"The Constitutional History of New York ..."
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1867 Constitutional Convention
Volume II

     The woman suffrage movement had its organized beginning in a convention held at Seneca Falls, New York, in July, 1848. That convention was called by four women, and was largely attended by both men and women. The women who called the convention prepared beforehand a "Declaration of Sentiments," in the general form and style of the Declaration of Independence, substituting "all men" for "King George," and "women" instead of the "American colonists," as the sufferers from the tyranny denounced by the declaration. The original Declaration had eighteen grievances against King George, and the promoters of the new movement wished to state the same numbers of grievances in their declaration. It required a protracted search among law books, church usages, and social customs to find the required number, but, with the aid of "several well-disposed men," the eighteen grievances were found and duly set in order. Under the call for the convention, the meeting on the first day was for women exclusively, but, notwithstanding this notice, many men were present at the opening of the meeting. The promoters concluded that the men might make themselves useful, and they were permitted to stay "and take the laboring oar through the convention." Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Lucretia Mott, Frederick Douglass, and other advocates of the new movement were there, actively engaged in formulating an aggressive policy for the enlargement of woman's opportunities. The convention was in session two days, and at its close the declaration with its eighteen grievances was, like its great original, sent forth on the wings of the morning to a "candid world."

The eighteen grievances may be summarized as follows:

• Woman was denied the elective franchise;
• She was obliged to submit to laws made without her assistance;
• Such laws withheld from her rights conferred on ignorant men, natives and foreigners;
• She was oppressed on all sides as a result of not possessing the elective franchise;
• A married woman was civilly dead;
• She was deprived of rights of property, even of wages earned;
• She was not responsible for crimes committed in the presence of her husband;
• She was compelled to take a subordinate position in marriage;
• Her husband might chastise and imprison her;
• She had no voice in framing the laws concerning divorce;
• Single women must pay taxes, but had no other recognition in public affairs;
• Woman was excluded from nearly all profitable employments;
• She was not permitted to teach theology, medicine, or law;
• She was denied facilities for thorough education, and colleges were closed against her;
• She was excluded from the ministry, and from nearly all participation in church affairs;
• Women and men were not judged by the same code of morals;
• Man asserted the divine right of prescribing woman's sphere of action;
• And, finally, she was reduced to an abject condition by man's oppression.

     The time was evidently not yet ripe for the radical reforms proposed by this convention. The historians of the convention say that its proceedings "were unsparingly ridiculed by the press, and denounced by the pulpit;" but it was the beginning of an agitation which has had large results, and the end is not yet. It may be worth while to note here some of the changes in conditions outlined in the declaration, which appear in various statutes passed since this memorable convention. These statutes reflect social and political conditions, and are in most respects the clear result of the movement inaugurated by the Seneca Falls convention. Looking beyond the Constitutional Convention of 1867, which is the immediate subject of our study, we observe that there is now little left of the grievances stated in the declaration, but that nearly all have disappeared in the social development of the last half century; and it would seem that the limit has almost been reached beyond which reform cannot be carried without constitutional amendment which shall confer on women a complete elective franchise with all the rights which the Constitution guarantees to men.

     Many of the changes since the Convention of 1848 are not found in the statutes, but have become firmly established in society. The statutes show, among others, the following steps in the development of these reforms: In 1849 married women were given full right to take, hold, and dispose of property, and antenuptial contracts were to continue in full force after marriage; in 1850 a married woman was permitted to make and collect deposits in savings banks the same as if single; in 1851 married women who were stockholders in corporations might vote for directors, by proxy or otherwise; in 1853 the widow's estate only was liable for her debts contracted before marriage, but the husband continued liable for antenuptial debts of his wife to the extent of property received from her; in 1857 the State Woman's Hospital was incorporated: there were thirty-five women as directresses with authority to manage its domestic concerns; in 1858 a wife might insure her husband's life for the benefit of herself and her children: in 1859 the Woman's Library of New York was incorporated; in 1860 a married woman was given full control of her property and earnings. She was authorized to carry on trade or business in her own name, and she might sue and be sued in all matters relating to her property, and maintain actions for injuries to her person or character. She was also made joint guardian of her children with her husband, and, in case of his death intestate leaving a minor child or children, she had the use of all his real estate during the minority of the youngest child and one third thereof during her life. In 1862 a wife might sell and dispose of her property and make contracts with the same effect as if single, and a child could not be apprenticed without his mother's consent; in 1867 an adult woman was entitled to vote for church trustees, and married women might be appointed executors, administrators, and guardians, and give bonds with the same effect as if single; in 1873 a child could not be adopted without its mother's consent; in 1878 a married woman could execute a power of attorney with the same effect as if single. In 1879 a married woman might make an acknowledgment of a written instrument the same as if single, this dispensed with the old practice of a separate examination of the wife on making an acknowledgment. In 1880 an adult woman was made eligible to any school office, and in 1881 she was given the right to vote at school meetings. In 1881 employers of women were required to afford them reasonable use of seats. In 1884 a married woman was vested with full power to make contracts as if single, except with her husband. In 1886 women under twenty-one were not permitted to work in a manufacturing establishment more than sixty hours in one week. By a statute passed the same year women might be admitted to practice as attorneys. In 1887 husband and wife might convey land directly to each other; in 1888 women were entitled to vote for members of the board of education in the city of Auburn. A statute passed in 1888 required police matrons to be appointed in certain cities, and another statute made women eligible as managers of the State Industrial School. In 1889 taxable women were entitled to vote on tax questions in the village of Cooperstown. By statutes passed in 1890 women were made eligible as deputy factory inspectors, were to sue and be sued as if single, might maintain actions for injuries to property, character, person, or growing out of marital relations, as if single, and were to be appointed physicians in each state asylum, except the State Asylum for Insane Criminals. In 1891 the incorporation of young women's Christian associations was authorized. By statutes passed in 1892 the wife or daughter of a town clerk might be his deputy; a woman or girl was not permitted to sell or serve intoxicating liquors, unless she was a member of the licensee's family; a married woman might make contracts with her husband the same as with any other person; a board of women managers was to be appointed for the World's Fair, and an adult woman was also given the right to vote for school commissioner; but this statute was held unconstitutional by the court of appeals. In 1893 a woman might be clerk of a village under the general law, and was also made eligible as school commissioner in Syracuse. By a statute passed in 1899 women were not to be employed in any factory in using any emery, corundum, stone or emery polishing or buffing wheel; a statute passed in 1901 conferred on taxable women the right to vote on tax questions in towns and villages; in 1902 a married woman was authorized to maintain actions in her own name, recover for wages, salary, profits, or compensation or other remuneration for any work or service, or derived from any business carried on by her; and the statute declares her presumptively entitled to recover in such cases unless the contrary expressly appears.

     In addition to these positive statutory provisions, women are appointed to the offices of notary public and commissioner of deeds. They officially represented the state at the World's Columbian Exposition, in 1893, at the Atlanta Exposition, in 1895, and at the Pan American Exposition, in 1901. Women also took a prominent part in the management of the Louisiana Purchase Exposition, at St. Louis, in 1904. They are managers of hospitals, charitable and reformatory institutions, directors of corporations, and occupy numerous administrative positions. They have become physicians, lawyers, ministers, teachers, professors, and presidents of educational institutions, and are found in almost every branch of business. The declaration of 1848 has borne abundant fruit.

     This summary may appropriately be concluded by quoting from recent opinions expressed by high executive and legislative authority. Governor Frank W. Higgins, in his first annual message, 1905, recommended that, in third-class cities, the right to vote at special tax elections be restricted to resident taxpayers, but "without limitation as to sex," observing that it would be only "an act of justice to extend that right to women property holders as well as to men." S. Frederick Nixon, in his address to the assembly, at the opening of the legislature of 1905, on his seventh consecutive election as speaker, which he said was "an unprecedented honor," urged the extension of the right to suffrage to all taxpaying women in all third-class cities, saying that they already enjoyed the right in seventeen cities of this class. He thought it only just that "all women taxpayers should vote on all tax propositions," and that every community would be benefited by their votes.

     In the chapter on the period between the Conventions of 1846 and 1867 I have referred to the petition for woman suffrage presented to the legislature in 1853 by citizens of Rochester, and the proposed constitutional amendments on this subject prior to this Convention. When this Convention was about to be chosen, the advocates of woman suffrage determined to use the occasion to advance their cause. They began to agitate the subject in the legislature of 1867 when the convention act was under consideration, and urged the legislature to give women the right to vote for delegates. The convention acts of 1801 and 1821 were cited as precedents for an elective franchise broader than that fixed by the Constitution. It was also asserted, in substance, that when a new constitution was to be framed society resolved itself into its constituent elements, and all members of society had a right to be heard. I have already quoted from Mr. Folger's speech, showing that the senate substantially accepted this view of the situation presented when a constitutional convention was to be chosen, and, while the senate proposed to enlarge the elective franchise, it did not propose to give women the right to vote for delegates. Advocates of the new movement were heard by the Convention, and the committee on suffrage was urged to propose equal suffrage for men and women. The committee declined to recommend the extension of the elective franchise to women, observing that, "however defensible in theory, we are satisfied that public sentiment does not demand, and would not sustain, an innovation so revolutionary and sweeping, so openly at war with a distribution of duties and functions between the sexes as venerable and pervading as government itself, and involving transformations so radical in social and domestic life."

     When the suffrage article was under consideration in the Convention, George William Curtis proposed to extend the elective franchise to women, supporting his proposition by an elaborate address with a force, lucidity and eloquence which left little to be said by other speakers. Mr. Curtis delivered the principal speech on that side. There were speeches against it, but they seemed hardly necessary in view of the manifest attitude of the Convention toward this question. Mr. Wales proposed to confer the right of suffrage on taxpaying women. Mr. Graves proposed to submit the question of women suffrage to the women themselves at a special election, and, if a majority of the votes cast were in the affirmative, all women should thereafter have the right to vote on the same conditions as men. Mr. Greeley, chairman of the committee, opposed this proposition because it "compelled women to vote in order to avoid voting." He was in favor of submitting the question to women, but thought that all that did not vote should be counted in the negative. "Let the women who do not choose to vote abstain from voting, and by abstaining affirm their desire not to have the right of suffrage extended to them. I believe in the principle that 'governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed,' and whenever the women of this state shall say that they desire the right to vote I am in favor of conceding it." He did not believe that one tenth of the women desired the right of suffrage. "I wish the women of the state to be heard as women, and not to be mixed up and commingled with men in caucuses, on nominating committees, and at the polls, but allowed to have their views heard as the women of the state. I would be willing to commit to them all questions connected with the domestic relations, with marriage, separation, and divorce, and all questions touching the care of families, of inheritance, and of dower. If they are ever to exercise the elective franchise, let them meet as women, and elect delegates as women, and have legislatures or conventions to which only women shall be admitted, either as spectators or officers; and let them there state their wishes in regard to the legislation of the state. I am sure they will be heard. I am very sure they will be heard as women; but this demand for a common right with men is the voice of a very few women; and the claim that they act for women I repudiate." Referring to Queen Elizabeth, Mr. Greeley inquired whether she selected a Cabinet or called a Parliament of men and women indiscriminately. "I appeal to all the female rulers, from Semiramis to Victoria, to the Empress Catherine of Russia, to Maria Theresa of Austria. Not one of these great women has ever proposed the commingling of men and women in legislation or government." The proposition for a separate submission of the question was defeated by a vote of 9 to 133. The question on extending the elective franchise to women was presented in various forms, but the highest number of votes received was twenty-four.

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