1	COURT OF APPEALS
2	STATE OF NEW YORK
3	
4	MATTER OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK,
5	Respondent,
6	-against-
7	No. 168 ENRIQUE D., (Papers Sealed)
8	Appellant.
9	
10	20 Eagle Street Albany, New York 12207
11	September 12, 2013
12	Before:
13	CHIEF JUDGE JONATHAN LIPPMAN ASSOCIATE JUDGE VICTORIA A. GRAFFEO
14	ASSOCIATE JUDGE SUSAN PHILLIPS READ ASSOCIATE JUDGE ROBERT S. SMITH
15	ASSOCIATE JUDGE EUGENE F. PIGOTT, JR. ASSOCIATE JUDGE JENNY RIVERA
16	ASSOCIATE JUDGE SHEILA ABDUS-SALAAM
17	Appearances:
18	SADIE ZEA ISHEE, ESQ. MENTAL HYGIENE LEGAL SERVICE, FIRST JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
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21	VALERIE FIGUEREDO, ESQ.
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25	Penina Wolicki Official Court Transcriber
-	

1	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: State of New York v.
2	Enrique D.
3	MS. ISHEE: May I have two minutes for
4	rebuttal, please, Your Honor?
5	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Two minutes;
6	absolutely. Go ahead.
7	MS. ISHEE: Good afternoon. May it please
8	the court, my name is Sadie Ishee, and I represent
9	appellant, Enrique D.
10	This case is really quite simple, the
11	statute, Mental Hygiene Law 10.08(g) grants an
12	Article 10 respondent the right to call witnesses on
13	his behalf. The United States Constitution, as the
14	U.S. Supreme Court has recognized, grants a person -
15	
16	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: What's wrong with the
17	decision that that those witnesses should be -
18	as the judge said, should what they say
19	should come in through the expert? What's
20	what's wrong with that?
21	MS. ISHEE: Well, the most basic thing that
22	is wrong with that is that that is an unprecedented
23	extension of the professional reliability exception.
24	I know that this court will be dealing more directly

with the professional - - -

1	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yes.
2	MS. ISHEE: reliability exception
3	later today. But whatever it has meant to date, it
4	certainly has never meant that an expert should go
5	out of his way to learn more hearsay information
6	after he has already rendered an opinion in a written
7	report, after trial has already begun, and in
8	order to circumvent the
9	JUDGE PIGOTT: The rationale seemed to
LO	-
L1	MS. ISHEE: witness' live testimony.
L2	JUDGE PIGOTT: be, if I if I
L3	understand it right, that that this witness was
L4	going to testify as to facts which would be more
L5	meaningful to the trier of fact in the context of a
L6	professional judgment. It I'm sorry, go ahead.
L7	MS. ISHEE: I don't think that is
L8	necessarily the case, Your Honor. Basically, the
L9	facts that this witness would have testified to would
20	have been relevant directly relevant to both of
21	the two prongs of the mental abnormality
22	JUDGE SMITH: What's what's the
23	MS. ISHEE: definition.
24	JUDGE SMITH: relevance?
25	MS ISHEE: The relevance is twofold

1 Number one, he was diagnosed with a condition called 2 paraphilia NOS non-consent, which as this court knows 3 from its decision in Shannon S., is a highly 4 controversial diagnosis. It is a diagnosis that has 5 been - - -JUDGE SMITH: Okay, but how does - - - how 6 7 does Ms. Nieves' (ph.) testimony prove that he didn't have this disease? 8 9 MS. ISHEE: Well, as the scientific 10 articles that were cited by both experts that were 11 relied upon by both experts that were entered into 12 evidence in this case make absolutely clear, evidence 13 from consensual sexual partners is highly relevant to 14 determining whether or not this diagnosis is properly 15 ascribed. 16 JUDGE SMITH: Well, I - - -17 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Why is that - - -18 JUDGE SMITH: - - - walk us through the 19 logic. 20 MS. ISHEE: Okay. So a consensual - - -21 it's actually, I would say, in three respects. 22 Number one, the respects that are specifically 23 discussed in the articles, a consensual sexual 2.4 partner might be able to testify about the fantasy

life that was engaged in by the consensual partners,

1 for example, rape fantasies that were acted out. 2 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Does that have to do 3 with the definition of what paraphilia NOS nonconsent is? 4 5 MS. ISHEE: Yes, Your Honor, absolutely. This is - - - it's a re - - - any paraphilia not 6 7 otherwise specified is - - -8 JUDGE SMITH: So, this - - -9 MS. ISHEE: - - - a recurrent - - -10 JUDGE SMITH: - - - this lady would testify 11 --- I'm sorry. I didn't mean to cut off your 12 answer. Did you get an answer to your question? 13 Go ahead, finish your answer to the 14 question? 15 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: She said yes. We've 16 been trying to get people to say yes or no all day. 17 She said yes. JUDGE SMITH: Okay, but if I understand 18 19 right, what - - - what you're saying, Ms. Nieves 20 could say no, he wasn't into - - - he wasn't into 21 coercion or force at all. 22 MS. ISHEE: Yes. 23 JUDGE SMITH: But does the fact that he 2.4 wasn't into it with her prove that he didn't have a

mental abnormality that he - - - that he had an inten

1 - - - a tendency to coerce other people? 2 MS. ISHEE: Well, again, there are nu - - -3 several elements to the definition of paraphilia NOS that I think are significant here. It's not only 4 5 that he didn't coerce her, it's also that he was able 6 to engage in consensual sex, that he was aroused to 7 consensual sex. It is also that the - - -8 9 JUDGE SMITH: The inference - - -10 MS. ISHEE: - - - definition - - -11 JUDGE SMITH: - - - from that is that he 12 was not - - - that it wasn't the nonconsensual aspect 13 of it that aroused him with the other partners? MS. ISHEE: That's correct. And that is in 14 15 line with what the scientific articles say is significant about consensual partners. 16 17 JUDGE GRAFFEO: Would - - - if she had been 18 allowed to testify, would that open the door to the 19 State bringing in the twenty or two dozen some-odd 20 other sexual partners he had that might have 21 testified to something entirely different about his behavior? 22 23 MS. ISHEE: I think the State had the right 2.4 to bring in all of those sexual partners if they

wanted to regardless of whether or not she testified.

I - - - you know, any question as to the relevance of an individual witness' testimony would be resolved by the trier of fact, and it's possible that they would have been redundant. But I frankly think it would have been - - -

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JUDGE SMITH: There would come a point where you would admit the court could exclude them as cumulative?

MS. ISHEE: Yes, there would come a point when I would admit the court - - -

JUDGE PIGOTT: Your bigger point is, if I understand it correctly, is not whether or not Ms.

Nieves - - - you know, what the weight of her testimony would have been to the trier of fact, but the fact that this court seemed to say that that type of testimony isn't available to a respondent at all?

MS. ISHEE: Yes, that is precisely the problem. The statute says unequivocally that it is, and the court said unequivocally that it's not. And I think the Appellate Division really misunderstood the issues in this case. Because as this court - - -

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Well, it's hard to understand. This paraphilia NOS, it's not really a recognized diag - - it's fuzzy enough, I guess, what I'm saying, without a restriction - - -

restricting what you could hear about it. 1 2 MS. ISHEE: I absolutely agree. And I 3 think this court was crystal clear about that in its Shannon S. decision. If I could just quote from the 4 5 Shannon S. decision for a moment? This court said, "Any issue pertaining to the reliability of 6 7 paraphilia NOS, as a predicate condition for a 8 finding of mental abnormality, has to be viewed as a 9 factor relevant to the weight to be attributed to the 10 diagnosis, an issue properly reserved for resolution 11 by the fact finder." JUDGE SMITH: Okay, but Ms. Nieves isn't 12 13 going to tell the jury that paraphilia NOS isn't a 14 good diagnosis. 15 What she is going to shed MS. ISHEE: No. 16 light on, though, is the validity of that diagnosis 17 on the facts of this case. JUDGE SMITH: Well, she - - - I mean, am I 18 19 - - - am I - - - maybe I'm - - - am I right in saying what you're essentially trying to prove in this case 20 21 is no, I'm not - - - I don't have paraphilia; I'm - -22 - I don't coerce people because I have an urge to 23 coerce them; I coerce them because I'm a rapist - - -2.4 MS. ISHEE: Essentially, yes.

JUDGE SMITH: - - - it's my choice.

MS. ISHEE: And this court - - -

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JUDGE SMITH: Maybe not a lot of jury appeal in that argument, but that's the argument.

MS. ISHEE: No, but a lot of Constitutional appeal, Your Honor. This court, again, referring back to Shannon S., and I really think this case is sort of a mirror image of Shannon S., because this court, in Shannon S., recognized that there is an imperfect fit between the DSM and the legal definition of mental abnormality.

And what doctors do, what psychiatric - - - psychiatric experts do, is they diagnose under the DSM. And what the jury is asked to do in an Article 10 case is not that. It is asked, on the one hand to determine whether that diagnosis fits within the legal framework for mental abnormality. It is also asked to look at the additional question of whether there's serious difficulty in controlling behaviors.

JUDGE PIGOTT: But one of the points that your opposition makes is that - - - that the points where the experts disagreed were not the areas where Ms. Nieves could have offered relevant testimony, so it doesn't make any difference.

MS. ISHEE: I just don't think that's true,
Your Honor. I think both experts relied on these two

articles. And I think the articles make clear, and I 1 2 think also both experts' testimony made clear, that 3 what you need for this diagnosis is more than the fact of the convictions themselves. 4 5 JUDGE READ: So your position is, then, 6 this was an abuse of discretion by the judge not to 7 let this testimony in? And - - -8 MS. ISHEE: Yes. 9 JUDGE READ: - - - and that was enough to 10 make the trial unfair. 11 JUDGE SMITH: Do you admit he had discretion? 12 13 MS. ISHEE: Well, I don't think that there was discretion to exclude this relevant evidence, 14 15 because there was no - - - you know, the rule in New 16 York State is that any relevant evidence is 17 admissible unless its admission violates some exclusionary rule. And I don't think this evidence 18 19 does. 20 JUDGE SMITH: Well, he - - -21 JUDGE READ: So if he wouldn't - - -JUDGE SMITH: - - - why - - -22 23 JUDGE READ: Sorry. 2.4 JUDGE SMITH: Sorry. 25 JUDGE READ: Go ahead.

1	JUDGE SMITH: I understand your point that
2	the that the judge that the judge
3	couldn't exclude this testimony just because he was
4	going to let it in through the expert. But why did
5	the why did the expert never testify to it?
6	Why didn't you let the expert why didn't you
7	ask the expert what Ms. Nieves said?
8	MS. ISHEE: Well, Your Honor, this
9	JUDGE SMITH: Your answer is you didn't
10	have to. But nevertheless, why didn't you do it?
11	MS. ISHEE: My light is on I could
12	answer the question, if you'd like me to.
13	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Answer the question,
14	yes.
15	MS. ISHEE: Okay. It's a twofold answer.
16	One is, this is not in the record, but she didn't
17	speak English, and he didn't speak Spanish, and this
18	ruling was made in the middle of trial, and there was
19	not time to find an interpreter.
20	JUDGE SMITH: Well, what's the second
21	MS. ISHEE: I know it's
22	JUDGE SMITH: reason?
23	MS. ISHEE: Okay.
24	JUDGE SMITH: There are a few Spanish
25	interpreters

1 MS. ISHEE: The second - - - okay. 2 JUDGE SMITH: - - - out there. 3 MS. ISHEE: The more compelling reason, I think, is that he did not diagnose her with 4 5 paraphilia NOS. This was not relevant to his diagnosis, because he did not diagnose her with this 6 7 condition. JUDGE SMITH: I understand. 8 9 MS. ISHEE: Under these articles, it would 10 be highly relevant to determine whether that 11 diagnosis was accurate. So I think really the 12 State's expert, Dr. Harris - - -13 JUDGE SMITH: So you're saying - - - you're 14 saying it related only to the underlying facts, and 15 it had nothing to do with Dr. Bard's (ph.) opinions. In Dr. Bard's opinion, there was no such - - - there 16 17 was no such diagnosis and it doesn't matter what Ms. 18 Nieves says? 19 MS. ISHEE: That was an aspect of Dr. 20 Bard's opinion. He did also say that you - - - if 21 you were to attribute this diagnosis to someone, you 22 would need more than just the facts of the convictions themselves. 23 2.4 JUDGE SMITH: But Ms. - - - yeah, but 25 you're saying Ms. Nieves couldn't - - - you're saying

1	basically Ms. Nieves' testimony was relevant to the
2	fact-finder, but it was irrelevant to Dr. Bard?
3	MS. ISHEE: Yes. It may have been relevant
4	to Dr. Harris, the State's expert, but
5	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay.
6	MS. ISHEE: it was not relevant to -
7	
8	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Thanks, counselor.
9	MS. FIGUEREDO: May it please the court,
10	Valerie Figueredo for the State.
11	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Counsel, why
12	why shouldn't they be able to put in this testimony,
13	forgetting the fact that they appear to be entitled
14	to do it? They want to show that that this guy
15	may be a recidivist, but he's not driven by, you
16	know, this particular diagnosis. Why shouldn't they
17	be able to do that by putting in witness who would go
18	to that point? Why possibly would they would
19	they not be able to do it?
20	MS. FIGUEREDO: We're not arguing for a
21	categorical rule barring all lay witnesses. In
22	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yeah, but why is it
23	wrong in this case to let them do it?
24	MS. FIGUEREDO: In this case it was wrong

because based on the proffer offered to Supreme

1 Court, for the relevance - - - for the offered 2 relevancy of Naomi N.'s testimony, the Supreme Court 3 reasonably concluded that the more appropriate presentation of that evidence to demonstrate its 4 5 relevancy - - -CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: On what basis? 6 7 - - - how can they just say the more appropriate - -- they have a right to introduce those witnesses. 8 9 You think they don't have a right? 10 MS. FIGUEREDO: It depends on the context 11 of the case. JUDGE PIGOTT: Well, the - - -12 13 MS. FIGUEREDO: In this case - - -14 JUDGE PIGOTT: - - - the direct quote from 15 the State was - - - in objecting to this, you argued 16 against - - - not you personally, but they argue 17 against civilian witnesses on the issue of mental abnormality, whether he's got serious difficulty 18 19 controlling his behavior. 20 "That determination must be based upon the 21 testimony of experts, and I would object to any 22 civilian witnesses being called." 23 MS. FIGUEREDO: That is the objection the 2.4 trial - - - the trial attorney raised below. That is

not what we argue now. We are not seeking a

1	categorical rule. The Supreme Court
2	JUDGE PIGOTT: So he was was he wrong
3	in making this I shouldn't say making
4	obviously he could make the objection but that
5	you would you would not sustain an objection on
6	that ground today?
7	MS. FIGUEREDO: We would not sustain an
8	objection on that ground. We do not argue that lay
9	witnesses are completely irrelevant. It depends on
10	the context of the particular case.
11	JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: But why is this
12	witness
13	MS. FIGUEREDO: In this case
14	JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: not relevant?
15	MS. FIGUEREDO: in this case, the
16	ruling was made pre-trial, and based on the limited
17	proffer offered for her relevancy, the Supreme Court
18	reasonably concluded that Naomi N.'s live testimony
19	was not necessary.
20	JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: But didn't the court
21	also reserve decision on the issue, and maybe would
22	allow the testimony at some point after after -
23	
24	MS. FIGUEREDO: That's correct
25	JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: the pre-trial in

1 limine - - -2 MS. FIGUEREDO: - - - the court gave a 3 concession to Enrique D.'s trial attorney to demonstrate the relevancy of Naomi N.'s testimony 4 5 through Dr. Bard's testimony. JUDGE PIGOTT: Yeah. His statement - - -6 7 MS. FIGUEREDO: But - - -JUDGE PIGOTT: - - - the court's statement 8 9 was that "the girlfriend's opinion would not be 10 relevant and that any information she possessed 11 should come out in the proper way through defense 12 experts." 13 MS. FIGUEREDO: And it's important to - - -14 JUDGE PIGOTT: Do you agree with that? 15 MS. FIGUEREDO: - - - it's important to 16 understand that statement in the context in which it 17 was made, which is in a pre-trial ruling before any 18 of the experts or any other witnesses testified. JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: So the court didn't 19 2.0 know whether Dr. Bard had ever even interviewed Naomi 21 N.? 22 MS. FIGUEREDO: At that point, the court 23 did not know what evidence it would see, so it did not know whether Dr. Bard found her testimony or her 2.4

- - - the facts of her relationship with Enrique D. -

1	
2	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Counsel, but isn't it
3	
4	JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: So
5	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: isn't it
6	obvious that court testimony is better than hearsay?
7	I mean, how how difficult is this? I mean, why
8	would that be not be so obvious?
9	MS. FIGUEREDO: In the context of the
10	initial
11	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: In the in the
12	context of this court, testimony is not better than
13	hearsay?
14	MS. FIGUEREDO: Naomi N.'s live testimony
15	was not necessary here, because the reason we
16	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: But it but it
17	would be okay for the doctor to to say what
18	- if he had spoken to her, to say what she would say.
19	Does that make any sense to you?
20	MS. FIGUEREDO: If Dr. Bard had interviewed
21	Naomi N. and found the details of her relationship
22	with Enrique D. relevant to his psychiatric
23	diagnosis, he could have testified to that. And
24	counsel for

 ${\tt JUDGE\ PIGOTT:}\ {\tt Well,\ let's\ assume\ what\ Ms.}$

Ishee said was the case, and she said it might have been relevant to your expert. And your expert said "Paraphilia NOS non-consent is a catchall diagnosis for problems with sexual arousal that don't fit any category. And the defendant's arousal by coercive sexual behavior is what - - that's what his problem is, and there's no evidence other than the sexual offenses themselves."

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So based upon the fact that he had been a convicted sex abuser, he says he - - - his sexual proclivity is coercion. Would it not make some sense to have someone come in and say, we have great sex and it's not coerced at all?

MS. FIGUEREDO: No, because as Dr. Bard testified, it is very common for sex offenders to engage in consensual sexual relationships even while offending.

JUDGE PIGOTT: But Harris said the opposite, and that's what you're trying to - - - that's who the defense is trying to defeat by saying - - - he - - - Dr. Harris says it has to be coercive; I'm here to tell you that our sex is not.

MS. FIGUEREDO: Dr. Harris opined that based on the pattern of offenses, Enrique D. met the criteria for paraphilia NOS dia - - NOS non-consent

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2	JUDGE SMITH: And one and one of
3	- I mean, the central criterion is that co it
4	is coercion itself is something that he needs to
5	arouse him, yes?
6	MS. FIGUEREDO: That's correct. Dr. Harris
7	
8	JUDGE SMITH: And you say you have to
9	come someone come in and say he doesn't need -
10	he gets aroused very easily with no coercion.
11	Why is that not relevant?
12	MS. FIGUEREDO: It is not relevant, because
13	as both experts testified, it is common for these
14	offenders to have sex and still be aroused while
15	committing these sexual offenses. So the fact that
16	he was able to engage in twenty-six other other
17	consensual relationships
18	JUDGE SMITH: Even if even if
19	even if a million experts said it, couldn't a jury
20	find that that if he does if he does get
21	aroused without coercion, maybe he doesn't have a
22	disease where he needs coercion?
23	MS. FIGUEREDO: Even if that were the case,
24	that was not a reason proffered to Supreme Court for

the admissibility of Naomi N.'s testimony. They

focused on the fact of whether Nao - - - of whether 1 2 he ever had offended against Naomi N. And Dr. Bard, 3 in concluding that Enrique D. did not have paraphilia 4 NOS, also focused on just the existence of their 5 consensual relationship. The details of that 6 relationship were - - -7 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Doesn't that tell you -8 9 MS. FIGUEREDO: - - - not relevant - - -10 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: - - - counsel, that 11 there is maybe some relevance, more than a little 12 bit, to whether this particular man, for the jury's 13 purposes, may not have paraphilia NOS, because he 14 does get aroused by consensual sex as well as the 15 other? 16 MS. FIGUEREDO: And the - - - and the jury 17 knew of those consensual relationships, and the State 18 did not dispute them. So it was perfectly acceptable 19 for Supreme Court to conclude that this fact, which 20 was already in evidence, and which was undisputed, 21 did not need to be further - - -22 JUDGE PIGOTT: Then why do you care? 23 would seem to me that it's no big deal. Bring her 2.4 Maybe she's a very persuasive witness. You in.

don't know how large or how expansive her testimony

1 may have been. There may have been withering cross 2 examination by the State that - - - that crushed any 3 testimony she brought in. But the idea of bringing 4 it in, it seems to me, as a matter of law - - -5 because it seemed to me the court was saying as a 6 matter of law you can't bring civilian witnesses in -7 - - would be wrong. And I think you agree with that. 8 But that being said, then the witness ought 9 to come in. And the weight is left to the trier of 10 fact, the jury. 11 MS. FIGUEREDO: That may be the case. 12 given the facts of this case, they are now trying to 13 overturn a unanimous jury verdict after a full trial 14 based on offered testimony that was not even relevant 15 to their - - -16 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yeah, but the - - -17 MS. FIGUEREDO: - - - own expert - - -18 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: - - - but the trier of fact has to determine whether there's a mental 19 20 abnormality here. And - - -21 MS. FIGUEREDO: And - - -22 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: - - - and wouldn't 23 this help them? That's what's at issue. That's what 2.4 they're trying to decide, whether - - - a mental

abnormality predisposing him to a certain kind of

conduct. How could this not be relevant?

2.4

MS. FIGUEREDO: Even if the court were convinced that the existence of the relationship was minimally relevant, that fact is undisputed and known by the jury. So it did not impact the jury's decision in any way. It didn't even impact Dr. Bard's diagnosis, because Dr. Bard did not - - - JUDGE SMITH: You're arguing harmless error?

MS. FIGUEREDO: We would argue that it would be - - - it would be harmless error, that the jury would have reached the same verdict regardless of Naomi N.'s testimony, because the existence of those twenty-six relationships were known to them and undisputed.

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yeah, but as Judge Pigott said, maybe she's a very persuasive witness. Why would you say that? This is a critical issue on whether he has this mental abnormality. Whether your expert or their expert disagrees, or whatever, there's a fundamental question that the jury has to decide.

MS. FIGUEREDO: Even if the court believed that Naomi N. would have been a more persuasive witness, it was certainly within Supreme Court's

discretion to determine how - - - the best 1 presentation of that evidence. And in the context of 2 3 the limited proffer - - -4 JUDGE SMITH: Isn't - - - can you cite any 5 case anywhere in which - - - in which it's been held that it's - - - that you can produce evidence only 6 7 through a third party and not through the declarant, 8 where hearsay is preferred to direct testimony? 9 MS. FIGUEREDO: We're not - - - we're not 10 arguing for a categorical rule in that sense. 11 JUDGE SMITH: Okay. Well, can you - - -12 can you cite - - - is there any case, categorical or 13 noncategorical that's ever held that except for this 14 one? 15 MS. FIGUEREDO: Well, in the - - - in the context of People v. Goldstein, the court does permit 16 17 an expert to testify to information which they determine is a basis for their diagnosis. And in 18 19 this case, if Dr. Bard had interviewed Naomi N., and 20 found the details of that relationship relevant to his - - -21 22 JUDGE RIVERA: But why does that foreclose 23 bringing in Naomi? MS. FIGUEREDO: It does - - - we're not 2.4 25 saying it would always foreclose the bringing in the

live testimony of a lay witness. What we're saying is that here, in this case, Supreme Court, given the reasons it was provided for her independent live testimony, it was not an abuse of discretion for the court to say your - - - this is normally the type of information the expert - - -

2.4

JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: But counsel, wasn't

the - - - wasn't the court already making a

determination, according to what you said, that it

could only come in through Dr. Bard, without even

knowing whether Dr. Bard had even ever interviewed

Naomi N., or any of the other part - - consensual

sex partners? So how could the court make that

decision that it could only come in through Dr. Bard?

Wouldn't that be coercing Dr. Bard to interview her

so that the testimony could come in?

MS. FIGUEREDO: The court said - - - said clearly that it would reserve its judgment and would permit - - it was a concession permitting Enrique D. to demonstrate the relevancy of Naomi N.'s testimony through Dr. Bard.

There was a subsequent ruling where the court finally says I'm not going to permit it. But certainly, if Enrique D. had found - - - had tried to have - - -

1 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: So what would Dr. Bard have had to say in order for the court to determine 2 3 that Naomi N. should testify or not? MS. FIGUEREDO: If Dr. Bard has based his 4 5 conclusion on the absence of sexual fantasies and urges and would then have interviewed Naomi N., and 6 7 Naomi N. would have said I've been in a relationship 8 for X years, X months, and during that time he never 9 engaged in these sexual fantasies or urges, then the 10 Supreme Court, based on that information, could have 11 ruled, perhaps this is relevant. But that was not 12 what happened here. 13 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Based on what the expert said? 14 15 MS. FIGUEREDO: Based on what the expert 16 relied on in reaching his psychiatric diagnosis. 17 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Then maybe she comes in? Is that the way this works? 18 19 MS. FIGUEREDO: That is not the way it 20 works. Naom - - - if - - -21 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: You're saying she could still come in and testify, but only after the 22 23 expert said what she said? 2.4 MS. FIGUEREDO: In the initial phase of the 25 Article 10 proceeding, where the question is

1	fundamentally diagnostic, the experts' testimony
2	would be the most important aspect or most important
3	evidence. So to demonstrate to the judge or to the
4	trier to the trier of fact that the information
5	is relevant, it would be necessary for the expert to
6	explain how he used that information in reaching his
7	
8	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Article 10 is a
9	pretty serious proceeding, isn't it?
10	MS. FIGUEREDO: Yes.
11	JUDGE GRAFFEO: The statute's not limited
12	to only calling expert witnesses, is it?
13	MS. FIGUEREDO: It is not. In in
14	10.08(g) the respondent does have the opportunity to
15	call and examine witnesses. But that does not mean -
16	
17	JUDGE RIVERA: He could have testified,
18	correct?
19	MS. FIGUEREDO: I'm sorry?
20	JUDGE RIVERA: He can testify?
21	MS. FIGUEREDO: Enrique D. did testify.
22	And he can testify.
23	JUDGE RIVERA: Right. And he can.
24	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: But is is
25	JUDGE RIVERA: So why when, then,

1 can't he call her to testify? 2 MS. FIGUEREDO: We're not saying that he 3 can't. What we're saying is that in this - - - in 4 this instance, Supreme Court, based on the reasons 5 that were given to it for her independent live testimony, reasonably concluded that the information 6 7 which was already undisputed - - -CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So basically his 8 9 liber - - - his liberty is dependent on this hearsay 10 coming through the doctor, and he has no right to 11 just say, you know, this really may rebut what 12 they're talking about in terms of my diagnosis. He 13 can't just call - - - I mean, I know you're saying 14 it's a discretionary decision. But it sounds more 15 like a decision that he can't call civilian 16 witnesses. 17 MS. FIGUEREDO: That - - - that's not correct. He can call civilian witnesses - - -18 19 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: You think the judge 20 had an open - - -21 MS. FIGUEREDO: - - - if he can demonstrate 22 23 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: - - - mind and it was 2.4 just discretionary given the context that he wouldn't 25 allow him at that point?

1	MS. FIGUEREDO: That the judge very
2	clearly it was a pre-trial ruling
3	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay.
4	MS. FIGUEREDO: and very clearly says
5	I will maintain an open mind.
6	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, counselor.
7	Thank you.
8	MS. FIGUEREDO: Thank you.
9	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Counselor, rebuttal?
10	MS. ISHEE: Your Honor, this court in
11	Blades discussed the well-established policy
12	preference for live witness testimony instead of less
13	reliable substitute suffered only through narrow
14	exceptions.
15	JUDGE PIGOTT: This is part one of a two-
16	party phase in these things.
17	MS. ISHEE: Yes.
18	JUDGE PIGOTT: I mean, all this all
19	this determines is if he has the abnormality.
20	Whether or not he goes free or is subject to SIST or
21	whatever, comes later. It doesn't the State
22	puts on an expert. They do not call the victims.
23	You know, he had three previous criminal convictions.
24	Conceivably they could call those people in and put
25	them through another gauntlet of describing what this

man did to them at a certain time. They don't. They do it all through an expert.

2.4

This judge seems to have decided the same thing on your side saying, you know, we're going to have an expert on the State relating to the victims that - - - that resulted in his - - - in his being convicted and sentenced. You now can put in any witnesses you want through your expert. Then we determine whether he's suffering from his - - - from an abnormality. Then we'll go on to the other part.

So it's - - - there's an argument to be made, it seems to me, that there's a balancing there, and why - - - and doesn't it make some sense?

MS. ISHEE: Your Honor, I think that that balancing is just contrary to the statute. The statute says he has the right to call witnesses on his behalf. It doesn't say that there's some kind of balancing depending on how much the experts rely on them.

JUDGE PIGOTT: Ms. Figueredo was now saying, you know, I'll grant you that. But in this particular case, why doesn't it make sense to just have the two experts testify as to what they know? Because all we're doing is diagnosing, now. We're not saying who struck John.

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MS. ISHEE: I think that hearsay is just
 1
          not as reliable as live witness testimony.
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                    JUDGE SMITH: It is - - - it is - - -
                    MS. ISHEE: I think - - -
 4
 5
                    JUDGE SMITH: - - - it is theoretically
          possible, isn't it, that there's testimony - - - you
 6
 7
          could have a witness' testimony that would be
          irrelevant unless the expert first testified and
 8
 9
          explained why it was important?
10
                    MS. ISHEE: I think it is theoretically
11
          possible that that could be the case. I don't think
12
13
                    JUDGE SMITH: Why is it not - - -
                    MS. ISHEE: - - - that this witness - - -
14
15
                    JUDGE SMITH: - - - true here?
                    MS. ISHEE: I think it's not true here
16
17
          because the facts that she would have testified to
          were well within the understanding of - - -
18
19
                    JUDGE SMITH: You're really saying - - -
2.0
                    MS. ISHEE: - - - the - - -
21
                    JUDGE SMITH: - - - I guess, that what she
22
          was - - - her testimony was made relevant, not by - -
23
          - not by Bard's opinion, but by Harris?
2.4
                    MS. ISHEE: Yes, exactly.
25
                    CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay.
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1	Go ahead. I'm sorry. Did you want to
2	finish up?
3	MS. ISHEE: No.
4	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Good. All right.
5	Thank you both.
6	(Court is adjourned)
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CERTIFICATION I, Penina Wolicki, certify that the foregoing transcript of proceedings in the Court of Appeals of Matter of the State of New York v. Enrique D., No. 168 was prepared using the required transcription equipment and is a true and accurate record of the proceedings. Penina waich. Signature: Agency Name: eScribers Address of Agency: 700 West 192nd Street Suite # 607 New York, NY 10040 Date: September 19, 2013