Reyes v Reid
2014 NYSlipOp 06571 [121 AD3d 664]
October 1, 2014
Appellate Division, Second Department
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
As corrected through Wednesday, December 3, 2014


[*1]
 Luisa Reyes et al., Appellants,
v
Daniel C. Reid et al., Respondents.

Richard A. Russell, Newburgh, N.Y. (John J. Leen of counsel), for appellants.

Thomas K. Moore (Andrea G. Sawyers, Melville, N.Y. [Jennifer M. Belk], of counsel), for respondents.

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the plaintiffs appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Orange County (Bartlett, J.), dated March 20, 2013, which granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff Luisa Reyes did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject accident.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

The defendants met their prima facie burden of showing that the plaintiff Luisa Reyes did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject accident (see Toure v Avis Rent A Car Sys., 98 NY2d 345 [2002]; Gaddy v Eyler, 79 NY2d 955, 956-957 [1992]). The defendants submitted competent medical evidence establishing, prima facie, that the alleged injury to the lumbar region of Reyes's spine did not constitute a serious injury under either the permanent consequential limitation of use category or the significant limitation of use category of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) (see Il Chung Lim v Chrabaszcz, 95 AD3d 950 [2012]).

The plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue of fact in opposition. Therefore, the Supreme Court properly granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. Rivera, J.P., Hall, Austin, Miller and Maltese, JJ., concur.