1	COURT OF APPEALS
2	STATE OF NEW YORK
3	
4	MATTER OF JOHN KAPON, et al.
5	Appellants,
6	-against-
7	No. 63 WILLIAM I. KOCH,
8	Respondent.
9	
10	20 Eagle Street
11	Albany, New York 12207 February 19, 2014
12	Before:
13	CHIEF JUDGE JONATHAN LIPPMAN
14	ASSOCIATE JUDGE VICTORIA A. GRAFFEO ASSOCIATE JUDGE SUSAN PHILLIPS READ
15	ASSOCIATE JUDGE EUGENE F. PIGOTT, JR. ASSOCIATE JUDGE JENNY RIVERA
16	ASSOCIATE JUDGE SHEILA ABDUS-SALAAM
17	Appearances:
18	PAUL SHECHTMAN, ESQ. ZUCKERMAN SPAEDER LLP
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25	Sharona Shapiro Official Court Transcriber

1	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Number 63. Counsel,
2	are you ready to proceed?
3	MR. SHECHTMAN: I am, Your Honor.
4	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Good. Do you want
5	any rebuttal time, counselor?
6	MR. SHECHTMAN: Two minutes, Your Honor.
7	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Two minutes. You
8	have it. Go ahead, you're on.
9	MR. SHECHTMAN: May it please the court.
10	Paul Shechtman, and I represent appellants John Kapon
11	and Justin Christoph.
12	I suppose I should begin with two
13	announcements. First, a jury has found Rudy
14	Kurniawan if I say his name right guilty
15	of manufacturing and distributing counterfeit wine,
16	which should confirm one's faith in the jury system.
17	And in the case of Koch v. Acker
18	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Right.
19	MR. SHECHTMAN: which is the separate
20	
21	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Right.
22	MR. SCHECHTMAN: action involving
23	five bottles of counterfeit wine
24	JUDGE GRAFFEO: Is that the California
25	action?

1	MR. SHECHTMAN: That's the New York action.
2	M_{Y}
3	JUDGE GRAFFEO: The New York action.
4	MR. SHECHTMAN: That's the New York action.
5	JUDGE READ: Discovery's been reopened,
6	right?
7	MR. SHECHTMAN: Reopened, to the extent
8	that it it is permitted as to Acker's
9	relationship with Kurniawan through 2006.
10	JUDGE READ: So that's narrow enough that
11	it doesn't affect your argument here, is that
12	MR. SHECHTMAN: I think, Your Honor, it is
13	narrow enough. It it affects the use argument
14	somewhat. I think the argument still has some life,
15	but it it certainly makes it less important to
16	us.
17	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Counselor, whose
18	burden is it, in these kinds of situations, with an
19	out-of-state action and who who has to
20	show that it's relevant or not relevant? Where
21	where does the burden lie in in our present
22	case law? And you know, obviously, the statutory
23	framework has changed. Where are we today?
24	MR. SHECHTMAN: It seems to me it's just
25	the right first question.

1 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay. 2 MR. SHECHTMAN: It -- and the -- I 3 don't know where this court's case law is, because 4 this court has not had a chance to really look at 5 this since - - -CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: On this really exact 6 7 point, yeah. MR. SHECHTMAN: - - - the 1984 amendment. 8 9 I know where the Appellate Divisions are, and 10 respectfully, they're all over the lot. And what one 11 learns, for example, is - - - I think what's clear is 12 after 1984, it is very hard to say that where you're 13 - - - there's a subpoena to a nonparty, special circumstances have to be shown. I don't know how one 14 15 can argue that, given that those words were taken 16 from the statute - - -17 JUDGE GRAFFEO: What does the uniform 18 interstate statute do? Where does that put the 19 burden? 20 MR. SHECHTMAN: It - - - it - - - when I 21 started this, Judge, I thought it mattered greatly. 22 I don't think it does. I think it takes you back to 23 3101(a), and so the question here is the same as 2.4 subpoenaing a nonparty in New York. What it does

25

say, though - - -

1 JUDGE GRAFFEO: And on material? 2 MR. SHECHTMAN: No, and I - - - if you give 3 me one second; I apologize. What it does say, though, is the New York court is the decider, and 4 5 that's very important, because I don't think the judge here or the - - - saw himself as the decider. 6 7 But I think what controls here is 3101 - - -JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: The decider of what, 8 9 though, counsel? 10 MR. SHECHTMAN: The decider of relevance 11 and use. And I - - - that - - - what I think matters here is 3101(a)(4). When the advisory committee 12 13 first proposed a change in this law, which is 1983, 14 the change that was proposed was to eliminate the 15 enumeration, so New York law would look like federal 16 law. Parties and nonparties would be treated alike. 17 What happened in 1984 wasn't that. 18 enumeration remained. What changed, though, was the word "special circumstances" dropped out of (a)(4). 19 20 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So how did the 21 legislative intent change? 22 MR. SHECHTMAN: I think the legislative 23 intent changed in the following fashion. 2.4 legislature wanted to keep a distinction; that's what

all of the Appellate Divisions have recognized.

1 wanted to keep a distinction, but it didn't want to 2 keep the same high bar. It didn't want to keep 3 special circumstances. 4 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Oh, it's a more 5 nuanced distinction - - -MR. SCHECHTMAN: 6 It - - -7 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: - - - between a party 8 and a nonparty? How - - - how nuanced? 9 MR. SHECHTMAN: I think the answer is in 10 the language. It says, "Any person, upon notice 11 stating the circumstances or reasons such disclosure 12 is sought or required". Initially - - -13 JUDGE RIVERA: You read that - - - read that from where? Where did you read that from? 14 15 MR. SHECHTMAN: "Any person" - - -JUDGE RIVERA: No, no, where did you read 16 17 it from? 18 MR. SHECHTMAN: 3101(a)(4). 19 JUDGE RIVERA: (a)(4), okay. MR. SHECHTMAN: And if -- after that was 2.0 21 passed in 1984, the Appellate Divisions were - - - as 22 I say, were all over the lot. There were some that 23 still required special circumstances. I don't see 2.4 how you can say that; those words were eliminated. 25 There were some - - - and that's where the Second

_	Department and the Third Department are now
2	that said we don't require special circumstances, but
3	we do require a showing that you're unable to obtain
4	it from another party. And that, to be honest
5	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Is that the same as
6	special circumstances?
7	MR. SHECHTMAN: I think it's the same, and
8	Mr. Connors, who writes the Practice Commentary,
9	quotes from a the legal giant "The Who", the
10	rock group, and says, "Meet the new boss. Same as
11	the old boss". Right? So
12	JUDGE RIVERA: Okay. But other than Pete
13	Townshend, I'm a litt I'm still not clear as to
14	what you say
15	MR. SHECHTMAN: I think
16	JUDGE RIVERA: is the standard.
17	What's the criteria?
18	MR. SHECHTMAN: I think your answer is
19	this. There is a difference. If there wasn't a
20	difference, we would have gotten rid of the
21	enumeration and gone to the federal standard.
22	JUDGE RIVERA: Okay. But then what's the
23	standard?
24	MR. SHECHTMAN: I think the standard is
25	something like this and I take it from the words

1	"sought or required"
2	JUDGE RIVERA: Um-hum.
3	MR. SHECHTMAN: that first the burden
4	is on the issuing party. It's not, as in the part -
5	as in the party situation, the burden is on the -
6	
7	JUDGE RIVERA: To show what? What's the
8	standard?
9	MR. SHECHTMAN: The burden is there to show
10	a demonstrable need to obtain evidence to prepare for
11	trial.
12	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: At what point do they
13	if that is the burden, at what point do they
14	meet that burden?
15	MR. SHECHTMAN: It's there needs to
16	be notice in the subpoena itself.
17	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Is it in the notice
18	that they
19	MR. SHECHTMAN: But I think
20	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: say why they
21	need it?
22	MR. SHECHTMAN: I think the notice
23	provision in this state has become so minimal, and
24	the cases say that, that I don't think this is really
25	about the notice, Your Honor.

1	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So when do they come
2	in and show what you're say
3	MR. SHECHTMAN: I think it happens on a
4	motion to quash
5	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay.
6	MR. SCHECHTMAN: which is what
7	happened in this state.
8	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So the purpose of the
9	notice is to give the opportunity to move to quash,
10	and then you meet this issue
11	MR. SHECHTMAN: And then the question is,
12	at that stage, the motion to quash, who has the
13	burden and what? And the answer here is
14	JUDGE RIVERA: Well, they have to say
15	something in the motion, right?
16	MR. SHECHTMAN: The motion to quash is
17	_
18	JUDGE RIVERA: It can't be "I want it
19	quashed". They have to say something, yes? They
20	must have some burden.
21	MR. SHECHTMAN: Well, they have a burden of
22	going forward, which is to say that we move to quash;
23	we don't think we think this subpoena is
24	overbroad. Now the question is whose burden is it to
25	to satisfy the

1 JUDGE GRAFFEO: So all you have to - - -2 all your clients have to say is the subpoenas are 3 overbroad? MR. SHECHTMAN: I think that's all that has 4 5 to be said. And I think, under this provision, which 6 as I say, treats parties - - -7 JUDGE GRAFFEO: But the purpose of the 8 Interstate Act was to avoid litigation, correct? 9 MR. SHECHTMAN: The purpose of the - - -10 JUDGE GRAFFEO: To have discovery - - -11 MR. SHECHTMAN: The purpose of the - - -12 JUDGE GRAFFEO: - - - without having to 13 secure a court order, right? 14 MR. SHECHTMAN: The purpose of the 15 Interstate Act was to simplify this, but it wasn't to 16 change the underlying distinction between party and 17 nonparty. As I said, that could have been changed easily in 1984. That's what the advisory committee 18 19 wanted. That's what didn't happen. So if there is 20 to be any distinction, it seems to me the distinction 21 is found in two places. One, whose burden is it on 22 the motion to quash? I think the answer is it's their burden. And what is their burden? Their 23 2.4 burden is to show that they need this for purposes -

1 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: But now to show that 2 there are special circumstances, right? 3 MR. SHECHTMAN: Not to show that there are 4 special circumstances. Look, it seems to me there's 5 some situations where you're able to obtain it from 6 another party but you're still entitled - - -7 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Well, is - - -8 MR. SHECHTMAN: - - - to get it from this 9 person. 10 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: - - - is relevance 11 the test? I've got to show it's relevant? Is that 12 what they have to do? 13 MR. SHECHTMAN: I - - - I think they have 14 to show something more than - - - Judge, I don't 15 think they have to show we're seeking admissible 16 evidence, right, because this, after all, is 17 discovery. I think they have to say here is why we 18 need this to prepare for trial. 19 JUDGE GRAFFEO: So it's more than 3101(d). 20 It's more than that test, because that would just be 21 the material and relevance. 22 MR. SHECHTMAN: That - - - that's correct. 23 And - - - and that, as to a party, we know is a very 2.4 low standard. It's the federal standard. It's

basically - - - it's reasonably calculated to lead to

- - - to admissible evidence. But here we retain a 1 2 distinction, and the question becomes what life to 3 give to the distinction. JUDGE READ: So is it theirs to show - - -4 5 their burden to show why it was sought or required? 6 Is that what you're saying? MR. SHECHTMAN: I'm saying that that, I 7 think, is where it comes from, Judge. It's not - - -8 9 that that is why it was retained in there. 10 the legislature's way of saying in this state, unlike 11 in the federal courts, we distinguish between parties 12 and nonparties for purposes of subpoena litigation. 13 JUDGE RIVERA: What - - -14 JUDGE PIGOTT: All of your - - -15 JUDGE RIVERA: What would they - - - what 16 would be necessary to show that they "need" this? 17 That sounds almost like a minimal standard to me, but 18 I may be misunderstanding you. 19 MR. SHECHTMAN: What would be - - - answer 2.0 would be some showing, which is to say, in this case, 21 why do you need testimony about events that occurred 22 after you purchased these bottles? 23 JUDGE RIVERA: So is that equivalent to you 2.4 can't get this information anywhere else?

MR. SHECHTMAN: I don't - - - I don't think

nec - - it is, Your Honor, because I think there
will be cases in which you can get something
somewhere else, but you're still entitled to get it
from this - - - from this source, right?

JUDGE PIGOTT: You're - - -

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MR. SHECHTMAN: But I - - -

JUDGE PIGOTT: I'm sorry, Mr. Shechtman.

MR. SHECHTMAN: No, just - - - my

apologies.

JUDGE PIGOTT: I understand your argument perfectly, and I think you may be right, even up to the Appellate Division level, except that when - - when your client came in, they raised issues that were then addressed. In other words, they didn't come in, as you're suggesting, saying, you know, I -- - I have this subpoena; I know I have a burden of going forward, but you know, they can't demonstrate why I'm needed. Instead, they said it was defective because it was served before Koch had taken Mr. K.'s EBT. They said that they need information - - they're seeking information that's not material and necessary. They said the motive is wrong, it seeks information for the New York suit, and they said that it failed to state particularly why disclosure is sought. So then the - - - the judge addressed those,

which I think he had to do in order to properly decide this motion.

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MR. SHECHTMAN: Well, they - - - they also said that there's no need for information that goes beyond the 149 bottles at issue here.

JUDGE PIGOTT: Right, but what my - - - my point was that I - - - I think you're exactly right that there's a burden of going forward, not a burden of proof, and that - - - that what the Appellate Division then did may be incorrect, but it was - - - it was your client that then said I've got - - - I've got other - - - I realize I don't have to say anything, but I'm saying this; and this is the four reasons why I should not be deposed. And - - - and he rejected them.

MR. SHECHTMAN: But one of the reasons that he said, Judge, was it shouldn't be more than 149 bottles, right? And the answer that came back - - - and this is the bottom of page 17 and 18 in the appendix - - - "There's no meaningful way for this court to delineate in advance the matters which might be permissible." Right? He said, "Based on the pleadings give in this case, this court cannot say the questions of Acker's historical practices would be irrelevant or not reasonably calculated." As soon

1	as you go to that language, "irrelevant" and "not
2	reasonably calculated", and as soon as you say that
3	we haven't shown, for example, the causes of action
4	based on California law which petitioners had not
5	given
6	JUDGE PIGOTT: That's right, and
7	MR. SHECHTMAN: to say that is to put
8	the burden on us.
9	JUDGE PIGOTT: And the Appellate Division
10	agreed with that. They they said that
11	that you failed to show that the requested deposition
12	testimony so
13	MR. SHECHTMAN: Is not utterly irrelevant.
14	JUDGE PIGOTT: Right, and that's and
15	that's the wrong standard; that's your point.
16	MR. SHECHTMAN: I that's that's
17	the main point, Judge, that no one in this case,
18	either at the initial level or at the Appellate
19	Division, has applied the right standard.
20	JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Mr. Shechtman, if we
21	disagree with that and we think that the legislature
22	wanted to equalize parties and nonparties with
23	respect to disclosure, then you lose?
24	MR. SHECHTMAN: I lose.
25	JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Okay.

1	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, counselor.
2	JUDGE GRAFFEO: But
3	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: You'll oh, go
4	ahead, Judge Graffeo.
5	JUDGE GRAFFEO: Can I just ask one
6	can I just ask you on substance? Is it that your
7	clients don't want to provide any discovery, or is it
8	that there's a certain identifiable
9	MR. SHECHTMAN: Look, my my clients
10	have a have an underlying concern here, which
11	is there is a separate action against them in which
12	discovery was closed and now is sharply limited. We
13	have a deposition in a California matter, right, in
14	which depositions as to my client seem to be wide
15	open; there are no limits imposed on them. And that
16	is the underlying concern here. But
17	JUDGE GRAFFEO: Yeah, I'm trying to cut to
18	the chase. What are the what are they do
19	we know what they're willing to do or
20	MR. SHECHTMAN: I think what we're
21	JUDGE GRAFFEO: they haven't revealed
22	that yet?
23	MR. SHECHTMAN: we're we're
24	willing to do and I think we're required to do is to
25	provide depositions that give Koch information that

1	he needs to litigate against Kurniawan in California.
2	Now, I have to say I think it's probably much less
3	than he thinks, because we now have a guilty verdict.
4	So one of the questions here, for example, is should
5	we have to testify about other people to whom we sold
6	counterfeit wine. The answer is yes, there could be
7	similar-act evidence in California. It's hard to
8	think one needs similar-act evidence after a guilty
9	plea and with a fellow whose sink contained, you
10	know, all sorts of manufacturing equipment.
11	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, counsel.
12	You'll have your rebuttal time. Let's hear
13	MR. SHECHTMAN: So I guess
14	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: from your
15	adversary.
16	MR. SHECHTMAN: it comes down to the
17	question of whose burden
18	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yes.
19	MR. SHECHTMAN: and and what
20	that standard is. Thank you, court.
21	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Thank you, counselor.
22	Counselor, whose burden is it?
23	MR. KABA: Your Honor, may it please the
24	court. Moez Kaba on behalf of respondent William
25	Koch.

We think the burden is - - - is quite 1 2 clear; one - - - one looks at the statutory context 3 and history, as this court is to do. The burden - -4 5 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: How so? 6 MR. KABA: The burden is on the party 7 seeking to quash the subpoena - - -JUDGE PIGOTT: Why would that - - -8 9 MR. KABA: - - - and deny - - -10 JUDGE PIGOTT: Why would that be? If you subpoenaed me to testify in this case, I've got to 11 12 somehow go get a lawyer and I've got to move to - - -13 and say, you know, they shouldn't be deposing me 14 because of whatever reason I can possibly think of, 15 when you would then come in and say, well, we're not 16 deposing them for that reason at all; we want to 17 depose him because want to prove he wasn't where he -18 - - where this person says he was. 19 MR. KABA: Well - - -20 JUDGE PIGOTT: That shouldn't be my burden; 21 I'm - - - I'm just a citizen of the State of New 22 If you want to depose somebody, it seems to 23 me, as Mr. Shechtman's pointing out, they can come in 2.4 and say this is an improper subpoena; we - - - we

don't want to respond. And it would be your burden

1	to say it's not frivolous, it's not it's not
2	litigious, it's it's legitimate it's
3	legitimately seeking information. And I think you'd
4	win. But I don't know that you can say to every
5	nonparty that all of a sudden they have a burden in a
6	lawsuit in which they're not a party.
7	MR. KABA: Well, Your Honor, that
8	frankly, that would turn the legislature's intent
9	right on its head. The legislature said there
10	are three regimes here: the pre-1984 regime, where
11	one had to go to court to subpoena
12	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: What's the purpose of
13	the notice, though? The purpose of the notice is to
14	allow them the opportunity to move to quash.
15	MR. KABA: Exa the purpose of the
16	notice
17	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So once
18	MR. KABA: is so you
19	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: once they do -
20	
21	MR. KABA: you're a nonparty
22	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: once they do
23	that, what is your obligation?
24	MR. KABA: Our obligation is to respond.
25	JUDGE PIGOTT: But they don't

1	MR. KABA: If they are able if they
2	are able
3	JUDGE PIGOTT: They don't
4	MR. KABA: to prove under irrelevance
5	
6	JUDGE PIGOTT: They don't know what
7	questions you're going to ask. I mean, if you
8	if you just, you know, go to depose someone, I mean,
9	how do how does anybody know what what
10	the purpose of your of your question is?
11	MR. KABA: Your Honor, in no
12	JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Could I just
13	MR. KABA: deposition is that known.
14	JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Could I just add to
15	that? How does it work in the federal court? This
16	was designed to kind of track Federal Rule 26, right?
17	So how does it work in the federal court?
18	MR. KABA: Your Honor, I'll give you an
19	example from the Southern District of New York; it's
20	the U.S. v. IBM. The burden is on the party seeking
21	to limit the discovery. And it is consistent with
22	the rule in many other states. And I I
23	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: And after they say -
24	what I don't quite get is after they say what's
25	wrong with the discovery, and you know, and it

1	doesn't have to be in a great level of detail, why
2	wouldn't, just in the normal course, it shift that
3	you have to say, well, why it's okay. Isn't that
4	-
5	MR. KABA: Well, Your Honor, but that's
6	- that is what happened in this case. The burden
7	-
8	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So
9	MR. KABA: is on the party
10	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So is it your burden?
11	MR. KABA: moving to quash.
12	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So is it your burden?
13	What's their burden and what's your burden?
14	MR. KABA: I
15	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: What do they have to
16	say when they move to quash, and what's your
17	responsibility coming back?
18	MR. KABA: When they move to quash a
19	subpoena, they have to say the material is utterly
20	irrelevant.
21	JUDGE PIGOTT: Let me all right. Let
22	me stop you there.
23	MR. KABA: The material sought is utterly
24	irrelevant.
25	JUDGE PIGOTT: Let me stop you there. Your

JUDGE PIGOTT: Let me stop you there. Your

--- I'm looking at your subpoena, and it says
you've got to appear at this place on February 15th,
2012, and any adjourned date thereof, to testify and
give evidence before trial in this action. Period.

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MR. KABA: Well, Your Honor, the subpoena also attached the complaint - - -

JUDGE PIGOTT: That's separate.

MR. KABA: - - - in the California action.

JUDGE PIGOTT: That's - - - I agree with you. That's separate, and there's all kinds of discovery there. But the deposition notice is exactly that. And, by the way, that's pretty common. I mean, that's - - - that's what mine looked like. You know, you've got to come in and give - - - and give testimony. Now, if somebody got a complaint saying I'm going to be on vacation or I - - - you know, you've got the wrong Bill Smith, or something like that, that's fine. But other than that, most people don't know - - - nonparties don't know what they're going to be asked.

MR. KABA: Well, but Your Honor, in this - - that is not true in this case, and that - - - in
fact, there are many cases in this state that require
the party who is seeking to quash or the nonparty
seeking to quash to show utter irrelevance.

1	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: What
2	MR. KABA: It goes back to the Anheuser-
3	Busch matter
4	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: What
5	MR. KABA: from this court.
6	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: What did they say
7	- what should they have said, as opposed to what they
8	said in the motion to quash?
9	MR. KABA: Well, Your Honor, respon
10	the petitioner here said
11	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: You're saying they
12	have to say it's totally irrelevant?
13	MR. KABA: They have to they have to
14	offer some proof of utter irrelevance. There needs
15	to be
16	JUDGE GRAFFEO: Why can't they say
17	MR. KABA: some way to get
18	JUDGE GRAFFEO: Why can't they say it's
19	overbroad?
20	MR. KABA: Well, Your Honor, if all they
21	have if all a party a nonparty
22	JUDGE GRAFFEO: Especially in light of the
23	fact that there's no specifics in the notice.
24	MR. KABA: Well, if all a nonparty has to
25	say is a deposition some questions may be overbroad,

1 then the legislature's intent, which in 1984, in the 2 Senate offering statement, the legislature says we do 3 not want to place obstacles in the path of the 4 discovery process and this amendment would, quote, 5 "eliminate the burden, allow for the discovery of any 6 person" - - -7 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yeah, but aren't - -8 9 MR. KABA: - - - "who possesses" - - -10 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: - - - aren't you the 11 one who knows - - -12 MR. KABA: - - - "material and necessary 13 information". 14 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Aren't you the one 15 who knows in more detail what information you want? 16 MR. KABA: Well, Your Honor, in the context 17 of the deposition subpoena - - -18 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: In other words, you 19 know what I mean, there's only so much they can say before you come back and really get in there and say 20 21 some level of detail about what - - - what your needs 22 are. 23 MR. KABA: But Your Honor, in the context 2.4 of a deposition subpoena, petitioners move to quash. 25 That is, they are asking to get rid of the subpoena

1 altogether, and they have to make a showing that the 2 information - - -3 JUDGE PIGOTT: Well, wait a minute. Wait a 4 minute. 5 MR. KABA: - - - sought is not material or 6 necessary. 7 JUDGE PIGOTT: Wait a minute. When you - -8 9 JUDGE RIVERA: Can I just - - -10 JUDGE PIGOTT: When you say move to quash, 11 it doesn't necessarily mean you're - - - you're 12 trying to avoid the whole thing. You're right. I 13 mean, you'll both end up in court and there'll be a 14 determination. If you look at - - - let's assume, 15 for example, you've got a matrimonial, and somebody 16 decides they're going to subpoena every bank in the 17 city and ask for all of the records having to do with whoever - - - you know, both people. Do - - - do all 18 19 the banks - - - I mean, do they have to come forward 20 and say we don't think this is relevant? They don't 21 know whether it's relevant or not. 22 MR. KABA: Well, Your Honor, that question 23 is - - -2.4 JUDGE PIGOTT: But they have - - -25 MR. KABA: - - - averted - - -

1 JUDGE PIGOTT: I'm almost done. They have 2 to say that it's over burdensome? They don't know if 3 it's over burdensome. I think they can move to quash 4 saying we don't understand this, and then you can 5 come in and say we need these records for - - - you 6 know, for equitable distribution. And - - - and that 7 would make some sense. But how do you put the burden 8 on the bank to say what - - - what we have is not 9 relevant or - - - or is irrelevant to a matrimonial. 10 MR. KABA: But Your Honor, in - - - in this state, courts - - - and in other states and in the 11 12 federal system, courts put the burden on the moving 13 party to avoid - - -JUDGE PIGOTT: I understand - - -14

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MR. KABA: - - - providing the testimony.

JUDGE PIGOTT: I don't understand fortynine of the states, and I - - - and I don't - - didn't practice a lot of federal law, but 3101(d) is pretty familiar territory for a lot of people, and -- - and you're right. I mean, it - - - it calls for broad discovery. But that having been said, you know, if you just spread subpoenas out, you know, to -- - to every bank in -- in the city of Albany, because you're kind of curious whether your spouse has a - - - has a bank account there, I think the

1 bank has a right to come in and say we don't want - -- don't want to do this search; we have no idea what 2 3 they're up to, but we don't want to do it. And it 4 seems to me that's going forward. And then you would 5 then have to establish why you think this particular 6 bank ought to be deposed. 7 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Counsel, is that the 8 thrust of your argument, what you're just talking 9 about with Judge Pigott, that broad liberal 10 discovery, end of story, essentially, as far as 11 you're concerned? MR. KABA: Your Honor - - -12 13 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Is that the - - -14 MR. KABA: - - - that's not entirely the 15 end of the story. But the - - - the legislature was 16 quite clear when it shifted the rule in 1984 to get 17 rid of - - -18 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: But you would - - -19 MR. KABA: - - - judicial involvement. 20 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: But you would agree 21 that the legisla - - - or would you, that the 22 legislature, in some way, wanted to make a 23 distinction, you know - - -2.4 MR. KABA: Your Honor, I think the

distinction exists, but I think it is a 3103

	distinction. It is when you are moving for a
2	protective order
3	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: But
4	MR. KABA: to lim because of
5	burden, because of annoyance, because of
6	embarrassment. Then surely a nonparty's argument for
7	undue burden and embarrassment
8	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: But you're saying
9	really that
10	MR. KABA: will matter more.
11	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: they wanted to
12	make a distinction, but it's not really a
13	distinction?
14	MR. KABA: But the the distinction in
15	the case law
16	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: And if it is a
17	distinction, what is it?
18	MR. KABA: I don't think there is a
19	distinction between parties and nonparties
20	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: There's no
21	distinction?
22	MR. KABA: for purposes of
23	determining whether or not disclosure can be had of
24	them.
25	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So the statute was

1 designed and the legislative intent is that they 2 should be treated exactly the same? Is that borne -3 - - borne out by the legislative history? MR. KABA: Your Honor, I will - - - I will 4 5 read to you the - - -6 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Please do. Go ahead. 7 MR. KABA: I will read to you the 8 memorandum in support of legislation - - -9 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Go ahead, sure. 10 MR. KABA: - - - from the Senate. It says, 11 "Recent interpretations of CPLR 3104(a)(4) have held 12 that it is procedurally incorrect to seek discovery 13 from a nonparty witness without first securing a 14 court order. This strict interpretation" - - - con -15 - - "is contrary to the purpose of the disclosure 16 statute and places an obstacle in the path of the 17 discovery process." And here's the key language. 18 "The proposed amendment would eliminate this burden 19 and allow for the discovery of any person who 20 possesses material and necessary evidence. All of 21 the necessary protections to avoid abuse of nonparty 22 witnesses presently exist under 3103 and 3104." 23 JUDGE RIVERA: Okay. So before - - -2.4 before I end up interrupting your answer, three

sentences: What's your burden? What's their burden

1 on the quash? What's your burden in response? 2 MR. KABA: Your Honor, their burden, when 3 they move to qua - - -4 JUDGE RIVERA: No, no, your burden; we 5 started with your burden. MR. KABA: Our burden is to serve a 6 7 subpoena on a nonparty that seeks material and 8 necessary information. 9 JUDGE RIVERA: Okay. 10 MR. KABA: Their burden is to move to - - -11 when they move to quash, or as was done in this case, 12 they move for a protective order - - -13 JUDGE RIVERA: Right. MR. KABA: - - - their burden is to satisfy 14 15 the standards in the law for that: utter 16 irrelevance, if they're moving to quash, or 17 justification, good cause of some sort, if they're 18 moving for a protective order. In response, we must 19 - - - we must respond to that and show your - - -2.0 that their arguments for irrelevance do not hold 21 water. The idea that we must also show some other 22 need, as - - - as appellant here described - - - I 23 wrote this down. The - - - the appellants say that 2.4

the issuing party, quote, "must show a demonstrable

need for evidence to prepare for trial". That's

nowhere in the statute, and that's - - - how is that anything other than special circumstances, which the legislature quite deliberately struck from the statute?

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JUDGE GRAFFEO: To follow up to Judge
Rivera's question, is there any point in that burden
shifting that you ever tell them what you're looking
for?

MR. KABA: Absolutely, Your Honor, when we respond to their motion to quash. And in fact, we did precisely that in this case. And in fact, Your Honor, appellant has never argued that they do not have relevant information, material and necessary information in this case. Acker, Merrall & Condit, and Mr. Kapon, in particular, are the conduits through which this counterfeit wine was sold. They formed the basis for the transactions in the California action, the fraud transaction in the California action. Surely they have relevant information.

Then the question becomes - - - what I believe the - - - the proper interpretation of what they are seeking is they want to limit the scope of the deposition before a single question has been asked. And courts in this state say when you move

for a protective order, you bear the burden to show the good cau - - - that good cause exists for that protective order.

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JUDGE PIGOTT: Do you see a difference between moving for a protective order under 3103 or - - and moving to quash a subpoena under 3101?

MR. KABA: I do, Your Honor. I - - - I believe under 3101, moving to quash has to be understood and interpreted in light of the legislative amendments, and in light of the legislature's intent which is - - -

JUDGE PIGOTT: Well, the amendment – – – the amendment – – – $\ensuremath{^{-}}$

MR. KABA: - - - full and full disclosure.

JUDGE PIGOTT: Excuse me. Excuse me. The amendment, as you read it, it's - - - it's exactly right. It used to be you had to go get a court order, which was a pain in the neck and took a lot of time and money. So now you can just issue it just like the person is - - - is in the state or - - - or whatever. But that did not change, I don't think - - - you know, the fact that the nonparty person, who may be a bartender, you know, who happened to serve drinks to somebody and there was an accident down the road and now three years later there's a lawsuit, for

1 him to come in or her to come in and say, you know, I 2 don't - - - I don't have any relevant information; 3 I'm a bartender, when he doesn't know anything. So -4 - - so it makes sense that there's a burden to go 5 forward to say I - - - I have no idea why this is 6 happening and I don't want to go and I've got to work and whatever other reasons. And then the judge would 7 8 say, you know, why are you picking on this guy? And 9 you'd say because he was a bartender for purposes of 10 this. Nine times out of ten, you're not going to get 11 a motion to quash. When you do, doesn't it make 12 sense to say the burden of going forward is on the 13 person who subpoenaed, but the burden of - - - of 14 proof or the burden of es - - - of establishing 15 irrelevance is on the person seeking the deposition? 16 MR. KABA: But Your Honor, there are two 17 18

responses to that, if I may. The burden - - - in the statute, there is no allocation of that burden. In this court's case law, and in the case law of other courts - - and I have to tell you, 3119 explicitly requests that the courts pay attention to uniformity of application and consideration so that - - -

JUDGE PIGOTT: I - - -

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MR. KABA: - - - discovery is easier.

JUDGE PIGOTT: I think you're - - - wait.

1	I think you're misunderstanding 3119, only in the
2	sense that I don't think you lived through the days
3	before it when it was really a pain in the neck. And
4	back I'm too old
5	MR. KABA: Some states still require
6	require us
7	JUDGE PIGOTT: Letters Rogatory used to be
8	what
9	MR. KABA: Yeah, no, but some states still
10	require it, Your Honor.
11	JUDGE PIGOTT: That
12	MR. KABA: I guess my point
13	JUDGE PIGOTT: That was what we're getting
14	rid of. I mean, this is easy now. You can you
15	can get nonparty witnesses and your goal
16	MR. KABA: But Your Honor, if the system is
17	really just the nonparty gets to come into court and
18	says I think this is overbroad, you really haven't -
19	
20	JUDGE PIGOTT: Not overbroad.
21	MR. KABA: gotten rid of that system.
22	JUDGE PIGOTT: Not overbroad. I got
23	subpoenaed in a case I have no idea, and and
24	I'm going on vacation, and they tell me that I got to
25	be down here. And I don't want to do it. And I've

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          got three kid - - - anything that says - - -
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                    MR. KABA: Your Honor, every - - -
 3
                    JUDGE PIGOTT: - - - your - - - I'm almost
 4
          done.
 5
                    MR. KABA: Yes.
 6
                    JUDGE PIGOTT: Anything that they want to
 7
          bring. And then you had to say, Judge, we've got the
 8
          wrong person, wrong Bill Smith; we're sorry. Or we
 9
          really need him; we can give him a new date.
10
                    MR. KABA: But Your Honor, in every case,
11
          their - - - the incentive would then be on the
12
          subpoenaed party to go to court and request judicial
13
14
                    JUDGE PIGOTT: No, no, no - - -
15
                    MR. KABA: - - - involvement in - - -
16
                    JUDGE PIGOTT: - - - it's expensive, it's
17
          time-consuming - - -
18
                    MR. KABA: - - - interaction.
19
                    JUDGE PIGOTT: It's - - -
                    MR. KABA: In your example, Your Honor, the
20
21
          - - - the bartender just gets to go to court and say
22
          I don't understand why I'm being subpoenaed. But as
23
          I've said, just - - -
2.4
                    JUDGE PIGOTT: Right. Doesn't even need a
25
          lawyer to do that. And that's - - - that's my point.
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And - - - and you - - - you want to say that because 1 2 you served him with a piece of paper, he's got to go 3 get a lawyer, figure out what 3101(a)(4) means to 4 him, and file a petition and a motion to quash. And 5 I don't think that's required. It seems to me you 6 can just - - -7 MR. KABA: Well, Your Honor, if I - - - if 8 I may just - - -9 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Last - - - last 10 point, counsel. 11 MR. KABA: - - - my last thought is whatever the burden, whatever the proof, in this case 12 13 it has been met, because the issue of relevance is 14 not fairly in dispute, and the Supreme Court's 15 decision, and the Appellate Department's decision - -16 17 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Can - - -MR. KABA: - - - I think make that clear. 18 19 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: I guess the point is 20 - - - and you don't have to answer this, but just 21 from - - - from what we're hearing is, is there a 22 clear rule, or does it depend upon what you say, what 23 they say, and then what you say? You know what I'm 2.4 saying? Is there - - - is there a sharply defined

rule, or is it very much dependent on - - - on, you

1	know, the exact colloquy between you?
2	MR. KABA: If I may, Your Honor, with
3	respect? I
4	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Go ahead, quickly.
5	MR. KABA: I think the rule is motivated by
6	looking at the history of what the legislature wanted
7	
8	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay.
9	MR. KABA: to do, which is
10	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: You think there is -
11	
12	MR. KABA: minimize judicial
13	involvement
14	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: You think there is a
15	rule
16	MR. KABA: and promote full
17	disclosure.
18	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: that basically
19	puts the burden on them
20	MR. KABA: I think the rule
21	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: to show it's
22	not relevant.
23	MR. KABA: I think the rule from Anheuser-
24	Busch and other
25	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay.

	MR. KABA: cases and the legislature
2	puts the burden
3	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay.
4	MR. KABA: But it has a role for us
5	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, counselor.
6	MR. KABA: which is to then come back
7	and say, yes, indeed, it is material and necessary -
8	
9	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay. Let's hear
10	-
11	MR. KABA: and relevant.
12	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: rebuttal from
13	your adversary.
14	MR. KABA: Thank you.
15	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Thank you.
16	Counselor, is there a black and white rule,
17	or is it very dependent in each case? Your
18	adversary's saying the burden's on you, period. Is
19	it that easily is it just the answer the burden
20	is on him, or is it a more nuanced
21	MR. SHECHTMAN: No, I no
22	JUDGE RIVERA: And consider the three
23	sentences: his burden initially, yours on the quash,
24	his in response.
25	MR. SHECHTMAN: Let me try to do both.

1 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yes, sure. 2 JUDGE RIVERA: Go ahead. 3 MR. SHECHTMAN: And let me step back for one - - - one second. It's hard to think that this 4 5 is the federal system. You have a statute that on its face distinguishes between parties and 6 7 nonparties. JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: So you're saying it's 8 9 not like Federal Rule 26? 10 MR. SHECHTMAN: It - - - the Federal Rule 11 26, you can't find the word "nonparty" in it. Right? 12 The standard is the same. 13 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: So even if the legislature said this is going to track Federal Rule 14 15 26, you say, but you left in non - - - a distinction between parties and nonparties - - -16 17 MR. SHECHTMAN: Well - - -18 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: - - - so that's - - -19 MR. SHECHTMAN: - - - I think if the 2.0 legislature - - - legislative history said that, Your 21 Honor, you'd say the sta - - - the language isn't 22 very good, but I suppose we know what they meant, 23 right? But here we know the following. The advisory 2.4 committee on civil practice said to them, turn this 25 into federal law; put brackets around all those

1	sections and make parties and nonparties the same.
2	They chose not to do it. They chose to keep a
3	distinction
4	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Counselor, so how
5	does it translate into the answer to those questions?
6	MR. SHECHTMAN: And one one final
7	thing.
8	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Sure.
9	MR. SHECHTMAN: In 1985, when it went back
10	to the advisory committee, they lamented, right?
11	They said we didn't get what we wanted. We hoped to
12	get rid of any
13	JUDGE RIVERA: Okay.
14	MR. SHECHTMAN: special circumstances
15	
16	JUDGE RIVERA: So what did they think they
17	got?
18	MR. SHECHTMAN: So what they think they got
19	is the following.
20	JUDGE RIVERA: His burden, your burden, and
21	then his burden again.
22	MR. SHECHTMAN: I think Judge Pigott is
23	right.
24	JUDGE RIVERA: Okay.
25	MR SHECHTMAN: I think the answer is my

1	burden is minimal. My burden is to come in and say I
2	don't want to comply with this subpoena. Right? Or
3	I think this subpoena is
4	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: You have to say
5	something, but not that much?
6	MR. SHECHTMAN: Not much more than
7	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Go ahead.
8	MR. SHECHTMAN: Not much more than
9	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Continue.
10	MR. SHECHTMAN: good morning; I just
11	think I have to show up and say
12	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay. And then?
13	MR. SHECHTMAN: I'm starting this
14	process.
15	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: And then?
16	MR. SHECHTMAN: And then the burden shifts
17	here. And the burden shifts to say
18	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: More than minimal?
19	MR. SHECHTMAN: The burden is that there is
20	a need, a demonstrable need to obtain evidence in
21	preparation of trial, so that the judge should be
22	saying
23	JUDGE RIVERA: And what's the source of
24	that burden? Where's the language for that?
25	MR. SHECHTMAN: The language of that is in

1	the phrase, "Upon notice stating the circumstances or
2	reasons such that disclosure is sought or required".
3	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: At what level of
4	detail does he have to do that?
5	MR. SHECHTMAN: Enough that he can say to
6	the judge, Judge, this is required, this is required,
7	so that when we say, well, why is anything more
8	required than the 149 bottles? We're prepared to
9	testify about that. The answer is well, we need your
10	historical and internal practices for the following
11	reason. We
12	JUDGE RIVERA: Okay. I'm but I'm not
13	clear what you have articulated as your burden. What
14	
15	MR. SHECHTMAN: I don't think I have
16	JUDGE RIVERA: What
17	MR. SHECHTMAN: I don't think I have a
18	burden.
19	JUDGE RIVERA: You just come in and say I
20	don't want to comply.
21	MR. SHECHTMAN: I think I come in and say -
22	
23	JUDGE RIVERA: Is that what you're saying?
24	MR. SHECHTMAN: they've subpoenaed
25	me, I'm a nonparty

1	JUDGE RIVERA: And I don't want to comply.
2	MR. SHECHTMAN: and I don't want to -
3	
4	JUDGE RIVERA: That's all you have to do.
5	MR. SHECHTMAN: I don't want to
6	comply, or I think this is burdensome, or I think
7	this is overbroad, or I have to go on vacation.
8	Right?
9	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay.
10	MR. SHECHTMAN: To which at that
11	point
12	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Finish finish
13	up.
14	MR. SHECHTMAN: At that point
15	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Go ahead.
16	MR. SHECHTMAN: the issuing party in
17	New York, unlike in the federal courts, has to say to
18	the judge, we need this for purposes of litigating,
19	not that we have to have special circumstances, not
20	that we can't get it from anybody else
21	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay.
22	MR. SHECHTMAN: but here's the reason
23	we need it. And the question is why do you need
24	information about our historical internal practices
25	or procedures? The judge below said because it's not

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          utterly irrelevant. But very little in life is
          utterly irrelevant, right?
 2
 3
                    JUDGE PIGOTT: But we have - - - 3101 is
 4
          pretty broad.
 5
                    MR. SHECHTMAN: 3101 is broad, but it's
          broad for - - - for parties. It's wide open for
 6
 7
          parties; it's the federal standard. Right? But it's
 8
          not written as broadly for nonparties, and that's
 9
          what was rejected.
10
                    CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Well, there's still -
11
          - - you would agree that it's still, in general, a
          liberal - - -
12
13
                    MR. SHECHTMAN: It's still, in general, a
          liberal - - -
14
15
                    CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: - - - test.
16
                    MR. SHECHTMAN: - - - standard to say - - -
17
                    CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay.
                    MR. SHECHTMAN: - - - I need this for
18
          purposes of litigation. Right? That's a pretty - -
19
2.0
          - pretty liberal standard. And but why is it that he
21
          needs transactions post-2006 - - -
22
                    CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, counsel.
23
                    MR. SHECHTMAN: - - - when his complaint
2.4
          ends in 2006?
25
                    CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Thank you, counsel.
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1	MR. SHECHTMAN: So that, I think, is the
2	answer to the three questions.
3	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay.
4	JUDGE RIVERA: Thank you.
5	MR. SHECHTMAN: I thank the court.
6	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Thank you both.
7	Appreciate it.
8	(Court is adjourned)
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CERTIFICATION

I, Sharona Shapiro, certify that the foregoing transcript of proceedings in the Court of Appeals of Matter of John Kapon, et al. v. William I. Koch, No. 63 was prepared using the required transcription equipment and is a true and accurate record of the proceedings.

Shorma Shaphe

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