1	COURT OF APPEALS
2	STATE OF NEW YORK
3	
4	GEORGITSI REALTY, LLC,
5	Appellant,
6	-against-
7	No. 156 PENN-STAR INSURANCE COMPANY,
8	Respondent.
9	
10	20 Eagle Street Albany, New York 12207 September 10, 2013
11	September 10, 2013
12	Before:
13	CHIEF JUDGE JONATHAN LIPPMAN ASSOCIATE JUDGE VICTORIA A. GRAFFEO
14	ASSOCIATE JUDGE SUSAN PHILLIPS READ ASSOCIATE JUDGE ROBERT S. SMITH
15	ASSOCIATE JUDGE EUGENE F. PIGOTT, JR. ASSOCIATE JUDGE JENNY RIVERA ASSOCIATE JUDGE SHEILA ABDUS-SALAAM
16	
17	Appearances:
18	JACK S. DWECK, ESQ. THE DWECK LAW FIRM LLP
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20	New York, NY 10019
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21	MIRANDA SAMBURSKY SLONE SKLARIN VERVENIOTIS LLP Attorneys for Respondent
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24	
	Penina Wolicki
25	Official Court Transcriber

1	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Number 156. You look
2	like you're ready to go, counsel. Would you like any
3	rebuttal time?
4	MR. DWECK: Not necessary, Judge Lippman.
5	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: No rebuttal time.
6	Okay. Great; proceed.
7	MR. DWECK: Thank you, Your Honors. Good
8	afternoon, Your Honors. I'm Jack Dweck from The
9	Dweck Law Firm, and we represent the plaintiff,
LO	Georgitsi Realty. You have before you two questions
L1	that have been certified from the Second Circuit
L2	Court of Appeals. We have a damage case that
L3	resulted in a denial of coverage by the
L4	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: What what is
L5	vandalism all about in this policy? What do you have
L6	to show to recover on a policy that has vandalism
L7	coverage for willful and de and malicious
L8	damage to property?
L9	MR. DWECK: Judge Lippman
20	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yeah.
21	MR. DWECK: you're right on with that
22	question, because you need to show either intentional
23	conduct
24	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Right.

MR. DWECK: - - - or conduct that is so

1 reckless and wanton as to constitute the equivalent of intentional conduct. 2 3 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: How do you define the 4 latter? What - - - what has to happen to have 5 something that's so, you know, over the edge, that it's the equivalent of intentional? 6 7 MR. DWECK: You mean egregious? 8 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Egregious. 9 MR. DWECK: Okay. 10 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Stand amended. 11 ahead. MR. DWECK: One of the associates in my 12 13 office referred to it as I-don't-give-a-damn conduct. 14 In our particular instance - - -15 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yes - - -16 MR. DWECK: - - - here - - -17 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: - - - tell us why in 18 this case it's I-don't-give-a-damn conduct. MR. DWECK: - - - we have an adjacent owner 19 2.0 that was excavating to sixty feet below the surface. 21 They did not properly shore up the building, and my 22 lady who owns the apartment building has sustained 23 severe damage, because the building has become 2.4 unstable.

JUDGE READ: Well, there were stop-work

1	orders, right?
2	MR. DWECK: I'm sorry?
3	JUDGE READ: There were stop-work orders?
4	They were ignored? Is that what you're
5	MR. DWECK: There were sixteen stop orders.
6	JUDGE READ: So you rely on that, that they
7	were ignored.
8	JUDGE GRAFFEO: Were they on notice that
9	there was potential damage to your particular
10	building?
11	MR. DWECK: Judge Graffeo, not only were
12	they on notice, but the summonses specifically
13	referred to the danger to our building by the
14	continued excavation in violation of the stop orders.
15	JUDGE SMITH: If you didn't if you
16	didn't have the orders, would you still have
17	vandalism?
18	MR. DWECK: Absolutely.
19	JUDGE SMITH: Why?
20	MR. DWECK: Because they were on notice.
21	There was a TRO issued by a Supreme Court judge in
22	Brooklyn that they violated.
23	JUDGE SMITH: Okay, I guess what I'm really
24	saying is if you you have these pe you
25	have documents; you have a TRO, you have stop-work

have documents; you have a TRO, you have stop-work

1	orders, you have notices of violation. Suppose you
2	have suppose all you have is you have cond
3	- they're on notice they are you've told
4	them stop doing it, they keep doing it. Is that
5	enough to be vandalism?
6	MR. DWECK: I do believe it is, Judge
7	Smith, because the notice that they have, whether it
8	was from my lady or the stop orders or any other
9	outside source, put them in a position where they
10	knew that the result of their continuing
11	JUDGE SMITH: So every excavation case can
12	be within vandalism coverage?
13	MR. DWECK: If it's in continued disregard
14	with illegal conduct? Absolutely.
15	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: What about if they
16	didn't weren't on notice. They're doing it -
17	- they were just oblivious to what would happen to
18	your property? Would that be okay under the policy?
19	MR. DWECK: Judge Lippman, you're tempting
20	me with the Fanberg decision.
21	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Go ahead. Don't be
22	tempted. Go for it.
23	MR. DWECK: If they were not on notice, it
24	would be a completely different story, because you'd
25	have to determine whether the conduct was

have to determine whether the conduct was

intentional, meaning whether there was any ill will towards the adjacent property - - -

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Say there - - -

MR. DWECK: - - - owner.

2.0

2.4

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: - - - was no ill will towards you, but they could care less what happened to your property. I would assume that anyone who's doing excavation in that kind of a situation might guess that this had the possibility of damaging properties that were adjacent.

MR. DWECK: Judge Lippman - - -

explain to us where it kicks in. Is it once there's a notice, a lot of notice? Could it be no notice if you're oblivious to the consequences? Where do you draw the lines here? Where I think Judge Smith might have been going is, how much do we expose - - - what exposure are in these policies for the insurer? In other words, is any kind of excavation, basically, you know, if it's damaged, you're going to be liable?

Where do you draw the line? Do you have to have notice? What kind of notice? Or can you just be, again, oblivious, not - - - could care less, but have no particular ill will towards you? Doesn't even know who you are other than that they are or

1	should be aware that if they're doing this, there
2	could be consequences what are the what
3	are the different gradations of this?
4	MR. DWECK: Judge Lippman, you're from one
5	extreme to the other.
6	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yes.
7	MR. DWECK: If there's no notice
8	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yes.
9	MR. DWECK: then you can't turn
10	around and say any excavation that causes damage
11	would fall within a V&MM clause.
12	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So if there's
13	if there's no notice, but you knew that other people
14	could be damaged, okay, right?
15	MR. DWECK: If the conduct was otherwise
16	legal.
17	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Assuming it was
18	otherwise legal. Okay.
19	MR. DWECK: Okay.
20	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: What's the next step?
21	What gets you to the point where it is covered on
22	vandalism and under the pol one notice?
23	MR. DWECK: One notice
24	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yeah.
25	MR. DWECK: with the expectation that

1	damage could possibly be caused.
2	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Foreseeable?
3	Foreseeable at that
4	MR. DWECK: Absolutely foreseeable. And
5	lawful con unlawful conduct.
6	JUDGE READ: Well, so why doesn't every
7	excavation case, then, potentially fall under one of
8	these policy ex policy provisions, a peril of
9	this sort?
10	MR. DWECK: Because not every excavation is
11	illegal, Judge Pigott.
12	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Judge Read. Yes.
13	MR. DWECK: I'm sorry.
14	JUDGE READ: Well, that's okay, let's
15	say this is an illegal excavation. Then would it
16	- then would it then it would fall under the -
17	you're saying that's the key for you?
18	MR. DWECK: Not necessarily. Because one
19	of the cases that we had come across in our research
20	was one where they didn't secure a proper building
21	permit. And the notice was there, but they said it
22	wasn't enough
23	JUDGE READ: Well, it occurs to me, I
24	guess, that this is not the kind of thing we usually
25	think of as vandalism. And are so let me

1 follow that up with asking you, this is an all peril 2 - - - this is a perils policy, right? 3 MR. DWECK: Yes. 4 JUDGE READ: Are there other perils that 5 this - - - that you might have gotten insurance for 6 that would more closely - - - or more easily fall 7 within - - - I mean what about collapse or something of that sort? 8 9 MR. DWECK: Yes, you could - - - you could 10 have an all-risk policy. This was a named perils 11 policy. JUDGE READ: Well, what - - - are there 12 13 other - - - are there any other named perils under which this more clearly falls? Or if I have a - - -14 15 if I have - - - if I'm in your situation, is this the 16 kind of peril I have to get in the policy in order to 17 recover? There's nothing closer? 18 MR. DWECK: You could get a more broader 19 form policy that would cover any kind of damage. 20 JUDGE SMITH: Suppose you're sitting around 21 worrying that there might be an excavation next door 22 and it might damage your building, what kind of 23 insurance policy would you be well advised to get? 2.4 MR. DWECK: All-risk.

JUDGE SMITH: Um-hum.

1	MR. DWECK: All-risk, but
2	JUDGE SMITH: And you and your client
3	didn't get that?
4	MR. DWECK: She did not. She had to
5	JUDGE SMITH: You would have had to pay a
6	higher premium to get that?
7	MR. DWECK: The premium would probably be
8	ten times what she paid.
9	JUDGE SMITH: Well, why should she get the
10	same coverage for one-tenth the premium?
11	MR. DWECK: Because it's a named peril for
12	which she did pay the premium, she's entitled to
13	recovery.
14	JUDGE READ: Well, I guess that's the
15	question.
16	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: And is it is it
17	the two things, I gather from what you're
18	saying, are notice and illegality? Those must be
19	there?
20	MR. DWECK: That's for the state of mind -
21	
22	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Your yeah.
23	MR. DWECK: that's for the state of
24	mind portion of what was certified to you from the
25	Second Circuit.

1	JUDGE GRAFFEO: What what about
2	proximity? I mean, do you agree with the Sixth
3	Circuit case where it was three miles away? Is there
4	is there I'm concerned with distance and
5	
6	MR. DWECK: Judge Graffeo, that's the case
7	we're relying on on all fours, the Louisville case.
8	JUDGE GRAFFEO: Right. So
9	MR. DWECK: That was three miles upriver.
10	JUDGE GRAFFEO: proximity's not an
11	element of what you're suggesting?
12	MR. DWECK: No. If it's a if the
13	damage is a natural consequence of the illegal
14	conduct, it's a covered peril under the V&MM cause.
15	So
16	JUDGE SMITH: Did
17	JUDGE GRAFFEO: Was there notice in the
18	Louisville case?
19	MR. DWECK: There there was illegal
20	conduct in the Louisville case.
21	JUDGE GRAFFEO: Yes. The dumping of the -
22	
23	MR. DWECK: And they went further
24	JUDGE GRAFFEO: toxins.
25	MR. DWECK: and said the natural flow

1	of the water into which the toxic substances were
2	placed, would naturally end up at the sewage plant.
3	JUDGE GRAFFEO: You need illegal conduct or
4	notice?
5	MR. DWECK: That's correct.
6	JUDGE GRAFFEO: I'm just trying to
7	MR. DWECK: That's correct.
8	JUDGE GRAFFEO: tick off all the
9	elements
10	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Even if
11	JUDGE GRAFFEO: that you think are
12	necessary.
13	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: you didn't
14	- even if you didn't get the broadest policy, in your
15	kind of policy, if you have those two factors, that's
16	it?
17	MR. DWECK: That's it for the state of
18	mind, Judge Lippman.
19	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Right.
20	MR. DWECK: Then you still have the other
21	question about the damage being inflicted directly
22	upon the property, which is what the lower court in
23	the Eastern District
24	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Right.
25	MR. DWECK: dismissed us on. And I

1	think she was sorely mistaken. I think she just
2	either disregarded the Louisville case or
3	misinterpreted it, because the policy
4	JUDGE SMITH: But why why maybe
5	it's just that her reaction, as Judge Read said a few
6	a minutes ago, when you des you describe these
7	facts and then you ask yourself the question is this
8	vandalism, the word doesn't seem to fit. Why not?
9	What's the problem that's hanging us up here?
10	MR. DWECK: It's Judge Smith, it's
11	vandalism and malicious mischief. They they go
12	hand-in-hand. It's the the inappropriate
13	conduct that constitutes the
14	JUDGE SMITH: But there's a lot of
15	inappropriate conduct in the world, and you and
16	vandalism is used only for a subset of that conduct.
17	MR. DWECK: Yeah, but it has to be combined
18	with
19	JUDGE SMITH: It's a it's a
20	this somehow this doesn't to me, this
21	doesn't resemble the Vandals sacking Rome or or
22	the teenagers across the street vandalizing my house.
23	Why is it really like that?
24	MR. DWECK: I hesitated to do this because

I didn't think it would be appropriate for this

1	court. But one of the associates in my office
2	JUDGE SMITH: A picture of the sack of
3	Rome?
4	MR. DWECK: no told me this is
5	what I should be flashing before the judges in the
6	Court of Appeals. That was the attitude that was
7	manifested by the excavator
8	JUDGE SMITH: Okay.
9	MR. DWECK: and the adjacent owner.
10	JUDGE SMITH: Is every is every
11	reckless damage to property vandalism?
12	MR. DWECK: If there's notice? If there's
13	illegal
14	JUDGE SMITH: Well
15	MR. DWECK: conduct?
16	JUDGE SMITH: it could hardly be
17	reckless without some kind of notice.
18	MR. DWECK: If there was notice and it was
19	illegal conduct, you bet your bottom dollar, Judge
20	Smith.
21	JUDGE GRAFFEO: Well
22	JUDGE SMITH: So I don't need so
23	maybe I maybe I should save my money and not
24	buy a property damage policy and just buy a named
25	perils policy and put everything under vandalism.

1 MR. DWECK: That's correct. And that's 2 what people do, because otherwise you could have a 3 runaway expense for insurance coverage. 4 JUDGE RIVERA: Also - - - also in your 5 case, the - - - the next-door neighbor, these 6 excavators, they ended up paying for the privilege of 7 damaging your client's property. Is that not correct? I mean, didn't they pay a certain amount of 8 9 these fines? It's almost like the cost of doing 10 business. I just have to pay that; I can keep 11 excavating? 12 MR. DWECK: Obviously you picked up that 13 point in my brief, Judge Rivera. It was an economic 14 15 JUDGE RIVERA: I read them now and then. 16 Yeah. 17 MR. DWECK: It was an economic decision. 18 JUDGE RIVERA: Um-hum. 19 MR. DWECK: And you turn around and say why 2.0 21 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Well, Mr. Dweck, 22 because it was an economic decision and basically a 23 calculated risk, why is that - - - going to your 2.4 second point about the state of mind, why is that

25

intent?

1	MR. DWECK: Because if they engage in
2	conduct that is in
3	JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: To directly to
4	directly damage your client's property.
5	MR. DWECK: They didn't care. They only
6	were concerned about getting their work done, getting
7	their workers
8	JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Exactly.
9	MR. DWECK: to finish the job.
LO	JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: So they weren't
L1	intending to damage your client's property, they were
L2	only concerned about getting the work done on their
L3	property.
L4	MR. DWECK: That's correct.
L5	JUDGE READ: And the damage to your
L6	property was just an
L7	JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: It's collateral
L8	JUDGE READ: unfortunate consequence?
L9	JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: essentially.
20	MR. DWECK: It was incidental to their
21	conduct.
22	JUDGE READ: Yeah. That's the question,
23	though. So how does that go to intent?
24	MR. DWECK: Because if they turn around and
25	say we don't give a damn and they do things on a

	reckless basis they pleaded guilty to sixteen
2	summons
3	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: But wait a but
4	wait a second. I think what you're saying and
5	let me understand your argument it's because
6	they were on notice that this would damage you, not
7	just I don't give a damn and people say, oh, this
8	could hurt people. Did the notices indicate
9	did what the different forms that this
10	would hurt your property in particular, and is that
11	necessary?
12	MR. DWECK: Absolutely, Judge Lippman. And
13	It's in the summonses
14	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: But is that
15	MR. DWECK: that are published in the
16	record.
17	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: is that another
18	element that's necessary? In other words, it's not
19	just and I want to understand what your
20	argument is I don't give a damn. It's I don't
21	give a damn about you. Is that
22	MR. DWECK: I didn't give a damn about
23	_
24	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: is that
25	MR DWECK: you or anybody else

1 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yeah, yeah. But it's 2 the "you", isn't that important? Doesn't it matter 3 that they had in front of them, oh, this would damage 4 your particular property? 5 MR. DWECK: That's correct. Absolutely 6 correct, Judge Lippman. And since they were on 7 notice that our property would be damaged, and they 8 continued to disregard the summonses anyway, pleading 9 guilty is the equivalent of intentional conduct. 10 you're pleading guilty, you have intentional conduct, 11 then you have the state of mind that was referred to 12 you for determination - - -13 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So that makes it - -14 15 MR. DWECK: - - - by the Second Circuit. CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: - - - that makes it -16 17 - - and are you arguing this - - - that makes it 18 intent as to you? 19 MR. DWECK: That's correct. 2.0 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Is that what you're 21 saying? 22 MR. DWECK: Yeah. And we're the only ones 23 here looking to have coverage from my dear - - -2.4 Okay. CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: 25 MR. DWECK: - - - friend, Mr. Verveniotis.

1	The other issue that I know you have before
2	you is whether the damage has to be inflicted
3	directly to our property. And I suggest to you that
4	the wording of the policy does not limit, as the
5	lower court in the Eastern District ruled, that the
6	damage has to be inflicted directly to our property.
7	It could be from any source. If the damage is
8	sustained as a result of illegal conduct, it covers
9	our
LO	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: And what's your be -
L1	
L2	MR. DWECK: property.
L3	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: and what's your
L4	best cases that you rely on?
L5	MR. DWECK: Louisville.
L6	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay.
L7	MR. DWECK: Louisville is a Sixth Circuit
L8	case. You have the King case. You have the
L9	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: What about the Sec -
20	
21	MR. DWECK: Trautwein case.
22	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: what about the
23	Second Department case?
24	MR. DWECK: You mean Cresthill?
25	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Veah

1	MR. DWECK: No notice in Cresthill.
2	JUDGE SMITH: Okay. But Cresthill went
3	your way, didn't it?
4	MR. DWECK: Cresthill went our way. And
5	the intentional act of severing the pipes
6	JUDGE SMITH: Even on even on
7	and it wasn't your client's it wasn't the
8	insured's pipes that were severed.
9	MR. DWECK: It was in the same building,
10	Judge Smith.
11	JUDGE SMITH: Well, I'm trying to argue
12	your side. Why are you arguing the other guy?
13	That's a case of an act on other on somebody
14	else's property but which nevertheless was held to be
15	vandalism as to which the insured could collect for.
16	MR. DWECK: My recollection in reading
17	Cresthill was it was held that the pipes were severed
18	in the same building where the damage occurred.
19	JUDGE SMITH: So you think that
20	distinguishes Cresthill from this case?
21	MR. DWECK: That does.
22	JUDGE SMITH: Why do you want to
23	distinguish it? Why don't you okay.
24	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay.
25	MR. DWECK: It's favorable to us.

1	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Thanks thanks,
2	counsel.
3	MR. DWECK: Thank you very much.
4	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: We're going to hear
5	from your adversary.
6	MR. VERVENIOTIS: May it please the court,
7	my name is Steven Verveniotis. I represent Penn-Star
8	Insurance Company in this case.
9	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Counsel, what about
10	if you have notice as to this particular business;
11	you have illegality; why shouldn't you be held on the
12	vandalism clause why shouldn't you be held
13	liable? How much more do you need to have before
14	they can collect from you?
15	MR. VERVENIOTIS: I have a two-part answer.
16	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yes.
17	MR. VERVENIOTIS: The first
18	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Give it to us.
19	MR. VERVENIOTIS: as to this specific
20	case
21	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yes.
22	MR. VERVENIOTIS: I know you've heard
23	a lot about sixteen violations. But if you go and
24	look at the violations, they run over a period of
25	five years. They include things such as not having

	the proper plans in place
2	JUDGE SMITH: But couldn't couldn't a
3	jury find that these people were willful?
4	MR. VERVENIOTIS: A not with respect
5	to the other property. What they pled guilty was
6	several violations, including not having plans, not
7	having handrails, not having all kinds of stuff.
8	JUDGE SMITH: They were never on notice
9	that there that there was a threat to the
10	property next door?
11	MR. VERVENIOTIS: They were told to stop
12	work. They were given certain conditions, if you
13	look at the violations, under which they could
14	continue work
15	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Well, but that's not
16	what the judge asked you. Were they on no were
17	you on notice as to them?
18	MR. VERVENIOTIS: There came a point in
19	2008 in which there was indication about stopping
20	work completely
21	JUDGE SMITH: But was is there a
22	point at which this excavator's conduct could be
23	called willful?
24	MR. VERVENIOTIS: I don't think so. Not
25	with respect to the other building, Your Honor. The

1	conduct here, in order to be malice and the
2	issue that we were all going at before and we were
3	talking about it is, your conduct has to not be a
4	legitimate purpose, an that has a consequence
5	that can be expected. Much of the case law in
6	insurance drives
7	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yeah, but but
8	if you I understand that you're committed to
9	getting your job done. But if you know if
10	you're on notice that you're performing, A) an
11	illegal act, and B) that it will hurt them, why
12	shouldn't you be held responsible?
13	MR. VERVENIOTIS: Because that's
14	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: And that's not a
15	rhetorical question. What is the rationale under the
16	law or under policy
17	MR. VERVENIOTIS: The
18	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: as to why they
19	aren't able to view this as willful to them?
20	MR. VERVENIOTIS: The rationale is that
21	it's not malice intended towards the other building.
22	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Why
23	MR. VERVENIOTIS: You may be violating
24	_
25	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Why not

1	MR. VERVENIOTIS: the law.
2	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: but why isn't
3	it
4	MR. VERVENIOTIS: You may be
5	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: if you know
6	that if you're on notice that it's going to
7	hurt them
8	MR. VERVENIOTIS: You may
9	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: why isn't it
10	willful as to them?
11	MR. VERVENIOTIS: You may be negligent.
12	There might be circumstances as to a variety of
13	things happening, but the case law from this court
14	has always been that there's a division between the
15	possibility that things could happen and driving
16	something intentionally.
17	JUDGE SMITH: Well, you're not you're
18	not saying that the excavator couldn't be liable to -
19	to the lady who owned the house?
20	MR. VERVENIOTIS: Of course not.
21	JUDGE SMITH: And in fact, maybe she could
22	even be liable for punitive damages?
23	MR. VERVENIOTIS: I don't know about
24	punitive damages.
25	JUDGE SMITH: If she if she could

Τ.	- 1'm sorry, if they could if they could be
2	liable to her for punitive damages, would that make
3	it vandalism? Would that cause your policy to kick
4	in?
5	MR. VERVENIOTIS: I think van
6	punitive damages and vandalism are two different
7	things. And that's what I'm trying to drive at.
8	JUDGE SMITH: What's the te what
9	- tell me give me an example of conduct that
10	damages property and is so willful and wanton that
11	it's that it would give rise to punitive
12	damages, but it's not vandalism?
13	MR. VERVENIOTIS: I think vandalism is not
14	in not acting in accordance with how a
15	reasonable purpose would be to be to be
16	somebody that's totally, as you heard, disregarding
17	the consequences. That's not what vandalism is.
18	Vandalism requires your purpose to be to damage this
19	building. All the cases that we've read
20	JUDGE SMITH: Okay. Suppose suppose
21	kids in the neighborhood don't like my neighbor, and
22	they start throwing bricks at his window. And they
23	miss and hit my window or some debris flies and
24	damages my house. Have I suffered damage from

vandalism?

1	MR. VERVENIOTIS: I don't know. That's an
2	interesting question. I would say not, under those
3	circumstances. But I'm guessing with that
4	hypothetical. That drives to the point of what I'm
5	trying to say. If the intent was not to damage your
6	building, but it's a risk that they took, they were
7	negligent towards
8	JUDGE SMITH: Yeah, but in an ordinary
9	-
LO	MR. VERVENIOTIS: and that happened -
L1	
L2	JUDGE SMITH: situation in the
L3	hypothetical I gave you, I'd wake up the next morning
L4	and say my house has been vandalized, wouldn't I?
L5	MR. VERVENIOTIS: You may well say that,
L6	Your Honor.
L7	JUDGE SMITH: But on the other hand, I
L8	can't quite see the lady who owned this I mean,
L9	this building with the cracks in it, I understand she
20	was very upset. I wouldn't think the first words
21	that would come to her lips would be my house has
22	just been vandalized. I'm trying to figure
23	MR. VERVENIOTIS: Indeed
24	JUDGE SMITH: come to grips with why?
25	MR VERVENIOTIS: that indeed

1 that's what I'm trying to say in terms of explaining 2 about the history of this damage. When you look at 3 the record of this, you see engineers' reports that 4 talk about over a period of three years, this is 5 something that develops. 6 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: If you got - - -7 MR. VERVENIOTIS: We - - -8 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: - - - notice that 9 said - - - if you had a notice that said if you keep 10 doing this, they are going to be damaged in the 11 following fashion, if you have that notice, is that 12 vandalism? If you know specifically, if you keep 13 doing it and this is what's going to happen, that could be willful that would have you responsible 14 15 under the vandalism clause or not? What - - -16 MR. VERVENIOTIS: I think not, Your Honor. 17 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Why not? 18 MR. VERVENIOTIS: Because - - -19 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Why not? 20 MR. VERVENIOTIS: - - - it's not what 21 you're giving notice of, it's what your intent is. 22 Vandalism - - -23 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: How could you have 2.4 any other intent if you have notice that if you keep

doing it, it's going to - - - I mean, as long as your

intent is, well, you know what, this is going to help me, so I don't care what happens to them, that's not intent?

2.4

MR. VERVENIOTIS: No, Your Honor. That's not what I'm saying. In the exam - - -

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Why isn't - - - why isn't it intent if you say I need to finish this. I just got to get this garage done. I don't care what happens to them. I'm going to finish it. Let - - - whatever happens, happens. Why is that not willful intent as to them that would make you liable?

MR. VERVENIOTIS: Because the willful and malicious conduct has to be intended towards the other building. It cannot be something that's a consequence of what you did. That's the sticking point.

JUDGE GRAFFEO: So you mean - - - say, for instance, an adjacent building that your client - - - hypothetical client owns, okay, and they torched the building for whatever reason. They want the insurance proceeds or something. They start a fire. They intentionally start a fire. And that fire spreads to the neighbor next door. You're not going to cover that under the fire provision of this peril policy, because they didn't - - - they only intended

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to burn their building, not the building next door?
 1
                    MR. VERVENIOTIS: I don't think that's
 2
 3
          analogous, Your Honor. I mean, I don't know what the
 4
          answer would be under the fire coverage with respect
 5
          to that scenario.
                    JUDGE GRAFFEO: Well, it ought to - - - I
 6
 7
          mean, it ought to be similar, shouldn't it?
 8
                    MR. VERVENIOTIS: No, it's different
 9
          because vandalism is - - -
10
                    JUDGE GRAFFEO: If it's a wanton - - -
11
                    MR. VERVENIOTIS: - - - different than
12
          other - -
13
                    JUDGE GRAFFEO: - - - disregard - - -
14
                    MR. VERVENIOTIS: - - - conduct.
15
                    JUDGE GRAFFEO: - - - of the rights of
16
          another party, shouldn't that be covered?
17
                    MR. VERVENIOTIS: But that's - - - that's
          not vandalism. And malicious and willful tow - - -
18
19
          directed towards the property, which is what the full
20
          wording of the policy - - -
21
                    JUDGE SMITH: Well, suppose - - -
                    MR. VERVENIOTIS: - - - says.
22
23
                    JUDGE RIVERA: So - - - but I think in part
2.4
          you're arguing that the purpose is to excavate, it's
25
          not to damage their property. Okay. So but you have
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1 different ways of excavating. And if you choose to 2 excavate in way that you know in advance will cause 3 that destruction, why is that not going to come 4 within the policy's coverage? 5 MR. VERVENIOTIS: First - - -JUDGE RIVERA: I have several - - - several 6 7 choices. I pick the one that I know is going to have 8 a particular outcome that's adverse to this adjacent 9 property. 10 MR. VERVENIOTIS: First of all, clearly, 11 that did not happen here. If you go and look back at 12 the record, the excavation hap - - -13 JUDGE READ: Well, let's assume it did. 14 MR. VERVENIOTIS: - - - happened between 15 2005 - - right. So assuming it did, the fact that 16 there's different ways to excavate, again, brings you 17 back to the point that this excavator's purpose 18 wasn't to be maliciously damaging this building next 19 door. Vandalism is truly different - - -20 JUDGE SMITH: Well, suppose - - -21 MR. VERVENIOTIS: - - - than negligence. 22 JUDGE RIVERA: Maybe it wasn't the primary 23 purpose, but it's the - - -2.4 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Well, what would you 25 call it? Would you call it gross negligence or

1	something?
2	MR. VERVENIOTIS: Even the most gross
3	negligence is not vandalism, because it's not
4	JUDGE SMITH: Suppose suppose a kid
5	digs a hole in your front yard because he likes to
6	dig holes and he knows it might cause your building
7	to cave in, but he doesn't care. He doesn't have
8	anything against you. He just likes to dig holes.
9	And your building caves in. Vandalism?
LO	MR. VERVENIOTIS: I honestly don't know. I
L1	don't know what that
L2	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Counselor, what is a
L3	hypothetical that would be vandalism under this
L4	policy, assuming you're excavating, they have the
L5	building next door. Give us a hypothetical where it
L6	would come under the policy. You're doing
L7	excavation; they're being damaged. When is it that
L8	you would have to pay?
L9	MR. VERVENIOTIS: I don't think excavation,
20	especially under
21	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So it would never be
22	ex
23	MR. VERVENIOTIS: I don't think under this
24	policy it would be. This even specifically in

this policy provision that says we're not covering

1	anything that has
2	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So it can never be
3	excavation because, why?
4	MR. VERVENIOTIS: Because excavation is not
5	vandalism. The words have to be given the meaning
6	that they have.
7	JUDGE READ: So they should have had
8	MR. VERVENIOTIS: Vandalism means that
9	-
10	JUDGE READ: they should have
11	MR. VERVENIOTIS: you intend to
12	willfully damage this property.
13	JUDGE READ: So in order to recover they
14	had to have an all-risk policy?
15	MR. VERVENIOTIS: They would have to have
16	an all-risk policy, yes, instead of this policy which
17	they paid
18	JUDGE SMITH: You say excavation
19	MR. VERVENIOTIS: 3,000 dollars for.
20	JUDGE SMITH: you say excavation is
21	not vandalism. But you can imagine that digging
22	holes might be vandalism?
23	MR. VERVENIOTIS: Digging holes, especially
24	on your property, that goes underneath, I guess, the
25	foundation of your property, if I take the

1 hypothetical - - -2 JUDGE SMITH: Yeah, okay. 3 MR. VERVENIOTIS: - - - to I guess its 4 logical consequences, would be something where you're 5 actually doing something to the property. JUDGE SMITH: Okay, but I mean - - -6 7 MR. VERVENIOTIS: So I guess it's much 8 closer. 9 JUDGE SMITH: - - - I guess what I'm really 10 saying, isn't "excavation" a word that means digging 11 a hole? 12 MR. VERVENIOTIS: Except, Your Honor, the 13 excavation and all the work happened on another 14 property. 15 JUDGE SMITH: So if - - - so if the kid who likes to dig a hole dug it in your neighbor's lawn, 16 17 and it undermined your house, then you have not suffered any damage from vandalism? 18 19 MR. VERVENIOTIS: I don't think, under that 20 scenario, that that kid is any different than an 21 excavator who's doing something on somebody else's 22 property. They're not - - - they're not - - -23 although they may be negligent, and they may have 2.4 proximately caused, under some scenario, I don't - -

- you know - - - the kid, as well as the contractor,

1 may have caused the damage - - -JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: What if - - - what if 2 3 - - - again on a hypothetical. What if the person was trying to knock down their house but knew that it 4 5 was going to knock down the neighbor's house as well? Would that be vandalism? 6 7 MR. VERVENIOTIS: Again, Your Honor, I don't think that's vandalism. The fact that 8 9 something - - - there may be some consequences to 10 your actions and you may be negligent in how you go 11 about doing your actions such that those consequences 12 occur - - -13 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: What if the person had 14 a grudge - - -15 MR. VERVENIOTIS: Doesn't mean - - -16 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: - - - what if the 17 person had a grudge against the neighbor, and instead 18 of just harming the neighbor, decided well, I'll 19 just, you know, knock down my house and knock their 20 house down, too? 21 MR. VERVENIOTIS: I guess that could be 22 relevant in that - - - in that analysis, because if 23 the person's intent was to damage the building next 2.4 door, I guess - - - and that was their vehicle for

damaging next door - - -

1	JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: So you're saying it's
2	different because they didn't intend to
3	MR. VERVENIOTIS: No, clearly when
4	JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: cause damage
5	next door.
6	MR. VERVENIOTIS: you have a
7	legitimate purpose
8	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: You're saying the
9	difference is that your argument is as long as
10	primarily you're doing it for your purpose, even if
11	you don't give a damn, even if you know it will hurt
12	them, it doesn't matter. So the difference is intent
13	between what Judge Abdus-Salaam just said to you and
14	what you believe is the general law, that as long as
15	you have a reason for what you're doing, even if you
16	know it's going to hurt the other building
17	you've been told, you're on notice about it and
18	you say, oh, the hell with that, I don't care, that's
19	okay, as long as you have a purpose, illegal or
20	legal, that you're performing, that's okay, that's
21	not vandalism?
22	MR. VERVENIOTIS: My focus, Your Honor
23	-
24	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Is that your
25	argument?

1	MR. VERVENIOTIS: My focus
2	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Is
3	MR. VERVENIOTIS: I think so, but I
4	just want to be clear.
5	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: No, no, but in my
6	- in my words, answer my hypothetical. You as
7	long as you're building a garage underground,
8	or whatever you're doing there. You know it's going
9	to hurt them. You're on notice that it's going to
10	hurt them. It's illegal what you're doing. As long
11	as your mindset is, I don't give a flying you-know-
12	what, I want to finish this garage; no coverage, no
13	vandalism?
14	MR. VERVENIOTIS: I think that's not
15	vandalism. And indeed the quest
16	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: What is it? What is
17	it?
18	MR. VERVENIOTIS: I think it may be
19	negligence. You can sue them and you can prove your
20	damages, which is what they're doing. But the
21	question that's been certified to this court asks you
22	understand that
23	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: It's not willful
24	_
25	MR. VERVENIOTIS: nothing that

1 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: - - - it's not 2 willful and malicious damage to property? 3 MR. VERVENIOTIS: No, no. The certified 4 question is, an act not directed specifically at the 5 covered property. 6 JUDGE GRAFFEO: What's your best case for 7 your prop - - -8 MR. VERVENIOTIS: Hmm? 9 JUDGE GRAFFEO: - - - what's your best case 10 other than the district court in this case? 11 MR. VERVENIOTIS: The Fanberg case, which 12 is on page 25. And then there's a series of other 13 cases - -JUDGE SMITH: Counsel, did you have a sense 14 15 of what happened? I mean, you don't learn much about 16 the facts from reading the Fanberg opinion. 17 MR. VERVENIOTIS: I think it's pretty 18 analogous. I don't think playing around with whether 19 you had a violation notice or not getting a permit. 20 You know it's illegal. Everybody knows what the 21 consequences are when you do excavation, especially 22 in the city. And you've got building next to - - -23 buildings touching each other. 2.4 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Was the court - - -25 counsel, was the court in Fanberg saying it's not

1	vandalism, or were they saying it wasn't they
2	didn't intend to do it? The second question
3	MR. VERVENIOTIS: No, the
4	JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: were they
5	answering the first question that we've been
6	certified
7	MR. VERVENIOTIS: I think it's the first
8	question, because clearly it's the same the
9	same type of coverage. And they said this isn't
10	vandalism coverage
11	JUDGE SMITH: But couldn't
12	MR. VERVENIOTIS: because it's
13	JUDGE SMITH: couldn't
14	MR. VERVENIOTIS: construction next
15	door.
16	JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: But in Fanberg, didn't
17	they didn't the Second Department cite
18	favorably the Cresthill case where they said it was
19	vandalism, when
20	MR. VERVENIOTIS: Well
21	JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: someone ripped
22	out pipes and
23	MR. VERVENIOTIS: the Cresthill is
24	totally different. The consequence of running the
25	water is to in the same building, is to

for the water to flow downward. You are directing 1 2 something at the building. And again, I come to the 3 question - - - I come back to the question that's - -4 JUDGE SMITH: Well, wait a minute. 5 MR. VERVENIOTIS: - - - been certified. 6 7 JUDGE SMITH: Why is - - - why is flowing 8 water onto somebody's property so different from 9 digging a hole next to his property when you know 10 it's going to undermine his foundation? 11 MR. VERVENIOTIS: Because the coverage for 12 vandalism depends upon you doing something to the 13 property. JUDGE SMITH: Well, they did do something -14 15 MR. VERVENIOTIS: Digging a hole - - -16 17 JUDGE SMITH: - - - they did do something 18 to the property. The problem is that it wasn't 19 directed at the property. But the guys in Cresthill 20 didn't care about the pe - - - they may not even have 21 known there was stuff downstairs. They were just 22 tearing off pipes. 23 MR. VERVENIOTIS: But that's the wording of the coverage. It has to be directed to the - - - to 2.4 25 the property.

1	JUDGE GRAFFEO: If Crest if Cresthill
2	was a condominium, so there were two units, different
3	title owners, would
4	MR. VERVENIOTIS: I think it was.
5	JUDGE GRAFFEO: would there be
6	coverage?
7	MR. VERVENIOTIS: I think it was two
8	different owners of two different units but
9	JUDGE GRAFFEO: I thought
LO	MR. VERVENIOTIS: in the same
L1	building.
L2	JUDGE GRAFFEO: I thought they were
L3	tenants, but maybe I'm wrong.
L4	MR. VERVENIOTIS: No, it was two different
L5	ownerships and
L6	JUDGE GRAFFEO: So it's
L7	MR. VERVENIOTIS: two different
L8	policies
L9	JUDGE GRAFFEO: it's just in one
20	building?
21	MR. VERVENIOTIS: involved. It was
22	in the same building.
23	JUDGE GRAFFEO: But because it's the same
24	building, you've got better coverage if you're
25	another unit

1	MR. VERVENIOTIS: No, because
2	JUDGE GRAFFEO: in the same building
3	instead of being, say, two single-family houses
4	twenty feet apart?
5	MR. VERVENIOTIS: The water going onto that
6	property is something directed at that property. In
7	this case, there's nothing that is directed
8	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Isn't that an awful
9	fine distinction that you're making that if it goes
10	here, it's okay, but if it goes here here it's
11	not.
12	MR. VERVENIOTIS: But Your Honor, it has to
13	be a fine distinction in this situation. The limited
14	coverage that's purchased for a very low price here,
15	has to be only for vandalism coverage, for somebody
16	coming and damaging your building directly, not
17	consequences
18	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: But I think
19	MR. VERVENIOTIS: that impact your
20	building.
21	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: but I think the
22	issue is, what is damaging your property directly?
23	Is it if it flows downward or if it flows across, are
24	those two different situations?
25	MR. VERVENIOTIS: Nothing flows across when

MR. VERVENIOTIS: Nothing flows across when

1	you excavate.
2	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: If you if you -
3	
4	MR. VERVENIOTIS: When you're excavating -
5	
6	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: excavate and
7	the other thing collapses, obviously something's
8	happening to the other property.
9	MR. VERVENIOTIS: But you're not doing it
10	to the property. You're doing something in order to
11	do construction work that the other property then
12	succumbs to. There's a difference.
13	Vandalism requires you not to do things
14	that there could be consequences to another building,
15	but to do something to the building.
16	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, counselor.
17	Thanks.
18	Thank you both.
19	MR. VERVENIOTIS: Thank you, Your Honors.
20	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Appreciate it.
21	MR. DWECK: Thank you.
22	(Court is adjourned)
23	
24	

CERTIFICATION

I, Penina Wolicki, certify that the

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