1	COURT OF APPEALS
2	STATE OF NEW YORK
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4	PEOPLE,
5	Respondent,
6	-against-
7	No. 40 TERENCE MCCRAY,
8	Appellant.
9	
10	20 Eagle Street Albany, New York 12207
11	February 13, 2014
12	Before:
13	CHIEF JUDGE JONATHAN LIPPMAN ASSOCIATE JUDGE VICTORIA A. GRAFFEO
14	ASSOCIATE JUDGE SUSAN PHILLIPS READ ASSOCIATE JUDGE ROBERT S. SMITH
15	ASSOCIATE JUDGE EUGENE F. PIGOTT, JR.  ASSOCIATE JUDGE JENNY RIVERA  ASSOCIATE JUDGE SHEILA ABDUS-SALAAM
16	
17	Appearances:
18	PAUL J. CONNOLLY, ESQ. LAW OFFICE OF PAUL J. CONNOLLY
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20	Delmar, NY 12054
21	STEVEN M. SHARP, ESQ. OFFICE OF THE ALBANY COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY
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23	6 Lodge Street Albany, NY 12207
24	Penina Wolicki
25	Official Court Transcriber

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Counsel, we'll start
with number 48 40. Let's get going. Go ahead.
People v. McCray.
MR. CONNOLLY: Thank you
CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Counsel, you want
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MR. CONNOLLY: Two minutes, please?
CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Two minutes. Go
ahead. You're on.
MR. CONNOLLY: Our position in this case is
that the county court violated Mr. McCray's rights to
due process and to confrontation by failing to
disclose multiple records in the complainant's mental
health records that would have been of substantial
value to him in
JUDGE SMITH: Is this essentially a Brady
issue?
MR. CONNOLLY: It certainly could be viewed
as a Brady issue. It also involves the right to
confrontation, which Brady does as well. But the
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JUDGE SMITH: I thought I thought,
doesn't Ritchie (ph.) say that this isn't a
that this is essentially a Brady question?

MR. CONNOLLY: It does say that that is the

1 way that that court - - - the Supreme Court looked at 2 it - - - looked at this issue, yes. 3 JUDGE GRAFFEO: Counsel, what specifically 4 would be in the additional thirty-four pages that's 5 not redundant or immaterial, that was already 6 revealed in the original twenty-eight pages? 7 MR. CONNOLLY: Well - - -8 JUDGE GRAFFEO: What's the new information 9 that you feel would have made a difference? 10 MR. CONNOLLY: Maybe the most prominent or 11 salient new information is that this complainant had 12 accused her father of attempting to sexually assault 13 her, and the other evidence in the records indicated that that claim was false. And - - -14 15 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Is the relationship 16 to the father the key - - - the key area? I mean, is 17 that - - - is that a lot of your - - - your 18 contention here? 19 MR. CONNOLLY: That's a lot - - -20 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: In addition to the records that were turned over, the father is - - - is 21 22 the sticking point, as far as you're concerned? 2.3 MR. CONNOLLY: I wouldn't put it that way. 2.4 The father - - - the failure to turn over records

relating to false accusation against the father is

certainly significant, and it's among - - - maybe 1 2 it's the most important piece - - -3 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: What's the most 4 significant thing that you want us - - -5 MR. CONNOLLY: Yes. 6 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: - - - to reverse on? 7 MR. CONNOLLY: Well, I would say, that's 8 the most significant one, but it's certainly not the 9 only one that I submit - - -10 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: And - - -11 JUDGE GRAFFEO: And the Rape Shield Law 12 would not have kept that out of the proceeding 13 regardless? 14 MR. CONNOLLY: I submit that the Rape 15 Shield Law should be deemed to be irrelevant to that kind of evidence where the claim is that the sexual 16 17 assault never happened. 18 JUDGE SMITH: Well - - -19 MR. CONNOLLY: Not - - -20 JUDGE SMITH: - - - well, are you entitled 21 to put in anything that's relevant, no matter how - -22 - how much it invades the victim's privacy? Or do 2.3 you have to meet the Brady standard that it's - - -2.4 it's material in Brady terms; that it would - - - at

least with a reasonable possibility of a different

result?

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MR. CONNOLLY: In this situation, I would say there definitely is a reasonable possibility of a different result at this - - -

JUDGE SMITH: Yes, but I'm saying doesn't - doesn't the case turn on that? I mean, I - - - I can see how all this would meet a broad definition of relevance, but whether - - - you know, whether a jury - - whether there's any likelihood a jury would acquit you guy if it knew this stuff, is a different question.

MR. CONNOLLY: I would say, under the Ritchie test that the Supreme Court enunciated with respect to const - - - United States Constitutional law, that reasonable possibility would be the standard. And that would easily be met in this case, where there was - - - the evidence was far from overwhelming. I argue - - -

JUDGE SMITH: Well, I mean, the - - - she - - - let's assume that the jury thinks she falsely accused her father, although it's not - - - I mean, it was five years ago; it was an accusation that was never reported to the police. It's a very different kind of thing.

Here you've got a girl who comes out of an

encoun - - - comes out of this encounter in this 1 2 building with blood on her face, screaming, calling 3 911. Did - - does the encounter with the father really make you think that you're going to believe 5 the defendant's version of this, which is that she was essentially an unpaid prostitute who got into a 6 7 fight with him? 8 MR. CONNOLLY: I certainly think it could, 9 yes. This is a very close case. I mean, the - - -10

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neither the majority nor the dissent thought that the evidence in this case was overwhelming against the defendant.

JUDGE SMITH: Well - - - well, the Brady test isn't overwhelming. Even - - - I agree with you that - - -

MR. CONNOLLY: No, I understand that.

JUDGE SMITH: - - - if the error wasn't harmless. But is it - - - is it - - - but under Brady, it's got to be material. Isn't that a little stronger?

MR. CONNOLLY: There has to be a reasonable possibility that if this evidence had been introduced it could have affected the difference - - - it could have affected the outcome, excuse me. And in this situation, given all the facts and circumstances of

1 this case, where there was substantial reason to 2 doubt this complainant's account of this incident - -3 4 JUDGE SMITH: What's - - - what's the 5 substantial reason, apart from - - - apart from the 6 father - - - the incident with the father years 7 before? What - - - what makes you - - - what would 8 you say to a jury that would lead you to doubt the 9 complainant's account of this incident? 10 MR. CONNOLLY: A number of factors. One, 11 her injuries were inconsistent with her account of 12 this attack. They were very inconsistent with it. 13 For example, there was no injury at all discernible 14 to her neck, although she claimed that the defendant 15 choked her. JUDGE SMITH: Didn't - - - didn't the 16 17 hospital records show pain on rotation of the neck? 18 MR. CONNOLLY: That's subjective. There 19 was no objective evidence. There was no redness, no 20 - - - no bruising of any kind discernible in - - - in the neck. The only injury she had was a bruise on 21 22 her cheek and a cut on the inside of her lip and some scratches on her back. Cuts on her were - - -2.3 2.4 JUDGE SMITH: And he - - - and he had a

bite mark on his arm.

1 MR. CONNOLLY: Pardon me? 2 JUDGE SMITH: And he had a bite mark on his 3 arm? 4 MR. CONNOLLY: Yes, he had a bite mark on 5 his arm, which was consistent with his account that 6 it was an altercation relating to money. JUDGE SMITH: I guess - - - I guess what 7 8 bothers me is, you read these medical records, and 9 you get a picture of this obviously very troubled 10 child. But nothing in it suggests - - - but for all 11 her problems, I don't see anything in it that 12 suggests that she follows up consensual sex by asking 13 for money and then - - - and then lying about what 14 happened. And that doesn't - - - you - - - that 15 isn't the sort of kid that seems to emerge from those 16 records. 17 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Counsel, are you 18 limiting your arguments to just the admissibility of 19 the evidence, or are you also looking for something 20 that would lead, in discovery, that you could have 21 followed up on, that might have led to something that 22 was admissible? 2.3 MR. CONNOLLY: Oh, well, it's definitely

We're also arguing that the court should have

turned over these records so that the defendant's

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both.

1 attorney could have made further inquiry, conducted 2 further investigation. For example, with respect to 3 the - - - the prior claim - - - false - - - allegedly 4 false claim of sexual assault, defense counsel could 5 have obtained more information through investigation. CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Counsel, is it the 6 7 sheer number of records that are at issue here? Is 8 that what's bothering you? The volume of it? 9 MR. CONNOLLY: The volume of it is 10 significant. And that there are - - there're a lot of different evidence that - - -11 12 JUDGE GRAFFEO: At - - -13 MR. CONNOLLY: - - - discuss - - -14 JUDGE GRAFFEO: - - - at what point, though 15 - - - I mean, the jury was clearly aware that this 16 young woman had a number of significant problems. 17 It's pretty replete through the records that you were 18 provided with. And there was no subpoena for the 19 2009 hospitalization records. So, I mean, do we 20 reach a certain point where it's just more of the 21 same, more of the same - - -22 MR. CONNOLLY: No. 2.3 JUDGE GRAFFEO: - - - that you're looking for here? 2.4

MR. CONNOLLY: Respectfully, not at all.

For example, the other records that should have been 1 2 disclosed are records that this complainant 3 experienced flashbacks triggered by consensual sex. 4 And the flashbacks were to prior nonconsensual sex. 5 JUDGE GRAFFEO: Well, the disclosed records 6 talked about loss of memory in one or two instances? 7 MR. CONNOLLY: Yes, but - - -8 JUDGE GRAFFEO: It's not a topic that was -9 10 MR. CONNOLLY: Yes. 11 JUDGE GRAFFEO: - - - completely missing 12 from the records that were disclosed? 13 MR. CONNOLLY: No, no, it wasn't. But let 14 me just again - - -15 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: You're saying it's 16 contextual, or are you saying they're different 17 areas, in the records? The ones that you don't - - -18 you didn't get and the ones that you get? Is it just 19 contextual in nature, or are they totally different 20 areas of inquiry or interest? 21 MR. CONNOLLY: They're quite different 22 areas of inquiry. Take the flashbacks, for example. 2.3 There was nothing in the disclosed records to 2.4 indicate, necessarily, that the flashbacks were to

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prior sexual abuse.

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JUDGE SMITH: What does "flashback" mean?

Does it mean just that she remembered the prior

sexual abuse or that she - - - is there evidence that

she actually thought it was - - - she confused the

events, that she thought what had happened in the

past was happening in the present?

MR. CONNOLLY: Your Honor, I don't have the records, so I don't - - - they're not disclosed. So I don't know. But I mean, to me, "flashback" would mean that it would be pretty much akin to an hallucination - - - a hallucinatory experience where you feel you're - - - you're in a consensual sex - - - sexual situation, and you feel that - - - you believe that it's nonconsensual. You're having a - -

JUDGE SMITH: But isn't - - - isn't

hallucination a tough - - - a tough argument for you,

when the - - - when there's obviously a violent

encounter between - - - it's not as though she

imagined the whole thing. There was a violent

encounter between your client and the victim. We

know that. We know she bit his arm. The - - - the

question is, what kind of encounter was it?

You're saying that she, in fact, got into a fight over nonpayment and hallucinated that it was

forcible rape? That just doesn't - - - I can't - - -1 2 I have trouble getting my mind around that. 3 MR. CONNOLLY: It's important to keep in 4 mind that this is, as you noted before, this is a 5 very troubled - - - mentally troubled complainant. 6 So what may seem normal behavior to you or me, may 7 not be the type of behavior that she would engage in. 8 It may - - - so an experience that she would have as 9 a result of this consensual - - -10 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, counsel. 11 MR. CONNOLLY: - - - sexual encounter, may be quite different from the experience - - -12 13 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay. 14 MR. CONNOLLY: - - - that we would have. 15 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: You'll have your 16 rebuttal time. Let's hear from your adversary, 17 counsel. 18 Counselor? 19 MR. SHARP: May it please the court, Steven 20 Sharp for the People. 21 The trial court did not abuse its 22 discretion in this - - -2.3 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: What about - - - what 2.4 about the father and the issues with the father? I 25 think that's the most troubling question.

1 MR. SHARP: Sure. 2 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: What significance do 3 you give that? And why - - - why couldn't it have, 4 in light of everything else, change the result? 5 MR. SHARP: Well, I mean, there are a number of reasons. And first of all, I contend that 6 7 a record disclosed some prior sexual abuse by the 8 father involving the victim. That's on page A-453 of 9 the appendix. So right there, there - - - there was 10 an indication that there was some sort of sexual 11 abuse that the defense could have actually went out 12 and checked. 13 JUDGE SMITH: Was - - - but was there an indication that it was - - - that it was disbelieved? 14 15 MR. SHARP: No, but it did say that mother 16 and patient decided not to press charges, which would 17 give rise to, well, maybe that's a possibility to 18 explore. 19 JUDGE PIGOTT: Was there a plea offer in 20 this case? 21 MR. SHARP: Yes. And there were multiple 22 plea offers, I believe. 2.3 JUDGE PIGOTT: What was the - - - what was 2.4 the offer?

MR. SHARP: The last one?

JUDGE PIGOTT: Yeah.

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MR. SHARP: It was, I believe, a plea to a misdemeanor sexual abuse - - - A misdemeanor.

JUDGE PIGOTT: And what was the sentence?

MR. SHARP: The proposed sentence? I

believe it was probation. I'm not sure about that.

JUDGE PIGOTT: And - - - and this turned,
then, into this twenty-two years, he got for the - - it led me to believe that there was something the

DA knew that they would offer somebody time served, I
think, is what - - - you know, on an A misdemeanor,
who then goes to trial and gets twenty-two years.

It's just so dis - - - there's such a disparity there that doesn't make sense. And I didn't know if that was some indication that there's something in these records that the DA knew that no one, to this date, knows, that would lead some - - - lead to this type of a disparity in conviction and sentence.

MR. SHARP: Well, I'll say a couple things on that. And the first is, we never had possession of these records, so we had no idea what was in them. And if you - - if you look at the pre-trial stage, we disclosed a number of mental health issues, a number of instances - - -

1 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So why such a good 2 plea offer? 3 MR. SHARP: Well - - -4 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Or lenient plea 5 offer? MR. SHARP: Well, there's a couple reasons. 6 7 The first is, in any case like this, where you have a 8 troubled emotionally and mentally fragile victim, 9 it's - - - you're looking at putting her on the stand 10 in front of twelve strangers in a public courtroom 11 and facing the person who raped her. That's 12 obviously a consideration we go into. This woman's 13 troubled enough without having to put her through it. 14 And, you know, my - - - my understanding -15 - - I obviously wasn't the trial prosecutor in this 16 case - - - was there was some issues towards the 17 record that's not at all in the record as to why that 18 offer was made. But certainly nothing affecting the 19 complainant's credibility or anything with the mental 20 health records that are at issue here. CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: But it is - - - it 21 does jump out at you, what Judge Pigott just 22 2.3 mentioned, the - - - the nature of the plea offer and 2.4 the nature of the ultimate sentence is really quite

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jarring - - -

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CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: - - - to see the difference?

MR. SHARP: I understand that. And certainly that was an issue raised before the Appellate Division that had jurisdiction to reach the issue. And nonetheless, they still found that the sentence wasn't harsh and excessive.

And so I mean, there's a number of reasons that went into the offer. And ultimately, knowing on the record, the defendant rejected that offer and proceeded to trial. And so I - - - I don't know what else to say, I guess, on that issue.

But with respect to the father, and the record there, those records, first of all, don't rise to the level of even meeting a false claim to put before the jury, in my view. All it is, is a record says the mother's opinion is this never happened, and

JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Counsel, what - - - if

- - - if defendant had those records before trial

and he could, for example, do some investigation,

perhaps, question the mother or subpoena other

records that might have been more detailed about

these allegations that the victim made against her

father, do you think that might have had some impact on the trial; might have been a very different trial than what was actually - - - the case that was actually tried?

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MR. SHARP: Well, I still think that they had an indication of it, based on that disclosed record from the county court. But in any event, the father was dead by the time that these records were even disclosed. So - - -

JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Well, I wasn't suggesting that - - - that you would question the father or that there would be any investigation of the father. They would question the mother, who was saying that this never happened.

MR. SHARP: Sure. And they - - - they could have done that had these re - - - had these records been provided to them, if they wanted to take that step. But I still think, as the majority at the Appellate Division found, is that they can really conceive of no reason that this evidence would have even ultimately been admissible at trial, because the circumstances of this attempted rape, as specifically mentioned in those records, is far different from the rape at issue here. I mean, we're dealing with a young - - -

JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: There were some - - there were some similarities though. There was an
indication that she was penned in a prior assault
that she claimed - - - she was penned against the
wall and she said that this particular defendant
penned her against the wall. There seemed to be some
similarities in some of the records.

MR. SHARP: Well, I guess, in my view, that's a very tenuous connection. I'm - - - I'm looking at, she was thirteen at the time of this supposed attempted rape with her father, where she can't consent to sex. It's a father-daughter relationship; as opposed to this which is a date rape, where she's eighteen and can consent, and the whole issue is consent, that that is far too different and attenuated to actually - - - under this court's precedent in Mandel - - - reach the jury.

And even if we got to that point where it did reach the jury, based on the entire record, the mental health issues, I really can't see under a Brady-type analysis, that the jury would have changed its result.

JUDGE SMITH: Is there --- is there an issue other than the Brady issue here?

MR. SHARP: No.

1 JUDGE SMITH: Is this a pure Brady case? 2 MR. SHARP: It's basically a pure Brady 3 case, except the onus was on the trial court, in this 4 case, because the People never possessed the records. 5 JUDGE SMITH: But - - - but it's - - - but 6 it's error if it was Brady material, and it's not 7 error if it wasn't, and that's all there is to it? 8 MR. SHARP: Pretty much, yes, except - - -9 I mean, with the caveat that, you know, it's an abuse 10 of discretion standard to - - - for the trial court 11 turning over the records, in my view, under this 12 court's decision in Drake, in terms of going through 13 all those records and making the disclosures. 14 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, counselor. 15 MR. SHARP: Thanks. 16 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Thank you. 17 Counselor, rebuttal? 18 MR. CONNOLLY: Thank you. The prosecutor 19 maintains that the record on appeal indicates - - -20 or I should say, the disclosure medical records indicate that the complainant in this case did 21 22 previously accuse the father of sexual abuse. I 2.3 would suggest that it's just the contrary. If you 2.4 look at A-453 and A-474 of the appendix, the record

suggests that she never accused the father of sexual

abuse, but she did accuse several other people of sexual abuse.

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It mentions that she accused several people of sexual abuse, and it does not mention that she accused the father of sexual abuse, which is further indication that this claim was false.

Also, Judge Smith seems to be concerned about whether there's a reasonable possibility that disclosure of these records would have made a difference. I would draw the court's attention to a letter that the - - - excuse me - - - an affirmation that the prosecutor prepared in this case in opposition to a motion to dismiss in which she said that if there - - - I can't find the exact language - - but the effect is - - - of what she said is that if there are any records that indicate that this complainant ever fabricated anything or ever hallucinated anything having to do with sexual abuse or sexual assault, that would certainly be exculpatory and would dramatically affect the People's decision whether to proceed with this case.

JUDGE SMITH: Is there a difference - - - I realize you haven't seen the undisclosed records - - but is there a difference between a fabricated claim and a claim that was - - - that was not - - -

1 that was not well-founded? 2 MR. CONNOLLY: I haven't seen the records. 3 There could be a difference. But the People 4 themselves used this language. And their position 5 was, anything that indicated that she may be 6 fabricating or also hallucinating any experience of 7 sexual abuse, would be exculpatory and would affect 8 their decision to proceed. 9 Well, this is exactly what the evidence 10 that wasn't disclosed, like the flashbacks, that's 11 hallucinatory stuff, dealing with sexual abuse. And 12 it should have been disclosed. 13 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay. Thank you 14 both. 15 MR. CONNOLLY: Thank you. 16 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Appreciate it. 17 (Court is adjourned) 18 19 20 21 22 2.3 2.4

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## CERTIFICATION


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