1	COURT OF APPEALS
2	STATE OF NEW YORK
3	MATTER OF WAITE,
4	MATIER OF WATE,
5	Appellant,
	-against-
6	No. 82 TOWN OF CHAMPION,
7	Respondent.
8	
9	20 Eagle Street Albany, New York
10	June 7, 2018 Before:
11	CHIER THOSE TANEER DISTORE
12	CHIEF JUDGE JANET DIFIORE ASSOCIATE JUDGE JENNY RIVERA
13	ASSOCIATE JUDGE LESLIE E. STEIN ASSOCIATE JUDGE EUGENE M. FAHEY
14	ASSOCIATE JUDGE MICHAEL J. GARCIA ASSOCIATE JUDGE ROWAN D. WILSON
	ASSOCIATE JUDGE PAUL FEINMAN
15	
16	Appearances:
17	BRADLEY M. PINSKY, ESQ.
18	PINSKY LAW GROUP, PLLC Attorney for Appellant
	5789 Widewaters Parkway
19	Syracuse, NY 13214
20	JONATHAN B. FELLOWS, ESQ. BOND, SCHOENECK & KING
21	Attorney for Respondent
22	110 West Fayette Street Syracuse, NY 13202
23	
24	Sara Winkeljohn
25	Official Court Transcriber



1	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: The next matter on the
2	calendar is appeal number 82, Matter of Waite v. Town of
3	Champion.
4	Good afternoon, counsel.
5	MR. PINSKY: Good afternoon. I would like to
6	reserve two minutes for rebuttal.
7	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: You may, sir.
8	MR. PINSKY: May it please the court, my name is
9	Brad Pinsky, and we represent the appellants in this
10	matter. This court has often recognized that words matter
11	and the legislature knew the difference between division
12	and disillusion. The legislature used those words
13	"division" in Town Law 73 and 74, and the inescapable
14	conclusion is that what happened here was a division
15	JUDGE RIVERA: But is does the Champion -
16	- Town of Champion Fire Protection District, did that exis
17	once they created the other two fire protection districts?
18	MR. PINSKY: Of course it did, because the
19	all the
20	JUDGE RIVERA: It had the same boundaries?
21	MR. PINSKY: Yes, it it previously was the
22	entire town. It's still the entire town whether it's one
23	or
24	JUDGE RIVERA: Yeah, but the two districts have
25	different boundaries; do they not?

1	MR. PINSKY: The two districts encompass the
2	entire town.
3	JUDGE RIVERA: Yes, but they have different
4	boundaries. Each one is different; is it not?
5	MR. PINSKY: True, but let's look at what a fire
6	protection
7	JUDGE RIVERA: And they contracted with differen
8	villages; did they not?
9	MR. PINSKY: They were still in control just as
10	the town was still in control just as it was when ther
11	was one first protection
12	JUDGE RIVERA: Yes, of course, but did they
13	contract with different villages?
14	MR. PINSKY: They did contract with different
15	fire departments. They got rid of their fire department
16	who had been serving them for a hundred years.
17	JUDGE RIVERA: So then how is it a failure to
18	dissolve within the statutory meaning?
19	MR. PINSKY: Sure. How much time do we have?
20	The
21	JUDGE RIVERA: Not much.
22	MR. PINSKY: Let's look at first what the
23	legislature intended. The legislature recognized when it
24	passed the Citizens Empowerment Act that citizens have no
25	right to cause the dissolution at the end of the process,

1 the dissolution of a local government entity, so they 2 created the Citizens Empowerment Act. It would make no 3 sense to - - -4 JUDGE RIVERA: Yes, but it seems here - - - I've 5 got to stop you on the long road - - -6 MR. PINSKY: Sure. JUDGE RIVERA: - - - through the law. It seems 7 8 here that they did follow technically what they needed to 9 every step of the way. Your clients are dissatisfied. 10 strikes me that the law provides some recourse for them 11 which is to gain signatures to dissolve these two or create 12 another - - - or create a fire district, but they weren't 13 successful. It seems to me that the law and the system has 14 worked as intended. 15 MR. PINSKY: Ah, no. The law is working because 16 we are here. What that petition process is is only if the 17 residents do not like the outcome. But the law permits 18 five residents or more to petition when the local 19 government is unable or unwilling to accomplish and 20 complete. The legislature used the words "accomplish" and 21 "complete." 2.2 JUDGE STEIN: So at the - - -23 JUDGE FAHEY: Isn't the - - - isn't the - - - I'm

JUDGE STEIN: At the end - - - at the end of the

sorry, Judge. Go ahead. You go ahead.

24

day, under the Town Law, the town has the right to make the decision after going through certain processes, for one thing. So my - - - my question is - - - and it's sort of the interplay between these two sets of laws. My question is is let's assume you're right, okay, and what the town did not was not permitted. And just keep in mind, too, I'm not sure what - - - what dissolution of - - - of a fire protection district that has no assets and no - - - no bills and all that stuff is. But anyway, let's assume that - - - that the town properly dissolved the fire protection district. So how long - - so does that mean that never again - - never can the town create a new fire protection district the same or similar to the one that existed?

MR. PINSKY: The legislature thought about that, so what happens in this law is the legislature recognizes that the existing local government entity cannot exist any longer. There were only certain available options such - - such as, but not that we demanded, a fire district or a joint fire district. The power to dissolve a joint fire district or a fire district lies with the district and no longer the town, so, no, the town could not create a fire protection district because a fire district would be in its place.

JUDGE STEIN: Well, I'm not sure where the statute says that when you dissolve a fire protection



1	district then the end result must or must be a fire -
2	
3	MR. PINSKY: It doesn't say what it must be.
4	It's clear what it cannot be, and it cannot be
5	JUDGE RIVERA: But
6	MR. PINSKY: the exact same local
7	government entity.
8	JUDGE STEIN: Well, let's say
9	JUDGE RIVERA: But that's the problem, it's not
10	the same. There are two different districts contracting
11	with different villages to provide those fire services.
12	MR. PINSKY: Let's look at a fire protection
13	district. We must look at this. A fire protection
14	district, Miller v. Savage, in numerous cases at the
15	Appellate Division level have recognized quote, "that a
16	- a fire protection district has no independent existence
17	from a town". The town is in control under 1402 of the
18	Not-for-Profit Corporation Law, under 184 of the Town Law.
19	JUDGE FAHEY: So who's who's in control of
20	the fire district?
21	MR. PINSKY: Fire district under 174 I believe of
22	the Town Law is a separate political subdivision of the
23	state, five commissioners are in charge. The
24	JUDGE FAHEY: And how are the commissioners

25

chosen?

1	MR. PINSKY: It depends where it's a fire
2	district or a fire protect or a joint fire district.
3	JUDGE FAHEY: So at the core of it
4	MR. PINSKY: But generally, they're elected ever
5	year.
6	JUDGE FAHEY: they're elected. So the
7	volunteer firemen on one hand are are running the
8	fire districts and the town board is running the fire
9	protection district? Is that a fair characterization?
10	MR. PINSKY: Well, it's it's fair to say
11	that the town board is absolutely by law in control of a
12	fire protection district, but the residents are in charge
13	of a fire district because they're elected.
14	JUDGE FAHEY: I see. So but isn't the core
15	of your argument, and you can correct me if you think I'm
16	wrong, is is that, in effect, dissolution didn't take
17	place, what took place was division?
18	MR. PINSKY: That's exactly right.
19	JUDGE FAHEY: And so it so on this scenario
20	that we have in front of us which argues for a procedural
21	compliance with the law it is, in fact, an attempt to
22	subvert the electoral process?
23	MR. PINSKY: The town thumbed its nose at the
24	voters and the legislature, and we would like to propose a
25	hright-line test so that this court it's not in our

brief so if I may - - -

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JUDGE FAHEY: So how do we - - - how - - - you can get to your test, I do want to hear it. But how do we look at what Judge Rivera said which is that they've created a new fire protection district with different lines? It is not the same legal entity.

MR. PINSKY: Of - - - of course it is. A fire protection district has no separate independent existence. The town is still in control of contracting. The town still sets the tax rate. The town still choose - - -

JUDGE FAHEY: Okay. But if have the town of - - of Buffalo, New York, and it's thirty-two square miles
and I cut it in half and call it Buffalo One and Buffalo
Two, then they're not the same thing, are they?

MR. PINSKY: Because a town has a separate political existence. Again a - - - look at a sewer district, a lighting district, a resident says - - - JUDGE FAHEY: Okay.

MR. PINSKY: - - - I don't want to live with the lights above me anymore. Cut it into two and they still live with the lights above them because it's under the control of the town. It's not a separate entity.

JUDGE RIVERA: But doesn't - - - but doesn't the case really boil down to - - - because they have followed the technical requirements for dissolution - - - I



understand your argument about division, but let's go to something else. Doesn't it boil down to your clients don't want a fire protection district, but doesn't the law, at least now as it stands, leave that choice about how best to provide fire services to the town? You have your - - - your clients have their recourse through the electoral process. So far they have not been successful. Maybe they will be in the future. But right now, the town made a choice that this is the best way to deliver these services, services that they must under the law deliver.

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MR. PINSKY: But they have to create a new local government entity within the bounds of the law. And let's be clear, the Fourth Department has - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: Right, and they did.

MR. PINSKY: They did not - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: --- and your clients may be unhappy with it, and they have their recourse under the law.

MR. PINSKY: We disagree because they never accomplished and completed dissolution. And if - - - if I may, I'd like to give this court - - - it was not in our brief, the test to determine. As we know, what happened when Article 17 - - - when the - - -

JUDGE STEIN: Tell me - - - before you do that, how would you dissolve an entity such as this, as I said,



1	that had no no outstanding debts, no assets, no
2	MR. PINSKY: They had a contract. They had a
3	five-year they had successive one-year contracts that
4	they had with fire with the fire department.
5	JUDGE STEIN: Was the contract terminated?
6	MR. PINSKY: The contract was terminated. It
7	- it expired in the record I believe.
8	JUDGE STEIN: Okay.
9	MR. PINSKY: But it it no longer existed so
10	they wound up
11	JUDGE STEIN: So aside
12	MR. PINSKY: that contract.
13	JUDGE STEIN: aside from creating a
14	completely different type of entity, what more could the
15	town have done to dissolve the existing entity?
16	MR. PINSKY: It's it's not just about this
17	town.
18	JUDGE STEIN: It's not about what they do next.
19	MR. PINSKY: Right, it
20	JUDGE STEIN: What do they what could
21	more could they have done with what already existed?
22	MR. PINSKY: So under Town Law, a Town Law
23	184, a fire a town has the right to own equipment,
24	own fire apparatus, own other assets as part of that. If
25	this town had owned them they would have wound up and had

this town had owned them they would have wound up and had

to sell them.

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JUDGE STEIN: They didn't. But they didn't.

MR. PINSKY: They didn't, but going forward in precedent that's a non, non-sequitur. It - - - they could have owned them. They - - -

JUDGE STEIN: But how can we tell whether it was dissolved if none of those things existed?

MR. PINSKY: That's what I want to tell you. So what happened when the state legislature created the Citizen Empowerment Act, they repealed every single dissolution and consolidation statute and took every single dissolution and consolidation statute and put it inside 17-A. So here's what happens. We have a test for you. So if it deals with dissolution it's inside 17-A. If it - - if the ultimate formation of the new entity can be achieved outside 17-A it cannot constitute dissolution, right. Only - - - dissolution can only be accomplished inside.

So here's the test, here's what happened. They could have - - - the town's plan could have been achieved by diminishing the boundaries outside 17-A. Under 172(c) they could have diminished the boundaries of the fire protection district, and then under Town Law 170 they could have formed a new fire protection district. That achieves the exact same goal. Thus, as a matter of law, it cannot constitute dissolution because all of the dissolution



2	JUDGE STEIN: So if they changed the boundaries
3	by an inch, that that's enough? That will that
4	will take care of it?
5	MR. PINSKY: No, that would be more gamesmanship.
6	This court should not allow any
7	JUDGE STEIN: Under your scenario, they've
8	changed the boundaries and now they've created a new one.
9	MR. PINSKY: They changed the boundaries outside
10	of 17-A, which shows you that it's not dissolution. They
11	would have to dissolve the entire government entity inside
12	of 17-A. If you can achieve it outside of 17-A it can't as
13	a matter of law constitute dissolution.
14	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, counsel.
15	MR. PINSKY: Thank you.
16	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Counsel.
17	MR. FELLOWS: Thank you, Your Honor; Jonathan
18	Fellows, Bond, Schoeneck & King for the town.
19	JUDGE GARCIA: Counsel, before you start, just a
20	quick question following up on what Judge Stein, and I'm a
21	little confused over exactly what was dissolved here. So
22	the town had a fire protection district. They had a
23	contract with an independent service to provide this fire
24	protection?
25	MR. FELLOWS: Yes, Your Honor, there well,

statutes were repealed and put into this.



1	there were contracts with three entities. Two of them were
2	village fire departments, the Village of West Carthage and
3	the Village of Copenhagen, and the third entity is the
4	Champion Volunteer Fire Company.
5	JUDGE GARCIA: Right, and that's the contract
6	that then is dissolved is the Champion Volunteer?
7	MR. FELLOWS: The contract that was between the
8	town on behalf of the fire protection district and the
9	Champion Volunteer Fire Company has been terminated by the
10	town on the grounds of breach.
11	JUDGE GARCIA: On this dissolution?
12	MR. FELLOWS: And there's a separate legal
13	proceeding by the
14	JUDGE GARCIA: I see.
15	MR. FELLOWS: by the volunteer fire company
16	to challenge the termination of that contract. And, Your
17	Honor, I think you go right to
18	JUDGE GARCIA: Just before you get there, so the
19	you split it into two fire protection districts, and those
20	are with the two towns that you just mentioned you had
21	contracts with before?
22	MR. FELLOWS: Villages, Judge.
23	JUDGE GARCIA: Villages, I'm sorry, yeah.
24	MR. FELLOWS: So now
25	JUDGE GARCIA: And that's what exists now?

1	MR. FELLOWS: the fire fire
2	protection district number one has a contract with Copenhag
3	Village of Copenhagen, and fire protection district
4	number two has a contract with the Village of West
5	Carthage.
6	JUDGE GARCIA: I see. Okay. Thank you.
7	JUDGE WILSON: So did you have to split it at all
8	to comply with the dissolution statute?
9	MR. FELLOWS: Well, yes, I believe we did, Judge.
10	But we that's what we did, so we created two new
11	_
12	JUDGE WILSON: No, I guess what I'm asking is
13	suppose you had just
14	MR. FELLOWS: entities.
15	JUDGE WILSON: dissolved the existing one
16	and created a new one that was exactly the same, one
17	district. Would that have complied?
18	MR. FELLOWS: No, Your Honor, I don't believe so.
19	JUDGE WILSON: Why? If you've gone through the
20	same processes that you did go through but it was just one
21	district, why wouldn't that comply?
22	MR. FELLOWS: The point that appellant keeps
23	making is everything is the same now as it was before, and,
24	Your Honor, everything is not the same. If I lived in the
25	fire protection district before this dissolution I was

taxed on the basis of the entire expense of providing fire protection in that district and payments to three different - - - two departments and one company. And that's in the record what was paid before to those three - - - two village departments and one fire company, and I was taxed for that. Now we've divided it, and I live in fire protection district number two. I'm taxed on the cost of providing fire protection in that district alone. And - -

JUDGE WILSON: I get the - - - I get that - - -

MR. FELLOWS: - - - we have - - -

JUDGE WILSON: - - - what happened is not my hypothetical but I was still trying to get an answer to why under my hypothetical you think that would not comply with your obligations?

MR. FELLOWS: Well, Your Honor, technically, if you read through the statute it would. I mean the statute says here's what a plan of dissolution must do, and Judge Stein's questions really go to a point of perhaps the statute - - - perhaps the legislature should have done more or less in terms of including fire protection districts because they aren't really what they were after in this statute. What they were after was separate taxing entities that owned assets and had employees, and when you look at what must be in a plan of dissolution, Your Honor, it says

1 what are you doing with the employees, what are you doing 2 with the assets? The fire - - -3 JUDGE STEIN: What I'm confused about is it seems 4 to me that dissolution is one thing. Okay. There's a 5 process of dissolution and whatever it was ends and then 6 the creation of something else is - - - is a completely 7 separate process, okay. So my question is is in this exact 8 circumstance, how do you know that - - - that the old one 9 was dissolved? 10 MR. FELLOWS: You know that because the town board on August 10, 2015, passed a resolution dissolving it 11 12 and approving a plan of dissolution, and that resolution's 13 in the record. 14 JUDGE STEIN: But that wouldn't be enough if it 15 had assets that needed to be sold or whatever or - - -16 right? 17 MR. FELLOWS: If there were assets that plan of dissolution would have had to resolve what's happening to 18 19 those assets. 20 JUDGE STEIN: But it's enough here because there 21 - - - there was nothing to do? 22 MR. FELLOWS: Correct. And, Your Honor, if I - -23 24 JUDGE FAHEY: Well, let me - - - let me ask - - -25 JUDGE RIVERA: Well, there is something to do.



You've got to walk through the - - - as you say, there's a process. You followed all those procedures, including developing and adopting a plan, voting on the plan at the town board, having public hearings about the plan, all of that. You put together a document that sets out all the requirements that the statute sets out that you have to say whether or not there are liabilities, how you're going to wind down, and all of that. So it's - - you are doing something, are you not?

MR. FELLOWS: Your Honor, we did a lot, and we followed the exact roadmap in Article 17-A. But the point that my opponent, respectfully, completely forgets is Article 17-A was intended to ease the elimination of overlapping separate taxing entities, and what he's doing - - and he said again, not today, is what this statute required was the creation of an overlapping taxing entity. There's nothing in Article 17-A which says you must create a new overlapping taxing entity.

There was no overlapping taxing entity before, and now he's saying because of the statute you must create a fire protection district, which as Judge Fahey noted, requires elections, commissioners, and typically in upstate New York they're then controlled by the volunteer firefighters. And they can impose taxes to pay for their fire equipment, and that's not what the town board wanted

to do. And the notion that the town board thumbed their nose at the results of the election is completely incorrect.

JUDGE FAHEY: Well - - -

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MR. FELLOWS: What the resolution - - -

JUDGE FAHEY: Hold on a second, Mr. Fellows. So the problem is is the logic of your solution to the dissolution - - - let's take it two ways. First, you've got the statutory interpretation problem, and the statutory interpretation problem is what is the meaning of dissolution? Dissolution's defined as, "A termination of the existence of a local government entity." You can rationally argue that that's what you did. So the only problem is is you created two entities that duplicated geographically the exact same thing as - - - as the one you had before. The logic of what you're saying is that another dissolution, you - - - you could then go out and create four entities and do the same thing and another dissolution you could create eight. And that's the logic of what you're arguing. So then if we're confronted with that absurd situation - - - because that would be a patently absurd situation - - - we had to say what's the statutory construction? What's the meaning of the text here? And it seems the meaning of the text is is that if you dissolve it, a - - - it's kind of absurd to think that

you're not creating something - - - you don't recreate the thing you just dissolved. And that seems to be what you've done, even though you've distributed the contracts. And that's the core of their argument the way I understand it.

MR. FELLOWS: Your Honor, but a fire protection district is nothing but typically a contractual relationship between a town and a village fire department or a volunteer fire company.

JUDGE FAHEY: Right.

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MR. FELLOWS: And we entered into new, different relationships that will have different costs to the taxpayers. And, Your Honor, what the voters voted was on a proposition of shall the Town of Champion Fire Protection District be dissolved, and they voted yes. They didn't say and you will then create a separate fire district with taxing authority and separate commissioners. No one voted for that because it wasn't on the referendum. What was left when Article 17-A was adopted, the legislature repealed certain provisions of the Town Law. They did not repeal Sections 170 and 171 which govern the creation of fire districts and fire protection districts and alarm districts, and so that's still in place. And - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: So if they're dissatisfied, am I correct as to what their options are?

MR. FELLOWS: Under Section 171?



JUDGE RIVERA: The options being the residents of the town.

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MR. FELLOWS: Your Honor, under Section 171 they can submit a petition to require the town board to hold a public hearing on whether a fire district is appropriate, and that's their remedy. And - - -

JUDGE WILSON: And ultimately, that is vested in the town to decide yes or no. And am I right that there is a pending Article 78 to challenge the creation of the two districts, or am I making that up?

MR. FELLOWS: No, that's what this proceeding is, Judge, in my mind. There is a separate challenge when the town board voted to terminate the contract between the town on behalf of the fire protection district, the old fire protection district, and the Champion Volunteer Fire Company. That was challenged in an Article 78 which was then converted to a breach of contract action. I believe on the first page of our brief, Judge, we say what the status of that litigation is.

JUDGE GARCIA: Counsel, do you know if the tax implications for this, are they positive, negative, neutral in terms of what was paid before by the residents and what's paid after?

MR. FELLOWS: We believe it will be less. It's not in the record what the taxes are today, Judge.



JUDGE GARCIA: Was it part of - - -

MR. FELLOWS: But we believe it's less because we believe we were getting overcharged by the Champion Volunteer Fire Company.

JUDGE GARCIA: Was it part of the consideration of whether or not to split these into two districts the way you did? Were you considering the tax implications?

MR. FELLOWS: Absolutely, Your Honor. The - - - the town board looked at what's the cost of fire districts versus fire protection districts, and typically, the cost is about twice that. But that goes back to my point, Your Honor, of if I'm in fire protection district number one, I'm only taxed now for fire protection in that district. And if I'm in fire protection two, I'm only taxed for fire protection in fire protection district number. So I'm in a very different place than I was in 2014.

JUDGE GARCIA: It seems to me part of the legislative intent here was to save taxpayer money, right, by dissolving government entities.

MR. FELLOWS: By - - - exactly, Your Honor. By eliminating separate overlapping taxing authorities, and what appellant is saying is we were legally required by this statute to create the very type of situation the legislature said they were trying to eliminate.

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, counsel.



1	Counsel, what about resp is respondent
2	correct when he argues that the will of the voters was not
3	frustrated here because they got exactly what they voted
4	for?
5	MR. PINSKY: No, they never got what the
6	petition said was to dissolve and terminate the fire
7	protection district. The primary question before this
8	court is whether a fire protection district, whether it's
9	one or two, is still in the control of the town. The town
10	is still in control. The residents did not want the town
11	in control of setting taxes, in control of contracting.
12	JUDGE RIVERA: But then but then why wasn'
13	the request to create a fire district is he incorrec
14	about that
15	MR. PINSKY: No problem with the law.
16	JUDGE RIVERA: that you can't can yo
17	request that?
18	MR. PINSKY: We think you you
19	JUDGE RIVERA: Is he correct?
20	MR. PINSKY: Well, you can't request it as part
21	of this process, and it's been a red herring they've been
22	arguing since day one. We've never once said what they
23	have to create. What we are saying is you must dissolve
24	and terminate the fire protection district.

JUDGE RIVERA: But you're basically saying

1	there's not anything else they could create.
2	MR. PINSKY: Oh, sure there are. There's a joint
3	fire district, a fire district
4	JUDGE RIVERA: But you're still talking about
5	fire districts.
6	MR. PINSKY: But there's three different versions
7	of what
8	JUDGE RIVERA: But I'm sorry. Just to be clear
9	again and if I'm asking you to repeat yourself, my
10	apologies. But I just want to know is he correct when he
11	says that you do have an electoral process by which you can
12	request not you, obviously, the residents
13	MR. PINSKY: Yes.
14	JUDGE RIVERA: can request the voters
15	can request that the town form a fire district?
16	MR. PINSKY: Request but not not mandate is
17	is true. I think Town Law 171 I think is where he's
18	going. It's not part of this process. It's outside 17-A.
19	JUDGE RIVERA: Did did the voters do that
20	at any point in time?
21	MR. PINSKY: No. They didn't need to because
22	they have no authority to. It is we agree it is not
23	up to the residents to demand what should exist after, but
24	it is clearly the will of the legislature that what existed
25	before cannot ever exist then. That's what the residents

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1	had the right to. And
2	JUDGE RIVERA: Well, the they the
3	residents now could seek dissolution of these two fire
4	protection districts and request the formation of a fire
5	district?
6	MR. PINSKY: Yeah, they they
7	JUDGE RIVERA: Could they do that?
8	MR. PINSKY: Sure they could, and then we'll get
9	four and then we'll get six and then we'll get eight, and
10	then we'll get a hundred different fire protection
11	districts. Your Honor is right. That's what we're going
12	to end up with.
13	JUDGE RIVERA: No, no, no. Dissolve this and
14	create a fire district. Can they not request that?
15	MR. PINSKY: We can't force that. No.
16	JUDGE RIVERA: I didn't say force that. I said
17	can you request that?
18	MR. PINSKY: They could petition to dissolve
19	under 17-A, and then as a separate matter they could
20	request the fire district. Note today
21	JUDGE RIVERA: And then there would be public
22	hearings on that?
23	MR. PINSKY: There would be a public hearing but
24	there's no mandate that they follow it.
25	JUDGE STEIN: And then if what they did was



1 irrational is there any - - -2 MR. PINSKY: No. 3 JUDGE STEIN: - - - remedy for that? 4 MR. PINSKY: No, as long as all the people in are 5 benefitted, all the people outside are benefitted. 6 JUDGE RIVERA: Were the - - - the town board elected officials? 7 Town board is elected officials. 8 MR. PINSKY: 9 JUDGE RIVERA: You could vote them out. 10 MR. PINSKY: You could. The supervisor's gone. 11 JUDGE RIVERA: If they're not following the will 12 of the voters expressed through these various requests. 13 MR. PINSKY: But the legislature gave the 14 residents the right to petition, as we're here, when the 15 government is unwilling and unable. And the legislative 16 memo in support says that the legislature recognizes that a 17 town board may be unwilling to accomplish dissolution. 18 They have not accomplished dissolution. And we take note 19 that they didn't even follow the process. 782(2)(i) of the 20 General Municipal Law requires that the plan of dissolution 2.1 provide for the termination of the existence of the local 2.2 government entity. Their plan of dissolution didn't plan 23 for the termination of the existence. They planned for a 24 word that matters, division. That's all they planned for.

They never

So the Appellate Division was wrong.

accomplished - - - they never followed the process because they never planned for the dissolution. Even if you accept the Fourth Department's argument that all they had to do was follow a process despite the result, they never even followed the process. CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, counsel. MR. PINSKY: Thank you. (Court is adjourned) 



## CERTIFICATION

I, Sara Winkeljohn, certify that the foregoing transcript of proceedings in the Court of Appeals of Matter of Waite v. Town of Champion, No. 82 was prepared using the required transcription equipment and is a true and accurate record of the proceedings.

Captaria out

Agency Name: eScribers

Signature:

Address of Agency: 352 Seventh Avenue

New York, NY 10001

Suite 604

Date:

June 13, 2018

