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People v Gillette. Points of Counsel | |
| Appellant's Point I (cont.) | |
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(c) The Court in its ruling said the letters were received for the purpose of showing how the deceased regarded her relations with the defendant. How is that important or material or in any way an element in the case? Does it bear upon the guilt or innocence of the defendant to know whether Grace Brown regarded her relations with the defendant as grossly improper or wholly correct, or whether she was entirely indifferent on the subject? The letters being read show that the deceased, Grace Brown, regarded her relations with the defendant as most painful to her. She suffered because of that relation, but it cannot he that that is a fact which is to be shown in this case against the defendant. Indeed, the receiving of these letters for the purpose announced by the Court would seem to be error in itself. As shown by the letters, Grace Brown's feelings were agonizing and the expression of them in the letters is very pathetic. The ruling of the Court was an announcement to the jury that those feelings and that pathos and the touching expression thereof were cogent and proper matters for them to consider as evidence in the case. Suppose these letters had been written to a third person in the precise language they are, would they not just as effectually show how the writer regarded her relations with Chester Gillette, as they do now? Would they then have been admissible on that ground? The belief, opinion and feelings of the deceased are wholly immaterial, and incompetent as evidence. People vs. Smith, 172 N. Y., 232. (d) It cannot be said that these letters were harmless and did not endanger or prejudice the defendant. On the contrary they were the most effective part of the People's case. The reading of those letters aroused the most profound sympathy for the deceased and the most intense prejudice against the defendant. Take for instance the paragraph in the last letter. (Case vol. 1, folio 2410.) "I have been bidding good-by to some places today. There are so many nooks, dear, and all of them so dear to me. I have lived here nearly all of my life. First I said good-by to the spring house with its great masses of green moss; then the apple tree where we had our play house; then the bee-hive, a cute little house in the orchard, and of course all of the neighbors that have mended my dresses from a little tot up to save me a thrashing I really deserved. "Oh, dear, you don't realize what all of this is to me. I know I shall never see any of them again, and mamma! great heavens, how I do love mamma! I don't know what I shall do without her. She is never cross and she always helps me so much. Sometimes I think if I could tell mamma, but I can't. She has trouble enough as it is, and I couldn't break her heart like that." When that paragraph was read as it was with the most dramatic effect as a climax to all the other tender and heartrending expressions that are in these letters, there was hardly a dry eye in the court room. The jurors were stirred with the most intense emotion. They were swept on to the verdict of guilty by an irresistible tide of feeling against which no barrier or warning was interposed, except such feeble remarks as the defendant's counsel could make. (e) It may be argued that some parts of these letters are material because they show an arrangement between the defendant and the deceased to go away together as they did go. The fact that they did go together is abundantly proved and not denied, and the terms in which they agreed to go is not important. It was urged on the trial that Grace Brown had said in her letter to the defendant that she was coming back to Cortland and that the defendant did not want that. If that statement made by Grace Brown is competent or has any effect, it could have been read as an extract from her letters. It may be urged that these letters written in June are so near to the time of the departure of this couple that they some way become evidence in connection with that. They cannot be held to he part of the res gestae; certainly not all of the letters are. (f) The appellant is not unmindful of the case People vs Sutherland, 154 N. Y., 347, which will doubtless be cited by the respondent. We observe about that case that the decision was by a divided court: two members of the court dissenting. The opinion, after saying that the letters were admissible, proceeds to the real ground upon which the decision rests, that the letters did not prejudice the defendant. The contents of the letters in that case do not appear, but it is plain that the nonprejudicial quality of the letters is the basis of the decision. In speaking of their admissibility the court says: "It depends on the contents of the letters." In another place it is said: "If they are mere harmless love, letters, as they seem to be, they prove nothing" etc. In the case at bar the letters are prejudicial to the defendant and bore fearfully against him, as a perusal of them will show, and as we have pointed out before. It cannot be said that these letters cannot by any possibility prejudice the defendant, and that is a true test. The respondent must establish that the evidence received could by no possibility have prejudiced the appellant. People vs. Smith, 172 N. Y., 243. (g) The rule of People vs. Sutherland was violated in this case in the way these letters were treated and used on the trial. The rule is that the letters were admissible to show how the deceased regarded her relations with defendant and not as proof of the statement of facts therein contained. Yet, all the way through the trial of this case, after the letters were in evidence, andespeciallyv during the cross examination of the defendant and the summing up by the district attorney, these letters were resorted to as proof of statements of fact therein contained, and the truth of what the letters contained was assumed and used with great force against the defendant. The court did not anywhere restrain the district attorney in that use of the letters, nor did it warn or advise the jury of the limited and restricted character of this evidence. "Where evidence is admitted not bearing directly upon the main issue, but having only an incidental relation, to a material fact, which is the subject of inquiry, it is both the province and duty of the trial court to clearly state the limits of its scope and application to be observed by counsel and jury." People vs. Webster, 139 N. Y., 81. The mere remark of the court made at the time of admitting the letters, that the letters were not received as proof of the facts therein stated, does not cure the error. The letters were read to the jury and used as effective proof of fact, without restriction by the court, or instruction regarding the effect of them. People vs. Smith, 172 N. Y., 240. | |
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