1	COURT OF APPEALS
2	STATE OF NEW YORK
3	
4	THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK,
5	Appellant,
6	-against- NO. 100
7	REBECCA RUIZ,
8	Respondent.
9	20 Eagle Stree Albany, New Yor November 17, 202
10	Before:
11	ACTING CHIEF JUDGE ANTHONY CANNATARO
12	ASSOCIATE JUDGE JENNY RIVERA ASSOCIATE JUDGE MICHAEL J. GARCIA
13	ASSOCIATE JUDGE ROWAN D. WILSON ASSOCIATE JUDGE MADELINE SINGAS
14	ASSOCIATE JUDGE SHIRLEY TROUTMAN
15	Appearances:
16	ANDREW M. MOLITOR, ESQ.
17	CHAUTAUQUA COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE Attorney for Appellant
18	1 N. Erie Street Mayville, NY 14757-1000
19	JOHN J. MORRISSEY, ESQ.
20	LEGAL AID BUREAU OF BUFFALO Attorney for Respondent
21	290 Main Street, Suite 400 Buffalo, NY 14202
22	
23	
24	
25	Kelly Vadeboncoeu: Official Court Transcribe:
	official coals flambulibes



1 ACTING CHIEF JUDGE CANNATARO: Our next appeal is 2 number 100, People v. Rebecca Ruiz. 3 MR. MOLITOR: Good afternoon. May it please the 4 Court. My name is Andrew Molitor from the Chautauqua 5 County District Attorney's Office, for the People of the 6 State of New York. 7 This case is unlike many temporary lawful 8 possession cases that have been before this court. 9 not a situation where the defendant fortuitously found a 10 gun, and intended to surrender that gun to the authorities, 11 nor is it a case where the defendant was - - - came into 12 possession of the gun by disarming an attacker. 13 JUDGE SINGAS: Do you think you can have 14 temporary and lawful possession in your home? 15 MR. MOLITOR: Is it possible? I'm - - - I'm - - -16 it may be possible under a different fact pattern than this 17 case, but I don't think it was possible in this case, for a variety of reasons. I think a review of the evidence - - -18 19 a reasonable view of the evidence in this case would show 20 that the defendant had a prior criminal conviction and was 2.1 not allowed to possess a firearm. 2.2 JUDGE TROUTMAN: Is constructive possession 23 preserved here? 24 MR. MOLITOR: I believe it is, Your Honor. And

if it isn't, I don't think anything is preserved.

case never should have been decided in the Appellate

Division. Because the defendant asked for temporary lawful possession, and we objected, and we cited the relevant standard. And the lower court can view all the evidence.

object - - - you didn't say constructive possession when you objected, but I believe in the post-trial motion, you made it - - - several statements that could be construed as constructive possession. Let's assume that just for a second, do we - - - do we nevertheless, have what the Appellate Division identified as a LaFontaine problem?

MR. MOLITOR: I don't - - I don't believe that this is a a LaFontaine problem, Your Honor. Because when the court is making a decision like it did in Butts, this court, and when the court is making a decision as to whether it should give a charge as to a defense, it can view all - - it takes a reasonable view of all the evidence. And all the reasonable inferences that flow from that evidence. And so I think the Appellate Division could've, you know, looked at all the evidence, and all the reasonable inferences that flowed therefrom, and said yeah, this clearly, there was a constructive possession, she was in constructive possession, and that precludes us from ever getting to the temporary lawful possession defense. And then - - and the court did not abuse its discretion. If



you think about some of the facts that are cited in defense of the, what I would say the justification argument, those are also facts that were never raised as part of the - - - the argument at the trial level. But they're being used here, I believe, to conflate justification and temporary lawful possession.

2.1

2.2

Beyond that, you know, if we don't even get to temporary lawf - - - if you we don't get there with construction possession, she is in actual possession of the weapon, and you know, as I said before, there is no - - - this is not a situation where she was disarming an attacker, or a situation where she fortuitously found the weapon. And then - - -

JUDGE WILSON: Well, that's what she claims though, right? That's her testimony. She fortuitously found it.

MR. MOLITOR: That's her testimony, yes. And T - - -

ACTING CHIEF JUDGE CANNATARO: We do have to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant, don't we?

MR. MOLITOR: That's true, but it still needs to be reasonable and rational. And I, you know, lay out in my - - in my papers all of how all the evidence and the reasonable inferences show that that testimony really isn't



rational.

2.1

ACTING CHIEF JUDGE CANNATARO: Why is not rational?

MR. MOLITOR: Well, Your Honor, I think it's illogical for someone to be under the situation that she describes. And to go into the kitchen towards the perceived threat, and pull out of a kitchen drawer, just by happenstance, a gun that's fully loaded and ready to go, and not know that that gun is there.

ACTING CHIEF JUDGE CANNATARO: Is it possible that, you know, there's a commotion, there's some banging at the door, she runs to the kitchen. Even if I knew I didn't have a gun in the house, I don't think it's beyond the realm of possibility that one could open a kitchen drawer to see if there's something heavy or sharp, or something in there that you could use to defend yourself. She just happened to find a gun when she opened it.

MR. MOLITOR: I completely agree with you about that, Your Honor. But she wasn't supposed to have guns in house, and she said - - - you know, she said, look - - -

ACTING CHIEF JUDGE CANNATARO: So you're saying she didn't have the right to pick up that gun, having found it?

MR. MOLITOR: --- I --- I'm saying that she knew about it, and she didn't have the right to pick up



that gun.

JUDGE WILSON: Well, so suppose it was actually her ex-husband, Spoons, or Waldo, or whatever you want to call him. And he had broken down the door. At that point, she opens the drawer, finds the gun. You still think she can't use it? That's temporary, that doesn't meet temporary lawful possession?

MR. MOLITOR: Yes.

JUDGE WILSON: And he's armed, and he fires a shot first and misses?

MR. MOLITOR: I understand - - - I understand the emotional component to what I'm saying, but yes, I don't think she can. And - - - or at least, it's not lawful for her to do so. Because the legislature never intended for justification to be a defense to a possessory crime. And this court in Pons made it clear - -

JUDGE RIVERA: Oh, I thought you were going to argue the legislature never intended for her to have the gun in the house to begin with.

MR. MOLITOR: That also. That's also the case, Your Honor. That's also the case.

JUDGE GARCIA: Counselor, could you tell me, what happens to the gun? What's in the record about what happens to the gun?

MR. MOLITOR: We don't know, per se. Exhibit 6,



which was in evidence at the 50-second mark, is when she says "get rid of this, I can't go to jail." And she testifies that she wasn't say - - - what - - - she testified that in explaining that 911 call, that it wasn't the gun that she used. She had just dropped the gun, and she didn't know what happened to it. She says instead, what she was doing is telling someone to get rid of the gun and the drugs that was on he victim. So we don't know.

JUDGE GARCIA: How long is it between the shooting and the time the police arrive?

MR. MOLITOR: I'm not sure exactly. But it was a very quick time period.

ACTING CHIEF JUDGE CANNATARO: The other part of the charge in this case, besides the legal possession of the gun, is the intent to dispose of it safely, as quickly as possible, is it not?

MR. MOLITOR: It is, Your Honor.

ACTING CHIEF JUDGE CANNATARO: And it occurs to me here that she said got - - - get rid of this, but we don't really know what this is, but even leaving that out of it, I don't see an effort on her part to help the police find the gun, she just said it's over there somewhere, and is there any evidence in this case that you can point to. And I'll ask this question of your adversary, but is there any evidence that you can point to that speaks to an intent

to dispose of the gun?

MR. MOLITOR: No, Your Honor. None. I don't think there's any at all. In fact, that original 911 call, you can hear the operator saying "where's the shooter, where's the shooter." And she says "he ran, he's gone." So I don't think there was ever any intent to safely dispose of that weapon.

JUDGE RIVERA: Well, given the circumstances, is it possible that - - - this - - - as you've said, it's been a short period between the - - - in response to Judge Garcia, a short period between the shooting and when the police arrived, that perhaps you didn't have the opportunity to really think that through. Having been - - - she says, right, this is her testimony, feared for her life, shoots through, then she realized, shot someone else, and she's distraught, and just releases the gun. Is it possible that, in that moment, perhaps there's not an opportunity really to think cooly about well, what will I do with this gun?

MR. MOLITOR: Well, I would Your Honor, that the facts, at least - - at least that 911 call points to the exact opposite, which is that she cooly told the 911 operator that it was someone - - - that the shooter was somebody else, and she's inadvertently caught saying get rid of this, I can't go to jail.



2	know, even if there is a legal excuse for possessing the
3	weapon, she uses it in a quintessentially dangerous way.
4	And justify you know, justification does not mean
5	safe. Here, what she did was very dangerous. And we just
6	can't get around the fact, you know, no one can get around
7	the fact
8	JUDGE WILSON: But when you say "dangerous", not
9	because she killed somebody, but because she shot through
10	door without knowing who was on the other side?
11	MR. MOLITOR: Yeah, and she says she fired a
12	warning shot through a door, in from the inside of
13	her to the outside where it could have struck someone in
14	another house, someone driving in a car, or someone walkin
15	nearby.
16	ACTING CHIEF JUDGE CANNATARO: Thank you.
17	MR. MOLITOR: Thank you, Your Honor.
18	ACTING CHIEF JUDGE CANNATARO: Counsel, before I
19	forget, is there any evidence of this record of your clien
20	making an effort to safely dispose of the gun as quickly a
21	possible?
22	MR. MORRISSEY: John Morrissey, on behalf of Ms.
23	Ruiz
24	ACTING CHIEF JUDGE CANNATARO: Sorry.
25	MR. MORRISSEY: Ms. Ruiz. The first thing
	A CONTRACTOR OF THE CONTRACTOR

So - - - and then I'll just conclude with, you

that she does upon leaving the house is she begins to try to render medical aid to - - - to Mr. Duman. So she drops the gun outside, and immediately begins trying to help him. She calls 911, and is on the phone with them, begging for a police to get there.

JUDGE TROUTMAN: Is she required to safely dispose of it, in order to get the benefit of the charge?

MR. MORRISSEY: I do not believe so. It's certainly an underlying policy justification of the - - - of the defense, but I disagree with the idea that it is one of the requirements of the charge. I think this - - -

ACTING CHIEF JUDGE CANNATARO: Isn't it in the charge? Isn't that specific language in the charge?

MR. MORRISSEY: Or - - - I think I misspoke, the charge, what this court's to determine when the defense applies, and those two requirements are that there be a legal excuse, and it not be used in a dangerous manner. If we look at the charge, the charge contains almost like a catch-all of possible elements, and then looking at some of the Appellate Division case law, we tailor the specific parts of that charge. But I don't believe it is required to immediately dispose of the gun to police. She wants police there. She's telling the police the gun is over there. She dropped it. She relinquishes possession very early on into the encounter. As soon as she no longer

needs to - - - to defend herself. And there's also no evidence that she's trying to hide.

JUDGE SINGAS: Didn't we decide this case already in Williams?

MR. MORRISSEY: I don't believe we decided this case, or - - - not we, that this court has decided this case in Williams, for two reasons. The first, the only issue before this court is dangerous use. That's the only preserved issue, and that's the only issue that was ruled on adversely by the trial court. And Williams, 2020, I assume - - well, Williams, 2020, not 1980, correct?

JUDGE SINGAS: Yes.

MR. MORRISSEY: And Williams, 2020, the majority explicitly says we're not talking about dangerous use. But even if we set aside those procedural issues. There's a key factual distinction. In Williams, 2020, you have possession, imminent threat, and then use. So the possession, the crime, has been completed before there's any legal excuse to pick up the gun. In this case, we have a situation of imminent threat, then picking up the gun — — picking up the gun exclusively to deal with that threat, and then relinquishing possession as soon as the threat has been erased. So that timing component is a key distinction.

JUDGE RIVERA: The threats erased, she shot him



1 and killed him, but what - - - why isn't dangerous use? 2 Since you say that's the preserved question. Why isn't it? 3 Why didn't she use it in a dangerous way? 4 MR. MORRISSEY: Because at the time she believed 5 her estranged husband was beating in the door, something he 6 had done before, to break in, possibly kill her. 7 four children in the house, and so she had a need to defend 8 her house, her children, her property from this man. 9 only that - - -

ACTING CHIEF JUDGE CANNATARO: This is a windowless door, was it not? You - - - you couldn't see through the door that - - - that she shot through, could you?

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

2.1

2.2

23

24

25

MR. MORRISSEY: It is a windowless door, but there was someone banging on the door that's identifying themselves as her estranged husband's, in very loud, threatening - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: Well, that might be why she shoots, that's about justification, and the - - - and the finder of fact agreed there. What about the dangerous use when it comes to the possession of the weapon?

MR. MORRISSEY: I think when we consider dangerous use, we need to consider how and why Ms. Ruiz used the weapon. And some of the facts that relate to justification are naturally going to relate to dangerous



use.

ACTING CHIEF JUDGE CANNATARO: Such as? Which - - which parts of justification are a factor in dangerous
use? Because we've opined that there isn't much of a
connection between those two.

MR. MORRISSEY: So the legal doctrines are distinct, but some of the facts that may support a justification may also support temporary lawful possession. And I think we see that in the Almodovar case, where this - - - we had a situation in which the accused shot someone four times, point blank range, in self-defense, and this court said no justification, but in those circumstances the accused is entitled to a temporary lawful possession charge. That is after Williams, 1980, after the court has taken dangerous - - or after the court has announced the dangerous requirement. So we have a situation where justification and temporary lawful possession are not only not mutually exclusive, but also some of the same facts are going to - - -

ACTING CHIEF JUDGE CANNATARO: Can I ask you a different dangerous use question? After she used the gun, and you have your argument about, you know, the responsibility of the way she used the gun, she then apparently, by her own testimony, throws it into the yard. Is that a safe use of a gun?



MR. MORRISSEY: So she drops it in the yard. I think it's important to remember why she's doing that. She is trying, at that point, to save the life of someone.

This is a very, very emotional time. I disagree very much with this idea that you could listen to her 911 call or hear her phone calls and think this is a cool situation.

She had just believed her estranged husband was going to break in and possibly kill her. So she makes a very difficult decision and then finds out that she just shot the person that that she loves, and so she immediately begins trying to give a - - - putting possession of the weapon, relinquishing possession - - -

2.1

2.2

JUDGE TROUTMAN: And you argue that the 911 tape doesn't suggest otherwise?

MR. MORRISSEY: So in the light most favorable, because we have Ms. Ruiz' testimony about what happened to the gun. She said "I dropped it, I was not telling anyone else to take it." And in the light most favorable, the jury credits that testimony. And to the extent that we have arguments that have been advanced differently, saying well, there's actually a couple factors that - - - that weigh against it, I think those are better for a closing argument than a light most favorable.

JUDGE WILSON: If the construction possession argument is preserved, I'm not saying it is, if it is, is



1 there a LaFontaine problem? 2 MR. MORRISSEY: I certainly think there is. The 3 words constructive possession aren't even mentioned in 4 trial. If we look at the People's bill of particulars - -5 6 JUDGE WILSON: Well, how about post-trial? 7 MR. MORRISSEY: I think it's still - - - there's 8 still a LaFontaine issue, because we're talking about the 9 trial court denying the instruction. And when it denied 10 the instruction it's only citing to the - - - to the dangerous use component. So I think that the LaFontaine 11 12 issue persists. 13 Well, speaking of dangerous, I think the 14 Williams, 1980, case also illustrates a - - -15 JUDGE RIVERA: If this is not dangerous use, 16 what - - - what would have been dangerous use? 17 MR. MORRISSEY: I think if you - - -18 JUDGE RIVERA: When you're shooting through a 19 door, when you can't see who's behind it, shooting out into, right, a residential area, if that's not dangerous 20 21 use, what - - - what would have been dangerous use? 22 MR. MORRISSEY: So I think there's a fuller way 23 to view Ms. Ruiz' action, that she says gives a verbal 24 warning before firing, fires a single shot, and it is only

after you have a person identifying themselves. She's not

guessing at that. She's entitled to believe that that is

Walter Duprey outside the door. Because he said his name,
and he's done it before. I think if there - - - if she had
continued to fire, if she had fired multiple shots, that's
something that could distinguish, or - -
JUDGE SINGAS: What if she fired only once and
didn't hit Mr. Duman, but hit one of the passerbyers?

MR. MORRISSEY: I think we have a situation in

MR. MORRISSEY: I think we have a situation in which she tried to mitigate that. She says even though she was firing a warning shot, it was pointed at the door. The passerbys, they are not - - -

ACTING CHIEF JUDGE CANNATARO: Could you just go

--- I don't understand how that's a mitigation. If

you're firing a warning shot at the door, and of which you

believe there's someone standing on the other side of it.

And you probably should be charged with knowing that

there's a street beyond that where people are passing by.

How does that justify her actions?

MR. MORRISSEY: I think, because it shows she's trying to keep the gun directed toward the threat that she's facing. That she's not - - - if we look at something that happened - - -

ACTING CHIEF JUDGE CANNATARO: But she can't see the threat. I know that she - - - I know that she - - - you are arguing that she thinks her ex-husband, or husband,



is there. And I'm not debating that. But she can't see who's on the other side of the door or where they are. So what - - how did she even know it's warning shot, how does she not know that it's a kill shot?

2.2

MR. MORRISSEY: I think we have her testimony that it was her intent not to - - not to kill the person. And we, in the light most favorable - - -

ACTING CHIEF JUDGE CANNATARO: I don't doubt that either. But I'm saying given the circumstances, given the lack of visibility, she has no idea what she's shooting at.

MR. MORRISSEY: I disagree with the idea that she has no idea what she's shooting at. I appreciate the court's point in that she can't see, but there is a lot of other information available to her about who is on the other side of the door.

I don't think it would have been very safe if, you know, she's going to open the door to see who it really is. If she had done that in March, the last time this had happened, she would have been in much greater danger. If someone's banging on the door saying hey, it's Spoons, and she says well, I'm going to go double check that. I think that would be a much more dangerous situation. And I apologize - - - I see my - - - may I please?

ACTING CHIEF JUDGE CANNATARO: Finish your comment.

1	MR. MORRISSEY: And when we have seen this court
2	talking about dangerous, I think we have the quintessential
3	example of Williams, 1980, in which the person is spinning
4	the gun on their finger like a cowboy and it goes off. So
5	something far and away more reckless and unreasonable that
6	put other people's lives at risk as opposed to taking a
7	single shot because you believed your abusive husband was
8	trying to break the down the door again and possibly kill
9	you in front of your children.
10	JUDGE GARCIA: But it wasn't him at the door,
11	right? It wasn't the estranged husband.
12	MR. MORRISSEY: It was not. It was her it
13	was her current boyfriend, but he had identified himself
14	as Spoons, Walter Duprey, the estranged husband's nickname.
15	JUDGE GARCIA: She testifies he's identifying
16	himself as my ex-husband at the door?
17	MR. MORRISSEY: Yes. And then I think you
18	combine that with the fact that her ex-husband had done
19	pretty much this exact same thing before that is a
20	very reasonable and fair belief to assume that that person
21	is telling the truth.
22	ACTING CHIEF JUDGE CANNATARO: Thank you,
23	counselor.
24	MR. MORRISSEY: Thank you.

(Court is adjourned)



CERTIFICATION I, Kelly Vadeboncoeur, certify that the foregoing transcript of proceedings in the Court of Appeals of The People of the State of New York v. Rebecca Ruiz, No. 100 was prepared using the required transcription equipment and is a true and accurate record of the proceedings. Killy Vadeboncoeur Signature: Agency Name: eScribers Address of Agency: 7227 North 16th Street Suite 207 Phoenix, AZ 85020 Date: November 23, 2022

