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Bergdorf Goodman Inc. v Hillard
2003 NY Slip Op 51544(U)
Decided on November 21, 2003
Appellate Term, Second Department
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the Official Reports.


Decided on November 21, 2003
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

APPELLATE TERM : 2nd and 11th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

PRESENT:PESCE, P.J., PATTERSON and RIOS, JJ.
NO. 2002-1795 K C

BERGDORF GOODMAN INC., Appellant,

against

DAVID HILLARD, Respondent, -and LATIA HILLARD, Defendant.


Appeal by plaintiff from an order of the Civil Court, Kings County (K. Yellen, J.), entered November 15, 2002, granting defendant David Hillard's motion to vacate a default judgment.


Order unanimously reversed without costs and defendant David Hillard's motion to vacate a default judgment denied.

A defendant seeking to vacate a default must show both a reasonable excuse for the default and a meritorious defense to the action (Putney v Pearlman, 203 AD2d 333). The determination of what constitutes a reasonable excuse lies within the sound discretion of the trial court (Bardales v Blades, 191 AD2d 667, 668). The court improvidently exercised its discretion in this case, however, and reversal is warranted (see generally Roussodimou v Zafiriadis, 238 AD2d 568). Defendant did not proffer any defense to the action and provided only a bare, unsubstantiated allegation that his wife had problems with a pregnancy as an excuse (see Westchester Med. Ctr. v ELRAC, Inc., 301 AD2d 518; Eretz Funding v Shalosh Assocs., 266 AD2d 184). Furthermore, the motion was made approximately 17 months after entry of the default judgment, and defendant provides no excuse for this delay (see generally Molesky v Molesky, 255 AD2d 821).
Decision Date: November 21, 2003