1	COURT OF APPEALS
2	STATE OF NEW YORK
3	WEST MIDTOWN MANAGEMENT GROUP, INC.,
4	Respondent,
5	
6	-against- No. 81
7	STATE OF NEW YORK, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, OFFICE OF THE MEDICAID INSPECTOR GENERAL,
9	Appellant.
10	20 Eagle Stree Albany, New Yor
11	June 7, 201 Before:
12	CHIEF JUDGE JANET DIFIORE
13	ASSOCIATE JUDGE JENNY RIVERA ASSOCIATE JUDGE LESLIE E. STEIN
14	ASSOCIATE JUDGE EUGENE M. FAHEY ASSOCIATE JUDGE MICHAEL J. GARCIA
15	ASSOCIATE JUDGE ROWAN D. WILSON ASSOCIATE JUDGE PAUL FEINMAN
16	71050C1711L 00DGL 1710L 1LINFIN
17	Appearances:
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21	JONATHAN M. GOIDEL, ESQ.
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CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: The first appeal on this afternoon's calendar is appeal number 81, West Midtown Management Group v. State of New York. Counsel. MS. OLSEN: Good afternoon. May it please the court, Caroline Olsen on behalf of the Office of the Medicaid Inspector General. With the court's permission, I'd like to reserve two minutes for rebuttal. CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: You may. MS. OLSEN: A final audit report found that West Midtown had received Medicaid overpayments of 1.86 million CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Counsel, what's the exact issue before us? Are we here to determine whether the IG can recoup the entire amount by any means, or are we here to determine whether the overpayment can only be recouped through the withholding process as defined in the notices?

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MS. OLSEN: We're here to correct the error in the First Department's decision which conflated and basically equated the force and effect of the - - - of the final audit report with the notice of withholding. Under Social Services Law 145(a) a final audit report has the effect of a - - - any - - - the final audit report here had the effect of 1.86 million dollar money judgment, that was the final and dispositive determination of liability.

Under the relevant regula - - - regulatory scheme, notices of withholding simply inform a provider that a - - - that the agency has selected a particular mechanism to recover that, and so the - - - the First Department's decision confused liability and remedy and that's the error that needs to be corrected.

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JUDGE GARCIA: But put another way then, did the First Department decision foreclose your agency from withholding, or did it prohibit you from collecting at all?

MS. OLSEN: Well, on the very first page of the decision it does say that under the final audit report the agency is - - is limited to - - under the final audit report to collecting 1.46 million dollars - - to 1.46 million.

JUDGE GARCIA: So they've limited the amount of your recovery?

MS. OLSEN: Well, I think that we would need clarity from the court that that - - - that the order does not limit our - - - our recovery under the final audit report.

JUDGE STEIN: So when it comes to the withholding part of it, do you agree that the notices that you sent that - - - that are in the record were not sufficient to enable you to collect that additional amount without some further notice at least?



1	MS. OLSEN: Well, I I don't think that
2	issue
3	JUDGE STEIN: Not to collect, I'm sorry. To
4	withhold.
5	MS. OLSEN: I don't think that issue is is
6	squarely before the court because, again, in this instance
7	the agency did issue additional notices of withholding
8	before it began collecting the remainder of the of
9	the 400,000 dollars.
10	JUDGE FEINMAN: And and this lawsuit was
11	actually commenced before those notices the
12	subsequent notices went out, right?
13	MS. OLSEN: That's exactly right, yes.
14	JUDGE FEINMAN: So those notices aren't
15	necessarily part of this record, so that's why it's not
16	before us? Or
17	MS. OLSEN: I think under this court's case law,
18	including Michael B., there's no the court should
19	consider very well consider those, and I think it -
20	- it's particularly appropriate to do so here because the
21	the main contention is there is a lack of notice, but
22	in fact, the agency provided the notice that everyone seem
23	to that that the petitioner
24	JUDGE FAHEY: Well, that isn't isn't
25	that the point? Isn't the point you provided a right to

recover. The question is does that eliminate the fair notice requirement that's set out in 519.5? And that's a distinction that - - - that it seems that the Appellate Division drew here.

MS. OLSEN: Well, I think there are two - - - to unpack that question a little bit I think there's - - - JUDGE FAHEY: Go ahead.

MS. OLSEN: The question is notice of what, and so the final audit report puts the - - - puts the agent - -

JUDGE FAHEY: Well, the notice of the amount that you're going to collect, that's what - - - that's what you're required to give. That's what a fair notice requirement would be, and you can't conflate the two things. A right to recover is not the same as a right to notice of a party of what you're going to recover. There's no question you properly established the right to recover here. It's just a question of whether or not they were properly notified of it. And the way I read what the Appellate Division said is that, yeah, you've got a right to recover, but you still have to give them the notice of the amount that you're going to take.

MS. OLSEN: And I think the - - - the notices at issue here did do so. If you look the - - - if you read the notices, they have to be read in light of the statutory



and regulatory context, and they have to be read in light of the fact that the notices, which are on page - - - page 50 of the - - - of the record explicitly referenced the final audit report. That portion of the final audit report says that if you do not settle within 20 days the agency will begin to recover using a - - - will provide notice, will begin to recover not barring any other remedy at law.

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But even if - - - putting aside the plain reading of the notices, we know that West Midtown understood that the final - - - the final audit report was a statement of liability and that the notices of withholding did not affect that. And we know that because there are three contemporaneous statements in the record from West Midtown that post-date the notices that use the 1.46 million dollar figure that say we understand that we are liable for 1.86 million dollars. And so there - - - there really can be no question that they actually understood that - - - that point.

JUDGE WILSON: Have you by now withheld the full amount, the 1.86?

MS. OLSEN: That's correct, and following this - - the issuance of the notice in July 2014, the agency did
collect that amount. And so what this action is really
trying to argue is that we were somehow precluded from
issuing additional notices of withholding and that that



money has to be - - - that money, which no one disputes is an overpayment for - - - for services that were not reimbursable under Medicaid have to be - - - nonetheless have to go back to the - - - to the provider.

JUDGE WILSON: And did you collect those under the notice that's - - - the newer notice that's not in the record, or did you collect them under the old notice? Or is it not clear what you notice you collected under?

MS. OLSEN: Those were collected exclusively under the - - - the subsequent notices that - - - the one that - - - the first one being issued in July 2014. And just to remind the court about why there was this - - - this - - - what's seemingly a gap, at West Midtown's request, the agency granted a significant reduction in the withholding rate from 50 percent to 5 percent, so it actually took several years to recover the full 1.46 million dollars. When the agency had recovered that in mid-2014, the agency then - - - it expeditiously provided notice that it was going to collect the remaining amount.

JUDGE WILSON: So the thing that - - - the thing that's stumping me a little that I'm probably just missing something is if what's at issue here is whether the notices that are in the record gave you the ability to collect beyond the 1.46 million, but in fact, you withheld the differences between the 1.46 and the 1.86 based on notices



that aren't in the record, sort of what we're doing here because even if we say you could or could not collect that additional amount under the original notices, you didn't actually collect it under those notices.

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MS. OLSEN: Well, again, as - - - that gets back to the - - - sort of the reason why we're here to begin which is that the First Department's decision actually treats the notices of withholding as if they can have the - - - they can amend the final audit report and the liability - - -

JUDGE WILSON: So that's the sole point.

MS. OLSEN: That's the issue.

JUDGE FEINMAN: So the issue really is did that FAR - - - I'm calling it a FAR, that final audit report, get amended by those notices, and your position is it doesn't because they didn't accept any offer of settlement within twenty days?

MS. OLSEN: Our - - - our position is that the - - - that the notice of withholding could not amend the final audit report, and that is true because of the act - - - the regul - - - statutory and regulatory scheme under the Social Services Law, and it is also true as - - - just as a matter of fact here that the notices of withholding when plainly read could not be read to - - - to somehow limit the liability and that again is confirmed from the - - -

from the contemporaneous statements.

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JUDGE FAHEY: Just - - just so I'm clear, and maybe I read the record wrong, is the actual notice - - - not the FAR, but the notices that were sent out - - - said 1.4, right?

MS. OLSEN: That is correct, but the very - -
JUDGE FAHEY: Okay. So let me just - - - let me

just follow up. So they said 1.4, the only time that they

got actual notice of the 1.8 was on a telephone call; is

that correct? Because that's what the record says.

MS. OLSEN: I think that's incorrect because I think the final audit report provided the - - - provided notice that they were on the hook for 1.86.

JUDGE FAHEY: Well, it didn't provide the statutory notice that's set out in - - - in 519.5, did it?

MS. OLSEN: Well, I think there's some - - - it's - - - there's an open question whether it is sufficient to put the notice of withholding into the final audit report, but here the final audit report did do that. And I would just say on the September 2013 call, both of the - - - two of the three contemporaneous statements from West Midtown when - - in correspondence with the court and the agency acknowledged the 1.86 million. So between the notice of withholding that mentioned 1.46 million and that September call they acknowledged their liability for 1.86 million.

JUDGE WILSON: So can - - - I'm sorry. Could you help me with one more thing? There's a sentence in the Appellate Division sentence, the majority, that says, "Contrary to the dissent's assertions, we express no view as to OMIG's right to continue pursuing the higher point estimate." What does that mean?

MS. OLSEN: It's a - - - it's a somewhat bewildering statement in the decision. Again, I sort of - - - I point the court to the fact that in that beginning part of the - - - the beginning part of the decision the court said that the agency was bound or was capped at 1.46 million, but I think regardless of how you read that sentence, we're seeking clarity that the notices of withholding and that - - - we're not capped the final audit report and that the agency was free to collect the 1.86 million.

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, counsel.

Counsel.

JUDGE WILSON: What does that sentence mean?

MR. GOIDEL: Well, I can only speculate, Your

Honor, and I'm perfectly willing to do that. First, if it

may please the court, I'm Jonathan Goidel, and I'm here on

behalf of the respondents. I don't know whether or not

what the Appellate Division majority meant by that was

perhaps there was some other vehicle by which - - - perhaps

1	another audit, perhaps some other vehicle by which they
2	could seek to pursue the higher number. I don't know, but
3	what I do know is that, as Justice Fahey said a couple of
4	times, the requisite notice was not given for withholding
5	more than 1.4. And if I could get the
6	JUDGE STEIN: But does that aren't there -
7	isn't there more than first of all, isn't there
8	more than one way to collect the liability
9	MR. GOIDEL: That's
10	JUDGE STEIN: owed?
11	MR. GOIDEL: Your Honor, yes.
12	JUDGE STEIN: Okay.
13	MR. GOIDEL: And I
14	JUDGE STEIN: Well, let me let me finish.
15	MR. GOIDEL: Surely.
16	JUDGE STEIN: And and so withholding is one
17	way.
18	MR. GOIDEL: Correct.
19	JUDGE STEIN: Okay. And let's assume for the
20	moment that up until the time they collected the 1.4
21	million dollars, right, they had only served notices of
22	their intent to withhold that amount. What prevents them
23	from then serving additional notices of withholding of the
24	amount between 1.4 and 1.8 million dollars?



MR. GOIDEL: The statutory framework requires

that they give particular notices of what they are going to do, how they're going to collect the amount that they've determined to collect.

JUDGE STEIN: But does it say they have to do it at the very beginning and - - and never change?

MR. GOIDEL: And never change?

JUDGE STEIN: Never change the method or the amount that they do by any particular - -
MR. GOIDEL: I would - - well, Your Honor,

MR. GOIDEL: I would - - - well, Your Honor, that's an interesting question, and I suppose that requires a looking into, as I've done in preparation for arguing here today, into the definition of not barring any other remedy permitted by law. And I would suggest to the court that increasing the amount that you're collecting is not a remedy. I think that sentence contemplates attachment. I think it contemplates the filing of a judgment. I think it contemplates cutting off their rights as a provider.

JUDGE RIVERA: But - - - but are those things exclusive? Why couldn't they have - - - these look like form notices to me, by the way. So they have the form notices for withholding the lower amount, and then they can move on and try and collect all the way to the top if you do not appeal it, if you don't seek administrative review.

MR. GOIDEL: Because what the notices say, the cover letter which is statutorily required or required by



regulation, contemplates three scenarios. So the provider 1 2 is given notice of three potential scenarios, not the 3 fourth which is what OMIG is now suggesting was an 4 available option - - - three. Option number one, pay the 5 entire 1.4 immediately, write a check, here you go, we're 6 done. 7 JUDGE RIVERA: Within twenty days, yeah. 8 MR. GOIDEL: Yes, within twenty days, correct. 9 Option number two, contact us within twenty days and work 10 out a payment arrangement for that money, and you get to 11

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MR. GOIDEL: Yes, within twenty days, correct.

Option number two, contact us within twenty days and work out a payment arrangement for that money, and you get to control your fate in terms of controlling your cash flow - - - this is a business, controlling the - - - the severity of the effect of the withholding on your business. And then option number three, which is in the last paragraph of the first page on page 37 of the record is if you do nothing, which for all intents and purposes I suppose is what my client did - - - if you do nothing within that period of time we're going to collect 1.4, but we're going to do it at 50 percent. And that's a heavy lift.

JUDGE STEIN: No, we're - - it said we're going to withhold 1.4. It didn't say that's - - -

JUDGE FEINMAN: We're going to collect.

JUDGE STEIN: - - - all we're going to collect.

MR. GOIDEL: Well, it says we're going to liquidate.

JUDGE RIVERA: No, no. It says, "We're going to withhold equal to 50 percent of your medical billings to recover payment and liquidate the lower confidence limit amount, interest, and/or penalty" - - -MR. GOIDEL: Right. JUDGE RIVERA: - - - "not barring any other remedy allowed by law." MR. GOIDEL: So now the question is what is any other remedy allowed by law? And I think - - - and the majority of the Appellate Division thought - - -JUDGE RIVERA: But think of it logically, sir. MR. GOIDEL: That's what I'm trying to do. JUDGE RIVERA: They - - - they've got this lower amount that they say we have a very high confidence that even if you appealed, we will succeed. You're going to have to pay this. Then we believe there's an additional amount over that, and they give you what that top number

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is.

MR. GOIDEL: Right.

JUDGE RIVERA: We have a confidence level in that, depends if we're going to win that, fine. But all this says is, look, pay the whole - - - as you say, pay the whole amount or work - - - upfront or work out a payment schedule. Logically you're saying that they are then giving up the other amount if you do nothing?



1	MR. GOIDEL: Well, what I'm saying is that II yo
2	then take
3	JUDGE RIVERA: Why is the government giving up
4	all that money?
5	MR. GOIDEL: Well, they're not. What they're
6	doing is they what they say in that notice, in the
7	cover letter, they say we will pursue the 1.8 if you
8	appeal. So the the notices that they give are not
9	bereft of reference to the 1.8. They could easily
LO	JUDGE RIVERA: Well, they're telling
11	they're telling you what will happen if you go through an
L2	appeals process.
13	MR. GOIDEL: But they don't tell you what will -
L4	
L5	JUDGE RIVERA: But if you do none of these thing
L6	
L7	MR. GOIDEL: They don't tell you
L8	JUDGE RIVERA: you're liable.
L9	MR. GOIDEL: No, they don't tell you that. What
20	they tell you is that we're going to liquidate your
21	JUDGE STEIN: But isn't that the I think
22	the question isn't that the only logical assumption?
23	Because because the result that that you're
24	arguing for would say here are all these options, okay, an
25	this would be the higher amount and this would be the

3 MR. GOIDEL: At 50 percent. It's not that you 4 automatically get it. Yeah, the options contemplate your 5 participation by negotiating, which by the way they did. 6 JUDGE RIVERA: Yeah, but then your - - -7 MR. GOIDEL: They did contact within twenty days. 8 JUDGE RIVERA: - - - your client came back - - -9 yes, but your client came back to the well and didn't want 10 50 percent. You got it down to 5 percent. MR. GOIDEL: Well, that's - - -11 12 JUDGE RIVERA: So in - - - in actuality, this 13 paragraph doesn't really apply the way you're suggesting it 14 does. 15 MR. GOIDEL: Well, except that there - - - in 16 theory, there are no paragraphs because we did contact 17 within twenty days, and we did say a 50 percent withhold is 18 going to destroy our business. You're going to put us out 19 of business. We did. And all - - - we've always taken the 20 position - - - and the IG said that we seem to have 21 abandoned it. It's not that we abandoned it. It's just 22 that there's no - -23 JUDGE RIVERA: So - - - so I'm sorry. You're 24 saying you complied with option two? 25 MR. GOIDEL: And indeed, we did. We contacted

lower amount. And then if you do nothing you automatically

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get the lower amount?

within twenty days and there's in the record multiple

letters and emails to the Office of the Medicaid Inspector

General saying 50 percent is going to kill us. It's going

to kill my client and put him out of business. Please

reduce to 15 percent. Here is the information that you've

requested to - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: And was that with reference to the 1.4 or the 1.8?

MR. GOIDEL: They believed it was within reference to the 1.4. That's the point because that's the only - - - $\!\!\!$

JUDGE RIVERA: But weren't you still talking about the 1.8?

MR. GOIDEL: But they were - - - no, there was no reference to the 1.8. There was only reference - - - they said they were going to liquidate the 1.4 at 50 percent.

And O'Connell and Aronowitz said please don't do that.

Please liquidate the 1.4 at 15 percent, and here are the financial documents for that. What - - what seems to be the fly in the ointment to making this a nice, smooth matter is that my client contemplated through counsel appealing but they never did. So the OMIG is attempting to treat this as a situation where they did appeal because they expressed an intention to appeal.

JUDGE STEIN: That's not how I - - - I



interpreted that as them saying that they did - - - that 1 2 you client did nothing. 3 MR. GOIDEL: But they didn't do nothing. 4 JUDGE STEIN: But aren't you - - - aren't you 5 really sort of making an estoppel argument? 6 MR. GOIDEL: I don't believe so. I believe that, 7 as Judge Fahey said, what we're doing is we're saying 8 there's a - - - there's a statutory framework and you have 9 to give requisite notice. And they wouldn't - - -10 JUDGE STEIN: But - - - but notice of what? 11 MR. GOIDEL: Notice - - -12 JUDGE STEIN: So the - - - the FAR, the, right, 13 final audit report, gave notice. Okay, this is the - - -14 this is the amount we think you owe, 1.8, but this is the 15 amount that we're willing to negotiate with you about, the 16 1.4 if you do certain things, okay. And then assuming that 17 you don't do those certain things then they say we're going 18 to immediately start to withhold money. 19 MR. GOIDEL: At 50 percent, but they did contact 20 them. 2.1 JUDGE STEIN: Correct. 22 It's that last paragraph on page 37 MR. GOIDEL: 23 that says, "If within twenty days you fail to make full 24 payment or contact the OMIG" - - - which they did. 25 there is no - - -



JUDGE STEIN: No, no, and arrive at a plan.

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MR. GOIDEL: No, that's not what it says with regard to the last paragraph. It does not say that. But in any event, they did come to a plan, and there - - - we've always taken the position that there really was an agreement reached and that it was done through various conversations and meetings, OASAS, the Office of Alcohol and Substance Abuse Services was involved. They - - - they were lobbying on behalf of my client with the sister agency. And there was ultimately an agreement that it was going to be 1.4. It's not in the record because it was oral. But we - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: Has any lower court agreed with you about this option two, that you did actually comply with the requirements?

MR. GOIDEL: Well, yeah, they mentioned that we did contact within twenty days and that it's not true that we didn't. Yes, of course.

JUDGE RIVERA: Who is the they in that sentence? When you said that they - - - I asked what court has found. You said they.

MR. GOIDEL: Oh, the - - - I'm sorry. Yes, the Appellate Division did in fact acknowledge that within twenty days there was contact made, and it's in the record. It's plain.



2 determine that that contact complied with option number 3 two? 4 MR. GOIDEL: There was no discussion of that 5 specifically, but - - - but it was. And if I could just -6 - - Your Honor asked why are we here if they've already 7 collected it and they - - - it was under the separate 8 notices. Nobody's done the math, and it's not before the 9 court. But if they were collecting 1.4 versus 1.8 at 10 interest, then they would have had to be - - - a lot more 11 of that money would have been going toward interest, and 12 they would not have actually satisfied the notice 13 requirements because they would have started collecting - -14 - it still would have been - - - it still would have been 15 principle versus interest that they were collecting under 16 the original notices. So those numbers don't jive. 17 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, counsel. 18 MR. GOIDEL: Thank you, Your Honors. 19 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Counsel. 20 JUDGE RIVERA: Did they comply with option two? 2.1 MS. OLSEN: No, they didn't, Your Honor. 2.2 JUDGE RIVERA: Why not? 23 MS. OLSEN: Because in order to comply with 24 option two, there had to be some settle - there had to be a 25 settlement agreement. You had to enter into an explicit

JUDGE RIVERA: But did - - - but did they

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repayment agreement to reach the 1.46 million. Everything in the record actually defies the idea that there was some kind of settlement reached. Not only was there the July 2nd email that said we expect to request a hearing, but after they defaulted on their right to request a hearing they brought litigation to overcome that failure and to actually try to reduce the liability determination in the FAR. And so - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: So in option two this reference to repayment agreement is defined somewhere else as a formal written agreement?

MS. OLSEN: It's not, but I think any - - - I think the plain - - - the common sense reading of this interpret - - - of this - - - of the FAR, the cover letter combined with the provider rights section is you can - - - your - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: Let me ask you something. So let's say I'm the target. I call up day eighteen and I say, yes, I want to - - - I'll - - - we'll pay the lower confidence amount. I can't do it at that rate. Can you work with me? I'll do it in the following way. And if - - and if you all at that point over the phone agree, is that a repayment agreement?

MS. OLSEN: I - - - I don't think that - - - respectfully, I don't think that's the facts that we have



here. I think to - - -

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JUDGE RIVERA: No, but I'm asking. Would that be?

MS. OLSEN: It could - - - it could be. I think that it would have - - - probably would have to be memorialized somewhere and it was clearly not memorialized on - - - on this record. I would just like to say, too, the petitioner's trying to argue that these notices of withholding and trying to characterize them as if they said the agency is collecting 1.46 million and no more, and this - - - there's no support in the record anywhere for - - for that contention. They expressly - - - expressly refer back to the final audit report which says that if you default on your - - - if you do not accept a settlement, we will begin within twenty days to with - - - to withhold not barring any other remedy at law. I think they're trying to manufacture confusion out of the cover letter here, but this is an ex post reading whereas we have contemporaneous statements from West Midtown demonstrating that throughout the course of the litigation they understood that they were on the hook for 1.86 million dollars.

And for all of these reasons, we ask the court to reverse the First Department's decision holding that the notices of withholding had the effect of altering West Midtown's liability and that the agency was permitted to



1	recoup	the full	1.86 r	nillion c	lollars	overp	ayments.
2		CHIEF	JUDGE	DIFIORE:	Thank	you,	counsel.
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Date:

CERTIFICATION

I, Sara Winkeljohn, certify that the foregoing transcript of proceedings in the Court of Appeals of West Midtown Management Group, Inc. v. State of New York, Department of Health, Office of the Medicaid Inspector General, No. 81 was prepared using the required transcription equipment and is a true and accurate record of the proceedings.

Cazieria oo

Signature:

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June 13, 2018

