COURT OF APPEALS	
STATE OF NEW YORK	
PEOPLE,	
Respondent,	
-against-	No. 55
REYNALDO PEREZ,	
Appellant.	
PEOPLE, Respondent,	
-against-	
IVAN CALAFF,	No. 56
Appellant.	
PEOPLE, Respondent,	
-against-	
ALEXANDER DOCKERY A/K/A JOHN HARRIS,	No. 57
Appellant.	
PEOPLE,	
Respondent,	
-against-	No. 58
TEOFILO LOPEZ A/K/A GARCIA LOPEZ A/K/A ISIDORO GARCIA,	NO. Jo
Appellant.	
	20 Eagle Street Albany, New York 12207 February 20, 2014

1	Before:
2	CHIEF JUDGE JONATHAN LIPPMAN
3	ASSOCIATE JUDGE VICTORIA A. GRAFFEO ASSOCIATE JUDGE SUSAN PHILLIPS READ
4	ASSOCIATE JUDGE ROBERT S. SMITH ASSOCIATE JUDGE EUGENE F. PIGOTT, JR.
5	ASSOCIATE JUDGE JENNY RIVERA ASSOCIATE JUDGE SHEILA ABDUS-SALAAM
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Official Court Transcriber

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1 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: We're going to start 2 with, I guess, let's - - - let's do the appellants. 3 And Attorney Birnbach, you're going to start? 4 MR. BIRNBACH: Thank you, Your Honor. 5 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Do you want any - - any rebuttal time of your five minutes? 6 7 MR. BIRNBACH: No, Your Honor. 8 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, let it all rip 9 out. Go ahead. 10 MR. BIRNBACH: May it please the court, my 11 name is Howard Birnbach, counsel for Reynaldo Perez. 12 Your Honors, my client has been in prison 13 since July 27th, 1996. He was twenty-one years old 14 the date of his sentencing. And he's never had any 15 appellate review of his conviction. And he - - - he 16 stands to be in jail for the rest of his life without 17 ever having an appeal review. 18 And we - - - we maintain, under People v. 19 Ventura, where this court specifically said, "as a 20 matter of fundamental fairness, all" - - - I emphasize the word all - - - could not be more broad 21 22 -- - "all criminal defendants shall be permitted to 2.3 avail themselves of the intermediate appellate

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courts."

JUDGE RIVERA: Yeah, but they have a right

1 to appeal - - - avail themselves. They actually have 2 to perfect the appeal, do they not? 3 MR. BIRNBACH: Clearly, Your Honor. And in this - - - in this particular case, in 2003, six 4 5 years later after counsel was retained - - - prior 6 counsel, of course, Your Honor - - - the attorney was 7 adjudicated in neglect by the disciplinary committee. 8 And nine years later, he never even perfected the 9 appeal. 10 So the question is, if there's negligence 11 of that magnitude, should my client spend the rest of 12 his life in jail - - -13 JUDGE SMITH: Well, should - - - but didn't 14 15 JUDGE GRAFFEO: Perhaps - - -16 JUDGE SMITH: Go ahead. 17 JUDGE GRAFFEO: That's all right. 18 JUDGE SMITH: Didn't - - - didn't there 19 come time when - - - though, when your client, I mean 20 - - - after the six years or after the nine - - - I 21 mean, how many years was it, before your client 22 finally got around to doing anything? 2.3 MR. BIRNBACH: Well, in - - - in 2003, he 2.4 filed a grievance, okay. In 2009, prior counsel 25 submitted a 440 application. And in 2012 - - - it

was either 2011 or 2012 - - - it was denied by - - -1 2 leave to appeal was denied. Now, the Supreme Court 3 said in the 440 motion - - -JUDGE SMITH: You - - - you mean, leave to 4 5 appeal from the 440 or you're talk - - -MR. BIRNBACH: Yeah, leave to appeal of the 6 7 440 was denied. 8 JUDGE SMITH: When did he - - - when did he 9 try to - - - when did he first try to perfect or when 10 did he first perfect his direct - - - he never 11 perfected it - - - well - - -MR. BIRNBACH: Never perfected, Your Honor. 12 13 JUDGE SMITH: Huh? 14 MR. BIRNBACH: Never perfected as - - -15 JUDGE SMITH: Never perfected it. 16 MR. BIRNBACH: Never perfected it. 17 JUDGE SMITH: Isn't there some point at 18 which the - - - he has to share part of the blame for 19 that? 20 MR. BIRNBACH: Sharing part of the blame is one thing. He shared part of the blame by the fact 21 22 that he's been in prison for the last sixteen years. 2.3 JUDGE SMITH: Yeah, but - - - but the 2.4 system - - - the system doesn't work if people are 25

allowed to sit around for twenty - - - for decades -

1 - - and not do anything. 2 MR. BIRNBACH: Well, I think what this 3 court said in Ventura, is clearly there's a tension. 4 There's a tension between rules and regulations that 5 have court-filing deadlines and people possibly being in jail for the rest of their lives - - -6 7 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Where - - - where's 8 the balance, counselor? How do we find the right 9 balance? 10 MR. BIRNBACH: Well, I think you found it 11 correctly in Ventura. I think you said that court-12 filing deadlines as important as they may be - - -13 JUDGE READ: So could he wait another ten 14 years? 15 MR. BIRNBACH: Well, I think if you wait 16 another ten years while you're in prison, you bring 17 misery and misfortune upon yourself. What would you 18 suggest - - -19 JUDGE GRAFFEO: Well, taking - - - taking -20 - - let's - - - let's get away from the facts of your 21 case. 22 MR. BIRNBACH: Okay. 2.3 JUDGE GRAFFEO: Just in a general sense, is 2.4 there never a time period with which an appeal is 25 going to be untimely?

MR. BIRNBACH: I would suggest that if you follow the Appellate Division First Department rules, at least for indigents, you gets notice of untimeliness, and then the attorney has a right to come in and at least address it.

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In my case, the Appellate Division rules are structured, so if you have retained counsel, you'd never get notice. So my client never got notice, and my client was under the belief that because a 440 motion was going forth, he was appealing the conviction. Something was going on.

JUDGE RIVERA: But in 2003 of -- right, he does, indeed, complain and file a complaint with the disciplinary committee, or at least, his mother does, someone does --

MR. BIRNBACH: Yes.

JUDGE RIVERA: - - - on his behalf.

Whether it's 2003 or earlier than that, he - - - it's

- - - once that committee advises him that that

attorney had done nothing, isn't - - - doesn't that

put him on notice that maybe I should do something?

Why does he wait almost another decade?

MR. BIRNBACH: Because he's under the belief that an appeal will ultimately be consummated, and in fact - - -

1	JUDGE RIVERA: Well, why is a belief
2	what what would be what justifies that
3	belief?
4	MR. BIRNBACH: He retained counsel.
5	JUDGE RIVERA: Yeah.
6	MR. BIRNBACH: Counsel was admonished for
7	neglect. And therefore the matter did, in fact,
8	proceed ahead. It proceeded ahead, after a lengthy
9	period of time. But my point my client did
10	avail himself of the of the state process.
11	JUDGE RIVERA: So are are you arguing
12	that in reality that the only delay, if any, should -
13	that should be charged to him is after the denial
14	of his appeal from
15	MR. BIRNBACH: Yes.
16	JUDGE RIVERA: Well actually, once you
17	finish the finality of the appeal from the 440, is
18	that where you're claiming
19	MR. BIRNBACH: I would
20	JUDGE RIVERA: that's the only delay
21	that should be charged to him?
22	MR. BIRNBACH: Yes.
23	JUDGE GRAFFEO: And how long is that period
24	of time?
25	MR. BIRNBACH: Around two years. Look,

this is a balancing test. Let's remember one thing about the Appellate Division First Department. If I didn't make that application for leave to appeal, that appeal would still be viable. That appeal was viable sixteen years later when I walked into the case. Once I was retained, and I moved to extend the time to perfect the appeal, and I gave the court my brief, then they dismissed the appeal, and the appeal was no longer viable.

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So you have the extraordinary situation where if I don't show up and I don't do anything, the appeal remains viable. If I try to perfect, the appeal gets ousted.

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Well, at some pum - - some point, it has to be determined whether the
appeal can go or not go. That's going to happen
inevitably, right? Unless it just stays forever and
no one raises it - - -

MR. BIRNBACH: But I would - - - I see it's time for me to go.

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: What's your - - - it's okay. What's your bottom line? Why in your case does the balance tip in your favor?

MR. BIRNBACH: You have an administrative deadline. You have the possibility of a twenty - - -

1 twenty-one year-old man remaining in prison for the 2 rest of his life. Where do the balance of equities 3 move? Obviously the Appellate Division wasn't all 4 that agitated - - -5 JUDGE SMITH: Are you suggesting - - -JUDGE GRAFFEO: Well, it can't be the 6 7 seriousness of the crime? That can't be the test - -8 9 MR. BIRNBACH: No - - -10 JUDGE GRAFFEO: - - - for who's entitled to 11 an appeal and who isn't? 12 MR. BIRNBACH: I was specifically asked 13 where does the balance occur in - - - in my case. 14 think that's certainly a critical factor. In my case, if my client is denied his right to appeal, he 15 16 stands to be in prison for the rest of his life. 17 JUDGE PIGOTT: Mr. Birnbach, when you - - -18 when you talk about a balancing act, would it - - -19 would it be - - - in terms of equity. One of the - -20 - one the com - - - one of the things that the People argue is that, you know, witnesses are dead, you 21 22 know, memories fade, you know, it's been a long time. 2.3 If you were granted an appeal solely on the issue of 2.4 sufficiency, would that - - - would that balance the

equities, in your view?

1 MR. BIRNBACH: No, because I think my 2 client should not risk being in prison for the rest 3 of his life on the basis of an unjust conviction 4 because he didn't raise all the issues that should be 5 raised. JUDGE SMITH: But why - - - why should - -6 7 - why should the families of the victims have to risk 8 an unjust acquittal, all the - - - af - - - all these 9 years after the - - - the witnesses are no longer 10 there? 11 MR. BIRNBACH: Because the idea of somebody 12 remaining in prison for the rest of their life 13 without having an appeal is simply intolerable. 14 JUDGE RIVERA: Mr. - - - counsel, I know 15 that you are suggesting that if we're going to count 16 some delay to him, we count it from the - - - the 17 final decision on the appeal on the 440, which as you 18 say is about two years or so, but why - - - why can't 19 we view that as a strategic choice between him and 20 his lawyer, like in Lampkins - - -21 MR. BIRNBACH: Who would make - - -22 JUDGE RIVERA: - - - to pursue the 440 as opposed to the direct appeal? Why can't we reach 2.3 2.4 back?

MR. BIRNBACH: Well, the State Supreme

Court, when they denied the 440, said all the issues 1 2 you're raising are on the record. So this was the 3 only viable option that he had. The 440 made no 4 sense at all, and ironically, in the 440, he was 5 arguing the ineffective assistance of trial counsel. JUDGE RIVERA: But in - - - but in that 6 7 440, in the decision, the court did mention the 8 failure to have appealed. 9 MR. BIRNBACH: Yes, the court said you have 10 arguments to be raised on a direct appeal. Raise a 11 direct appeal. They said make a leave application. 12 JUDGE RIVERA: But he didn't at that time. 13 But he didn't at that time. 14 MR. BIRNBACH: He made a leave application. 15 Therefore, I think when you look at all the issues -16 - - and I'm only concerned about Perez; these other 17 attorneys will address their particular clients - - -18 clearly if Perez is denied his appeal, the results 19 could potentially be catastrophic, and as you can see 20 from the brief that I submitted to the Appellate 21 Division, there are many very serious arguments - - -22 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, counsel. 2.3 MR. BIRNBACH: Thank you very much, Your 2.4 Honor.

25 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Thanks a lot,

1	counsel.
2	MR. BIRNBACH: Thank you.
3	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Counselor, Dockery?
4	MS. ZOLOT: One minute for rebuttal, Your
5	Honor?
6	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Sure. What
7	what distinguishes your case, counsel?
8	MS. ZOLOT: What sets Mr. Dockery's case
9	apart is that he was a juvenile in 1986, when he was
10	left on his own without counsel's help to complete
11	the paperwork required by the First Department in
12	order to obtain counsel on appeal.
13	JUDGE GRAFFEO: He had he had other
14	arrests after the incident that
15	MS. ZOLOT: He had he had other
16	arrests
17	JUDGE GRAFFEO: that is the subject
18	of the appeal
19	MS. ZOLOT: In 19
20	JUDGE GRAFFEO: that you're trying to
21	bring.
22	MS. ZOLOT: In 1992, he had a conviction
23	for attempted weapon possession, but in fact, that
24	wouldn't
25	JUDGE GRAFFEO: Did he appeal that

conviction?

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MS. ZOLOT: He did not appeal that. He waived his right to appeal. Our position is that because of the violation that occurred in 1986, because of that Constitutional violation, the period that followed under the circumstances of this case, is not actually something this court needs to consider.

JUDGE GRAFFEO: Does that - - - by my calculation we've got a twenty-two-year interval here

MS. ZOLOT: That's correct.

 $\label{eq:JUDGE GRAFFEO: --- which is quite a long} \\ \text{period of time.}$

MS. ZOLOT: Well, West itself, said that a defendant who is properly advised of his appellate rights may not let the matter rest and then claim waiver. That's language from West. It hinges on whether the defendant, in the first instance, was properly advised. And here - - -

JUDGE READ: So did he not get the notice?

MS. ZOLOT: Here, he - - - here there was

no adequate notice, because he was a minor.

JUDGE SMITH: So - - so that means, essentially, he had - - if he didn't get adequate

notice the first time, he has forever?

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MS. ZOLOT: Under the circumstances here, perhaps if there's evidence of contemptuous conduct, willful contemptuous conduct, an actual prejudice, then under those circumstances. But our rule is that a juvenile who is denied counsel's help in preparing the IFP, is presumptively entitled to appeal unless the People can show contemptuous or willful conduct effecting an - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: If he's convicted in - - - in '92, did he get proper notice at that time?

MS. ZOLOT: He - - - what happened in '92 is actually very interesting. He was told about his right to appeal, but of course, he waived his right to appeal, so that he was never - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: But he was on notice?

MS. ZOLOT: He was - - - he was - - - actually, the opposite on notice, because the prosecutor at the 1992 plea proceeding led him to believe - - reinforced his misperception that the appeal was over and done with by actually saying, any appeal would be over by now. So far from giving him notice that he should start to look into that, maybe there was a problem, he was, in fact, mislead or his misperception was perpetuated by what an agent of the

1 State said. 2 JUDGE SMITH: Is it - - - is it too much to 3 ask, though, even of a - - - well, he's no longer a 4 juvenile by 1992, but even of a juvenile, is it too 5 much to ask that - - - that he should check out whether somebody's do - - - doing an appeal for him 6 7 or not? Or ask every couple of years how that appeal 8 is going? 9 MS. ZOLOT: That is too much. It's 10 certainly too much to ask for a juvenile. It might -11 - - it's worth mentioning that Mr. Dockery, not only 12 was a juvenile tried in adult court, and therefore 13 held to standards that are decade - - - now probably decades of neuroscience tells us are unreasonable, 14 15 untenable, and unfair, but then he was sent to a 16 youth facility. He was not sent to an adult prison 17 where there was no library and no legal advice - - -18 JUDGE GRAFFEO: When was - - -19 MS. ZOLOT: - - - so he didn't even have 20 access - - -21 JUDGE GRAFFEO: When was Mr. Dockery facing 22 persistent - - -2.3 MS. ZOLOT: That was in - - -2.4 JUDGE GRAFFEO: - - - status?

MS. ZOLOT: - - - 2000.

1 JUDGE GRAFFEO: And that didn't tip him off 2 that he should have - - -3 MS. ZOLOT: He - - -4 JUDGE GRAFFEO: - - - investigated the 5 status - -6 MS. ZOLOT: Well, he - - -7 JUDGE GRAFFEO: - - - of any appeals or his right to appeal? 8 9 MS. ZOLOT: He candidly admitted in his 10 affidavit that when he did pursue for the first time 11 an appeal - - - that was - - - that was the first 12 time he actually pursued one - - - he then began to 13 question what might have happened back in 1986. JUDGE GRAFFEO: Right, so, but - - -14 15 MS. ZOLOT: And - - -16 JUDGE GRAFFEO: - - - many years went by 17 after that. So why didn't he challenge the 18 persistent status at that juncture? 19 MS. ZOLOT: He began to question what 20 happened. He was pursuing remedies on the - - - on 21 the case that led to his - - - the case that directly 22 led to his persistent adjudication, but when he did 2.3 write the Appellate Division, and make inquiries, he 2.4 immediately - - - when he received back the in forma

pauperis at that point, he immediately submitted an

1	in forma pauperis and started to attempt to pursue an
2	appeal here.
3	JUDGE RIVERA: Did he have
4	MS. ZOLOT: Unlike in West, who waited nine
5	years when
6	JUDGE RIVERA: Did he have counsel is '92
7	and 2000 on those cases?
8	MS. ZOLOT: He had counsel, but it's
9	it's again, it's unfair to burden a person whose
LO	rights were hindered when they were a juvenile, that
L1	they now have the burden to somehow conduct some kind
L2	of investigation when a Constitutional violation
L3	occurred in the first place
L4	JUDGE RIVERA: Was was the coun
L5	MS. ZOLOT: that created that delay.
L6	JUDGE RIVERA: Was the counsel aware of a -
L7	of a statement made by the prosecutor in '92 that
L8	you say misled him?
L9	MS. ZOLOT: It was it was said in
20	open court, and everybody appeared to rely on that
21	representation.
22	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Anything else,
23	counselor?
24	MS. ZOLOT: Well, I would like to point out
>5	that in terms of this twenty-year period I'd like to

1 direct Your Honors to Dowd v. Cook, which putting 2 aside everything else - - - the particular 3 circumstances of this case - - - Dowd v. Cook says 4 that you can't look to that period to effect a cure 5 if the defendant can't recoup exactly what he lost in the first place. And here, Mr. Dockery's right to 6 7 appeal had degraded further along the timeline. 8 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, thanks, 9 counsel. 10 MS. ZOLOT: Thank you. 11 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Thank you. 12 Calaff? 13 MS. TRUPP: Good afternoon. Claudia Trupp on behalf of Mr. Calaff. I'd like to reserve a 14 15 minute for rebuttal. 16 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: A minute, sure. 17 MS. TRUPP: Mr. Calaff did not waive or 18 abandon his right to appeal merely by failing to 19 perfect it in a timely fashion. Here what you have 20

is an indigent defendant who was misinformed and misled by his assigned counsel about what needed to be done in order to perfect the appeal.

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By extending People v. West, the holding of People v. West to Mr. Calaff's case, the intermediate appellate court denied him review of his right to

1 counsel claim - - - a legitimate right to counsel 2 claim, and did so without the basis that underlay the 3 West decision, which was adequate notice of the right 4 to appeal and contemptuous conduct by the defendant. 5 JUDGE GRAFFEO: When he went in for 6 predicate status - - - when he was challenging the 7 predicate status, he didn't challenge this 8 conviction, did he? 9 MS. TRUPP: He did not at the predicate 10 felony hearing. That was in 2004. He explained in his affidavit - - -11 12 JUDGE GRAFFEO: Why - - - why not? 13 MS. TRUPP: He did not - - - he believed 14 that the appeal had been taken and lost. So he did 15 not know that there was a basis for the lack of 16 appeal. 17 JUDGE GRAFFEO: And on what basis did he 18 think he lost the appeal? 19 MS. TRUPP: He believed that because he 20 hadn't heard from his attorney that he had lost the 21 appeal. This was the first appeal he had ever taken. 22 He was a totally inexperienced criminal defendant, 2.3 unlike the defendant in West, who had perfected two 2.4 appeals prior to the one that was deemed abandoned.

So we have a totally inexperienced criminal defendant

1 who is reliant on the state to provide him with 2 counsel, who misadvises him about the steps to take, 3 and says, I'll take care of the appeal. 4 JUDGE SMITH: Well, how - - - I mean, this 5 is, of course, what he now says. Is there - - - is 6 there any way of testing the credibility of that 7 claim that he says - - -8 MS. TRUPP: Well, there is, because if you 9 look, what the Appellate Division said is that Mr. 10 Calaff's statements were refuted by the sentencing 11 There was never any claim here that Mr. minutes. 12 Calaff did not receive the notice of right to appeal 13 form. That was never the claim. The claim was that 14 the warnings in that form were muddled by counsel's 15 subsequent statements and - - -16 JUDGE SMITH: Okay, but - - - but how - - -17 but how do we know that this isn't - - -18 MS. TRUPP: Because - - -19 JUDGE SMITH: - - - a convenient, after-20 the-fact invention by the defendant? 21 MS. TRUPP: Because if you look at the 22 notice of right to appeal form, it says that the 2.3 defendant himself must file the notice of right to 2.4 appeal, and the defense counsel filed that here, and 25

so manifesting Mr. Calaff's intent to appeal. He

1 filed the notice of right to appeal and the profile 2 statement which - - -3 JUDGE SMITH: But that - - - that doesn't 4 sound like conclusive proof that the lawyer said - -5 MS. TRUPP: But there doesn't - - -6 7 JUDGE SMITH: - - - oh, don't worry; I'll 8 take care of everything; you don't have to - - -9 MS. TRUPP: In order to find abandonment, 10 the - - - the burden is on the State. And this court 11 has found over and over again, that if the burden is 12 going to be borne - - - if the State appoints counsel 13 and there is inadequate notice or there is evidence 14 and it does not - - - if you look - - - go back to 15 Montgomery, if you go back to McLean, it doesn't have 16 to be compelling proof of abandonment, because it is 17 the agent of the State who is creating the confusion, and these allegations were unrefuted by the People. 18 19 They never - - -20 JUDGE SMITH: How do the - - - how do these deadlines ever get enforced? I guess, you - - - you 21 22 - - - I suppose you're going to say as one of your 2.3 colleagues did, you have to give the guy notice? 2.4

MS. TRUPP: You have to give the guy

adequate notice, and you have to give him an

opportunity to explain the delay in a timely fashion. 1 2 JUDGE SMITH: So under - - - under the 3 system, and I'm beginning to think that maybe the 4 whole system ought - - - could be - - - it doesn't 5 work perfectly. MS. TRUPP: It does not work at all. 6 7 JUDGE SMITH: But - - - but - - - under the system we have, you're basically saying a guy has as 8 9 - - - has as long as it takes - - -10 MS. TRUPP: Well - - -11 JUDGE SMITH: - - - as many decades as it 12 takes. 13 MS. TRUPP: The prosecution and the court are not without their remedies. The prosecution can 14 15 move at any time to dismiss an appeal that's been 16 noticed. The court - - -17 JUDGE READ: Well, didn't you suggest - - -18 didn't you suggest at one point that there should be 19 a court rule? 20 MS. TRUPP: There should be - - - what - -- our position is that there needs to be some 21 22 assurance that indigent defendants are not losing the 2.3 right to appeal because they're slipping through the 2.4 cracks. And that's what happening in New York State 25 right now. And that is what the legacy of the West

decision is.

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JUDGE SMITH: Now of course, you say - - you say the prosecutor can move any time for
dismissal, but of - - on your theory, as I
understand it, he can move, but he's never going to
get it.

MS. TRUPP: Well - - -

JUDGE SMITH: All he's going to get is a deadline.

MS. TRUPP: What he's going to get is an opportunity to move at a time before prejudice ensues, and as this court recognized in Kordish, then counsel will need - - -

JUDGE SMITH: Then I was thinking, I mean - I'm not - - I'm not sure whether - - - which
side this is an argument for, but thinking of this
from the - - - from the point of view of the system,
it's a less than perfect way of doing it, because the
prosecutor has very little incentive to make the
motion.

MS. TRUPP: Well, the prosecution - - - if they're going to come back and say we've been prejudiced, a sophisticated legal actor, who's trained in the law, is going to say, we've been prejudiced by the delay. They have to have some

1 capability. 2 JUDGE SMITH: Okay, aren't - - - aren't you 3 almost expecting the prosecutor to be the - - - to be 4 the defendant's lawyer here, saying - - -5 MS. TRUPP: No. JUDGE SMITH: - - - oh, this guy's taking 6 7 too long; I better do something about it or he'll - -8 9 MS. TRUPP: It's in their interest to move 10 to dismiss these appeals if they're languishing. 11 JUDGE RIVERA: You're arguing it's in the 12 interest of - - - of the system and society as an 13 officer of the court to move on this. MS. TRUPP: Yes. And for - - - if we're 14 concerned about the legitimacy of the appellate 15 16 process, and we're concerned about, you know, not 17 delaying retrials, then there has to be a rule that 18 allows indigent defendants to timely assert their 19 right to counsel in a way - - -20 JUDGE GRAFFEO: Did he have - - - did he 21 have assigned counsel for his challenge to the 22 predicate status? 2.3 MS. TRUPP: Yes, he's always had assigned 2.4 counsel.

JUDGE GRAFFEO: So why didn't that attorney

1	investigate the earlier crime?
2	MS. TRUPP: That's a
3	JUDGE GRAFFEO: I don't understand that.
4	MS. TRUPP: Are you talking about the
5	appellate counsel or the trial attorney?
6	JUDGE GRAFFEO: Either one.
7	MS. TRUPP: Well, the fact is that
8	JUDGE GRAFFEO: Because there's two
9	attorneys there
10	MS. TRUPP: There's two attorneys there.
11	JUDGE GRAFFEO: who could have talked
12	to him about the fact that he didn't have a dis
13	any appeal pending on his original conviction.
14	MS. TRUPP: There is no evidence in this
15	record that there was that discussion. Those
16	those challenges are often made quickly at the time
17	of the predicate felony adjudication. There's often
18	not investigation into those claims.
19	And also with respect to the appeal, it's
20	very important to distinguish that when somebody is
21	assigned counsel on appeal, it's with respect to that
22	conviction. It's not with respect to every
23	conviction that's ever happened before. And so
24	that's why
25	JUDGE SMITH: Well, but well, if

1 you're being sentenced as a predicate, it is part of 2 the lawyer's job to take a look at the previous 3 conviction, isn't it? MS. TRUPP: At the trial level, yes. Also, 4 5 with respect to the right to counsel claim here, this is a case where there was a serious right to counsel 6 7 issue, and this court should remand the decision - -8 - reverse the Appellate Division with a comment on 9 the merits of the right to counsel. 10 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, thanks, 11 counsel. 12 MS. TRUPP: Thank you. 13 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Lopez? 14 Counsel, do you want any rebuttal time? 15 MR. ELGARTEN: One minute, please. 16 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: One minute, go ahead, 17 counsel. 18 MR. ELGARTEN: I'm Kerry Elgarten. I'm 19 here for Teofilo Lopez. This case - - - my case is a 20 little different from these other ones that you've heard. 21 22 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: How so? How so? 2.3 MR. ELGARTEN: It's - - - there's no 2.4 question what happened here; was the person 25 intentionally abandoning? My client absented himself

1 from trial and remained a fugitive for approximately 2 eleven years. That's why the appeal wasn't - - -3 JUDGE SMITH: You - - - don't you also have 4 the wrinkle that your guy in - - - arguably didn't 5 have counsel even on the - - - even on the matter 6 you're here appealing from? He had counsel, but 7 counsel wasn't given a chance to look at the record? 8 MR. ELGARTEN: No, I - - - I'm the person 9 who did his - - -10 JUDGE SMITH: Okay, but you - - -11 MR. ELGARTEN: - - - but I had yet to see 12 the record, if that's - - -13 JUDGE SMITH: Yeah, that's - - - that's my point. Yeah, I mean what - - -14 15 MR. ELGARTEN: Yes. 16 JUDGE SMITH: Are you - - - are you making 17 the argument that by not - - - I mean, you were 18 there, of course, but how effective can you be if you 19 haven't seen the record? And was - - - was that in 20 itself a deprivation of the right to counsel? MR. ELGARTEN: I don't - - - I'm not sure I 21 22 understand your question, because he had - - - he had 2.3 counsel. He - - - he absented himself during trial. 2.4 Counsel represented him. Counsel filed a notice of 25

appeal. That's the last thing that happened.

1 JUDGE SMITH: Okay, okay. He come - - - he 2 - - - counsel files a notice of appeal, then what 3 happened? The People move to dismiss? 4 MR. ELGARTEN: Eleven years later, he was 5 rearrested, taken back into custody - - -6 JUDGE SMITH: Oh, okay. Okay. 7 MR. ELGARTEN: He was brought back to court 8 for resentencing on a post-release supervision 9 sentence. 10 JUDGE SMITH: He gets resentenced. You - -11 - the - - - the appeal is taken. Is there - - - is 12 there another delay, or this - - - this proceeds more 13 or less in the normal course? MR. ELGARTEN: Well, that's sort of - - -14 15 the Appellate Division assigned the Legal Aid Society 16 to the resentencing appeal. The client and we 17 thought we were going to get assigned to the appeal 18 of the whole judgment. There were things said at the 19 resentencing that - - - that seem to indicate that. 20 And at that time, we moved to amend the order of 21 assignment to include the whole - - - the whole 22 trial. 2.3 JUDGE GRAFFEO: So the relief you're 2.4 looking from us is, in your case?

MR. ELGARTEN: The - - - the - - -

1 JUDGE GRAFFEO: The assignment to the underlying appeal? Is that what you're asking us to 2 3 do? MR. ELGARTEN: Yeah, well, at this point 4 5 the appeal is - - - is dismissed, so - - - so revival 6 of the appeal is - - -7 JUDGE SMITH: It was - - - it was dismissed 8 on the People's motion? 9 MR. ELGARTEN: Yes. 10 JUDGE SMITH: And that - - - that motion 11 was made essentially as a cross-motion to your motion 12 to - - to amend? 13 MR. ELGARTEN: Essentially, yeah. JUDGE SMITH: Yeah. I guess, my - - - my 14 15 question is, do you have an argument that on that - -16 - that - - - in opposing that cross-motion, your guy 17 was entitled to a lawyer who had seen the record? 18 MR. ELGARTEN: I have not previously made 19 that argument, but yes, I do think that - - -20 JUDGE SMITH: You'll - - - you'll take it. MR. ELGARTEN: I'll take it. 21 22 So, really this case falls under the - - -2.3 the guidelines provided in Taveras, and the case was 2.4 dismissed there, or the dismissal was upheld there,

because of prejudice. Here, as we were saying, we

have no idea what the issues are, and certainly, if sufficiency were the - - - sufficiency of the evidence were the issue raised, it couldn't possibly be prejudiced.

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There's - - - there's no retrial. There's no memory of witnesses that's implicated. And I would say that we should have the right to present our issues; if they can show prejudice, then so be it on those issues, but either way, there could - - - there could be a bright line - - - you suggested one earlier, Judge Pigott - - - that it would - - - sufficiency issues could always be raised, and in this circumstance, I certainly think we should have at least that opportunity.

But honestly, I don't know what issues the record would present in - - - in this circumstance, because I haven't seen the record.

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, thanks, counsel.

Okay, Perez, first.

MR. CHAMOY: May it please the court, Noah Chamoy for the People. Your Honors, the Appellate Division did not abuse its discretion as a matter of law in dismissing this appeal. The fact is, there's been no justification for a sixteen-year delay,

there's been no attempt at a justification - - -1 2 JUDGE RIVERA: Well, he's - - - he's 3 arguing that it's really not sixteen-years' delay 4 given the - - - the violation by his attorney of 5 failing to actually pursue the appeal on his behalf, the attorney that he retained - - - the attorney that 6 7 someone on his behalf complained about. He says it's 8 really at - - - at most, two-and-a-half years. 9 MR. CHAMOY: Correct. 10 JUDGE RIVERA: Why isn't that correct? 11 MR. CHAMOY: Well, that's not correct, 12 because, at most, what he can get is some time before 13 May 2003, when the neglect order was issued. The reason for the admonition is at that time - - -14 15 JUDGE RIVERA: You're saying he should have 16 fired his lawyer and gotten another one? 17 MR. CHAMOY: He may have. Actually, we 18 don't know from this record. He may no longer have 19 been the individual's attorney. There's no - - -20 JUDGE SMITH: Do we - - - we know if he 21 ever got - - - if he ever got his money back? I 22 suppose it doesn't matter, but - - -2.3 MR. CHAMOY: We don't have an answer to 2.4 that. We know that he did ask that attorney at some 25 later point in 2008 to work on a 440 for him, and the

1 attorney took money for that, clearly. But this is a 2 retained attorney - - -3 JUDGE SMITH: Maybe he earned - - - maybe 4 he - - - he was working off what he already had. 5 MR. CHAMOY: Potentially. But this is a 6 retained attorney. And the issue with retained 7 attorneys is there are really no Constitutional 8 rights at issue here. It's only a question of 9 ineffective assistance of counsel. All the 10 Constitutional rights relate to indigent defendants. 11 And it's to protect them so they are treated like 12 someone in his position of having a retained 13 attorney. So what we're dealing with here is not an 14 15 absolute - - -16 JUDGE SMITH: So are - - - are we - - - are 17 we penalizing him because his - - - his mother was 18 somehow able to scrape together this large sum money and - - - and give it to a lawyer who turned out to -19 - - to be irresponsible? I mean, should he - - - why 20 21 should he be worse off than somebody who - - - who 22 took no steps on his behalf? 2.3 MR. CHAMOY: We're - - - we're not 2.4 penalizing him for that reason. If we want to use

that language, we're penalizing him because he took

1 no interest in his appeal. Now from the record, it 2 appears his mother took an interest in his appeal. 3 The - - - both of those documents - - -4 JUDGE RIVERA: Well, she's not 5 incarcerated. 6 MR. CHAMOY: Correct. Both of the 7 documents - - -8 JUDGE RIVERA: It's easier for her to - - -9 to deal with the attorney, right - - -10 MR. CHAMOY: Yes. 11 JUDGE RIVERA: - - - and the issues here. 12 MR. CHAMOY: However, both the documents 13 come from her. The only evidence that we have comes from letters to her. 14 15 JUDGE RIVERA: Well, she may be the one 16 paying. 17 MR. CHAMOY: Correct, but the complaint - -18 - it doesn't say that the defendant was the one 19 complaining. It suggests that the mother was the one 20 complaining. The retainer letter is simply saying, 21 you know, that she paid the 30,000 dollars. 22 JUDGE RIVERA: Okay, but let's assume that 2.3 - - - that somehow we're persuaded by his argument 2.4 that you really have to only charge his client with

delay for two-and-a-half years, not for the entire

period of time. Why - - - why is that the kind of 1 2 delay that prejudices the People? 3 MR. CHAMOY: Well, we wouldn't make the 4 argument that two-and-a-half years is a delay that 5 prejudices the People. We make the argument that a substantial amount of time does, because two-and-a-6 7 half years from the time of the notice of appeal to the time someone filed - - -8 9 JUDGE SMITH: Well, we actually have a 10 system which two-and-a-half years is pretty - - -11 MR. CHAMOY: Well - - -12 JUDGE SMITH: - - - as the same as nothing? 13 MR. CHAMOY: It's pretty much actually par for the course, and we mention that in our brief. 14 15 JUDGE SMITH: Is this - - -16 JUDGE GRAFFEO: Did you make a - - -17 JUDGE SMITH: And that's a problem, too, 18 isn't it? 19 JUDGE RIVERA: So, then if - - - if we were 20 persuaded by him, you lose? 21 MR. CHAMOY: However - - -22 JUDGE RIVERA: Or he wins? 2.3 MR. CHAMOY: Yes, except that here what we 2.4 have is a problem which is, there's clearly a 25 strategy going on. And the depraved indifference

1 murder strategy is what's underpinning this entire 2 case, and if he made a strategic decision with that 3 attorney to pursue a 440, that's his choice. 4 JUDGE RIVERA: You're saying this is like 5 Lampkins? 6 MR. CHAMOY: Yes, exactly like Lampkins. 7 It is his choice. If his attorney consults him and 8 says, you have a better chance on an ineffective 9 assistance claim raising this point than going 10 through an unpreserved claim on appeal, where the 11 rule is, he'd be under the old law, because it wasn't 12 objected to - - -13 JUDGE RIVERA: So what - - - what would be 14 the correct way to - - - to have a court consider 15 that argument? 16 MR. CHAMOY: Well - - -17 JUDGE RIVERA: Is that an argument to be 18 considered on this motion to seek leave to extend 19 time to appeal or should that be considered on the 20 appeal itself? 21

MR. CHAMOY: Where he has an attorney, the solution is not to handle this on a motion to dismiss. The motion to dismiss happens. He actually still has an avenue of relief. Lampkins sets it out. He has the ability to file a coram nobis, present the

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allegations we say are deficient, supply affidavits from his attorney, supply the correspondence that was in writing to him, and explain what it was that the attorney failed to do.

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JUDGE PIGOTT: Mr. Chamoy, when - - - when

I was looking at these, every - - - we got seven

unhappy lawyers here. I mean, you got - - - we got

four that have multiple-year defendants, and you got

three trying to say, you know, it's a little late now

to start a new - - - do you have a suggestion or a

solution as to how this does not happen in the - -
in the future?

I know their suggestion is that you folks ought to be moving faster. I mean, you could set - - you could - - - you could take that 120-day deadline and docket it in your office, and then a pro forma motion, you know, could come out, but I guess, I think your argument there was that would - - - there would be a lot of them.

But is there - - - is there some kind of solution here, because I don't think there's are the last four we're going to hear about?

MR. CHAMOY: Correct. The solution appears to be the only thing suggested in Taveras v. Smith, which is an automatic dismissal rule in the Appellate

1 Divisions. That way attorneys don't have to be 2 assigned to every single defendant who has filed a 3 notice of appeal, most of whom - - - or at least many 4 of whom, and this in the thousands - - - don't even 5 know that they have an appeal pending. 6 JUDGE READ: Well, I - - - that was my 7 question. Is there - - - do we know, or is there any 8 way to know, because you file a notice of appeal, 9 it's almost done auto - - - in every case, right? 10 MR. CHAMOY: Correct. 11 JUDGE READ: And it goes into the Supreme 12 Court, into the file of the Supreme Court - - - or it 13 goes somewhere in the Supreme Court. Is there any way to know what - - - what universe or what the 14 15 number is of those that are unperfected, or even to 16 keep track of them? MR. CHAMOY: No. We only know that we have 17 18 an entire file room filled with them. 19 JUDGE READ: And - - - what? MR. CHAMOY: We have an entire file room 20 21 filled with them. 22 JUDGE READ: Okay. 2.3 MR. CHAMOY: Unfortunately. 2.4 JUDGE SMITH: You're - - - you're saying 25 that most of these defendants don't know that they

1 have an appeal pending? 2 MR. CHAMOY: Many of them do not. Taveras 3 himself, did not - - - he had - - - know he had an 4 appeal. I see my time is up, if I may - - -5 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: It's all right. By 6 all means, answer the question. 7 MR. CHAMOY: Yes. No, the issue here is on 8 a motion to dismiss, of course, he has a right to a 9 lawyer. He has the argument that he can get a steno 10 - - - the stenographer to pull up the minutes to his 11 proceedings, so that's in every single one of these 12 cases, he has these - - - a judge has to be assigned, 13 everything has to be litigated, merits-based 14 determination. That's simply - - - this many cases, 15 it's just such a tremendous burden. 16 Whereas if the People - - - for the motions 17 to dismiss, if the People wait, it actually helps. 18 Because for those defendants who have been sitting 19 out and waiting and finally file something, it gives 20 the Appellate Division the opportunity to decide 21 those cases where the defendant actually showed an 22 interest in filing his appeal.

JUDGE SMITH: You - - - you sound like you're saying this is absolutely the perfect system, and somehow - - - something's - - -

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1	MR. CHAMOY: No.
2	JUDGE SMITH: something's telling me
3	it's not. There's got to be a better way.
4	MR. CHAMOY: As I said, the automatic
5	dismissal rule would unfortunately be as far as
6	the case law suggests it's only
7	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yeah, but that's not
8	necessarily fair.
9	JUDGE SMITH: You you say an
10	automatic dismissal rule with no notice to the
11	defendant? No opportunity to come in and
12	MR. CHAMOY: All of that would be up to the
13	court, obviously. I mean, that's just the
14	providing notice
15	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yeah, but again, from
16	a policy perspective
17	MR. CHAMOY: It
18	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: it doesn't seem
19	equitable.
20	MR. CHAMOY: It's more a question of the
21	system
22	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: I understand the
23	efficiency issues.
24	MR. CHAMOY: Yes.
25	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yeah.

JUDGE GRAFFEO: Could you do a conditional? 1 2 MR. CHAMOY: I'm not sure how a conditional 3 would work in light of Taveras v. Smith, given that the moment you start down the path of any merits-4 5 based analysis, all of these additional rights 6 attach, which simply - - -JUDGE SMITH: What I - - - what I - - -7 8 what I thought Judge Graffeo was asking, does 9 conditional dismissal mean, unless you get - - - you 10 get it in - - - in whole months? 11 JUDGE GRAFFEO: Unless you get it in - - -12 unless you get it in, in ninety days or whatever. 13 MR. CHAMOY: I see, yeah - - -JUDGE GRAFFEO: It'll be an automatic 14 15 dismissal. 16 MR. CHAMOY: In our brief, I mean - - -17 JUDGE GRAFFEO: To provide notice, because 18 it appears that notice is one of the issues that 19 keeps rearing its head here. 20 MR. CHAMOY: I think that that issue 21 actually would be better responded to by my 22 contemporaries who have the problem of having no 2.3 attorney involved who was retained and brought in, 2.4 and who had control over what was going on.

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, counsel.

1 MR. CHAMOY: Thank you. 2 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Thanks, counsel. 3 Counsel, does this system make any sense that we're dealing with? 4 5 MS. MORSE: Absolutely. 6 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yeah? 7 MS. MORSE: Your Honors got it - - -8 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Why is it a good 9 system that we have now? 10 MS. MORSE: You got it - - - the 11 legislature got it right, and Your Honors got it 12 right in terms of understanding it, because what it 13 provides is a several-part system, where, yes, there 14 are time - - - there are deadlines, which encourage 15 appeals to be done in a timely fashion, but there's 16 also a wide discretion on the part of the Appellate 17 Division to take into account factors such as the one 18 present in this case. 19 JUDGE SMITH: How - - - how can - - - how 20 can it be good that there - - - that we can even 21 think about having an appeal - - - or having appeals 22 in cases that are a decade or two old? I mean, why -2.3 - - I mean, why can't we work out a system, where it 2.4 gets done in a few years? And - - -

MS. MORSE: Well, well, Your Honor, I think

--- I think Your Honors covered that in West very
nicely, if I could - - - I could just quote one
sentence from West. "The right to appeal is a
statutory right that must be affirmatively exercised
and timely asserted."

So if -- - to follow up on Your Honor's
point, if defendants perfected their appeals within
some reasonable period of time -- not necessarily

point, if defendants perfected their appeals within some reasonable period of time - - - not necessarily the 120 days, but within a shorter period of time, then that would certainly promote - - - as Your Honors also said in West in another place - - -

JUDGE SMITH: I mean, if -- if all the defendants and all the prosecutors were perfect, the system would work perfectly.

MS. MORSE: Right.

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JUDGE SMITH: But if - - - but couldn't we - - - in this - - - having imperfect defendants and prosecutors, isn't it possible to design a system in which we don't - - - we aren't sitting here, you know, discussing cases that were - - - were young in the Reagan administration?

MS. MORSE: Well, Your - - - Your Honor, I believe that the reason that there is - - - that we are talking about these cases, is these are the few cases that have reached this court after such an

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          amount of time - - -
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                    CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Well, what does that
 3
          mean?
 4
                    MS. MORSE: - - - in these - - - in these
 5
          cases - -
 6
                    CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Why - - - why is that
 7
          necessarily good?
 8
                    MS. MORSE: It - - - it - - - well, it's
 9
          good in the sense that it - - - as I thought Your
10
          Honor was suggesting, that there are - - and I
11
          think the People would agree - - - that there are
12
          some situations where defendants can - - - do not
13
          meet the 120 day deadline, and the de - - - and the
          People might even consent. And there are - - - even
14
15
          if we don't consent, the Appellate Division can - - -
16
          has the discretion to extend the time. The question
17
          is, at some point, it is too long. And that's why -
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19
                    CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yeah, but this is not
20
          a coherent system - - -
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                    MS. MORSE: Well, I - - -
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                    CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: - - - that's all I'm
2.3
          saying.
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                    MS. MORSE: I'm sorry, Your Honor.
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                    CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Go ahead, sure.
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MS. MORSE: I believe it is the coherent 1 2 system, Your Honor. I think what happened in - - -3 in - - - with the statutor - - - with the legislative 4 scheme, which Your Honors recognized in West, even if 5 it's only the underpinnings, is that it doesn't lend 6 itself - - - this kind of thing, like many things in 7 life, does not lend itself to - - -8 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Counsel, what - - -9 what about your case, Dockery? 10 MS. MORSE: Yeah. 11 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: What about the fact 12 that he's a juv - - - was a juvenile? 13 MS. MORSE: Okay, if I could just correct a 14 couple of facts, though. When he appeared in front 15 of - - - first of all, he did get - - -16 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: What's the 17 significance of his having been a juvenile? 18 MS. MORSE: It is one of the factors that 19 the Appellate Division considered. The Appellate Division - - -20 21 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Is it a significant 22 factor? MS. MORSE: Absolutely, it's significant 2.3 2.4 that, at the time of sentencing, the defendant was 25 sixteen years old. But also significant is the fact

1 that he did not appear in front of the Appellate 2 Division until he was thirty-eight years old. And 3 twenty-two years passed - - -4 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Is that a sad 5 commentary on our system? MS. MORSE: It's a - - - well, I don't know 6 7 about a sad commentary on the system. I think what 8 it indicates in this case, the Appellate Division 9 recognized, is that there was - - - to be simplistic 10 about it - - - there was no good excuse for sitting 11 on this appeal for twenty-two years. And there are 12 different facets to it. And I just want to - - -13 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: No, but again, you're starting out from the point of a juvenile. I wonder 14 15 whether that doesn't tint the whole thing or - - -16 MS. MORSE: It - - - it - - -17 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: - - - the whole - - -18 all the way through. 19 MS. MORSE: Your Honor - - -20 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: How do you get past 21 that? 22 MS. MORSE: Well, Your Honor, what I would 2.3 say is two things. It could, in some other 2.4 hypothetical situation, where a defendant at sixteen 25 or seventeen, you know, beyond the 120 days, comes to

1	the Appellate Division even if he came to the
2	Appellate Division five years after sentencing, and
3	said, you know, I was a juvenile, and all the things
4	Your Honor is suggesting. Honestly, I think the
5	People
6	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Do you agree more
7	leeway for a juvenile?
8	MS. MORSE: Absolutely, and in fact, we
9	probably would the the People
10	would probably even consent. And the Appellate
11	Division
12	JUDGE RIVERA: Your opponent says he was
13	misled.
14	MS. MORSE: I'm sorry?
15	JUDGE RIVERA: Your opponent says he was
16	misled.
17	MS. MORSE: Well, honestly, several things
18	about that. At that same proceeding
19	JUDGE RIVERA: Please.
20	MS. MORSE: where it was said in oper
21	court, the attorney the same attorney
22	represented him at plea he was getting a very
23	advantageous plea bargain in that situation. So in
24	that at that time the attorney represented he
25	was going to look into it. That attorney came back

at the time of sentencing and there was no complaint about it.

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Now it's certainly possible - - - and I think it's reasonable under the ordinary circumstances of the world, where we do presume competence on the part of lawyers, that the lawyer found out that there was no appeal, and the defendant certainly had a strategic reason to go ahead and take that extremely favorable plea at that point, because he wouldn't be giving anything up. He could always appeal later.

And what happened in this case, with respect to the persistent finding, is that - - - and I'm not say - - - we don't know what happened, but I'm just speculating - - - that there could be a reason. It's not as if there's no possible reason. Once the defendant was sentenced to that very long sentence, sure enough all of his - - - and this defendant went on to commit crime after crime after crime - - all of those cases, he got very favorable plea bargains on the theory that he was already serving a long sentence.

So perhaps he was focused on the longer sentence for one reason or another - - - $\!\!\!\!$

JUDGE RIVERA: So you're saying maybe it's

1	strategic?
2	MS. MORSE: Could be.
3	JUDGE RIVERA: You, too, fall back on this
4	Lampkins
5	MS. MORSE: It could
6	JUDGE RIVERA: Lampkins
7	MS. MORSE: Well, it could be, Your Honor,
8	honestly
9	JUDGE RIVERA: But we don't know.
10	MS. MORSE: We don't know.
11	JUDGE RIVERA: So I'll ask you the question
12	also. Is that something that should be decided on
13	the motion to enlarge or on the actual appeal?
14	MS. MORSE: I I'm sorry, Your Honor.
15	I don't understand the question.
16	JUDGE RIVERA: This question of whether or
17	not it's a strategic choice to conduct himself in the
18	way
19	MS. MORSE: I I
20	JUDGE RIVERA: you're suggesting he
21	conducted himself.
22	MS. MORSE: I don't think in this case,
23	Your Honor, that there's a need to reach that point,
24	because what happened is, the defendant submitted
25	papers to the Appellate Division where he gave an

1 explanation. He actually gave inconsistent 2 explanations at two different times for the delay. 3 So at this - - - in this situation we have 4 5 JUDGE RIVERA: Well, where does the - - -6 the argument I thought you were making that it's 7 strategic and it falls under Lampkins. 8 MS. MORSE: I - - - I just - - - I just 9 meant that in - - - I wasn't so much saying that it 10 fell under Lampkins, as much as that - - - that I 11 could imagine a rational reason that a person could 12 have for the not having pursued it in this way. But 13 - - - but I'm just saying what the Appellate Division 14 had in front of it, is they had an explanation 15 affirmatively by the defendant. 16 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, counsel. 17 MS. MORSE: Could I just - - -CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Sure, go ahead. 18 19 MS. MORSE: Could I - - - I just have one -20 21 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yes, go ahead. 22 MS. MORSE: - - - one more point, okay. 2.3 Just the fact that - - - as Your Honor said 2.4 in West - - - because you talked - - - Your Honor 25 talked about the system - - - improving the system -

- - this defendant - - - it's not too much to ask, or 1 2 maybe it was Judge Smith who said that - - - it's not 3 too much to ask, and in fact, this - - - that the 4 defendant, even someone who had been a juvenile, 5 thirty-one years of age in this case, he filed a 6 poor-person's application for an appellate lawyer in 7 a different case. So that indicates that he had the 8 9 wherewithal, whatever might have happened to him ear 10 - - - long ago, he - - - this particular defendant 11 had the wherewithal. He chose not to do it in this 12 particular case. 13 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay. MS. MORSE: So there's - - - okay. 14 15 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Thanks, counsel. 16 MS. MORSE: I apologize. 17 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, counsel, you 18 have Calaff and Lopez, right? 19 MR. COHN: Chief Judge Lippman, may it 20 please the court, David Cohn for the People in Calaff

So, Your Honors, I submit that Calaff and Lopez have already been decided by this court's decisions in West, its companion case, Jones, and People v. Taveras, as well as by the legislature's

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and Lopez.

clear pronouncements in CPL 460.70(1), and 470.60(1). 1 2 As some of the other attorneys have 3 discussed, in West, this court said very clearly, the 4 right to appeal is not a due process or a Sixth 5 Amendment right. It's a statutory right, created by 6 the legislature. 7 JUDGE RIVERA: But - - - but - - -8 MR. COHN: It must - - -9 JUDGE RIVERA: But in - - - in Lopez, even 10 he at least entitled to the record to see if he might 11 make an argument that perhaps will persuade the AD? 12 It is discretionary. 13 MR. COHN: Your Honor, actually, in West 14 and in Jones, the companion case to Taveras, those 15 appeals were dismissed before the attorneys actually 16 got a full record to see that - - - the only question 17 that's relevant to the dismissal of the appeal issue 18 - - - and of course, it - - - this court did notice -19 20 JUDGE SMITH: But if he's - - - but if he's entitled to counsel, why is he not entitled to a 21 22 lawyer who's seen the record? 2.3 MR. COHN: Well, Your Honor - - - Your 2.4 Honor, in West and in Jones, all I can say is - - -25 JUDGE SMITH: But my - - - my question - -

- my question was why?

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MR. COHN: Why? Well, Your Honor, I believe that Taveras v. Smith says that the reason the defendant is entitled to counsel, in order to respond to a People's motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute, is not necessarily because it has anything to do with the merits of the appeal, although that could be one factor, as this court has recognized.

The reason is, is because it's a discretionary determination that requires some sort of legal argument. So - - -

JUDGE SMITH: Yeah, but - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: Well, how are you going to make it without the record?

MR. COHN: Well, you can make a legal argument as to the excuse for the delay. That's - - - that's the primary motivation. The reason for the delay, the length for the delay, whether the defendant is trying - - -

JUDGE SMITH: You - - - you can - - - you can argue, but one of the discretionary factors is what kind - - - I mean, what kind of case - - - and if you look at the record - - - I mean, if he looked at the record and saw - - - and found some gross

error that everyone had overlooked, maybe one that
suggested his client was innocent, you think maybe
we'd be looking at this case a little differently?

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MR. COHN: Your Honor, I submit that we would not, because especially in Lopez, this is a case - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: But what - - - what if the record even suggests that it's - - - that you're not going to be prejudiced by a late appeal?

MR. COHN: Your Honor, it would hard to see exactly what that scenario would be. I knew there was a suggestion of the sufficiency of the evidence issue. Of course, if a defendant complies with the court rules, and complies with the legislature's rules, and pursues an appeal in a timely fashion, and the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction, of course, he's entitled to appellate relief.

JUDGE SMITH: Well, let me give you a hypothetical I make up. He looks at the record, and he says, well, how about that, there's - - - there's a forensic sample from all these years ago, and DNA testing has advanced since then. Maybe we go get it tested.

MR. COHN: Well, Your Honor, that - - -

1 JUDGE SMITH: And - - - and you see where 2 I'm going. Shouldn't he, at least, have a chance to 3 look at the record? 4 MR. COHN: Your Honor, as far as a forensic 5 test, a new - - - or a new evidence for an actual 6 innocence claim, that could be raised in a CPL 440.10 7 motion and - - -8 JUDGE PIGOTT: You know, there's - - - that 9 was two-edged sword I was - - - I meant to ask Mr. 10 Chamoy about that, because I think in - - - in your 11 case, Perez, it was - - - there's a Dym (ph.) factor, 12 and the claim by the People is that, you know, this 13 is strategic. That now, you know, because of John-14 Baptiste (ph.), he can now raise the Dym, and say 15 that, you know, under - - - under our new - - - our 16 new standard he can argue it. And - - - and that's a 17 very good argument. 18 But I thought the defense can make the same 19 argument saying, you know, we do have - - - I mean, 20 maybe this isn't Dym, and maybe he shouldn't be on a 21 Dym. And I don't know where that puts us. 22 MR. COHN: I'm - - - Your Honor, I'm not 2.3 exactly sure how that relates - - -2.4 JUDGE PIGOTT: But much like Judge Smith is

saying there's a D - - - there may be a DNA issue

1 somewhere. MR. COHN: Right. If - - -2 3 JUDGE PIGOTT: Well, if there's - - - if 4 there's a change in the law, in between the time of 5 the conviction, like there was with Dym, and - - -6 and the time that the appeal finally gets perfected, 7 that could be - - - have a profound effect on the 8 conviction and the subsequent sentence. 9 MR. COHN: Well, Your Honor, a person - - -10 a defendant who appealed in a timely fashion, would 11 not be entitled to a retroactive change in the law -12 - - I mean, to a change in the law, unless it was 13 retroactive, unless it a watershed rule of criminal 14 procedure that would retro - - - that was retroactive 15 JUDGE SMITH: On direct - - - on direct 16 17 appeal? 18 MR. COHN: If his direct appeal had been 19 taken in a timely fashion, and it was over - - -20 JUDGE PIGOTT: That's - - - that's my 21 point. 22 JUDGE SMITH: Well, I see what - - - I see 2.3 what you're saying. 2.4 MR. COHN: Right. 25 JUDGE SMITH: Yeah, you're - - - you're

saying that he might luck out --- I mean, maybe the best thing that ever happened to him that he waited a few decades to --- to appeal.

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MR. COHN: Right, well, he could - - - in essence, get an - - - what might be - - - as some considered to be an undeserved windfall, because he waited this long. And in fact, that's a very important point in both the Calaff - - - and the - - - or Calaff - - - or the Lopez cases.

First in Calaff, you have a defendant who pled guilty in 1993. He was a very active litigant. This was not an unsophisticated litigant. This was someone who - - - who spoke very freely with the trial court. He had a number of prior convictions. He was informed of - - - informed of his appeal rights on several different occasions, '92, 2000, 2004.

He - - - even though he claimed, which the Appellate Division said was an incredible claim, even though he claimed that his lawyer after advising him of what he had to do to take an appeal, took him aside off the record, and said, oh, don't worry about all that. I'm going to take care of it for you, it seems clear, and what the Appellate Division found on this record, is that he made a decision that he liked

his guilty plea, and didn't want to disturb it. And then, nineteen years later, when he's a persistent felony offender facing a life sentence, he has nothing to lose anymore by trying to vacate his guilty plea.

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So there's game playing going on in Calaff.

JUDGE PIGOTT: But that's gets us back to,

I guess, the - - - the nut here. I mean, there's -
you have a vested interest in - - - in getting

these appeals determined timely, for the reason you

just said, and as Mr. Chamoy raised. They claim to

have a vested interest in getting these things done

timely, and unfortunately it's not happening and

we're - - I guess, we're looking for a solution to

that.

MR. COHN: Right, Your Honor, and - - - and it's quite possible that the legislature might look at this and decide that there could be a different system that could be put in place. Whether or not there could be a better system than the one we have now, is not a reason to give a windfall to someone who sat on his appellate rights strategically for nineteen years. It's not a reason to give a windfall to a defendant who fled the jurisdiction for twelve years, trying to avoid his punishment.

JUDGE RIVERA: Well, I'm not clear on the -1 2 -- I'm not -- - I'm not so clear on the windfall. 3 I understand the argument on the person in absentia, 4 but the other windfall - - - I mean, the person's 5 incarcerated, and they - - - they risk, because this 6 is a - - - losing the right to appeal, because this 7 is discretionary now, I don't - - - I'm not really 8 clear on what this great windfall is that you're 9 describing. 10 MR. COHN: Well, the windfall - - -11 JUDGE RIVERA: I mean, it sounds like a 12 heck of a risk to take on the hopes. 13

MR. COHN: Well, Your Honor, I respectfully submit, Your Honor, that the windfall in $-\ -\ -$ in the Calaff case is that the defendant was happy with his plea bargain at the time that he $-\ -\ -$

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JUDGE READ: So you're saying he changed his mind?

MR. COHN: He changed his mind, because now he's a persistent felony offender who's subject to a life sentence, and by the way, this guilty plea is one of the reasons why he's a persistent felony offender, so he has nothing to lose. If he had appealed immediately after the plea bargain, he could have gone to trial. He could have gotten a - - - a

1	conviction of a higher count and a greater sentence.
2	So he had a lot to lose by appealing. The
3	it is
4	JUDGE RIVERA: Although he might have
5	gotten free. He had a lot to win.
6	MR. COHN: He might have, but he could have
7	looked at the evidence and and as the evidence
8	in this case was, it was a burglary and he was
9	identified shortly after the crime
LO	JUDGE SMITH: Are you
L1	JUDGE RIVERA: Not pure speculation on your
L2	side, no?
L3	MR. COHN: Pure speculation
L4	JUDGE RIVERA: Of what you just said.
L5	MR. COHN: That's no, that's in the
L6	VDF; it's in the record. It's in the record. He was
L7	identified shortly
L8	JUDGE SMITH: Are you suggesting maybe
L9	should be a different rule for for plea cases?
20	I if Calaff the only one of these that's a
21	plea?
22	MR. COHN: Calaff is a plea. Lopez is a
23	trial in absentia. And I believe that Calaff is the
24	only one of these that's a a plea case.

JUDGE GRAFFEO: Based on your knowledge of

1 the system, is there any way we can improve it? 2 Particularly in terms of providing notice? 3 MR. COHN: Your Honor, I - - - I think that 4 this court made it very clear in West and Taveras 5 that it is a defendant's right by statute and it's a 6 defendant's responsibility by statute to exercise in a timely fashion. Now to the extent that this court 7 8 could encourage the defense bar to be very diligent 9 in following up on those appeals - - -10 JUDGE SMITH: The only - - - the only way 11 to improve this system is to - - - is to increase the 12 diligence of the defense bar? I mean, otherwise, the 13 system's perfect? 14 MR. COHN: Your Honor, I'm not saying it's 15 I'm saying that - - perfect. 16 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: But the DA has no - -17 - no responsibility to make it better in terms of - -18 - you want the same thing as the defense bar wants. 19 You want justice to be at the end - - - the product 20 of all of this. Isn't there something - - - I guess we're all saying - - - isn't there some way where 21 both sides can cooperate and the court can put into 22

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MR. COHN: Your Honor, this really does

place some kind of coherent system that would ensure

that - - - that people have their day in court?

sound like a question for the legislature. It sounds like a question for the Appellate Division and its rule-making authority.

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CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: But it's certainly a mess, and we see it right in front of us.

JUDGE PIGOTT: But - - - but even then,
what would the rule be? I mean, we would be happy to
recommend it. I - - - I realize you may say it's a
legislature - - - it could be the Office of Court
Administration; it could be somebody, but I just
don't know what the rule would be.

MR. COHN: Your Honor, our office doesn't, at this time, have a - - - a formal position on that, so I - - - I don't feel like I can answer that adequately. Certainly, if the legislature wants to look at - - - at the system, and say, you have X amount of time to take an appeal, and after that X amount of time expires, your appeal is dismissed. That might be a - - - a clearer rule.

I don't think there's an allegation in either the Calaff or the Lopez case that the defendants were un - - -

JUDGE SMITH: Well, what - - - what about Judge Graffeo's idea of a conditional dismissal?

Your appeal's dismissed unless you perfect it in

ninety days.

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MR. COHN: If that were the Appellate

Division rule, I imagine that would - - - that would

be an appropriate rule. I do not know under Taveras

v. Smith, whether a counsel would have to be assigned

at that point to the dismissal of the appeal, and I

don't even - - I don't know if that would have any

effect on the Calaff and Lopez cases.

My - - - my contention is - - - just

limited to those cases, is that you have defendants

who abuse the system. You have one defendant who

pled guilty, liked his plea for a very long time,

until he became a persistent felony offender. You

have another defendant who deliberately tried to

evade justice and - - and in fact, in Ventura, this

court recognized that there's - - there's a

difference where a defendant deliberately tries to

evade justice.

This court should not participate in that sort of conduct that $-\ -\$

JUDGE RIVERA: Well, as the system exists, is there - - - putting aside my comment before about being officers of the court, and - - - and the Chief Judge's comment that you're all interested in achieving justice, if I was going to be jaded, I

1 would say that there is - - - right now, as the 2 system exists, an incentive to the People, because 3 the longer they wait, or the greater the delay, based 4 on your advocacy, if we - - - if we indeed followed 5 your advice or your arguments here - - - it's very 6 unlikely that they could ever succeed in enlarging 7 time for an appeal with these extensive delays. So 8 it's - - - it strikes me that right now you're very 9 invested in this system as it exists. 10 MR. COHN: Your Honor, I actually believe that if you look across the country, New York is 11 12 quite generous to defendants compared to other 13 systems. We have Supreme Court cases - - -14 JUDGE RIVERA: Is that a bad thing? 15 MR. COHN: Sorry? I'm not saying it's bad. 16 I'm - - - I'm just saying that - - - that - - -17 JUDGE SMITH: Generous in terms of the 18 number of years we allow cases to kick around. 19 MR. COHN: Right, and in fact - - -20 JUDGE SMITH: Is that - - - wouldn't there 21 be a better way to achieve fairness than by letting 22 people take nineteen years to prosecute their 2.3 appeals? I mean, that - - - we're all in favor of 2.4 being generous to defendants, but is that a good kind

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of generosity?

MR. COHN: Well, I think we would all like 1 2 appeals to be resolved in less than nineteen years. 3 I don't believe that that goal is furthered by 4 reinstating an appeal of somebody who has waited 5 nineteen years for strategic reasons, or because they 6 absconded - - -7 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, counsel. 8 Thanks, counsel. 9 MR. COHN: Thank you. 10 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Appreciate it. 11 All right. So we have a few one-minute 12 rebuttals. 13 MS. ZOLOT: Before I address the particulars of Mr. Dockery's case, since we've been 14 15 discussing possible rules and solutions, there's 16 really a very simple solution. 17 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Give it to us. 18 MS. ZOLOT: That is, overrule West. If we 19 overruled West, and we extended assigned counsel's 20 agency at the trial level to filling out the IFP, and 21 making the motion for assignment of counsel, these 22 problems would be resolved. JUDGE READ: But what would be the - - -2.3 2.4 MS. ZOLOT: Certainly in both Dockery and

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Calaff's case.

1 JUDGE READ: What would be the cost of 2 Do you have any - - that? 3 MS. ZOLOT: In dollars and cents? 4 JUDGE READ: Yeah, do we have any notion 5 what would be the cost of that, because I gather that 6 a lot of these notices of appeal are filed for people 7 who really don't want to perfect the appeal. 8 MS. ZOLOT: Well, along with that, and 9 what's lacking in today's sys - - - today's system, 10 is a meaningful discussion with the client about the 11 pros - - - what's required in the Family Court Act 12 actually - - - a meaningful discussion with the 13 client about the costs and benefits of appealing, the 14 possible appellate issues in the case, whether 15 there's a value to appealing, how long it will take. 16 Maybe there's a risk to appealing for a plea client. 17 Maybe the - - - the client would choose not to appeal 18 once made aware that's there's a risk. 19 If there were that meaningful discussion 20 and then extending trial counsel's agency for the 21 IFP, which is just another part - - - he's already 22 filing or she's already filing a notice of appeal - -2.3 2.4 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Right.

MS. ZOLOT: - - - you understand - - -

1 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yeah, okay, give us 2 Dockery. 3 MS. ZOLOT: As for Dockery - - -4 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yeah, give us 5 Dockery. MS. ZOLOT: I'd like to get back to first 6 7 principles there. Mr. Dockery was fifteen years old 8 when he was charged, sixteen years old at sentencing. 9 My adversary quotes West, but what she fails to quote 10 is that a waiver under Dockery is found only if the 11 defendant, in the first instance, is properly advised 12 of his appellate rights. 13 Our position is that as a matter of law, a minor is not properly advised when a written notice 14 15 in - - -16 JUDGE SMITH: Is this - - - is this - - -17 is this notice something the average, or even a 18 subaverage fifteen-year-old can't read? 19 MS. ZOLOT: I - - - no. It isn't. 20 fact, in Mr. Dockery's case, amicus points out that 21 it's written at, at least, a tenth-grade level. My 22 client was in the ninth grade. JUDGE PIGOTT: Well, plus he said - - - I 2.3 2.4 think he said he had trouble with the questions 25 about, what is your income? Do you own a house?

MS. ZOLOT: Well, it's so confusing for a 1 2 minor. I'm still not clear exactly whose information 3 would be sought in this, whether it's the minor's or 4 the - - - or the parent's. It's just - - - it's just 5 set up to be not understood. So to the extent that 6 in West - - - to the extent there's any vitality to 7 West, that it's clear for adults; it's certainly not clear for minors. 8 9 So back to first principles, Mr. - - - Mr. 10 Dockery's due process rights were violated in 1986 11 and that has to color how we see that entire period 12 after that. 13 JUDGE RIVERA: It doesn't matter if he 14 subsequently appreciates and understands these 15 rights? 16 MS. ZOLOT: No - - - I would say no, but -17 18 JUDGE RIVERA: There was no point when this 19 20 MS. ZOLOT: - - - more to the - - -21 JUDGE RIVERA: - - - this proc - - - let's 22 assume there was an error. Let's ass - - - let's go 2.3 with you on that. There's no point in time, moving 2.4 down the line, someone like this individual who ends

up back in the system - - - there's no point in time

when that error is cured?

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MS. ZOLOT: Only if the People could show contemptuous conduct and actual prejudice. An action alone is not enough to - - - to deprive him of his fundamental right to appeal.

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, thanks, counsel.

Okay, Calaff, go ahead.

MS. TRUPP: I also want to urge you to overrule People v. West, and to point out that New York State is one of only two states that leaves a gap in representation between the time trial - - - an appointed trial attorney's agency ends, and appellate counsel is perfected.

JUDGE SMITH: Well, we decided in West, I

think, what - - - when - - - the extent of the

Constitutional right to counsel. Presumably, it's

one thing to say the guy doesn't have a

Constitutional right to have someone fill out the

form for him, as a policy matter, it might be wise to

have a rule, the lawyer has to fill out the form.

MS. TRUPP: This court has a role in assuring that the right to appeal is not dissipated because somebody is indigent, and that is what is happening right now.

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                    CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: You're just saying
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          the gap is - - - is - - -
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                    MS. TRUPP: The gap - - -
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                    CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: - - - an
 5
          unconscionable situation.
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                    MS. TRUPP: You are seeing the tip of the
 7
          iceberg here. These are the defendants who made it
          up to the Court of Appeals. You are not seeing the
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          myriad of - - -
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                    CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yes.
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                    MS. TRUPP: - - - other defendants who are
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          surrendering their rights to appeal, simply because
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          they do not know how to file an in forma pauperis.
          And I understand - - -
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                    JUDGE SMITH: I - - - but - - - but what
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          about - - - you're Calaff?
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                    MS. TRUPP: I'm Calaff.
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                    JUDGE SMITH: Yeah, so you're the - - - you
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          - - - why - - - why isn't it plausible that your guy
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          and a lot of other guys never pursued an appeal
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          because they - - - because it was not in their
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          interest to do so, because they might, God forbid,
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          get their plea back?
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                    MS. TRUPP: There's - - - first of all,
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          there's no reason to believe Mr. Calaff didn't want
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1 to pursue an appeal. On this record, he was 2 unsatisfied with his sentence, because he believed 3 that the original promise had been two-and-a-half to 4 5 JUDGE SMITH: Nobody's ever thrilled to sit 6 in jail. 7 MS. TRUPP: No, no, no. But there would 8 have been no benefit for him not to appeal, because 9 he got a higher sentence than what he thought he was 10 initially got - - -11 JUDGE SMITH: What - - - what - - - what 12 about - - - but he - - - but he - - - no, they told 13 him what the sentence was going to be, and he still 14 took the deal. He thought it was beneficial then. 15 MS. TRUPP: Because he was so - - - told 16 that he had a chance to challenge it on appeal. That 17 was the reason that he accepted it. 18 JUDGE SMITH: You - - - you mean, he plead 19 - - - people plead guilty because their lawyer said, 20 don't worry, plead guilty, and we'll beat it on 21 appeal? 22 MS. TRUPP: There are - - - the belief that 2.3 you have a chance to challenge it on appeal could 2.4 absolutely rationally inform your decision to plead 25 quilty.

JUDGE SMITH: I think - - - I'm not talking about a case with a suppression motion. This is just a - - - the case against you is really strong; you better plead guilty and now, don't worry, we'll win the appeal? Doesn't make sense.

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MS. TRUPP: There's no suggestion here that Mr. Calaff had a strategic reason, at least as of 2004, to sit on his appellate rights, because at that point, his sentence is being enhanced. If he knew he had an appeal then, there would have been - - - if he was a sophisticated - - -

JUDGE SMITH: I mean, can't - - - can't the - - - I mean, is it - - - is it - - - why can't the Appellate Division cast a skeptical eye on the claim that a lawyer who was at, the very - - - in the very moment advising the guy to plea, was assuring him that he was going to get the - - - get the thing reversed on appeal. That sounds like a very odd thing for a lawyer to do.

MS. TRUPP: Well, there's a presumption against abandonment of a fundamental right. And the Appellate Division's findings are not supported by this record. They said that the sentencing minutes refuted the claim. The claim was based on what happened after the sentencing minutes.

So, yes, if they said we have reviewed these for credibility - - - if they had made a legitimate factual finding here, and placed it on the record the basis, then perhaps this would not have been an abuse of discretion. What we have here is a reasoning that makes no sense on its face. And for that reason, it's an abuse of discretion.

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, counselor. Thanks, counsel.

Counsel, Lopez?

MR. ELGARTEN: The defects in the system that we've been talking about, my co - - - these counsel have been talking about, is not the cause of the delay in this case.

But on the other hand, the tension that the People have in terms of what - - - what should they do to bring an end to the case, doesn't exist here either, because here, while the - - - the - - - Mr.

Lopez was a fugitive. Had they brought a motion to dismiss, it just would have been granted under the dis - - - the fugitive disentitlement doctrine.

And it's -- it would be very obvious and very easy to follow such a person. He was a fugitive at trial. Let's see what -- wait the designated time period and then move to dismiss. So those

1	things aren't implicated here, and they fail to do
2	that here, and now they're saying, oh, I'm getting a
3	wind Mr. Lopez is getting a windfall, but he's
4	not getting a windfall.
5	He's getting a we're seeking a chance
6	to appeal and make sure and see if he didn't get a
7	fair trial and see if an innocent man wasn't
8	convicted or if he wasn't convicted of something he
9	didn't actually commit.
10	So especially in the absence of a record, I
11	think it's totally a was an abuse of discretion
12	to have granted dismissal, and I'd ask for the
13	reversal.
14	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, counsel,
15	thanks.
16	Thank you all. Appreciate it.
17	(Court is adjourned)
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CERTIFICATION

CERTIFICATION

I, Karen Schiffmiller, certify that the foregoing transcript of proceedings in the Court of Appeals of People v. Reynaldo Perez, No. 55, and of People v. Ivan Calaff, No. 56, People v. Alexander Dockery a/k/a John Harris, No. 57, People v. Teofilo Lopez a/k/a Garcia Lopez a/k/a Isidoro Garcia, No. 58, was prepared using the required transcription equipment and is a true and accurate record of the proceedings.

Hour Schffmille.

Signature:

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Date: February 27, 2014