pertains to Boreali is did you - - - and I think it was put quite well by Judge Kaye, as usual, in - - in the Higgins case. She said did you make an exception as an accommodation to special interests? Similar, the footnote in - - in the NYC C.L.A.S.H case,

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the - - - you know, the soda - - - the sugary drinks rule, a modification of the rule as an accommodation to the beverage industry, don't interfere with the beverage industry. In Boreali, it was don't interfere with bars and conventions and political clubs those kinds of - - - those kinds of - - -

What we're talking about here is just a recognition of the jurisdictional division that has occurred among daycare regulation for - - - for decades in the State of New York, which is that very - - - small daycares, family - - - family and group family daycares are regulated by the State, large congregate daycares which are really what the rule - - - what the rule focuses on, and rightly so, are regulated by the City. And this - - - this division of jurisdiction is not specific to the flu vaccine rule. If you look at that specific section of the code, it says nothing about it. It's just a result of the fact that the - - - that the regulatory structure for daycares in the health code reflects that jurisdictional division among City and State law.

And just parenthetically, the Appellate Division was wrong here too, really, when it said 20 percent - - - you know, if you count by facilities perhaps 20 percent, but the - - but the facilities regulated by the State are very, very small. And it is the bulk of children in

daycare in New York and the ones in the larger congregate centers which are the hub of disease transmission, not just for these children that are extremely - - - at extreme high risk but their - - but their families - - -

DUDGE RIVERA: Does that - - - yeah, does that necessarily go to - - - I know the point you're making numerically. I understand it. I appreciate it. It's not that it's not compelling on some level. But aren't you missing a little bit of the argument that of course there is commercial value and pressure on having so many children have to be mandated to have this flu vaccine? I mean somebody's making money off of it is the bottom line. Just as they might have through some of these other choices. They may also have public health benefits.

MR. DEARING: Sure.

JUDGE RIVERA: But there is a money part of it, so I'm not so sure I'm fully persuaded about your argument that there's no commercial pressure involved in this.

MR. DEARING: Well, but I think it's important under Boreali not to confuse every criticism or - - - or someone might - - - or objection someone might craft about a regulation with what gives rise to separation of powers concerns under Boreali. And so when you talk about selectivity under Boreali, what you're really talking about is I think an agency that - - - that chooses to make an

exemption from a rule not because of - - - I mean chooses

to make an exemption for a rule I think said well in

Boreali for purely social or economic reasons. You know,

and - - and I mean I think theoretically someone - -
sure, a vaccine manufacturer I guess benefits to some

degree from the sale of additional vaccines, but that's not

- - there's no reason why that consideration raises any

kind of - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: Well, the government pays for them if someone can't afford them.

MR. DEARING: Yeah, the government pays for them.

JUDGE RIVERA: So it's a done deal. They're
going to get paid.

MR. DEARING: They're going to get paid for them, right. The government - - - the government does pay for them for people who can't afford them, and it's a good thing that it does. And - - - but nothing about that - - - when you - - - when you come back to the core point of Boreali, is this a separation of powers problem? Have you - - - have you jumped the rails off into something that's larger than you can do? The fact that you could - - - you could find grounds to object to a reg or even that you might think that a regulation may be less effective than another version of the regulation may be is not a separation of powers issue.

1 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, counsel. 2 MR. DEARING: Thank you. 3 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Counsel. 4 MR. SIRI: Good afternoon, Your Honors. May it 5 please the court, Aaron Siri on behalf of respondents. 6 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Counsel, isn't a flu 7 directive precisely the kind of public health initiative 8 you would expect of your Department of Health? 9 MR. SIRI: I would - - - I could see absolutely 10 that being part of what a board of health would consider. 11 But they can only act in accordance with the policy that's 12 been set by the legislature, and the policy here has been 13 clearly set by the legislature in Section 2164 and Section 14 613 of the Public Health Law. Section 2164 explicitly 15 provides precisely which vaccines are required to attend 16 school. 17 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: And no more? 18 MR. SIRI: I'm sorry? 19 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: And no more? 20 MR. SIRI: Well, too, if you read that in 21 conjunction with Section 613 of the Public Health Law, okay 2.2 -- and I'll talk specifically about the flu shot for a 23 moment rather than other vaccines because I think it helps 24 -- - it helps makes this -- - it makes -- - it helps 25

bring this into focus. In 2007, the CDC recommended that

all preschoolers get the flu shot. That same year, the legislature down the block started debating a bill regarding the flu shot for school. After four years, in and out of committee twelve times, seven times amended at least, and five times it was voted upon at least by the Assembly and House, the end result was a bill that did what? It amended Section 613 of the Public Health Law to direct the State Health Commissioner in participation with the New York City Board of Health to encourage, to educate, to recommend the flu shot, but it did not include the flu shot, as it could have, under Section 2164 as a required vaccine. And what - - - and where - - -

JUDGE FEINMAN: But how do you make the jump from that $-\ -\ -$

MR. SIRI: I'm sorry.

JUDGE FEINMAN: How do you make the jump from that, that the City cannot require it?

MR. SIRI: Right, so if you - - - so when the - - - so when the legislature passed that law about encouraging and recommending the flu shot, where did they put it? They put it in Section 613, and what else does Section 613 of the Public Health Law provide? It provides, "Nothing in this subdivision shall authorize" - - and appellant's counsel never finished the sentence, "Shall authorize mandatory immunization of adults or children except as

provided in Section 2164 and 2165."

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JUDGE WILSON: But saying that nothing in that section authorizes it doesn't mean that something else - -

MR. SIRI: Right.

JUDGE WILSON: - - - doesn't authorize it.

MR. SIRI: But what's in that section? In that section is the very directive to encourage and recommend the flu shot - - - $\!\!\!$

JUDGE WILSON: Because what I'm asking is why can't we infer from what your accurate description of what the legislature did is the legislature decided it didn't want a statewide rule requiring flu shots, it wanted a statewide rule encouraging flu education and left the City with whatever authority it previously had saying this section doesn't authorize anything new?

MR. SIRI: Yeah. I think that there's a field preemption and I think there's also conflict preemption, and I can - - - I'll try to say those very quickly.

There's one other provision in Section 613 that helps support I think conflict preemption. In Section 613 it also says, "Municipalities in the State shall maintain local programs of immunization to raise the immunity of the children and adults of each municipality to the highest reasonable level." And it requires that that plan by each



municipality, including New York City, has to be approved 1 2 by the Commissioner. So here you have the legislature 3 directing municipalities, including New York City, to 4 create health - - - local vaccination programs. And what 5 else does that section provide? It says you - - - "Nothing 6 in this subdivision shall authorize mandatory" - - - you can't - - - we're not authorizing you - - - we're saying to 7 8 you - - -9 JUDGE WILSON: Well, that section you just read 10 says it has to be approved by the Commissioner? MR. SIRI: Yes. So - - -11 12 JUDGE WILSON: You - - - and did the City submit 13 a plan for - - - that includes flu shots and was that 14 approved by the Commissioner? 15 MR. SIRI: I don't know, but I imagine - - -16 whether they did or didn't didn't change the requirement 17 under the law. You know, there's - - - there's - - - one 18 of the unique things about the Public Health Law - - -19

JUDGE RIVERA: Wait, is that position that if indeed they submitted such a plan, the Commissioner approved it, that the Commissioner could not approve it, that that would have been an abrogation or in violation of the law?

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MR. SIRI: Well, I - - - I would say it's two things. I'd say, number one, the Commissioner can't



1 approve a plan that has that, and I would say, number two, 2 they - - - even before they submit it to the Commissioner 3 they're not allowed to make a plan that includes requiring 4 the flu shot because that very section that requires them 5 to create local programs immunization says that nothing in 6 this section permits you to require any vaccines beyond 7 2164. I think the State legislature's clearly indicating 8 what their intended policy - - -9 JUDGE RIVERA: What are the adverse health 10 consequences of - - - of the State, if we were to read it 11 12

consequences of - - - of the State, if we were to read it this way, saying we're not going not mandate the flu shot. If the City wants to do that, they can do so, but we don't see a need to do that. Is there an adverse health consequence for the State - - - the State to have determined we don't think there's an adverse health consequence, this is the way we're going to deal with the flu shot?

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MR. SIRI: Are you asking me is there a safety issue there? I'm - - - I'm sorry.

JUDGE RIVERA: Well, I'm thinking about adverse health consequences.

MR. SIRI: Okay. Well, I mean, it's - -
JUDGE RIVERA: Because you're talking about
public health issues.

MR. SIRI: I hope this answers your question. If



it doesn't, please let me know. I think the answer - - - I think this addresses your question. When this court considered Boreali, it was well aware that secondhand smoke could cause lung cancer and kill people, right.

Nonetheless, when it decided Boreali it said the principle at issue had nothing to do with health. It has to do with separation of powers, whether or not the State Health

Department had the authority to expand the locations at which second - - - smoking was not permitted. That's the only issue before I believe this court today which is - - - did the Department of the - - - the Board of Health have the authority to require the flu vaccine?

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JUDGE FAHEY: So 17- now, what is it, -109(a) or -107(a)? Doesn't that give the City expressed authority under the Administrative Code?

MR. SIRI: 17-109 of the Administrative Code.

JUDGE FAHEY: Yeah, 109 it is. Yes.

MR. SIRI: Yes, so 17-109 provides a number of very specific powers to the Board of Health regarding vaccination, including collecting and preserving pure vaccine lymph and producing diphtheria toxin, a number of others. It - - nowhere in any of the specific grants when you read 17-109, it's only two sentences long - - nowhere in any of those does it say you can require a vaccine. Where appellant derives that authority - - -

1	JUDGE STEIN: But but the City has done so
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3	MR. SIRI: Right.
4	JUDGE STEIN: for many, many decades and
5	never has in anything that I've seen has the State
6	come out and indicated in any manner that it did not
7	approve of that.
8	MR. SIRI: I'll take that in two pieces if I
9	could, and hopefully I'll get to the second piece. The
10	first part is that the the authority that they
11	derive, 17-109, is from 100 years ago, and they derive
12	- there is a general provision in there about controlling
13	communicable disease. And it's from that general provision
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15	JUDGE FAHEY: I'm sorry. I lost that last line.
16	General provision on controlling
17	MR. SIRI: Regarding controlling communicable
18	disease.
19	JUDGE FAHEY: Right. That's fine. Go ahead.
20	MR. SIRI: So when you read yeah, so when
21	you read it says it just has a general provision
22	about
23	JUDGE FAHEY: Right.
24	MR. SIRI: It's through that provision that I
25	believe that the that the Board of Health has

1 required vaccines in the past. Okay. They haven't done so 2 in almost fifty years at this point or required new 3 vaccines. They've required some additional doses, required 4 - - - no new vaccines. And there are some principles of 5 statutory - - - of legislative construction I think answer 6 that - - - answer the question that you pose which is later 7 more specific laws must yield to earlier general laws. 8 They don't have to - - - they don't have to preempt. They 9 - - - we're not - - - we're not arguing that 17-109 is 10 repealed in any way. It's - - -11 JUDGE STEIN: But in 2010 and 2015 - - -12 MR. SIRI: No, in ---13 JUDGE STEIN: - - - the State legislature 14 acknowledged and pointed to and recommended programs of 15 immunization that the City was conducting. 16 MR. SIRI: I'm not aware of that being in the 17 record. The only thing I'm aware of is in 20 - - - the 18 only thing I'm aware of is that there was a - - - the 19 Department - - - I believe what you're pointing to is - - -20 JUDGE STEIN: Well, when - - - when they updated 21 the regulations associated with 2164 of the Public Health 22 Law I believe that there was - -23 MR. SIRI: Right. 24 JUDGE STEIN: There was some comment in - - -



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MR. SIRI: Page 19 of the reply brief that was

brought up, right. So I didn't get a chance to address

this in my - - - because it was in the reply. But, number

one, that was part of the dicta to a regula - - - it wasn't

in the regulation, this language that - - -

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JUDGE STEIN: But that may all be true, but aren't we talking about here whether the legislature is aware of what the City is doing and has indicated its disapproval of same? And so whether it - - - you know - - - you know, we're not talking about whether this is a controlling principle of law or not. We're talking about looking at the circumstances and whether - - - and whether there has been - - -

MR. SIRI: Yeah, the Public Health Law is unique I think in the following way. Every single time the State legislature wants to exclude New York City from a provision of the - - - it has done so explicitly. I - - - we've counted 209 specific sections in the Public Health Law where the legislate - - - where it says New York City is not included. But you know what's not excluded? It doesn't exclude New York City from Section 613 of the Public Health Law or 2164 of the Public Health Law. It could have done that. It never did that. And - - - and 17-109, just to go back to your last point, it doesn't - - we're not arguing that 17-109 is preempted, repealed in any way. It lives in harmony with the current statutory of



the - - - statutory regime of the last twenty, thirty years as codified in Section 613 and 2164. There - - - there's - - - the - - - you know, there are general statutes that all the time must yield to later, more specific statutes, and it's a principle of statutory construction that whenever possible you try to read them in harmony.

The general grant of authority regarding control of communicable disease may have been used in the past by the Board of Health unchallenged to require certain vaccines more than fifty years ago. But in the last thirty years, the legislature has enacted a statutory regime that, number one, under 2164 makes clear precisely which vaccines are required, puts a regime that goes from beginning to end every single step along the way with regard to vaccinations and school requirements. And I notice my light is red, so I - - I don't know if I'm - - I can keep going or should I - - I

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: You may finish your point.

MR. SIRI: Okay. And then under - - - under

Section 613, as I've pointed out, and so you've got a - -
under 2164 there is field preemption because you have the
- - you have the legislature putting in a very detailed

regime that goes from precisely - - - that applies to every

State. It applies to every school exactly which vaccines,

what a school, parent, and local health official need to do

if a child shows up without the required vaccines, what exemptions are permitted, what it is they have to do to get it, what appellate rights are permitted. All of those - - and it's completely - - - so for that reason, we believe that there's a field preemption.

and then there's also field preemption because under Section 613 of the Public Health Law, when you read it it puts - - it creates a Statewide program of immunization that is under the auspices of the State Health Commissioner. And it - - - part of that Statewide health immunization program includes that municipalities in the State shall maintain local programs of immunization, requires them to. It even - - it's the same provision that specifically says encourage the flu shot. And it even includes the - - the City as part of that program of encouragement, and then makes sure to say nothing in here permits requiring any vaccine that we, the legislature, have not required under 2164. And, you know, there's - - there's been a lot of debate about vaccinations, as I'm sure everybody in this court's aware - -

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, counsel.

MR. SIRI: And - - - okay, thank you.

MR. DEARING: Thank you. Just to clarify a couple points about 17-109. The - - - the City - - - firstly, the key language is "measures for general

vaccination." It authorizes specifically "measures for general vaccination." That has been in that statute from 1866 until the current day. Two months after that statute was passed - - it was passed in February 1866. Two months later, the City Board of Health adopted a smallpox vaccination mandate. And in the volume that collects that mandate, it says in the - - in the margin, "Health Bill Section 16" as the authorizing section, and that is this precise language.

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By the way, the Jacobson case, the big Supreme Court case on vaccines - - - vaccine mandates uses general vaccination - - - the attorney, in that case, used that phrase. The Attorney General of the State of New York in a 1903 opinion we cite used that phrase. And as Your Honors have pointed out, we have consistently adopted vaccine requirements pursuant to that language. And this idea that we haven't adopted any in fifty years, also untrue. State did not catch up to the City until 2004 when the State finally added pertussis and tetanus to the - - - to the Public Health Law 2164 which had been in the City law for quite some time. So the City required additional vaccines from - - - going back to 1866 through 2004, even from 2004 forward it required additional doses of the DPT vaccine up until 2014 when the State caught up, and the DOH consistently referred to the City's additional



requirements. And then in 2013, we passed this flu vaccine rule. So really, you're saying 1866 to the present day the City has required additional vaccines.

JUDGE WILSON: Do you know the answer to my question about the submission of a plan to the Commissioner?

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MR. DEARING: I do not, Your Honor, and I can certainly find out that answer and give it to you. I don't think it affects the - - - the resolution of this case.

And the reason is that whole section is about State aid.

That's the label of the article and the - - - the title on the section, and the - - - so what it says when - - - when he's referring to approval of the Commission - - approval of the State Commissioner, it's not in the abstract. It's in connection with an application for State aid. And so the reality is the - - - the local boards of health - - - local departments of health across the State do many things that are not funded by State aid, the City Board of Health in particular.

And the City - - - New York City actually applies directly to the Centers for Disease Control for - - - for direct funding that covers the City of New York. The State Department of Health applies to the CDC for funding that covers the rest of the State. So those - - - those two things really don't have anything to do with what we're



talking about. And as I said, the language - - - that language at the end, it says nothing authorizes it.

Nothing authorizes - - - nothing in this section authorizes mandatory vaccination, and we're not claiming that it does. There's no conflict there.

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Just one last - - - last point about the Statewide Coalition case to try to - - - to add a little. You invited me to answer your question on rebuttal, and I'm going to take you up on it which is - - - which I should have mentioned earlier is that there's a footnote - - - on this issue of coverage, which facilities does it apply to and which does it not, in Statewide Coalition there was a similar issue because the City Board of Health rules about - - - about food service establishments applied to certain kinds of establishments and not others, basically restaurants but not grocery stores or bodegas. And that was an issue in this case, and this court, although striking down the rule, dropped the footnote that specifically said that fact alone would not cause a problem under Boreali. That - - - that's really analogous to what's going on here, and this court has really already held that's not a Boreali issue.

If I could just make twenty seconds for one last point?

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: You may.



MR. DEARING: This reliance on the - - - on the so-called unenacted bills or the fact that a bill gets amended or how many times does the bill get amended, I'm not aware that the bill he's referring to that ended up with the education program ever included the flu vaccine I don't believe it ever did. It was amended in technical ways, eventually passed.

On the idea that bills are introduced, there are 12,000 bills introduced in the New York State Legislature every year. At least by a factor of two, more than any other legislature in the country. Only a small fraction -- - we're in the bottom quintile, actually, as to bills passed. The fact that a bill gets introduced - - - merely gets introduced means nothing.

> CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, counsel.

MR. DEARING: Thank you, Your Honor.

(Court is adjourned)

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CERTIFICATION

I, Sara Winkeljohn, certify that the foregoing transcript of proceedings in the Court of Appeals of Garcia v. New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, No. 64 was prepared using the required transcription equipment and is a true and accurate record of the proceedings.

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