Hernandez v Erskine
2014 NY Slip Op 08810 [123 AD3d 883]
December 17, 2014
Appellate Division, Second Department
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
As corrected through Wednesday, January 28, 2015


[*1]
 Margarita Hernandez, Appellant,
v
Aimee A. Erskine, Respondent.

Masterman Law, PLLC, Brooklyn, N.Y. (Dan Masterman of counsel), for appellant.

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Siegal, J.), dated December 17, 2012, which granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject accident.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.

The defendant met her prima facie burden of showing that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject accident (see Toure v Avis Rent A Car Sys., 98 NY2d 345 [2002]; Gaddy v Eyler, 79 NY2d 955, 956-957 [1992]). The defendant submitted competent medical evidence establishing, prima facie, that the alleged injuries to the cervical and lumbar regions of the plaintiff's spine, to both of the plaintiff's knees, and to the plaintiff's right shoulder did not constitute serious injuries under either the permanent consequential limitation of use or significant limitation of use categories of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) (see Staff v Yshua, 59 AD3d 614 [2009]).

In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact. Therefore, the Supreme Court properly granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. Rivera, J.P., Hall, Austin, Miller and Maltese, JJ., concur.