1	COURT OF APPEALS
2	STATE OF NEW YORK
3	
4	THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK,
5	Appellant,
6	-against- NO. 102
7	ANTHONY LAGANO,
8	Respondent.
9	20 Eagle Stree Albany, New Yor November 17, 202
10	Before:
11	ACTING CHIEF JUDGE ANTHONY CANNATARO
12	ASSOCIATE JUDGE JENNY RIVERA ASSOCIATE JUDGE MICHAEL J. GARCIA
13	ASSOCIATE JUDGE ROWAN D. WILSON ASSOCIATE JUDGE MADELINE SINGAS
14	ASSOCIATE JUDGE SHIRLEY TROUTMAN
15	Appearances:
16	THOMAS B. LITSKY, ESQ.
17	RICHMOND COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE Attorney for Appellant
18	130 Stuyvesant Place Staten Island, NY 10301
19	PETER E. BRILL, ESQ.
20	BRILL LEGAL GROUP, P.C. Attorneys for Respondent
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23	
24	Kelly Vadeboncoeu
25	Official Court Transcribe
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ACTING CHIEF JUDGE CANNATARO: Our next appeal is number 102, People v. Anthony Lagano.

2.1

2.2

MR. LITSKY: Good afternoon. Appellant respectfully req - - requests three minutes for rebuttal. Thank you.

ACTING CHIEF JUDGE CANNATARO: You have three minutes.

MR. LITSKY: May it please the court and counsel, my name is Thomas Litsky, appearing for Appellant.

This is a straightforward legal sufficiency case. Viewing the facts in a light most favorable to the prosecution, the question is whether there is a valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences from which a rational factfinder could have found the elements of harassment in the second degree beyond a reasonable doubt.

As the court is aware, to establish second degree harassment requires that the People are required to prove that the Defendant threatened to strike, shove, or otherwise subject another person to physical contact and Defendant did so with intent to harass, annoy, or alarm.

And intent may be inferred from the proven facts and consideration of the circumstances surrounding the Defendant's conduct, or in this case, his statements.

In this case, Defendant Lagano, known to carry a firearm, told the complainant that he would shoot the



complainant's children in the head, and kill the complainant. The statements are not disputed. They were recorded by the complainant, and the complainant testified about them at trial.

2.1

2.2

ACTING CHIEF JUDGE CANNATARO: It's arguably not an imminent threat. Is - - is that of any significance to the legal analysis?

MR. LITSKY: Oh, I - - - I - - - I would say that it is imminent if there had been threats previously, although not fleshed out in the record what the subject of those other threats were. But in this instance, he threatened to shoot the - - -

ACTING CHIEF JUDGE CANNATARO: Well, that would make it a credible threat, and I didn't say it wasn't credible. I'm saying, you know, they weren't together when this happened, and there was no timeframe put on when those things were going to happen. And I'm just wondering if you think that even factors in - - - to the analysis.

MR. LITSKY: It - - - it's certainly, it's one of the factors to be considered, and here the fact that the Defendant was known to carry a gun, and had threatened to use that gun to shoot the complainant's children is relevant. And also, that he knew where she lived. They were in a relationship. This is not some isolated stranger talking - - -

JUDGE TROUTMAN: Didn't he show - - - didn't he

show up when she was talking to another police officer at

one point, at her home, in the middle of the night?

MR. LITSKY: He - - - he - - - he did - - - there

is tes - -
JUDGE TROUTMAN: And he drove - -
MR. LITSKY: - - - yes, he - - - yes, Your Honor.

MR. LITSKY: - - - yes, he - - - yes, Your Honor. There is testimony in the record that the Defendant drove by the complainant's house. She saw his vehicle, and they spoke at - - - at - - - at that - - - that point on that evening.

JUDGE TROUTMAN: So is it your argument that you take all the facts into consideration in determining whether it - - - this is in fact legally sufficient? The facts that she knew, she knew he carried a gun, he was a police officer, he knew where she lived, and he had shown up, even unannounced.

MR. LITSKY: Yes, absolutely. You have to look at all - - all of the facts. Here, the Appellate Term found that this was not a genuine threat of physical - - - oh, I'm sorry, the Appellate Term recognized that genuine threats of physical harm fall within the scope of the statute. But thought that here this evidence was insufficient. But it's the People's considered position that if the Defendant Lagano's statement in these

circumstances, coupled with the fact that he carried a gun, does not constitute a genui - - - a genuine threat within the scope of the second degree harassment statute that we're not quite sure what - - - what does. This is - - - JUDGE RIVERA: So just to be clear, is it each of

the - - - the - - - the actions, are they separate threats, or is it all of them together, are what makes this ob - - - an obvious threat of physical contact - - - conduct?

MR. LITSKY: I - - - I'm sorry, I don't - - - I
don't - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: Is it - - - is it the threat that I'm going to kill you all. Is it the threat that I'm going to firebomb you. Is it the threat that your children will have a bullet in their head? Is it - - - is it all of those together, or is any one of those individually, is enough?

MR. LITSKY: I - - - I think in this case, all of it in consideration is sufficient. And that's where the court erred below. Now th - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: Let me ask you a different question. What is the - - - the - - - is it a subjective or objective standard? Is it that sh - - - she, the victim here, has to perceive it as a threat, or that objectively anyone would, regardless of whether or not she perceived it as a threat? A real threat.

1 MR. LITSKY: I - - - I - - - I - - - the - - -2 the better approach would be an objective approach. 3 Whether an ordinary, reasonable person familiar with the 4 context of the communication could believe the Defendant's 5 statement that he would kill the complainant and shoot her 6 children. But whatever standard applies, whether it's 7 objective, or subjective from the point of view of the 8 complainant who feared for her safety and for her children, 9 the - - - the People have es - - - established - - -10 JUDGE RIVERA: Well, if she - - - if she 11 was - - - if she apprehended it as a - - - a real threat. 12 And these are very serious types of threats, right, the 13 firebombing, the shooting, the killing, all of this. Why 14 - - why not call 911? Why not hang up and call 911? 15 MR. LITSKY: I - - -I - - - I can't speak to 16 having been the victim of such threats, but there is 17 evidence in the record that the victim herself was in 18 Also, the victim had this recording, and she was 19 concerned that if she contacted the police at that moment, 20 at midnight, it - - - she was concerned with preservation 21 of the evidence. Because she knew it was significant, and 22 it established that what had - - - what had happened - - -23 to her and it wasn't just her word. 24 JUDGE RIVERA: And is it perhaps more the weight

of the evidence, that really is what my question is about,

1	versus the sufficiency. That that goes more to how the			
2	jury might weigh her credibility.			
3	MR. LITSKY: Well, in in this case			
4	JUDGE RIVERA: As opposed to the sufficiency.			
5	Because that standard is in fav favors the people,			
6	right?			
7	MR. LITSKY: I I all of the facts			
8	have to be taken into account. And here the trier of fact,			
9	Judge Rajeswari, heard the evidence, found obviously,			
10	found the complainant to be credible, and found the			
11	Defendant guilty of the violation. Thank you.			
12	ACTING CHIEF JUDGE CANNATARO: Thank you.			
13	MR. BRILL: Good afternoon. May it please the			
14	court, counsel, my name is Peter Brill, and I represent Mr.			
15	Lagano.			
16	I'd just like to initially push back a bit on the			
17	assumption that the initial statement is, or was, in fact a			
18	threat.			
19	JUDGE RIVERA: Let me ask you, subjective or			
20	objective test?			
21	MR. BRILL: I I think it has to be an			
22	objective test.			
23	JUDGE RIVERA: Um-hum.			
24	MR. BRILL: Because each and every person's			
25	mental state can't be part of a a consistent analysis			

of the statute.

JUDGE WILSON: So if she testified, I'm - - - I wasn't afraid of him at all, I know him, he does this all this time, it's not a big deal, you would still say if it meets an objective standard, he can be prosecuted?

MR. BRILL: I would say that the - - - there's a certain discretion with regard to the prosecution when that - - - when that comes about. And there - - - that type of statement might negate the proof, but I think from an objective standard, you'd still have to be able to prosecute a case like that. Because there may be other factors that go into why a person would say that. But here, Ms. Derasio (ph.) was very clearly - - - knew what she was doing right at the beginning. She knew she was taping this conversation. She'd had a specific intent as to why she was taping this conversation. She wanted to get Mr. Lagano in trouble with his job.

JUDGE RIVERA: The - - - the - - - but again, doesn't that go to the credibility, that's not about the sufficiency, unless you think she's completely incredible, which I think that's a very hard argument to make here.

MR. BRILL: I don't think it's a question of whether she was completely incredible. I think that the - - - the sufficiency versus the - - - yeah, that - - - the - - - it's - - - it's a fine point. But in

the situation where we have a fifty-four minute 1 2 conversation - - -3 JUDGE RIVERA: Um-hum. 4 MR. BRILL: - - - and forty-six minutes of 5 those - - - that conversation is Ms. Derasio winding him 6 up, and pushing his buttons, knowing exactly what she wants 7 him to say so she can get him on tape, so she can take that 8 to his job, along with the argument that, well, he's in 9 uniform on Facebook, so I'm going to get you in trouble for 10 that also. I mean, it seemed like - - -11 JUDGE SINGAS: Mr. Brill, don't those facts 12 actually give him more of a motive to harm her? 13 MR. BRILL: It - - given the testimony on the 14 record of the nature of this relationship, this was a - - -15 a volatile, verbal relationship, there was no actual 16 violence in this relationship. So there's no basis to 17 believe that he had any interest to harm her. 18 JUDGE WILSON: You don't need - - - you don't 19 need actual violence to prosecute harassment - - -MR. BRILL: No, no, of course not. No, I - - - I 20 21 agree with that. But the - - - the point being that 22 the - - - the People's argument rests on the concept of he 23 has access to a gun, so therefore, it's more likely,

JUDGE WILSON: Well, does that - - - does that

24

25

and - - -

count at all, or we should disre - - - disregard it 1 2 entirely? 3 MR. BRILL: I think, it doesn't really count. 4 You know, we have one-and-a-half million families, 5 households in this country that, in this state, excuse me, 6 that have access to firearms, you know, if someone said I'm 7 going to stab you with a fork, we have probably a hundred 8 percent of households in this state that have access to a 9 fork. 10 JUDGE RIVERA: It - - - it does go to - - - well, but he's a trained offer, trained in the use 11 12 of a gun. 13 MR. BRILL: Which would - - -14 JUDGE RIVERA: Perhaps very well versed in how to 15 firebomb, but - - - but put that aside for one moment on 16 the firebombing. It - - - it does go to whether or not 17 the - - - and if - - - if we're using the objective 18 standard, any reasonable person, under the circumstances, 19 would take this as a real threat that someone who has a 20 gun, is trained in the use of the gun, is actually 21 threatening the use of the gun - - -22 MR. BRILL: Respectfully, I - - -23 JUDGE RIVERA: - - - on the children, at a 24 minimum - - - on the children at a minimum. 25 MR. BRILL: - - - Ju - - - Judge Rivera,



2	opposite. We have a responsible gun owner, who is trained			
3	in the use of that gun, would know to use that gun			
4	responsibly.			
5	JUDGE RIVERA: Well, then he's also an an			
6	officer, who one would think is measured in any statement,			
7	even in a phone call where, agreed, you know, emotions are			
8	running high, to say something, I mean, I if I			
9	if I understand the record, the next day he went to his			
10	commanding officer and said, I			
11	MR. BRILL: I said some things I shouldn't have.			
12	JUDGE RIVERA: I sai I did something			
13	wrong.			
14	MR. BRILL: Correct. No, absolutely. But I			
15	think he knew			
16	JUDGE RIVERA: And in fact, contradicted what he			
17	told her on the phone. On the phone, he said I never			
18	threatened your kids, and then he says to the commanding			
19	officer, I threatened to shoot the kids.			
20	MR. BRILL: I don't think that's exactly what he			
21	said to his commanding officer, but I think it's important			
22	also to go back to my first point			
23	JUDGE TROUTMAN: But he was concerned that he			
24	shouldn't have said what he said to her?			
25	MR. BRILL: Because I I think he was trying			

respectfully, I think it - - - it actually argues the

to head her off at the pass, because he knew that she was going to bring this recording and get him in trouble. So he figured that he could minimize that by bringing it up himself. But the threat that he allegedly made is not really a threat, it's a contingent threat, right. Your kids are going to get a bullet in the head, not, I am going to shoot your kids. And I think that there's a significant distinction there, as well. And I know you - - you might not agree with me.

JUDGE TROUTMAN: Th - - that - - that is

JUDGE TROUTMAN: Th - - - that - - - that is quite surprising. You - - a - - a parent, someone has a gun, they carry guns, and they say I'm going to harm your child. I - - I don't know if one would argue it's a contingency. The question would be, whether one would believe that they're making a threat they intend to carry out - - -

MR. BRILL: I agree.

JUDGE TROUTMAN: - - - or are capable of carrying out.

MR. BRILL: Well, that part I agree with. I think in a situation where he is making an observation, is the way I would - - - would say it, that your kids are going to get a bullet to the head, doesn't actually - - -

ACTING CHIEF JUDGE CANNATARO: So - - - so you're saying because he didn't say, I'm going to put a bullet in



1	your kid's head, that's
2	MR. BRILL: I think that if it doesn't
3	ACTING CHIEF JUDGE CANNATARO: that takes
4	it out of a threat?
5	MR. BRILL: if it doesn't have a specific
6	intent in the statement, that doesn't necessarily mean tha
7	he was intending to do it.
8	JUDGE WILSON: So it might just have been, your
9	kid, might be the accidental victim of a drive-by shooting
10	MR. BRILL: I don't think necessarily that. But
11	based upon the entire record, given the relationship and
12	given his innate knowledge of her children, an observation
13	that this is the road your children are headed down, could
14	be just as reasonable, a takeaway, from that statement.
15	ACTING CHIEF JUDGE CANNATARO: Again, sounds a
16	lot like a jury question.
17	JUDGE GARCIA: And doesn't he say right after
18	that, I'll kill you all?
19	MR. BRILL: Well, it was about six minutes later
20	he because again, he's getting wound up, his
21	pushing his buttons are getting pushed, and all of a
22	sudden
23	JUDGE GARCIA: Does that put shooting in the
24	head, in light of his later statement, and I'll kill you
25	all, to mean that he would kill the children, as well?

all, to mean that he would kill the children, as well?

MR. BRILL: I think I'll firebomb you, I'll kill 1 2 yous all, is - - - is the statement. 3 JUDGE RIVERA: Firebomb your house. JUDGE SINGAS: And doesn't the six minutes also 4 5 cut against your arguments, because it's not just him being 6 wound up, and then saying something like an outburst at one 7 second, that he regrets, he - - - he waits a full minute, 8 minute and-a-half, I mean, we have the tape, that we - - -9 we can listen to it. And so he's thinking about it, and 10 then he again, makes - - - he continues with that threat. So doesn't the - - - the timing of it - - -11 12 MR. BRILL: Well, I think it cuts both ways, 13 because - - -14 JUDGE SINGAS: - - - isn't it significant? 15 MR. BRILL: - - - again, a few minutes later, 16 when she directly confronts him. He completely denies it, so if you're - - - if you're analyzing his - - -17 18 JUDGE TROUTMAN: But again, the difference 19 between legal sufficiency and a jury determining beyond a 20 reasonable doubt, aren't they different? 21 MR. BRILL: Of course, they're different. 22 the - - - the analysis here is whether, as Mr. Litsky said, 23 a - - - a reasonable jury could actually arrive at this, 24 was there clear and present danger as the prior case law in



our state has that this was actually something that - - -

1	that was going to be carried out.	
2	JUDGE WILSON: Did you make a weight of the	
3	evidence argument in the Appellate Term?	
4	MR. BRILL: Forgive me, I can't recall at the	
5	moment. I'm sorry.	
6	So ultimately, we believe that this was actually	
7	a a scheme or a a plan that was really carried	
8	out by the complainant to get a specific result, the resul	
9	that what she did get	
10	JUDGE RIVERA: Well, let's say let's say	
11	you're right about that. Let let's say it's obvious	
12	on it's face, let's not even say it that it's	
13	question for the factfinder in this moment, or any	
14	factfinder would have found it out that way. Does that	
15	mean he didn't threaten her?	
16	MR. BRILL: No, it's a it's not a question	
17	of	
18	JUDGE RIVERA: So she incites him, but he	
19	actually goes th makes this threat, he's somehow not	
20	criminally liable for it?	
21	MR. BRILL: It's not really a question, and I	
22	take your point, but it's not really a question of whether	
23		
24	JUDGE RIVERA: It sounds like you're	
25	basically	



2 JUDGE RIVERA: - - - saying she doesn't feel 3 threatened, as opposed to the objective standard, which is 4 what I asked you up front. 5 MR. BRILL: She a, doesn't feel threatened, but 6 the things that he said, our position is - - - are not 7 threats that are sufficient under our current law. JUDGE SINGAS: So it's her fault? 8 9 MR. BRILL: No, not at all. But it's an argument 10 that she was a willing participant in, and she had her own 11 motives for recording that. And I think she fully intended 12 to get that type of outburst on tape so she could use it 13 against him. She was jealous of his other girlfriend. She 14 was angry at the way she was being treated. 15 JUDGE RIVERA: Again, all - - - all that may be 16 The point is, did this gentleman violate the law with his statements, that's the point. 17 18 MR. BRILL: Agreed. And going back to - - -19 JUDGE RIVERA: She may have done all those 20 things. I'm not going to argue that with you. 2.1 MR. BRILL: Right. But going back to Dietze and 22 and other cases, is this is a clear and present 23 danger under the circumstances, no. He's on the phone. 24 He's far - - - he's not - - -

MR. BRILL: - - - he made a threat.

1

25

JUDGE RIVERA: Is that the standard, clear and

1	present danger?		
2	MR. BRILL: That's one of the standards that has		
3	been		
4	JUDGE RIVERA: On on the section that had		
5	to do with sufficiency it seemed the court was focused on		
6	something else.		
7	MR. BRILL: Not on the stand		
8	JUDGE RIVERA: And didn't and didn't use		
9	that standard, did it?		
10	MR. BRILL: Not on the sufficiency standard,		
11	correct.		
12	JUDGE RIVERA: Correct. And that isn't		
13	that what we're worried about in this case? A different		
14	provision, but we're also worried about the sufficiency.		
15	MR. BRILL: Right.		
16	JUDGE RIVERA: That's what we're trying to		
17	resolve.		
18	MR. BRILL: Understood.		
19	JUDGE RIVERA: Yeah.		
20	MR. BRILL: Thank you.		
21	JUDGE RIVERA: Thank you.		
22	MR. LITSKY: Very briefly. This case did not		
23	involve a threat with a fork. This was someone that was		
24	armed, had a gun, obviously knew how to use it, and had		
25	threatened to kill the complainant. And it's not about		

	blaming someone who's in a contentious relationship, or th
2	end of a relationship.
3	JUDGE RIVERA: Does it matter whether or not he
4	actually intended to shoot her? Is that what the statute
5	requires
6	MR. LITSKY: No.
7	JUDGE RIVERA: or does it require that he
8	intended he intended to alarm her?
9	MR. LITSKY: That that's correct
10	that's correct.
11	JUDGE RIVERA: Annoy her with this, as any
12	as as my fellow member of the bench has suggested,
13	someone who is a parent would be troubled by someone
14	suggesting that their children are going to get a bullet i
15	the head.
16	MR. LITSKY: Yes. And this is not a
17	and and the and the remarks are obviously
18	serious in nature
19	JUDGE RIVERA: Yes.
20	MR. LITSKY: and she got the message. She
21	was afraid, and
22	JUDGE RIVERA: They do appear to escalate during
23	the conversation.
24	MR. LITSKY: I'm sorry?
25	JUDGE RIVERA: They do appear to escalate during



1 the conversation, I think. 2 MR. LITSKY: Yes, but - - - but - - - but - - -3 JUDGE RIVERA: Several members have pointed that 4 out, I think. 5 MR. LITSKY: - - - yes, it - - - it - - -6 thankfully, it didn't escalate further than simply words 7 that were exchanged. And of course, the statute 8 specifically does not require that. 9 JUDGE RIVERA: But it is - - - I'm - - - I'm a little unclear, when was he arrested, was it the following 10 11 day? 12 MR. LITSKY: It - - - it was that morning. 13 He ---he ---he came to work, and re --- and I'm not 14 sure if he was to work that day, but he reported to a 15 supervisor at the precinct that he said something he should not have said in a conversa - - - in a heated conversation, 16 17 he said that he would shoot this person's children. In sum 18 and substance, that's what - - - what the testimony was 19 from the captain. And he was arrested later that day, 20 following an investigation. 2.1 JUDGE RIVERA: There was an investigator who 2.2 spoke with the victim, yeah? 23 MR. LITSKY: Ye - - - there - - - there - - -24 yes, there was a supervisor at the precinct who spoke to 25



him. His state - - -

	JUDGE RIVERA: Well, I said, who spoke to her?		
2	Didn't someone speak to her?		
3	MR. LITSKY: Yes, there was a yes, there		
4	was there was an investigation, and the complainant		
5	was did wh did speak to the police, and		
6	he was charged. And this case is not Dietz, Dietz did no		
7	involve a firearm, Dietz did not involve a threat to kill		
8	And the cases that Dietz relied on, Watts and Todaro, tho		
9	were expressly conditional or equivocal statements that		
10	were made. Here, there's no way this was equivocal in		
11	nature. It was very clear. And thankfully it ended with		
12	the officer simply being charged		
13	JUDGE RIVERA: Um-hum.		
14	MR. LITSKY: and not something worse.		
15	ACTING CHIEF JUDGE CANNATARO: Thank you,		
16	counselor.		
17	MR. LITSKY: Thank you very much.		
18	We ask that you reverse the Appellate Term's		
19	order.		
20	ACTING CHIEF JUDGE CANNATARO: Thank you.		
21	(Court is adjourned)		
22			
23			
24			



1		CERTIFICATION	
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