1	COURT OF APPEALS
2	STATE OF NEW YORK
3	PEOPLE,
4	
5	Respondent,
6	-against- No. 78
7	STEVEN MYERS,
8	Appellant.
9 10	20 Eagle Street Albany, New York June 06, 2018
	Before:
11	CHIEF JUDGE JANET DIFIORE
12	ASSOCIATE JUDGE JENNY RIVERA ASSOCIATE JUDGE LESLIE E. STEIN
13	ASSOCIATE JUDGE EUGENE M. FAHEY ASSOCIATE JUDGE MICHAEL J. GARCIA
14	ASSOCIATE JUDGE ROWAN D. WILSON
15	ASSOCIATE JUDGE PAUL FEINMAN
16	Appearances:
17	JOHN A. CIRANDO, ESQ.
18	D.J. & J.A. CIRANDO, ESQS. Attorney for Appellant
19	101 South Salina Street, Suite 1010 Syracuse, NY 13202
20	NICOLE K. INTSCHERT, ADA ONONDAGA COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
21	Attorney for Respondent 505 South State Street, 4th Floor
22	Syracuse, NY 13202
23	
24	
25	Sara Winkeljohn Official Court Transcribe:



CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Number 78, the People of 1 2 the State of New York v. Steven Myers. 3 Counsel. 4 MR. CIRANDO: Good afternoon. May it please the 5 court, John Cirando from Syracuse, New York, on behalf of 6 the appellant, Steven Myers, and I'd like to reserve two minutes for rebuttal, if I may? 7 8 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: You may, sir. 9 MR. CIRANDO: Thank you. This is an appeal from 10 a judgment of conviction for the crime of burglary in the 11 third degree. Defendant was sentenced to serve two-and-a-12 third to seven years after failing drug court. 13 we wish to bring before the court today concerns the 14 adequacy of the waiver of the indictment. 15 JUDGE FEINMAN: So I want to be clear. 16 challenge isn't necessarily to the written waiver portion 17 of it but goes to whether or not there should have been 18 some sort of colloquy between the court and the defendant? 19 MR. CIRANDO: Yes, Your Honor. 20 JUDGE FEINMAN: All right. And my question to 2.1 you is assuming that that has to be knowing, voluntarily, 2.2 and intelligently made, that waiver, what is it that the 23 defendant has to do to preserve that challenge if anything?



indicated that it was not necessary to preserve the

MR. CIRANDO: Well, the Appellate Division

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1	challenge. And
2	JUDGE FEINMAN: And what's the rationale for
3	that?
4	MR. CIRANDO: The rationale for that was I
5	believe they they relied on the the Boston
6	case. And
7	JUDGE FEINMAN: And that's the rationale that
8	you're
9	MR. CIRANDO: Yes.
10	JUDGE FEINMAN: promoting here?
11	MR. CIRANDO: Yes. Yes.
12	JUDGE FEINMAN: Okay. So assuming that that's
13	the case, how much does that allocution have to be?
14	MR. CIRANDO: How much does the
15	JUDGE FEINMAN: How detailed? What what i
16	the court supposed to ask?
17	MR. CIRANDO: Well, in the the analogy tha
18	the first part of the answer would be the analogy to
19	the waiver of a jury trial. Which like this statute
20	does not say anything about a colloquy in the statute
21	itself, but the courts have indicated that in waiving a
22	jury trial the defendant has to knowingly, voluntarily, an
23	intelligently realize what he is doing and and agree
24	to do that.

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JUDGE STEIN: Can a court accept or reject a

waiver of a jury trial?

MR. CIRANDO: Yes.

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JUDGE STEIN: Okay. Can a court accept or reject a waiver of the right to indictment if the statutory and constitutional requirements are met?

MR. CIRANDO: Well, by constitutional requirement, I would add the voluntariness and the knowingly and the intelligent part. And I would say that if that is not met - - -

JUDGE STEIN: Well but - - - but you're arguing that the - - - that the only way to ascertain whether the waiver is knowing, voluntary, and intelligent is to conduct a colloquy.

MR. CIRANDO: Yes.

JUDGE STEIN: Right? And - - - and the People are arguing I believe that - - - that the requirements of appearing with counsel and signing a detailed written waiver and the requirements of which are in the statute, that all of that establishes that it's knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.

MR. CIRANDO: That - - -

JUDGE STEIN: Right?

MR. CIRANDO: The only - - - the analogy I can bring is to the - - - in the same sense as a waiver of a jury trial.

JUDGE STEIN: But what I'm - - - my point is that 1 2 the - - -3 MR. CIRANDO: Well, there has - - -4 JUDGE STEIN: - - - with a waiver of a jury trial 5 we don't have those statute - - - that whole statutory 6 mechanism, and the court can decide for whatever reason, 7 presumably because it's not knowing, voluntary, and 8 intelligent, to reject the waiver. Whereas here, it seems 9 to me that the way it's set up because the court can't reject it is it's an acknowledgment that if those 10 11 requirements are met then it meets the knowing, voluntary, 12 and intelligence test. 13 MR. CIRANDO: I - - - I don't think you - - - a 14 silent record cannot presume a proper waiver. I think the 15 court said this in People - - -16 JUDGE STEIN: But the record isn't silent. 17 MR. CIRANDO: It - - -18 JUDGE STEIN: The record shows the - - - that the 19 arguably again, that the - - - that the waiver was signed 20 in court as required with counsel and that the waiver met 21 all of the necessary requirements. 2.2 MR. CIRANDO: I would respectfully disagree that 23 as to the waiver - - - that the record demonstrates that 24 the waiver was actually signed in open court. There's 25

nothing in the record to verify that - - -

JUDGE FEINMAN: So - - - so prior to the - -
prior to the acceptance of the waiver, there's nothing here
that indicates - - - there is later on during the plea
colloquy, there's nothing that indicates that the defendant
even could read or understand - -
MR. CIRANDO: Right.

JUDGE FEINMAN: - - English or otherwise. I

mean he's obviously conversing with the judge in English,
but that's a very different issue about whether he can read

JUDGE GARCIA: There's - - - counsel, as I understand your argument was twofold. One is what we've been talking about just now with Judge Stein, which is there's no indication on the record that there was compliance with the statutory requirements. Second, even if so, you still have to have this colloquy.

MR. CIRANDO: Right.

and understand English.

JUDGE GARCIA: Is that correct?

MR. CIRANDO: Right.

JUDGE GARCIA: What I'd like to understand as to part two if we - - let's assume that a waiver is validly executed and we now put in a new requirement that you have to have some type of colloquy to elicit - - - to ensure that it's voluntary and knowing. What's the effect of that going to have on all the pleas like your client's where

judges who weren't told they had to do this before are - - we're now faced with a number of pleas that were
negotiated?

We have plea agreements, we have guilty pleas, people who have served or are serving their sentences, and now they're going to come - - be coming up through the pipeline, let's assume they're live appeals, and they'll say, you know, you didn't engage in this colloquy. And now we have a requirement that you don't have to preserve, because we're saying no preservation is necessary, where we have thousands of pleas that are going to be affected by a rule that we put in.

MR. CIRANDO: Well, I don't know if the violation of constitutional - - - of constitutional rights is - - - should be tempered by such a - - - such a concern initially. But - - -

JUDGE WILSON: What do you make of the fact that the Constitution itself specifies a written waiver when it was amended? Is that part of the right, or is at least something that we can assume that the people who amended the Constitution believed was sufficient?

MR. CIRANDO: Well, I - - - I still think to waive a - - - to waive a constitutional right or to waive your rights you - - - you have to do it knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. And I think that - - -

1	that is the cloud that's over everything
2	JUDGE FEINMAN: So so
3	JUDGE FAHEY: And why does that I'm sorry,
4	you go ahead.
5	JUDGE FEINMAN: I'm sorry. So would it be enough
6	if the judge just said I see you signed the waiver in the
7	presence of your counsel, who has also signed the waiver,
8	did you have a chance to discuss it with your attorney? Is
9	that enough?
10	MR. CIRANDO: That wouldn't be enough to to
11	have the defendant waive his right to appeal, so I don't
12	think it's it's sufficient to have the defendant
13	waive the right
14	JUDGE FEINMAN: So so is part of your
15	argument that because this is of a constitutional dimension
16	we should certainly not have a lesser requirement than we
17	have for the violation for the waiver of a statutory
18	right to appeal?
19	MR. CIRANDO: Right, yes.
20	JUDGE FEINMAN: Okay.
21	MR. CIRANDO: Yes, Your Honor.
22	JUDGE GARCIA: But to go back to Judge Wilson's
23	question, let's assume that the state constitution, the
24	drafters, intended this to be a knowing, intelligent, and
25	voluntary waiver, this would satisfy that, this written

form. We would essentially be saying our constitution 1 2 falls below the federal floor. That would have to be our 3 finding, right? That the state - - - it becomes the 4 reserve of our usual state constitution jurisprudence. 5 MR. CIRANDO: Usually, it's - - - it's the other 6 way around. 7 JUDGE GARCIA: But we would have to say this violates the Constitution of the United States. 8 9 MR. CIRANDO: Well I - - - I think even in the 10 federal statute you - - - federal constitution you still have to have it knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. 11 12 JUDGE GARCIA: But assume that our state 13 constitution doesn't require that, that we've said in the 14 state constitution that this extensive written waiver is 15 sufficient. To find that isn't, we'd have to say 16 essentially our state constitutional provision doesn't meet

MR. CIRANDO: It's just - - - well, I think we're talking about what is just a personal right, a personal right which the defendant can waive, and if the defendant is waving a personal right, such a personal right has to be done knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. And I would - - I would fall back on that - - - that analysis, Your Honor.

the federal constitutional standard.

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JUDGE FAHEY: I guess I - - - I struggle with the



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1	idea that the only way that this can be done is by an oral
2	waiver in some form, a detailed oral waiver. Because if I
3	am correct, you're saying that the the procedure
4	that's used to waive the right of appeal would be
5	insufficient.
6	MR. CIRANDO: No, I didn't I didn't mean it
7	that way.
8	JUDGE FAHEY: Okay.
9	MR. CIRANDO: I meant
10	JUDGE FAHEY: Explain that to me then.
11	MR. CIRANDO: in response to Judge
12	Feinman's question that the what he proposed was not
13	sufficient to waive someone's right to appeal, so it
14	shouldn't be sufficient to waive
15	JUDGE FAHEY: I see.
16	MR. CIRANDO: waive indictment.
17	JUDGE FAHEY: I see.
18	MR. CIRANDO: That that was the analysis I
19	gave.
20	JUDGE FAHEY: So why why do we need an oral
21	waiver on top of the written waiver? Because that's in
22	essence what you're asking, right?
23	MR. CIRANDO: For the same reason we need it in a
24	jury waiver, for the same reason we need it in an appeal

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waiver.

1 JUDGE FAHEY: And that reason is what? 2 MR. CIRANDO: That we want to ensure that a 3 waiver of the constitutional right is knowingly, 4 voluntarily, and intelligently entered. 5 JUDGE FAHEY: I see. 6 JUDGE RIVERA: Well, counsel, just to clarify, 7 your argument is not that every item that might be included 8 in the written waiver has to be part of the colloquy, are 9 you? 10 MR. CIRANDO: No. No. 11 JUDGE RIVERA: No. I - - - I thought your 12 argument was that the court, as it has to for other types 13 of rights, has to be convinced that the individual is 14 knowingly and intelligently waiving the right. 15 MR. CIRANDO: Right. 16 JUDGE RIVERA: That could mean something as 17 simple as asking did you read it, and do you know what it 18 means? 19 MR. CIRANDO: Right. 20 JUDGE RIVERA: And did you discuss that with your 21 lawyer? 22 MR. CIRANDO: Right, or simply stating do you 23 know your case can be presented to the grand jury or you 24 have the opportunity to testify? And if - - - if that



takes place, the court then can have the opportunity to

determine if the evidence before the grand jury is sufficient and if the procedures were followed. Do you understand that and do you wish to waive those rights and enter a plea of guilty to burglary in the third degree in accordance with this plea-bargain? And then if he says yes then you - - you have him sign the waiver, do you acknowledge your signature, pass it up to the judge, he signs it. Then you go into talking about his - - his plea-bargain and then waiver of his right to appeal, separate, separate, which I think this court has required. And - - and then I would say that the procedures in Judge Jasen's (ph.) dissent in Sizemore (ph.) would have been met. Thank you.

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, counsel.

Counsel.

MS. INTSCHERT: Hello, Your Honors; Nicole
Intschert for the People of the State New York. If I
could, I guess I would like to start with the question
about preservation. I believe that the - - - the second
contention here that we're were concerned about, the - - the requirement of an oral colloquy, is improperly before
this court. Inasmuch as I think the court is in agreement,
it's something above and beyond what is being required - -

JUDGE FEINMAN: Well, I haven't agreed to



anything yet. I just asked questions. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 preservation? 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 to consider - - -16 17 18

MS. INTSCHERT: My mistake. I apologize.

JUDGE RIVERA: Well, how is it unpreserved? Isn't it clear that what he is saying is that what went on here didn't comply with the Constitution? Haven't we said what - - - if that's your claim that that doesn't require

MS. INTSCHERT: And if - - - if this court were to find that in fact, the lack of a colloquy did not comply with the Constitution than it would, I submit, be a mode of proceedings error that wouldn't require preservation. But I don't think that based on what is in the - - - the Constitution and what is under the statute right now, that the oral colloquy is required, and I would ask this court

JUDGE STEIN: This is one of those strange situations where we have to decide that first to decide whether it needs to be preserved or not, right?

MS. INTSCHERT: Agreed, Your Honor, yes.

JUDGE STEIN: Okay.

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MS. INTSCHERT: And I - - - I think that Former Presiding Justice Kaye's reasoning in People v. Page is instructive. In People v. Page, of course, we were considering the waiver of the right to trial by jury and considering much I think the same issues here.



waiver of a right to trial by jury was attempted to be effected orally. And it - - - the court - - - the case came up all the way before this court, and the discussion was whether the oral colloquy would suffice without a written colloquy and the written - - - or, excuse me, a written waiver. And the written waiver is what was - - - what is and was required under the Constitution and under the CPL. And Judge Kaye, as I think astutely, pointed out that that is what the drafters of the Constitution and what the people of the State to New York through the legislature decided was necessary - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: That's not - - - that's not the question. Because the statute - - - excuse me, the

Constitution says, "Such waiver shall be evinced by written instrument," but his question or the issue he's posing is how does the court know that the waiver is knowingly and intelligently given? It's not whether or not there's a writing. I mean it's not - - it could not possibly be, but you'll correct me otherwise, that People's position that if the defendant either didn't speak English and the waiver's only written in English or the defendant couldn't read, that the simple fact that they sign that waiver with their name means that they understood the waiver. Don't you need the judge to ask something?

MS. INTSCHERT: Well, I would say that there



needs to be some - - - some sort of indication that there's an understanding, at a minimum, of whether the defendant can read and write. And in - - -

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JUDGE FEINMAN: So how do we have that - - - so accepting that concession, how do you have that evidence on this record?

MS. INTSCHERT: I - - - it's a little bit out of

JUDGE FEINMAN: Before you get to the plea colloquy?

MS. INTSCHERT: Admittedly, I'm not sure that my recollection of the record is all that clear, but based on my recollection, there - - - the court did not address the defendant himself before we entered the waiver of indictment. But I do think it's notable and instructive that immediately thereafter we went right into taking a plea, and in the course of taking the plea those sorts of questions were asked and answered. And if at - - - if at some point during the - - - the colloquy on the plea, how old are you, do you speak and read and understand English, have you had sufficient time to confer with your attorney, are you under the influence of any drugs or alcohol, et cetera, et cetera, if there had been some sort of issue there, then I think we would have readily been aware that the - - - there was an issue with the waiver of indictment.



JUDGE RIVERA: So if - - - if - - - since we're looking at a statewide rule, if those questions had not had - - - had been asked and you didn't have those answers - - - because you make of course an excellent point, is it - - - how then does the judge know that the waiver is valid and knowing and intelligent?

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MS. INTSCHERT: I'm afraid I don't have a good answer other than it - - - it would seem that in other cases where we're looking at the waiver of the right to a trial by jury, the entry of the plea - - - excuse me, the entry of the waiver of the right to trial by jury, was found acceptable even though there wasn't an oral colloquy that accompanied it. And I apologize because these cases weren't in my brief, but there are a handful of cases from the various departments of the Appellate Division saying that looking at the other circumstances surrounding the entry of the - - - or the waiver of the right to trial by jury, it could be inferred that despite the lack of a colloquy that the entry was knowing, voluntarily, and intelligently done.

JUDGE FEINMAN: So I just want to address the concern that I think was raised by Judge Garcia. It's not your experience, is it, that there are literally hundreds of thousands of pleas that could now be attacked based on the failure to have any colloquy. I mean, it would be more



	likely that most judges have asked something. You know,
2	maybe here just the judge forgot to do that.
3	MS. INTSCHERT: I'm inclined to believe that in
4	this particular instance, this was a one-time mistake that
5	I think the judge got distracted while he was at the bench
6	and forgot to engage in the colloquy that would have been
7	his normal practice.
8	JUDGE FEINMAN: Right, so are are you
9	familiar at all with the sample colloquy that's up there
10	with the PJI charges
11	MS. INTSCHERT: I've reviewed the model colloquy
12	Your Honor.
13	JUDGE FEINMAN: on the New York Court's do
14	gov website?
15	MS. INTSCHERT: Yes.
16	JUDGE FEINMAN: Are you familiar with that?
17	MS. INTSCHERT: Yes, Your Honor.
18	JUDGE FEINMAN: All right. So is everything
19	that's in that sample colloquy required, or is it something
20	less?
21	MS. INTSCHERT: I I would submit that it's
22	something less if I may refer
23	JUDGE FEINMAN: Yeah, sure. Yeah, yeah.
24	MS. INTSCHERT: Thank you.
25	JUDGE STEIN: Well, have we haven't we



generally with these types of colloquy said that there's no 1 2 specific - - -3 MS. INTSCHERT: Catechism? 4 JUDGE STEIN: - - - catechism? Yeah. 5 MS. INTSCHERT: Sorry. I'm sorry, Your Honor. 6 didn't mean to speak for you. JUDGE STEIN: No, that's - - - that's okay. 7 8 MS. INTSCHERT: But I - - - I agree, and so I - -9 - I can't - - - I certainly don't want to be responsible 10 for scripting what the colloquy should be. And I - - - I11 just think that there's - - -12 JUDGE RIVERA: But the conscientious judge being 13 aware of this script would be on notice, even if we have 14 never opined on this, that such a colloquy makes sense to 15 confirm that - - -16 MS. INTSCHERT: Yeah. 17 JUDGE RIVERA: - - - the individual knows what 18 they're doing? 19 MS. INTSCHERT: I'm - - - I'm sure that judges 20 are aware, and I'm sure that it - - - and it does make 2.1 I'm not at all saying that a colloquy is - - - an 2.2 oral colloquy in addition to the written waiver is a bad 23 idea. It's just that I don't think under the structure 24 that we have that it's necessary for there to be a specific



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one or - -

JUDGE FEINMAN: But - - - but the waiver at that 1 2 point goes to the very jurisdiction of the court, right? 3 Because this is happening in some sort of - - - whether 4 it's a - - - it's a Supreme Court part of what is up until 5 that point a pending felony complaint - - -6 MS. INTSCHERT: Correct, Judge. 7 JUDGE FEINMAN: - - - for which the Supreme Court 8 or the county court would have no jurisdiction otherwise, 9 right? 10 MS. INTSCHERT: Right. 11 JUDGE FEINMAN: That would be still pending in 12 the lower, local criminal court, whether that's the 13 criminal court of the City of New York or some other local 14 court, right? 15 Right. MS. INTSCHERT: 16 JUDGE FEINMAN: So until you get jurisdiction 17 through the waiver, how can you cure it with the plea part? 18 And I'm - - - I'm going back to something you said earlier. 19 I mean don't you really need it up front? 20 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: The question is can you do 21 a totality of the circumstances type analysis here.

MS. INTSCHERT: And I - - - and I think that you can in the sense that I - - - I believe that's the sort of suggested review that has come up through the Third, Fourth, and I believe the Second Departments.



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JUDGE RIVERA: Well, the point is it's a status 1 2 question. The status doesn't change from moments before to 3 moments later. Either the person knows English and - - -4 and they can read, or they can't. 5 MS. INTSCHERT: That's correct, Judge. 6 JUDGE STEIN: Going back to some questions about 7 the effect of this, so aside from the - - - from pleas in 8 the pipeline, so to speak, would this have any effect, for 9 example, on predicate felony determinations? 10 MS. INTSCHERT: Truthfully, Your Honor, I'm not 11 12 13

MS. INTSCHERT: Truthfully, Your Honor, I'm not sure that I know the answer to the question. I'm not sure I can give you - - - the court an adequate answer to that question. It certainly seems like it would implicate in the lines of like a Catu sort of analysis, which as far as I'm aware could lead to the implication that we have all - - all these kinds of procedural nightmares to go back and - - and fix or address one way or another. But beyond that, I'm afraid I don't have that answer.

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JUDGE RIVERA: But aren't we really - - - aren't

- - - wouldn't it really boil down to an ineffective

assistance of counsel claim? Counsel should have raised

it, they didn't, we've never opined on it, so maybe you

don't have the kind of Turner claim anyway. Aren't we

really talking about prospectively not retrospectively?

MS. INTSCHERT: I'm - - - Your Honor, I'm sorry I



1	don't know the answer. I would be happy to get back to you
2	if
3	JUDGE RIVERA: Fair enough.
4	MS. INTSCHERT: the court would like an
5	additional submission on that particular issue.
6	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, counsel.
7	MS. INTSCHERT: All right. Thank you, Your
8	Honors.
9	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Counsel.
10	MR. CIRANDO: I think, Judge Garcia, rather than
11	looking back looking forward, it's my understanding
12	that now the the our largest county in the
13	state, New York County, is going to start utilizing
14	Superior Court informations in an effort to speedily
15	dispose of matters.
16	JUDGE FEINMAN: But but there have been SCI
17	pleas in all the counties of the city for years. You have
18	Part F, and you have the N part, and the county part. So I
19	mean, the judges there are familiar with with those
20	waivers. So
21	MR. CIRANDO: There was
22	JUDGE FEINMAN: But it it's been done in
23	all all the counties
24	MR. CIRANDO: Okay.
25	JUDGE FEINMAN: of the City of New York.

But the - - - the real concern I think that Judge Garcia was expressing is are we now creating a rule that retrospectively, if we adopt your position, endangers literally thousands of otherwise settled pleas?

MR. CIRANDO: I don't believe so, Your Honor, because I don't think that there's that many cases in the state where there's absolutely no colloquy at all, and that's what we have here.

JUDGE GARCIA: We're going to be setting some kind of a floor, and I know we always say there's no catechism for this.

MR. CIRANDO: Right.

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JUDGE GARCIA: But then it will be did this meet the non-catechism test? Did this meet that - - - did you just say did you execute this extensive written waiver? Is that enough? And we've never said there is any requirement yet.

MR. CIRANDO: Right.

JUDGE GARCIA: So a judge who doesn't follow a form or who accepts this in court written waiver in the presence of counsel and thinks that's entirely appropriate because we've never said otherwise and that case is live, forget collateral attacks and ineffective assistance, there are thousands of these cases I would imagine, plea cases, in the pipeline right now. There's no preservation

requirement if we find this. And so we are going to start to get - - - and other cases like this come to mind - - - all these live cases first that say we didn't have to preserve this error, there was nothing at all, no catechism, nothing, or this was this, it didn't meet even your minimal standard, and we are going to be reviewing or the Appellate Divisions are going to be reviewing thousands of these cases based on a new rule.

MR. CIRANDO: Didn't you have that same problem when the court said that the guilty pleas were improper for certain reasons?

JUDGE GARCIA: We did.

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MR. CIRANDO: Didn't we have that same problem when the court said that the notice or the waiver of appeal can't just be done with a form? And - - - and more importantly, I think it was an answer to Judge Feinman's question where he - - - you said looking at what happened subsequently during the proceedings to use it prospectively, I don't think that would fly in the face of this court saying that the guilty plea is a separate entity and has to be resolved. The waiver of appeal is a separate entity separate and distinct and has to be resolved. They can't be lumped together. And I don't think the waiver - -

JUDGE FEINMAN: Well, here you're - - I mean



1	the argument would be that you can't do that because until
2	such time that you get the valid waiver, the court doesn't
3	the Supreme Court or the county court, depending on
4	what jurisdiction you're in, doesn't even have
5	jurisdiction.
6	MR. CIRANDO: Right, and that's why we don't nee
7	to preserve it. Thank you.
8	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, counsel.
9	MR. CIRANDO: Thank you.
10	(Court is adjourned)
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CERTIFICATION I, Sara Winkeljohn, certify that the foregoing transcript of proceedings in the Court of Appeals of People v. Steven Myers, No. 78 was prepared using the required transcription equipment and is a true and accurate record of the proceedings. Congleric Good Signature: Agency Name: eScribers Address of Agency: 352 Seventh Avenue Suite 604 New York, NY 10001 June 12, 2018 Date:

