Official Court Transcriber

1	COURT OF APPEALS
2	STATE OF NEW YORK
3	
4	
5	MATTER OF BRYAN R. HEDGES,
6	Petitioner.
7	No. 64
8	
9	20 Eagle Street Albany, New York 12207
10	March 19, 2013
11	Before:
12	CHIEF JUDGE JONATHAN LIPPMAN ASSOCIATE JUDGE VICTORIA A. GRAFFEO
13	ASSOCIATE JUDGE SUSAN PHILLIPS READ ASSOCIATE JUDGE ROBERT S. SMITH
14	ASSOCIATE JUDGE EUGENE F. PIGOTT, JR. ASSOCIATE JUDGE JENNY RIVERA
15	Appearances:
16	ROBERT F. JULIAN, ESQ.
17	EVAN ROSSI, ESQ. ROBERT F. JULIAN, P.C.
18	Attorney for Petitioner 2037 Genesee Street
19	Utica, NY 13501
20	ROBERT H. TEMBECKJIAN, ESQ. JOHN POSTEL, ESQ.
21	COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL CONDUCT Attorneys for Respondent
22	Corning Tower, 23rd Floor Empire State Plaza
23	Albany, NY 12223
24	Penina Wolicki

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Number 64, Matter of Hedges. Counselor. Would you like any rebuttal time, counselor?

MR. JULIAN: I would not, thank you, Your Honor.

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay. Go ahead, counsel.

MR. JULIAN: May it please the Court, I'm joined at counsel table by Evan Rossi, a recent admittee to the bar. And Judge Hedges is present in the room.

Judge Bryan Hedges had a distinguished public service record. He served with distinction as a County Attorney, Assistant District Attorney, and law clerk. He served his country with honor in Vietnam. He was a hardworking, productive, and fair family court judge.

The proof in this case does not support a finding that Bryan Hedges engaged in an act of moral turpitude - - -

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Counsel, what practical relief do you want from us in terms of the posture of this case now? The judge is no longer on the bench.

1	MR. JULIAN: That's correct.
2	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So what is it that
3	you want us to do?
4	MR. JULIAN: The practical relief, Judge,
5	would be to lift the finding, the determination of
6	the Commission on Judicial Conduct. It's a
7	reputational issue.
8	JUDGE SMITH: Not
9	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay.
10	JUDGE SMITH: you ask us not just to
11	alter the sanction, but to reverse the factual
12	determination?
13	MR. JULIAN: Yes.
14	JUDGE SMITH: So you would go you
15	would go farther than the dissent went in the
16	Commission?
17	MR. JULIAN: Yes. We'll take the
18	we'll take the lesser, though, if offered, Your
19	Honor.
20	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: But can but
21	it's basically to clear the reputation of the judge's
22	name?
23	MR. JULIAN: That is correct.
24	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay.
25	JUDGE GRAFFEO: Would that would that

1 clear the way for him to run for judicial office in 2 the future? 3 MR. JULIAN: We have agreed, we would stipulate - - - we told the Commission on Judicial 4 5 Conduct, that we would stipulate not to so serve, and we would sign any document or writing that would be 6 7 required. JUDGE PIGOTT: What in your view, then, 8 9 brings this case here? If you - - - if you're 10 agreeing not to run for office again - - - and it's 11 my understanding they're saying, this is so he won't run for office again, why are we here? 12 13 MR. JULIAN: Well, Judge, our position is that this is not a fair result. It is something that 14 15 happened in his pre-judicial career. And it was the 16 determination of the Commission - - - and I think 17 your cor - - - your question really should be directed at counsel for the - - -18 19 JUDGE PIGOTT: I was leading that way - - -2.0 MR. JULIAN: Yes. 21 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Counsel, what's the -22 - - what's the - - - the passage of time here - - -23 MR. JULIAN: Yes. 2.4 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: - - - which is 25 obviously great, what significance does that have in

terms of your argument that it's, you know, so many years since the event and the event was so many years before the judge became a judge - - - what's the significance of all - - - how does that play into this?

2.4

MR. JULIAN: Well, it - - - from a philosophical perspective, it's inconsistent with both the criminal and civil law of the state, which have statutes of limitation. But your question is more directed, obviously, to what is the practical problem. And I can give you one example.

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Sure, go ahead.

MR. JULIAN: A - - - Judge Hedges was criticized at the hearing and by the Commission on Judicial Conduct for failing to tell, in 1982, the parents of the child that during the act that he was engaging in that the child touched his hand. The testimony in two places from the father of this young woman is that it was his best recollection - - - as best he could remember, he didn't tell them. Judge Hedges said the same thing, as best he could remember.

Well, in point of fact, it's a conversation that occurred thirty years ago and it would be unbelievable or unreasonable to expect an exact

verbatim recollection - - -1 2 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So is part of your -3 - - is part of the thrust of what you're saying that memories have faded, and that's what makes this, in 4 5 your mind, unjust? MR. JULIAN: No one could say it better 6 7 than that. Memories have faded. 8 JUDGE SMITH: But you - - - you began by 9 saying that there's no act of moral turpitude here. 10 Your view of the record is this was essentially an 11 act of neg - - - of negligence? 12 MR. JULIAN: My view of the record is, 13 Judge Smith, it was a private act. He was engaged -14 15 JUDGE SMITH: Well, you can - - - private 16 acts can have plenty of moral turpitude. 17 MR. JULIAN: Yes, but I don't think this 18 act, as he was engaging in it, does. 19 JUDGE SMITH: I don't - - - we're all 20 obviously uncomfortable - - -21 MR. JULIAN: Yes. 22 JUDGE SMITH: - - - describing the facts in 23 any great detail, and I don't want to. But there are 2.4 obviously two interpretations of what went on. And 25 couldn't - - - isn't there certainly evidence in the

record - - - I realize we have our own fact-finding power. But surely there is evidence that this was a deliberate exploitation of a young child.

MR. JULIAN: There is a question of fact. There is a dispute in the record.

JUDGE SMITH: Okay. I guess what I'm saying is, suppose - - - I understand that there's a ques - - a dispute of fact. Suppose we were to resolve that dispute of fact against you. Suppose we find that there was an act, admittedly a long time ago, before he was a judge, but a real act of moral turpitude. What then?

MR. JULIAN: Well, if you find that, again, I think the next step following on Judge Lippman's question, can you reliably, in terms of the facts, given the lapse of time, determine the exact details of what happened.

JUDGE SMITH: Well, okay. But I understand that you can argue the facts and you can say the evidence isn't sufficient to prove anything. But suppose, just hypothetically, if we are satisfied as a matter of fact, that some act of real moral turpitude was committed, should we then confirm the determination?

MR. JULIAN: Sure. Yes.

2.0

2.4

1 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: And let me just 2 follow up on that question. There is no statute of 3 limitations - - - you're not saying that - - -4 regardless of the answer to Judge Smith's questions, 5 you're not saying that the lapse of time, in and of 6 itself, should preclude the Commission? 7 MR. JULIAN: No. What we're saying is the 8 lapse of time creates - - -9 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Makes it unfair to. 10 MR. JULIAN: - - - very serious 11 jurisprudential problems. And it's our position that 12 the - - - and we respect and admire the work that is 13 done by the Commission on Judicial Conduct - - - but 14 their rules and the pleading requirements, the lack 15 of discovery, make attempting to litigate a case of 16 this type - - -17 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Where do you draw - -18 19 MR. JULIAN: - - - very difficult. 20 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: - - - where do you 21 draw the line? We can come back to that issue, if 22 you want. But where do you draw the line on the 23 time? In other words, assuming you're right that at 2.4 some point the time itself, the fading memory, or

whatever it might be, creates great problems. What

would the rule be - - - how do we know when it's of such a period that it becomes impossible to deal with, and when is it okay?

2.0

2.4

MR. JULIAN: Well, Judge, in this case, you have a life well led. You have a man who has conducted himself with integrity on the bench. You have a man who served his country admirably in Vietnam. You have a man who has a lifetime of public service and a public record. So distant acts in the mists of time, I think, are overcome by a life well led. I mean, this is perhaps a poor analogy, and if it offends anyone, I apologize. But the - - - Pope Benedict had been a member of the Hitler Youth Corps, at least some of history says. I don't think anyone would argue that in the period of time going forward, his was a life well led and he served as a major religious leader.

JUDGE RIVERA: Can ask the question, then, a different way?

MR. JULIAN: Sure, yes.

JUDGE RIVERA: Because I think the answer is addressing something else. In terms of the fairness about the lapse of time, don't we in part - - or don't you in part have to take into consideration the nature of the conduct that's

alleged and the impact on the complainant?

Obviously, in this kind of a case, you're talking

about a young child, a minor, with particular

challenges. Takes a long time, perhaps, to talk

about this kind of conduct. Doesn't that affect this

lapse of time issue?

2.4

MR. JULIAN: I would - - - I would agree with that, Judge. But you have a lot to do with the kind of procedures that are followed by the Commission on Judicial Conduct. And I have to say, if you look at those procedures, if you're going to litigate that issue and determine who did it and how it was done, discovery and pleading requirements that are set forth are simply inadequate.

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Counsel, let me ask you one more question. I know that your light is on. Apropos this whole conversation that we've had about time and a morally reprehensible act, do you accept the fact from the arguments you're making that you could have - - even if it is one of - - even if it is a just considerable period of time, as this is, that there could be an act that's so singular that it doesn't matter? You know, if you ever identify - - and you used the example of the Pope - - but is - - are there some acts that it doesn't matter what the

time is? I guess that would be the question I'd ask
you.

MR. JULIAN: This is not a place to bring
religion into the discussion, or perhaps it is. I'm

religion into the discussion, or perhaps it is. I'm taught that everyone's entitled to redemption. And I'm taught that we are all human. And I'm taught that the savior that I worship found comfort in people who had committed crimes and who had done wrong, and that we should live in a forgiving world. And I think sometimes judges who have a history that is not simply an Ivy League history make the best judges.

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Thank you, counselor. Appreciate it.

Counsel?

2.0

2.4

MR. TEMBECKJIAN: Thank you, Your Honor.

Robert Tembeckjian for the Commission, and with me is

John Postel.

It is rare, and it would require exceptional circumstances to remove a judge for conduct that took place long before he or she took the bench. This is that exceptional case.

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Why - - - counsel, let's stay on that for a second. Without necessarily being graphic about it, why is this one of those - -

- in light of the question that I just asked your adversary, why is this such a singular event? As you say, the whole thing is a rare case, so much before he became a judge. Then this proceeding is so much -- - is after, really, a life career in the courts. What makes this unique that would warrant the sanction and the findings, despite the fact that obviously, we all understand that memories do fade and that it's hard - - - at the very least, hard, after all these years to try and make findings that resonate? What is uniquely - - - or what is unique 12 about this case?

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

2.4

25

MR. TEMBECKJIAN: It is, Judge Lippman, the nature of the act, which the petitioner himself called abhorrent. It violates one of the most sacred trusts of our society to - - - for an adult to engage in sexual behavior with a child, aggravated in this circumstance by the fact that the child is deaf, could not speak, had not even learned how to communicate with sign language yet.

JUDGE PIGOTT: When - - - there's a point in time when the judge resigned.

MR. TEMBECKJIAN: Yes.

JUDGE PIGOTT: And I'm, as you know, from Western New York. And everyone was surprised that he resigned, and no one knew much else. Then this happened. Why didn't this thing get resolved back then? Is there - - - you don't have to - - - you know, I don't want to know chapter and verse what was going on. But it seemed to me, Mr. Julian is arguing a certain amount of professional integrity here, and the fact that this judge was an exemplary judge for a long time, and a well-respected member of the community.

2.4

So he had resigned, and it was, as far as I would think most people knew, over. And now this petition starts, and this hearing is held, and this determination's made, and now you're here, all of which it seemed to me, is extraneous to the point that he was off the bench. And if he had ever chosen to run again, I would expect that your Commission would have been there in spades, very early.

MR. TEMBECKJIAN: Actually, Judge Pigott, had he chosen to run again, we would not have any authority to make public what had transpired to that point. All of our proceedings are protected by confidentiality.

JUDGE PIGOTT: Well, the district attorney would have, I guess. And I'm not suggesting you have to rely on somebody else. But you get my - - -

1 MR. TEMBECKJIAN: Right. 2 JUDGE PIGOTT: - - - my - - -3 MR. TEMBECKJIAN: I do. I do. And the - -4 5 JUDGE PIGOTT: What - - -6 MR. TEMBECKJIAN: - - - record shows this 7 judge resigned on the very day - - - he submitted his 8 resignation on the very day that he was notified that 9 the Commission was inquiring into this matter. 10 JUDGE PIGOTT: Right. So you have a judge 11 in one of the smaller towns out there who had a 12 rolling crap game when he was in college, and now is 13 worried that he may lose his office because the 14 Judicial Conduct Commission may be coming to see him, 15 because one of the people who lost a lot of money 16 when he was a sophomore is pretty upset. 17 MR. TEMBECKJIAN: I would - - - I would 18 never urge the Commission to undertake an inquiry 19 about a rolling crap game back in college, because 20 the nature of that act, the nature of that 21 wrongdoing, really doesn't reflect on judicial office 22 many years later. 23 JUDGE SMITH: But doesn't - - - doesn't the 2.4 - - doesn't the abhorrent nature of the act cut two 25 ways? I mean, it certainly is abhorrent, and it

1	certainly is the sort of thing that gets everyone's
2	emotions stirred. Is there an argument that for that
3	very reason it's difficult for the fact-finder to be
4	objective? I mean, we have the problem with juries
5	all the time
6	MR. TEMBECKJIAN: I don't think so
7	JUDGE SMITH: that where the crime is
8	hideous enough, they may lose sight of the issue of
9	whether the defendant did it. And now, if you're
10	- you essentially held a trial on what happened forty
11	years ago.
12	MR. TEMBECKJIAN: Well, it's clearly not
13	the case that the memories had faded. Both witnesses
14	testified with exquisite detail as to what occurred.
15	JUDGE SMITH: Yeah, that I
16	MR. TEMBECKJIAN: There were only
17	JUDGE SMITH: I'm not sure that's not
18	a non sequitur. Yes, both witnesses testified with
19	exquisite detail.
20	MR. TEMBECKJIAN: Yes, and
21	JUDGE SMITH: Can we not be a little
22	skeptical about both of their memories at this
23	distance?
24	MR. TEMBECKJIAN: Well, the Commission
25	based its determination on Judge Hedges' own version

1	of what occurred. And
2	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: What occurred forty
3	years ago
4	MR. TEMBECKJIAN: Yes
5	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: or whatever it
6	is.
7	MR. TEMBECKJIAN: well, I would
8	submit, Your Honor, that an act of sexual behavior
9	with a five-year-old child is such a unique and
10	extraordinary event that the memories don't fade.
11	And
12	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Well, you're talking
13	about a five-year-old child and a man
14	MR. TEMBECKJIAN: And a then twenty
15	and a then twenty-five-year-old man, both of whom
16	described
17	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: No, no, no. But I'm
18	saying a man, now, who is how many years later.
19	Wouldn't just common sense tell us that memories are
20	not quite as sharp, even in a traumatic event? Or
21	you really disagree?
22	MR. TEMBECKJIAN: The record in this case
23	doesn't support the view that the memories were
24	unclear or that the event was so remote in time
25	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Let me ask you

MR. TEMBECKJIAN: - - - that the parties 1 couldn't remember it. 2 3 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: - - - let me ask you another question sort of related. And I know it 4 5 doesn't exist, but I'm asking you from a policy 6 perspective - - -7 MR. TEMBECKJIAN: Yes. 8 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: - - - do you think 9 there should be a statute of limitations for the 10 Commission in terms of, you know, what you do? 11 MR. TEMBECKJIAN: No, I do not. For a 12 couple of reasons. First, the legislature has - - -13 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: There's never a statute of limitations? 14 MR. TEMBECKJIAN: No, there should not be a 15 statute of limitations. 16 17 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Why not? MR. TEMBECKJIAN: And - - -18 19 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Why not, from a 2.0 policy perspective? 21 MR. TEMBECKJIAN: Because the Constitution gives the Commission and this Court the authority to 22 23 discipline and remove judges from office for conduct 2.4 on and off the bench that reflects on their fitness

to be a judge which per - - - which, perforce,

1 requires an evaluation of pre-judge behavior - - -2 and conduct on or off the bench that's prejudicial to 3 the administration of justice. It is impossible, I think, to construct a 4 5 statute of limitations that might set an outer limit 6 on conduct which, in this case, is so bad - - -7 JUDGE PIGOTT: Yes, but - - -8 MR. TEMBECKJIAN: - - - and so singular 9 that - - -10 JUDGE PIGOTT: - - - let me interrupt - - -11 MR. TEMBECKJIAN: - - - it shouldn't - - -12 it shouldn't be limited by time. 13 JUDGE PIGOTT: If you get off this - - - if 14 you - - - let's assume you got an alcoholic who's 15 recovered, all right, and he had a terrible thing 16 with alcohol and things like that, cleans his act up, 17 does exactly what this judge did, you know; becomes 18 an upstanding member of the community, runs for 19 office and holds it. You can't - - - you can throw 20 him off the bench for the fact that he was an 21 alcoholic back in 1975, right? 22 MR. TEMBECKJIAN: Your Honor, I would - - -23 I would argue that that would be an inappropriate use 2.4 of the Commission's - - -

JUDGE PIGOTT: But that's - - - but there's

1	no limit
2	MR. TEMBECKJIAN: power and this
3	Court's power.
4	JUDGE PIGOTT: on it. What you're
5	arguing, and I'm not disagreeing with your analysis,
6	you're saying we have no time limit and it's our sole
7	discretion. If we decide that this judge, when we
8	found out that when he was drunk he did some really
9	nasty things he was driving a car at outrageous
LO	speeds, you know, with kids in the car, whatever
L1	- we think that that amounts to conduct off the
L2	bench, even though he was never on it didn't
L3	happen while he was on the bench off the bench
L4	
L5	MR. TEMBECKJIAN: I understand. I
L6	understand.
L7	JUDGE PIGOTT: that we can remove
L8	him?
L9	MR. TEMBECKJIAN: And those very same
20	questions could be asked if the event had been four
21	weeks ago, four months ago, four years ago
22	JUDGE PIGOTT: Well, if you got the robe or
23	
24	MR. TEMBECKJIAN: or forty years ago
25	JUDGE PIGOTT: if you've got the robe

on, it seems to me, it makes a difference. If you're

- - if you're a judge now and were a judge ten

years ago, and ten years ago, when you were a judge,

and you did this off the bench, that on and off the

bench, that makes sense. But when you're in college?

When you're in - - -

2.4

MR. TEMBECKJIAN: I would - - -

JUDGE PIGOTT: - - - law school?

MR. TEMBECKJIAN: - - - I would still submit, whether you were on the bench or off the bench, you have to evaluate the nature of the misbehavior against the integrity of the judicial office.

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Counselor, but let me give you a little more extreme example of Judge

Pigott's hypothetical. What if you had - - - and

this is an issue that I know about. We have someone

who was a drug addict, sold drugs, you know, had a

criminal history and then cleaned up their act and

got on the bench. Is that the same kind of - - or

let's do a totally different thing. All in the age

period that Judge Pigott is talking about -
burned your draft card, burned the American flag, all

of those things, and then becomes a judge. Is there

a dividing line?

1	I guess it goes back to the question I
2	asked you, or maybe I asked your adversary, is it
3	- how do you draw the line? What's so singular that
4	it's a proper exercise of what you do, as opposed to
5	something that really, as you say, would be
6	inappropriate to exercise your
7	MR. TEMBECKJIAN: I don't believe, and I
8	would urge this Court not to look for other
9	hypothetical examples that are not in this record and
10	that are not before you to determine whether or not
11	the discipline in this case
12	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: But how do you know -
13	
14	MR. TEMBECKJIAN: was appropriate.
15	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: I guess my
16	point to you is, it is you would agree it's a
17	very unusual case.
18	MR. TEMBECKJIAN: It is. And it
19	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Have you ever seen a
20	case like this before?
21	MR. TEMBECKJIAN: No, never. And it is
22	rare that this Court has removed a judge for conduct
23	that took place before they were. But it has
24	happened.

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: But I'm saying - - -

1 MR. TEMBECKJIAN: Twice in 2002. 2 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: - - - to you, how do 3 you distinguish the situation here from all the 4 countless things and some of the hypotheticals? 5 You're getting terrible, terrible conduct, or even 6 the hypothetical that your adversary gave. How do we 7 distin - - - you're saying we just don't have to? 8 MR. TEMBECKJIAN: You do what we do in 9 every case and what this Court does in every case. 10 You look at the record and the facts that are before 11 you. And what is before you is a case of sexual 12 misconduct of a five-year-old before the judge took 13 the bench. Weighing that behavior against the 14 passage of time, as you would do in any hypothetical. 15 But the one that's before you is perhaps the most 16 fundamental breach of trust in our society. 17 JUDGE GRAFFEO: Why though, when a judge agrees to resign, and if he or she offers a 18 19 commitment that they won't run again for judicial 20 office, what do you see - - - what's the purpose, 21 then of the - - -22 MR. TEMBECKJIAN: Twice in the - - -23 JUDGE GRAFFEO: - - - hearing and a 2.4 recommendation sanction?

MR. TEMBECKJIAN: Twice in the last five

1	years, in cases that ended up before you Matter
2	of Feeder, Matter of Jung the Commission
3	entered into stipulations with judges that they would
4	leave the bench and never come back. Both judges
5	abrogated those agreements and were subsequently
6	tried on misconduct charges, and both of them came
7	before this Court.
8	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: But is your
9	MR. TEMBECKJIAN: It's really an
10	unenforceable
11	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: But is
12	MR. TEMBECKJIAN: mechanism.
13	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: but is that
14	really the is the reason that, or is the reason
15	more that you feel that it's an issue of confidence
16	in the judiciary you know what I mean? Which
17	is the actual
18	MR. TEMBECKJIAN: Yeah, there are
19	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: that someone
20	would run again, or is that by not doing something,
21	what
22	MR. TEMBECKJIAN: there are
23	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: you know?
24	MR. TEMBECKJIAN: there are three
25	reasons. The only way, constitutionally,

becomes a judge, is for this Court to remove him from office. Secondly, the integrity of the institution of the judiciary and our courts requires a statement that when an individual engages in an act of sexual misbehavior with a five-year-old child, there is no place for that person on the bench. And third, it is a message to anyone who aspires to be a judge, that if you have this sort of moral turpitude in your background, you should not expect to be a judge.

There is no place for you on the bench. And if it is discovered, whenever the point of time that may be, you will be removed for it and it will be public.

2.4

It's the only way that I can argue to this

Court to protect the integrity of the courts and the

judiciary, is in removing this individual, to make

those three statements. And that really compels

affirming the Commission's decision that he should be

removed.

JUDGE PIGOTT: When you made this decision to proceed with this - - -

MR. TEMBECKJIAN: Yes.

JUDGE PIGOTT: - - - do you take into consideration what Mr. Julian was pointing out, the person's history in terms as a lawyer, as a judge, as

a community leader, as he mentioned, as a - - - had served with distinction in the military, before you decide to bring it, or do you simply say, this is an issue of moral turpitude; none of that is going to deter us from bringing this?

2.4

MR. TEMBECKJIAN: All of the issues that we've discussed here today were discussed at the Commission before the decision was made to go forward. And we always - - in this case, as in any case - - will accept into the record evidence of a judge's good works, evidence of reputation for truth and veracity. They often enter into the record evidence of how good a judge they were.

Always, the test for the Commission - - - and I would submit to this Court - - - has to be to weigh the behavior against those additional factors. I don't believe in this record, there is any evidence of redeeming behavior from the time of that event to the present day. He concealed what had occurred. He never apologized to the individual. Never sought counseling for his - - -

JUDGE SMITH: That's a little different from what you were saying a minute ago. You were saying you wanted to send the message that if you've done this once, you're never going to be a judge;

forget about it. Now you're saying, if there were some redeeming behavior, maybe it would be different? MR. TEMBECKJIAN: No, what I'm - - - what I'm saying is we take all of those things into consideration. And then we made a decision that this behavior, weighed against the passage of time and weighed against any other potential mitigation, compels a statement that this sort of behavior cannot be tolerated, whether it was four years ago or forty years ago. That's the Commission's position, and I would urge that that be the Court's position as well. CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay. Thank you counsel. Thank you both. Appreciate it. (Court is adjourned) 2.4

2 CERTIFICATION

I, Penina Wolicki, certify that the foregoing transcript of proceedings in the Court of Appeals of Matter of Bryan R. Hedges, No. 64 was prepared using the required transcription equipment and is a true and accurate record of the proceedings.

Penina waish.

Signature:

Agency Name: eScribers

Τ 0

Address of Agency: 700 West 192nd Street

Suite # 607

New York, NY 10040

Date: March 25, 2013