1	COURT OF APPEALS
2	STATE OF NEW YORK
3	MATTER OF HONORABLE LETICIA D. ASTACIO
4	MATTER OF HONORABLE LETICIA D. ASTACIO
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6	No. 94
7	20 Eagle Stree Albany, New Yor September 5, 201
9	Before:
LO	CHIEF JUDGE JANET DIFIORE ASSOCIATE JUDGE JENNY RIVERA
L1	ASSOCIATE JUDGE LESLIE E. STEIN ASSOCIATE JUDGE EUGENE M. FAHEY
L2	ASSOCIATE JUDGE MICHAEL J. GARCIA ASSOCIATE JUDGE ROWAN D. WILSON
L3	ASSOCIATE JUDGE PAUL FEINMAN
L 4	Appearances:
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25	Official Court Transcribe



1	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: The next matter on the
2	court's calendar is appeal number 94, the Matter of the
3	Honorable Leticia D. Astacio.
4	Counsel.
5	MR. JULIAN: May I reserve, Judge, two minutes
6	for rebuttal?
7	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: You may, sir.
8	MR. JULIAN: Thank you.
9	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: You're welcome.
10	MR. JULIAN: It is my honor to represent Judge
11	Astacio who is present here today. We argue that Judge
12	Astacio should not be removed from the bench. She is
13	remorseful.
14	JUDGE FEINMAN: So before we go any further, I
15	just want to be very, very clear about what it is you are
16	seeking. You are not disputing any of the findings of fact
17	or the fact that the charges were sustained to the extent
18	that they were sustained but merely arguing for a reduction
19	of sanction?
20	MR. JULIAN: Yes.
21	JUDGE FEINMAN: Is that correct?
22	MR. JULIAN: Yes.
23	JUDGE FEINMAN: Okay.
24	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: So is it your position that
25	Ms. Astacio's limited judicial experience should somehow

mitigate her conduct on the bench?

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MR. JULIAN: As to certain of the charges, yes.

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Which charges, sir?

MR. JULIAN: Well, to make a distinction between the on-the-bench charges, if you will, to lump it into that category, and the violation of the conditional discharge.

I'm not going to argue that the conditional discharge violations were anything but poor judgment on her part.

There were two violations which I thought she explained eloquently at the hearing. The first she did not read carefully the conditional discharge component that required her not to drink alcohol. It's - - - it's like doing an autopsy - - -

JUDGE STEIN: Does she have to read it carefully?

Or - - I mean it's - - - first of all, it seems to me

that anybody, and particularly a judge, would want to read

those conditions very carefully. In this particular case,

the judge actually, as I understand it, presided over DWI

cases, so she even had more reason to be familiar with

those types of conditions, so that seems like a little bit

of a shaky - - -

MR. JULIAN: Well, Judge Stein, let me say this, this is a form that was used by some judges and not other judges. And I'm not here to tell this court that Judge Astacio was not familiar with the form per se. What I am

1	saying to you is that I believe and and I thin
2	the medical records demonstrate this was a traumatic event
3	for her reading in detail what happened to her. She shoul
4	have done it. She acknowledges she should have done it.
5	She apologized to the Commission nine times in her ten-
6	minute
7	JUDGE RIVERA: Can I ask was the requirement not
8	to consume alcohol or not to consume alcohol and also not
9	to drive while under the influence of alcohol
10	MR. JULIAN: Yes.
11	JUDGE RIVERA: What just to be clear, what
12	what were the conditions?
13	MR. JULIAN: Oh, thank you. The condition was
14	not to consume alcohol.
15	JUDGE RIVERA: Then it it made no mention
16	of driving while under the influence?
17	MR. JULIAN: It's a conditional discharge, and s
18	I think implied is that one should not drive also under th
19	influence.
20	JUDGE RIVERA: Correct, perfect. So then when
21	she got behind the wheel and didn't pass the blow test
22	_
23	MR. JULIAN: Yes.
24	JUDGE RIVERA: how how
25	MR. JULIAN: Oh, I'm sorry. I didn't mean to



interrupt.

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JUDGE RIVERA: No, no, no. Doesn't that already show that regardless of whether or not she had read the document that she was not complying?

MR. JULIAN: Right, so - - - so I would refer the court to page 369 of the record. As to that issue, she was present with her aunt. The - - - the requirement as I understand it is she is to blow and then the other person is to drive if she passes the blow. What you do when you don't pass the blow I'm not exactly sure. In this instance, she failed. So I would respectfully argue, Judge, that her intent was not to drive.

JUDGE RIVERA: What are the other mitigating factors in addition to the - - as the Chief Judge already mentioned the lack of experience, judicial experience?

What other mitigating factors?

MR. JULIAN: Well, I think one of the important mitigating factors here is that this judge, she violated a conditional discharge that - - - and took a trip. She had arranged to be contacted by her attorney by email. For whatever reason, he left the message for her by cell phone. And so she was not aware in real time that Judge Aronson on May 15th had required her to be present and take a test to ascertain whether or not she had been consuming alcohol.

JUDGE STEIN: At that time did she know that she



was under a continuing requirement to take tests as
directed?

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MR. JULIAN: Well, the - - - the conditional discharge - - - and I say this respectfully to that court.

I'm not here to point the finger at them, but it's not exactly clear that she can't travel or can't be away in the conditional discharge.

often on probation or parole there's a condition that says you can't leave the state or sometimes even the county without permission. I get that. I want to go focus on the difference between a removal and a censure. And in the cases where we have approved a removal, it's because there's a belief that the judge has been - - has lost the public confidence irretrievably. So what evidence in this record would lead us to conclude that that is not the case?

MR. JULIAN: I think there are several components of evidence. First of all, you have her biography in the record as she was elected by - - - as the first woman of her ethnicity to the bench in that community. Second, you have the very clear demonstration by the judge that she is remorseful. And - - - and I have to say this, when she was trying to express to the Commission her remorse she was interrupted, and she was - - - and introduced into the proceeding was a statement that the chair of the commission

2 3 JUDGE STEIN: Is - - is there any evidence as 4 to that that in fact that commissioner or indeed any of the 5 commissioners took that into account in determining the 6 sanction? 7 MR. JULIAN: Well - - -8 JUDGE STEIN: Or - - or as I understand it was 9 expressly stated that they would not and did not. 10 MR. JULIAN: Judge, that is - - - that would be a 11 difficult thing to prove but let me say the statement 12 speaks for itself. The statement if it is to be believed 13 and uttered reflects contempt on Judge Astacio's part for 14 both the body - - -15 JUDGE STEIN: Well, I thought it was just calling 16 into question her sincerity in - - - in something that she 17 had said. 18 MR. JULIAN: Well, no - - -19 JUDGE STEIN: And I'm not suggesting that it was 20 appropriate by the way. 2.1 MR. JULIAN: Thank you. Well, may I just finish 2.2 by saying to you and - - - and to the other members of the 23 court that statement not only suggested that she had 24 contempt for the body but also contempt for the rule of 25 That was central to our argument in front of the law.

apparently had read or seen or thought he had read or seen

Commission. What we were attempting to demonstrate, what we were attempting to say to the Commission is we're a young judge, we're only thirty-seven, thirty-eight years old, and we understand that we've made mistakes and there was sort of a cascading of mistakes. But we have not done or engaged in conduct that the people who you have - - this court has historically removed, that conduct. We have not - - -JUDGE RIVERA: Well, we - - - but the court has

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recognized that driving under the influence is a serious, grave matter, correct?

MR. JULIAN: Correct. Remove - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: And so it's not once, it's more than once that - - - or at least more than once that she attempted to do so post the misdemeanor, right?

MR. JULIAN: Judge, I think that's a question of fact on the record. I refer you back to page 369. there is no question Judge Astacio acknowledged that she recognizes that driving under the influence is indeed a serious offense.

JUDGE FAHEY: Let me ask this.

MR. JULIAN: Yes, Judge Fahey.

JUDGE FAHEY: In - - - Mr. Julian, in the cases where judges have been pulled over, gotten DWIs but haven't been removed, they've - - - they've acknowledged that



1 they're alcoholics and they've gone to AA. Usually, 2 there's been that kind of proof in the record. Do we have 3 that kind of proof in the record here with Judge Astacio? 4 MR. JULIAN: What we have in the record - - - and 5 there - - - there are exceptions, Judge Fahey. 6 JUDGE FAHEY: That's fine. I bow to your 7 superior knowledge on that. Trust me. But I just want to 8 know in this case. 9 In this case, we put into the record MR. JULIAN: 10 the analysis of her psychologist who pointed out that she was engaging in - - - anesthetizing - - -11 12 JUDGE FAHEY: So - - - so - - - I saw that. 13 MR. JULIAN: - - - by alcohol. 14 JUDGE FAHEY: So let's assume that's true. But 15 she didn't say she was an alcoholic. I think - - - and I 16 thought the psychologist said something like some mild 17 cognitive disability related and that alcohol was used 18 under moments of stress. 19 MR. JULIAN: You - - - you have it pretty much, 20 but the - - - she also went through two outpatient alcohol 21 programs, one finding her to have a mild alcohol abuse 2.2 disorder. 23 JUDGE FAHEY: Okay. Has there been a public 24 acknowledgment that I'm an alcoholic, I was wrong, I



shouldn't have done this?

MR. JULIAN: Yes, throughout the - - - an 1 2 alcoholic, I cannot say that. 3 JUDGE FAHEY: Oh, okay. 4 MR. JULIAN: But what I can say is a public 5 acknowledge - - - acknowledgment and nine times to the 6 Commission in ten minutes. 7 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, Counsel. 8 MR. JULIAN: Thank you, Judge. 9 MR. LINDNER: Good afternoon, Chief Judge 10 DiFiore, good afternoon, Your Honors. May it please the 11 court. On October 3rd, 2016, just six weeks after the 12 petitioner was convicted of driving while intoxicated she 13 attempted to commit the same crime again. She admitted in 14 her testimony that she had four glasses of wine, three 15 shots of tequila. She was drunk. She shouldn't have been 16 driving, and yet she admits that she got in her car and she 17 attempted to start and to operate the vehicle. Only her 18 court-ordered ignition interlock device stopped her from 19 doing so again. There are a lot of aggravating factors in 20 this case. There really are a lot of them, most notably 21 that she was incarcerated for violating a court order. But 22 I think this incident - -23 JUDGE STEIN: Does that - - - that go to the 24 public confidence?

MR. LINDNER:

Absolutely.

1 JUDGE STEIN: Is that your point on that? 2 MR. LINDNER: You said in Quinn the notorious 3 involvement with the law was a factor, and I think you have 4 that here in - - - in droves. 5 JUDGE STEIN: So - - - so a judge who has a DWI 6 and happens to make the news is more subject to removal 7 than a judge who does the same thing but it's not a good 8 news day? 9 MR. LINDNER: The judge has no control over what 10 the news does, Your Honor. I understand where you're going 11 with that. No, a judge is responsible for her conduct. 12 When a judge commits crimes that are newsworthy it has an 13 impact on public confidence. You have never had a judge 14 who was incarcerated for violating a court order and went 15 back on the bench, and it would be unprecedented to do that

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here.

JUDGE RIVERA: Absent the - - - the DWI, are the other charges on their face enough for the removal?

MR. LINDNER: The other - - - well, I think that the - - - the DWI with the multiple aggravating factors and the two violations of the conditional discharge, we'd consider those as a package. If you're asking about charge 5 and charge - - I'm sorry, charge 4 and charge 5, which are the on-the-bench conduct, we concede in the brief that those are less egregious. But I think they show a certain

amount of lack of impulse control that you see through
these other charges. You know, the comments about the - - the buyer's remorse were really uncalled for, and she's
not accepting responsibility for that. She's tried to say

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CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Counsel, how can we be assured that the Chair's comments didn't prejudice the Commission's determination?

MR. LINDNER: Read the determination. The determination at every turn points to record evidence in support of the findings of fact and the conclusions of law that they made. And really, how could it not? I mean the - - the DWI and the Thailand violation were established after trial and upheld on appeal. She admits to the first violation. She admits that she was rude and profane with the police officer. She admits nearly everything that you would need to find removal regardless of what she said.

In terms of her remorse or accepting responsibility, you have her own brief to this court. She says she accepts responsibility except she didn't really do it. She accepts responsibility for having been convicted of DWI. But she wasn't drunk, and she was wrongly convicted. She's sorry that she spoke profanely to state troopers who were just doing their job, but they provoked it.



And now you have an argument in her reply brief, which I really was quite surprised to see - - - and Counsel mentioned it - - - an argument that she didn't really intend to drive on October 3rd, that her aunt was going to drive. What's surprising about that - - - it's surprising on several levels. First of all, it's an argument that appears for the first time in the reply brief. It's not in her main brief to this court. You won't find it in the briefs to the Commission or to the referee. You won't find it in her statement that she made when she appeared before the Commission.

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And it's completely at odds with her plea - - - her guilty plea. She stood in open court, it's at page 870 of your record, and she admitted that she attempted to start and to operate - - - to operate the vehicle. And then she goes on - - - there is pages of her explanation for how that happened and it's all about how she didn't read the conditions. She says nothing about the fact that she didn't intend to drive. The fact that she's raising that defense now in her reply brief for the first time is evidence that she's still not willing to accept responsibility.

JUDGE RIVERA: Did she seek mitigation on the basis of some alcohol abuse problem or difficulty or challenge?



MR. LINDNER: Well, there's no medical evidence here to support alcoholism, but let me say the disease of alcoholism is not a defense. It's an explanation. If you have a case like Landicino in which there's substantial medical evidence that a judge suffers from a disease and there's also substantial evidence in the form of multiple people who come in and testify about the judge's efforts to rehabilitate himself and to conquer his disease, the Commission in that case said we would remove this judge but for the extensive evidence of rehabilitation. But if you go back to Quinn and to Aldrich, in Aldrich there's evidence in that record that the judge had been sober for two years by the time it got to this court. He was an alcoholic and nobody disputed that. But the nature his - -- of his conduct, which was being intoxicated on the bench and making racist statements - -

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JUDGE FAHEY: So - - - so let me ask you this.

Everything that happened, the - - - the three violations

ultimately of the conditional discharge, if afterwards the

judge had gone to Alcoholics Anonymous, gone to a program,

forsworn all alcohol, came out public and said I was an

alcoholic, I made some mistakes, but I still want to be a

judge and I think I can still serve the community

effectively, in point of fact maybe I even learned

something from these experiences and I can be a better

judge as a result of them - - - because some of the remarks struck me more as immature than - - - than venal, I guess that - - - that would be the way I would characterize them. As I think one of your commissioners said she may have been her own worst enemy. In that circumstance, would your - - do you think the recommendation might have been different?

MR. LINDNER: I think - - - and that's exactly where I was going with - - - with Aldrich, Your Honor. In Aldrich there was evidence that the judge had gone to AA, that he was sober, that he was no longer an alcoholic and that was - - but you said the - - the nature of the misconduct there was - - I because you called it of such an aggravated nature that it simply wasn't enough. You said in other cases, in Bauer, sometimes no amount of contrition is enough. And in a case where a judge has gone to jail for violating a court order, who's twice tried to drive while intoxicated, I think this might be a case where even if there had been sincere contrition it would not have been enough.

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, counsel.

MR. LINDNER: Thank you, Your Honors.

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Mr. Julian.

MR. JULIAN: Yes; thank you, Judge. First of all, this judge went - - -



JUDGE RIVERA: Counsel, could you - - - could address the Commission's - - - counsel for the Commission's point that despite the representations that she's remorseful the reality is that she blames others or says others provoked her or says no, I never did that. In other words, she doesn't really recognize that she has violated rules or that - - - that she's done something that - - -

MR. JULIAN: She fully - - - I'm sorry.

JUDGE RIVERA: - - - warrants removal.

MR. JULIAN: I'm sorry. I didn't mean to speak up.

JUDGE RIVERA: No, no. Please.

MR. JULIAN: She fully recognizes that she violates rules. She - - - she had a trial in city court. She was convicted. She - - - she did not believe - - - at the time she was driving at 7:00 in the morning and she was driving to the YWCA to work out, she did not believe she was under the influence of alcohol. But she accepts the verdict. She understands that that's the verdict. And this court has - - - has held - - - has said that simply because a judge contests the issue that in and of itself is not an expression of remorse. You don't check your rights at the door as a judge. She then went to three different programs, two of them outpatient, one required by the conditional discharge, to address her alcohol issues.

And then she has said at - - - and again, I want 1 2 to reiterate, to the Commission nine times during the 3 argument that was punctuated by the reference that I 4 referred to that she was sorry, that she accepted 5 responsibility. In fact, her words in front of the 6 Commission were I accept responsibility for everything. 7 During the hearing as to each of the charges that are 8 relevant, including the charge dealing with her treatment 9 of the police officer, she said she was sorry, she 10 apologized. At the station, she apologized to the police 11 officer after she had engaged in - - -12 JUDGE RIVERA: No, I understand. But I think -13 - I thought Counsel's point was that she may be saying 14

- I thought Counsel's point was that she may be saying those things but - - - but then she also says but I was provoked and that helps to explain. I - - - I take responsibility. I shouldn't have done that, but I was provoked, right?

MR. JULIAN: Well - - -

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JUDGE RIVERA: Or as you were saying she blows but it's really someone - - - she blows to be able to - - to get her BAC number up, but - - - but it's her aunt who was going to drive.

MR. JULIAN: Well - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: And I wasn't - - - I - - - as you said now, I didn't think I was drunk, but I accept that

that's the conclusion. And that's what he's saying, that that's different from true - - - someone who really shows contriteness, who really says I recognize that I was wrong. MR. JULIAN: There are always facts that underline contriteness, and if we're being penalized for trying the case to point out what exactly the mitigating factors were - - - I mean you don't get to a place without walking there. And she got to the place where she apologized, but we also in trying the case talked about our journey. And if that - - - if that is bad lawyering on my part I plead guilty. CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, Counsel. (Court is adjourned)



I, Sara Winkeljohn, certify that the foregoing transcript of proceedings in the Court of Appeals of Matter of Honorable Leticia D. Astacio, No. 94 was prepared using the required transcription equipment and is a true and accurate record of the proceedings. Considerich and Signature: Address of Agency: 352 Seventh Avenue Suite 604 New York, NY 10001 September 12, 2018

