1	COURT OF APPEALS
2	STATE OF NEW YORK
3	
4	PEOPLE,
5	Respondent,
6	-against-
7	No. 81 CHRISTOPHER OATHOUT,
8	Appellant.
9	
10	20 Eagle Street Albany, New York 12207
11	March 21, 2013
12	Before:
13	CHIEF JUDGE JONATHAN LIPPMAN ASSOCIATE JUDGE VICTORIA A. GRAFFEO
14	ASSOCIATE JUDGE SUSAN PHILLIPS READ ASSOCIATE JUDGE ROBERT S. SMITH
15	ASSOCIATE JUDGE EUGENE F. PIGOTT, JR. ASSOCIATE JUDGE JENNY RIVERA
16	Appearances:
17	CHERYL COLEMAN, ESQ.
18	CHERYL COLEMAN, ATTORNEY AT LAW Attorney for Appellant
19	90 State Street Suite 1400
20	Albany, NY 12207
21	STEVEN M. SHARP, ESQ. ALBANY COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
22	Attorneys for Respondent Albany County Judicial Center
	6 Lodge Street
23	Albany, NY 12207
24	Penina Wolicki
25	Official Court Transcriber

1	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Number [81].
2	Counselor?
3	MS. COLEMAN: Good afternoon, Your Honors.
4	Cheryl Coleman on behalf of appellant, Christopher
5	Oathout. Respectfully, we would ask this Court to
6	follow the precedent
7	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Counselor, would you
8	like any rebuttal time?
9	MS. COLEMAN: No, thank you, Your Honor.
10	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, go ahead.
11	You're on.
12	MS. COLEMAN: Thank you. We would
13	respectfully ask this Court to follow and expand upor
14	the precedent that we believe it set in Fisher, when
15	this Court held that counsel's, in that case,
16	multiple failures to object in the prosecutor's
17	summation, constituted ineffective assistance. It -
18	
19	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Tell us about
20	about the significance of beyond a reasonable doubt
21	in this case.
22	MS. COLEMAN: Your Honor, with all res
23	_
24	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: The failure to argue
25	beyond a reasonable doubt.

MS. COLEMAN: I think, while it is not the worst failure of counsel, Judge Lippman, that it is - it was a significant failure. I would respectfully submit that this was the type of case that was meant for a reasonable doubt situation.

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JUDGE SMITH: Isn't it - - - can't it be an effective strategy to say, as this lawyer did, look,

I know - - - the judge is going to tell you about a reasonable doubt, but I'm not worrying about technicalities; my guy is innocent?

MS. COLEMAN: No. With all respect, I would say that the way this counselor did it, Your Honor, was to actually go a step beyond doing that. This counsel actually took on the burden of proof.

And I would submit that it was an extremely ineffective strategy.

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Counselor, is there - - was there any proof of actual innocence for him
to build on?

MS. COLEMAN: I don't think there was. I think that the evidence, if you looked at that, at best, showed that Mr. Oathout maybe probably did the crime. Certainly, Your Honor, the proof in this case was as minimal and certainly more minimal than that in the Fisher case.

JUDGE READ: You said this wasn't his worst 1 2 -- - worst error. What would you consider to be the 3 worst error? 4 MS. COLEMAN: Yes. Your Honor, I would 5 respectfully submit that counsel's worst error - - and there were two - - - but I would say that the 6 7 worst error was the multiple and repeated failure to 8 object to egregious Molineux violations by the 9 prosecutor. I would respectfully submit that as the 10 Court will recall in this case, while the prosecutor 11 did receive permission under Molineux to go into the 12 fact that this crime allegedly occurred, according to 13 the one witness, during an act of prosecution - - -JUDGE READ: Prostitution? 14 15 MS. COLEMAN: - - - prostitution. What did 16 I say? Right. 17 JUDGE READ: Prosecution. 18 MS. COLEMAN: Okay. That the - - - that 19 the prosecutor did not attempt to get a ruling on 2.0 whether or not he could get into the fact that - - -21 and I think there's a good reason for it, because it wouldn't have been admissible - - - that my client, 22 23 on numerous other occasions, acted as a gay 2.4 prostitute for old men.

JUDGE SMITH: Well, wasn't - - - I mean,

1	wasn't it can you really imagine trying this
2	case without the jury knowing that the man had
3	is a gay prostitute and crack user? Wasn't that
4	integral to the whole theory of both the prosecution
5	and the defense?
6	MS. COLEMAN: The tip of the iceberg, Your
7	Honor, may have been integral. The tip of the
8	iceberg, that this act allegedly occurred that
9	the murder allegedly occurred during an act of
10	prostitution, was certainly res gestae evidence.
11	JUDGE SMITH: Well, also also that he
12	had all these bench warrants. He
13	MS. COLEMAN: I'm not clear, Your Honor.
14	Yes, there was evidence that he had bench warrants.
15	I don't think
16	JUDGE SMITH: And the defense wanted to
17	bring out the bench warrants, because they're the
18	reason for the flight.
19	MS. COLEMAN: That may have been
20	JUDGE GRAFFEO: As well as well as
21	the bus ticket, right? That was
22	MS. COLEMAN: Yes. Yes.
23	JUDGE GRAFFEO: so that he could come
24	up with a different explanation for why he fled the
25	scene.

1 MS. COLEMAN: That certainly may have been, arguably, trial strategy. However, there is no - - -2 3 I submit - - - trial strategy for corroborating in an 4 extremely illegal sense - - - corroborating the 5 testimony of the prosecution's only witness. Without 6 that - - -7 JUDGE GRAFFEO: Didn't he fairly 8 effectively attack her credibility? 9 MS. COLEMAN: I would - - -10 JUDGE GRAFFEO: He did bring out the 11 inconsistencies - - -12 MS. COLEMAN: - - - I would respectfully -13 14 JUDGE GRAFFEO: - - - in her testimony. 15 MS. COLEMAN: - - - I'm sorry, Judge. I 16 would respectfully submit he did not act effectively with her. He - - - just as it was warned by the 17 prosecutor in his pre-trial motion, where he warned 18 19 the county court about counsel's pending 20 ineffectiveness, he did so extremely ineffectively, 21 open-endedly. He failed to utilize the time-honored 22 and evidentiarily acceptable way of impeaching the 23 witness by questions and answer with the state - - -2.4 with the statements.

I thought that his - - - with all respect -

- - cross-exam of the - - - of the confidential informant Lugo, was rambling, that it was ineffective, that it was not pointed in a specific direction.

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And he failed - - - and I cannot, with all respect, emphasize this enough. He - - - the worst part of this uncharged crime evidence was that it served as illegal corroboration of propensity. The jury was led to infer that of course Lugo was telling the truth when she testified that this murder occurred during an act of prostitution, because after all, my client was a gay prostitute all the time with old men, just like the victim.

JUDGE SMITH: Is that - - - I mean, you're
- - - you're saying implicitly that it's the law that
if someone is accused of committing murder during the
course of an act of prostitution, it's irrelevant to
whether that person is a prostitute or not?

MS. COLEMAN: Are you saying that - - - I don't know if I'm prepared to make that leap, Your Honor. I don't think the relevance is the issue. I think the issue is prejudice versus probative value.

JUDGE SMITH: Well, whether it's relevant or not, you're saying it's inadmissible. I mean, I - - it just seems odd to me. I mean, the claim is

that a prostitute killed his or her client. How are 1 2 you supposed to evaluate that claim without knowing 3 whether this is, in fact, a prostitute? MS. COLEMAN: I think that's too bad for 4 5 the People, Your Honor, I would say, under that circumstance. They can't do it the way that they did 6 7 They can't make propensity inferences. And this it. 8 was a propensity inference. And it's one, with all 9 respect, that should have been weighed by the trial 10 court prior to a Molineux hearing. 11 And I think it's key, Your Honors, that 12 it's very clear from the record that counsel didn't 13 even know what Molineux was. His response, as the 14 record shows, to the question, when he was asked to 15 make an argument during the very mini-Molineux 16 hearing, his response was that the People never 17 charged it. I mean, that's - - -CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: The client wanted to 18 19 continue - -2.0 MS. COLEMAN: - - - what Molineux is. 21 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: - - - though, right? 22 MS. COLEMAN: Your Honor? 23 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: The client wanted to 2.4 continue?

MS. COLEMAN: Yes.

1	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: With him as attorney?
2	MS. COLEMAN: At that point in time
3	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Right.
4	MS. COLEMAN: I think that he
5	you know, which respectfully, I would submit, under
6	Turner, is clearly irrelevant.
7	JUDGE GRAFFEO: Is
8	MS. COLEMAN: There's certainly no claim
9	that he could waive ineffectiveness.
10	JUDGE GRAFFEO: This wasn't an assigned
11	counsel. He selected
12	MS. COLEMAN: You know, that's
13	JUDGE GRAFFEO: his counsel. So how
14	far can the trial judge intrude on that attorney-
15	client relationship, that right to counsel?
16	MS. COLEMAN: I mean, I you know, the
17	client certainly has the right to choose his own
18	counsel. I would respectfully submit to the Court
19	that that, in itself, though I would respectfully
20	submit that the court should have conducted more
21	inquiry, that the client's choice in and of itself is
22	not relevant to this
23	JUDGE SMITH: If the court
24	MS. COLEMAN: court's decision
25	JUDGE SMITH: the court had

disqualified this lawyer, you're be standing here arguing that your client had been deprived of counsel of his choice.

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MS. COLEMAN: I don't know. Maybe. maybe it's a Catch-22 for the court. I don't know. But I know that this counsel was grossly ineffective.

JUDGE RIVERA: Did you mention the second error? You said there were two specifically - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: - - - you wanted to mention.

MS. COLEMAN: Yes, Your Honor, thank you.

What was the second one, please?

MS. COLEMAN: The second egregious failure, I would submit, had to do with failure to object during summation. There were two, what we would submit, instances of prosecutorial misconduct in summation, the first of which was less bad than the second. The first included what we submit was arguable vouching for the credibility of a witness. But the second one - - - and it was here that coupled with the other failures, we think makes a real argument for ineffectiveness, this was the prosecutor arguing, without any evidence in the record, that my client was left-handed, pointed out to the jurors that my client had - - - was left-handed, that he had been taking notes during the trial with his left

hand, which was grossly improper, and then invited -

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JUDGE SMITH: If he had pointed out to the jurors that your client was a tall man, that would have been okay, wouldn't it?

MS. COLEMAN: I don't think it would have, unless he - - - I think there are certain things where you are able to stand up and, you know, demonstrate, with the court's permission, that. But I think summation was not the proper place to do that.

JUDGE GRAFFEO: Could there have been a defense strategy to allow that testimony about the right hand - - - the left hand? Because didn't Lugo say that the crime was committed with the right hand?

MS. COLEMAN: I understand that the People made that argument, Your Honor. And I guess my response was, when you look at the other failures of counsel, the fact that he filed the notice of appeal after the preliminary hearing, you know this wasn't strategy. You know that this was just sheer incompetence. And whether or not, you know, the client signed on to it, I would respectfully submit is irrelevant.

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, counselor,

1	thanks.
2	MS. COLEMAN: Thank you.
3	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Counselor?
4	MR. SHARP: May it please the Court, Stever
5	Sharp on behalf of the People.
6	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Counselor, the People
7	saw there was a problem here with counsel for the
8	defendant, right?
9	MR. SHARP: I would say that the People
LO	thought there might be certain issues and made a
L1	motion in regard to that. And I think that those
L2	concerns were belied by the test the transcript
L3	of the trial.
L4	JUDGE SMITH: You're say you're
L5	saying he did a better job than you expected him to?
L6	MR. SHARP: Yes, yes.
L7	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: How could he have
L8	done a credible job without arguing reasonable doubt
L9	in a case where there was absolutely no proof of
20	actual innocence?
21	MR. SHARP: I completely disagree that he
22	didn't argue reasonable doubt. He reminded the jury
23	in his opening statement of the burden of reasonable
24	doubt. Just because he's phrasing it in a way of

saying - -

1	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Is his
2	MR. SHARP: he didn't commit the
3	crime
4	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: his strategy
5	was arguing actual innocence, wasn't it?
6	MR. SHARP: I don't think so.
7	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: You don't think that
8	that's what he was arguing?
9	MR. SHARP: No, he was arguing, he didn't
10	commit this crime. There's no difference just
11	because he didn't say
12	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: What's the difference
13	between actual innocence and he didn't commit the
14	crime?
15	MR. SHARP: The difference what's the
16	difference between he didn't commit this crime and
17	there's not evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that
18	he committed this crime? There is no difference.
19	JUDGE SMITH: You're saying that actual
20	innocence and reasonable doubt aren't really
21	different things?
22	MR. SHARP: No, they're exactly the same.
23	Certainly, in this case
24	JUDGE PIGOTT: But you're not
25	JUDGE RIVERA: That's a shock.

1 JUDGE PIGOTT: Are you sure about that? 2 JUDGE RIVERA: That's a shock. 3 MR. SHARP: What I'm saying is making the argument that saying that he didn't commit this 4 5 crime, you know, is no different than saying he - - you know, there's no evidence beyond a reasonable 6 7 doubt that he didn't commit this crime. JUDGE GRAFFEO: Isn't that setting a higher 8 9 bar for the jury than what they should have 10 considered under the reasonable doubt standard? 11 MR. SHARP: He didn't say it's our burden 12 to prove his innocence, so you need to find that he 13 is innocent. He said in his opening statement, he 14 said in his closing, you need to find the defendant 15 not guilty. He mentioned reasonable doubt in both 16 his opening - - -17 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Counsel - - -MR. SHARP: - - - and his summation. 18 19 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: - - - counsel, in 20 effect, you know, if you're not going to argue 21 seriously reasonable doubt and you're going to argue 22 that he just did not commit the crime, aren't you, in 23 effect, depriving the defendant of a viable defense? 2.4 I mean, entirely depriving him of a - - - of a

defense which is at all credible?

MR. SHARP: I think that there was a viable 1 2 defense that was put out by defense counsel - - -3 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: What was the viable 4 defense - - -5 MR. SHARP: - - - here. 6 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: - - - that he was 7 arguing? MR. SHARP: The viable defense that he 8 9 argued was that Lugo was not credible, that his use 10 of a false name and his subsequent flight was backed 11 up by other reasonable explanations, which was he had 12 warrants out for him; he didn't want to go back to 13 jail. That's why he gave the false name. He already 14 had a bus ticket lined up for New York City, which is 15 why he ended up in New York City. 16 And he attacked Lugo's credibility over and 17 over again. The cross-examination of her was very 18 extensive. 19 JUDGE RIVERA: And are you arguing that's 20 an attempt to create reasonable doubt? 21 MR. SHARP: Yes. And it's clear from out 22 (sic) his summation where he attacked Lugo at length 23 at his - - - during his summation. Not that - - -2.4 you know, he didn't put on this he's innocent sort of

defense because of X, Y, and Z. He's saying Lugo's

1 not credible, you can't believe a word she says. 2 He argued that the jailhouse informant was 3 not credible because of his past crimes. And he put forth a defense - - -4 5 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: And he emphasized the 6 relationship, what he did, what Lugo did; he 7 emphasized this whole scenario of being, you know, a 8 prostitute - - - a gay prostitute with elder men and 9 all this kind of stuff - - -MR. SHARP: Yeah, he - - -10 11 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: - - - that was a good 12 strategy to be emphasizing that? 13 MR. SHARP: - - - he conceded the lesser 14 crimes. How can you not concede that based on all 15 the evidence that the People presented? Arguing that 16 he wasn't in those sort of circumstance, when you're 17 already putting forth evidence that there were bench 18 warrants for drug use and the repeated evidence that 19 came in to establish that, he conceded that. And he 20 made the argument that none of these crimes are 21 nonviolent - - -22 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So the prosecutor was 23 - - - was alarmed for no good reason at the

beginning, and it turned out that this guy did a

pretty good job?

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MR. SHARP: Well, I think it goes without 1 saying that that motion - - - there was no love lost 2 3 between defense counsel and the initial prosecutor. JUDGE PIGOTT: I thought it was incredible 4 5 - - - I thought it was kind of a nice thing. You know, the DA always talks about the fact that their 6 job is to, you know, make sure there's a fair trial 7 8 and do justice, and I, in my mind, was commending him 9 for bringing a motion that he thought needed to be 10 brought. 11 I wanted to ask you, Ms. Coleman talked about the Molineux issue. Do you have a view on - -12 13 - on the way Molineux was handled in this case? MR. SHARP: I think it could have been done 14 15 I think that the trial prosecutor - - -16 prosecutor could have made a more expansive Molineux 17 application. But on the whole the evidence that came 18 in, which was certainly inextricably interwoven with 19 the murder, that he was going there to perform an act 20 of prostitution for money, and that a fight ensued 21 because he - - -22 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Do you think the 23 defense counsel knew what Molineux is? 2.4 MR. SHARP: Yeah. He didn't just make the

argument that it wasn't charged, which - - - you

1 know, I've heard judges make that argument before that it wasn't charged, so we can't get into it on a 2 3 Molineux issue. He made the argument that it was 4 prejudicial. 5 JUDGE SMITH: Isn't uncharged crimes a 6 synonym for Molineux? 7 MR. SHARP: Yes, yes. But that doesn't 8 stop people from making the argument that they should 9 have charged it, and therefore, you know. 10 made that argument. And he also said that it was too 11 prejudicial. And the judge balanced the 12 probativeness and admitted it anyway. 13 I would like to address the - - - the 14 motion that we made and what county court did, in 15 response to Judge Graffeo's earlier question. 16 And People v. Knowles sets out a very 17 specific standard that a court cannot interfere with 18 defendant's chosen counsel, retained counsel, absent 19 good cause. And at that stage, when the motion was 2.0 filed, there was no good cause to remove this 21 attorney. 22 JUDGE GRAFFEO: Did the trial judge ever 23 rule on the request for stand-by counsel? 2.4 MR. SHARP: He asked whether - - -

JUDGE GRAFFEO: It seems that there was a

request or at least an acquiescence to use stand-by counsel. What happened to that?

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MR. SHARP: Well, on the record, I think it's page 20 of Defendant's Appendix, the judge basically said - - asked defense attorney if he'd seen the motion, if he had talked about it with his client, and said okay; he didn't - - he didn't actually go into, you know, denied or anything like that. There's nothing on the record - - -

JUDGE GRAFFEO: He didn't really rule - - - he didn't really rule on the request, did he? Or did I miss something - - -

MR. SHARP: Not - - -

JUDGE GRAFFEO: - - - in the record?

MR. SHARP: - - - not to my knowledge. On the record, there's nothing to indicate that he ever ruled on it. And there was some acquiescence by the defense attorney who said, you know, basically, that's fine. If you want to do that, that's fine. But I think county court in this case left it well enough alone, recognizing that interfering with defendant's right to retain counsel would be an error, and certainly Ms. Coleman would be here arguing that, if that was the case.

JUDGE PIGOTT: Well, didn't he join in the

motion for stand-by counsel?

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MR. SHARP: Yes. And that's why I refer to the no love lost. It seemed to me that, you know, that was exactly what he was doing. You're calling me ineffective, so sure, here's some attorneys that I like, so have them appointed as stand-by counsel.

And so it was joined - - it was never joined by the defendant. In fact, the defendant reaffirmed his desire to have defense counsel - - defense counsel as his counsel and representative there.

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, counselor, bottom line is you don't necessarily think that defense counsel did a good job, but you're just saying it didn't raise (sic) to the level of ineffective assistance?

MR. SHARP: Yeah. Defendant's not entitled to perfect representation, he's entitled to meaningful representation.

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay.

JUDGE PIGOTT: When he - - - when he - - - Ms. Coleman mentioned, too, that he filed a notice of appeal with respect to the grand jury indictment.

MR. SHARP: He filed, allegedly - - - and I don't even think that this is clear from the record before the Court outside of the prosecutor's motion -

1	filed a notice of appeal on the ruling of the
2	preliminary hearing.
3	JUDGE PIGOTT: Oh, okay.
4	MR. SHARP: Yeah.
5	JUDGE SMITH: Is it is it fair to say
6	that this that this defense lawyer was not an
7	expert in criminal practice?
8	MR. SHARP: Sure. But I think many
9	JUDGE SMITH: I mean, he I mean, the
LO	sense I get is that he there's a lot about
L1	criminal law he doesn't know, but he does know how to
L2	try a case?
L3	MR. SHARP: Yes. If you read the trial
L4	transcript, it's very clear that he had a strategy, a
L5	viable one, albeit an unsuccessful one.
L6	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay.
L7	JUDGE SMITH: Did was there any point
L8	at which his ignorance of the criminal law seemed to
L9	affect his performance?
20	MR. SHARP: No.
21	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: You don't think his
22	ignorance as a criminal lawyer affected his
23	performance?
24	MR. SHARP: Affected the the overall
25	nerformance?

1	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yes.
2	MR. SHARP: No. I think that he
3	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: You don't
4	MR. SHARP: I think
5	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: have to know
6	anything about criminal law to defend someone in a
7	serious when their liberty is at stake?
8	MR. SHARP: He did know things about the
9	criminal law. I think that that's clear from the
10	record. I'm not saying that he was completely
11	ignorant of all criminal law principles. What I am
12	saying is, while he could have done a better
13	performance and I think you could say that any
14	time you have a guilty verdict, that a defense
15	attorney could have done a better job on the
16	whole, he provided meaningful assistance, and that
17	any lack of knowledge on criminal legal principles,
18	however much that may have been, did not affect
19	overall, in terms of transferring this to an
20	unmeaningful representation.
21	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay.
22	JUDGE RIVERA: But isn't this a little bit
23	more than just
24	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Judge Rivera.
25	JUDGE RIVERA: meaningful principles?

1	Isn't it about motion practices and about specific
2	types of it strikes me as not about the overall
3	principles or maybe I've misunderstood you
4	- but about some very discrete areas of criminal law
5	that were critical to the representation in this
6	case. Did I misunderstand you about what you meant
7	about criminal process?
8	MR. SHARP: I'm saying, on the whole, he
9	provided meaningful representation. There may have
10	been certain areas that he could have done a better
11	job in. But on the whole he provided
12	JUDGE SMITH: What do you think is the
13	worst thing he did?
14	MR. SHARP: The worst thing that he did?
15	honestly I don't know. I would have to say
16	that most likely it was the failure on his part to
17	object to the exceeding of the Molineux evidence.
18	But I think all that would have resulted in was a
19	further hearing that could have been cured mid-trial.
20	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay. Thanks,
21	counsel.
22	Counselor, rebuttal?
23	MS. COLEMAN: No, thank you.
24	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Oh, you didn't take
25	any. Okay. Thank you both.

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CERTIFICATION I, Penina Wolicki, certify that the foregoing transcript of proceedings in the Court of Appeals of People v. Christopher Oathout, No. 81 was prepared using the required transcription equipment and is a true and accurate record of the proceedings. Penina waich. Signature: Agency Name: eScribers Address of Agency: 700 West 192nd Street Suite # 607 New York, NY 10040 Date: March 29, 2013