1	COURT OF APPEALS
2	STATE OF NEW YORK
3	
4	UNION SQUARE PARK COMMUNITY COALITION, INC., et al.
5	Appellants,
6	-against-
7	No. 17 NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF PARKS AND RECREATION, et al.
8	Respondents.
9	Respondents.
10	20 Eagle Street
11	Albany, New York 12207 January 14, 2014
12	Before:
10	CHIEF JUDGE JONATHAN LIPPMAN
13	ASSOCIATE JUDGE VICTORIA A. GRAFFEO ASSOCIATE JUDGE SUSAN PHILLIPS READ
14	ASSOCIATE JUDGE ROBERT S. SMITH ASSOCIATE JUDGE EUGENE F. PIGOTT, JR.
15	ASSOCIATE JUDGE LOGENE F. FIGOTI, UK. ASSOCIATE JUDGE JENNY RIVERA
16	ASSOCIATE JUDGE SHEILA ABDUS-SALAAM
	Appearances:
17	SANFORD I. WEISBURST, ESQ.
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24	
25	Sharona Shapiro Official Court Transcriber

1	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: 17, Union Square.
2	Counselor, you want some rebuttal time?
3	MR. WEISBURST: I'd like to reserve three
4	minutes, please.
5	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay. One second
6	'til your adversary's able to be seated. And go
7	ahead, counselor.
8	MR. WEISBURST: Chief Judge Lippman, and
9	may it please the court. My name is Sanford
10	Weisburst, and I'm here on behalf of the Union Square
11	Park Community Coalition and the individual
12	plaintiffs.
13	I'd like to start by talking about where
14	the Appellate
15	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Let me ask you, a
16	park can be a public a restaurant can be a
17	public use, right?
18	MR. WEISBURST: In our view, a restaurant
19	can be, depending upon the facts and the
20	circumstances.
21	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Why isn't it in this
22	case, when there are so many provisions about what
23	they're doing with the community and the park and
24	whatever that they have to comply with?
25	MR. WEISBURST: A couple of reasons.

1 First, to clarify the record on that, there are only 2 two hours per week of community activities that are 3 chosen by the restaurant. So it's not really in the 4 true sense - - -5 JUDGE PIGOTT: Two hours per week in the 6 restaurant? 7 MR. WEISBURST: Yes, in the restaurant. 8 JUDGE PIGOTT: Not in the park. I mean, 9 the park's - - -10 MR. WEISBURST: No, but this is in - - -11 this is a very unique structure. It goes back a long 12 ways to the very first Labor Day; there was an 13 important protest there. More recently, at the time of the Republican National Convention in 2004; even 14 15 more recently, in 2011. This is an iconic public 16 speaking place. 17 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So how does this - -18 19 MR. WEISBURST: It's also - - -20 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: - - - destroy this 21 iconic nature of - - -22 MR. WEISBURST: Well, if you had a 23 restaurant there during its operating season, Chief 24 Judge Lippman, you'd - - - you wouldn't be able to 25 have speakers on the steps. And this is shown in the

1 addendum to our brief. The restaurant takes up the 2 steps; it has tables even outside. And you wouldn't 3 be able to have a speaker standing up there, as well 4 as his equipment to project his voice to thousands of 5 people, if you had an operating restaurant there. And it's not just about public speaking - - -6 7 JUDGE GRAFFEO: Has there ever been food service in this park? 8 9 There has been food service MR. WEISBURST: 10 on the other side of the Pavilion. And I think the 11 geography's a little important here. So the place 12 where the public speaking is typically taking place 13 is on the north plaza, looking north from the Pavilion. On the south of the Pavilion there is 14 15 what's called a sunken courtyard, and there once was 16 a - - - a cafe operating solely outside the Pavilion 17 on the south side of the Pavilion, never in the Pavilion or on the north plaza - - -18 19 JUDGE GRAFFEO: So you're more concerned 20 with the location than the fact that there's food 21 being sold? 22 MR. WEISBURST: We're concerned certainly 23 with the location, because it's displacing very 2.4 important recreational and public speaking 25 opportunities in this - - - in this park. It's - - -

1 it's really a unique structure. 2 JUDGE GRAFFEO: I - - - I thought you were 3 concerned with disruption and noise and - - -4 MR. WEISBURST: Well, there - - -5 JUDGE GRAFFEO: - - - that type of thing, 6 so how - - -7 MR. WEISBURST: We are concerned - - -8 JUDGE GRAFFEO: How is encouraging - - -9 MR. WEISBURST: Absolutely. There is a - -10 11 JUDGE GRAFFEO: - - - what you're talking about consistent with that concern? 12 13 MR. WEISBURST: There is a concern, which 14 is that there's a playground that is immediately 15 south of the Pavilion, and you're going to have the 16 bar that serves alcohol to the patrons of the 17 restaurant - - -18 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So if you put the 19 restaurant in another place in the park, you might be 20 okay with it? 21 MR. WEISBURST: Well, it would be a 22 different - - - there would be different arguments. 23 I think that it would be - - - this is - - - if you 24 could pick the worst place in the park to displace 25 park activities, this would be it.

1	JUDGE PIGOTT: But we're a law court
2	MR. WEISBURST: You put it
3	JUDGE PIGOTT: what do we do, as a
4	matter of law
5	MR. WEISBURST: Sure.
6	JUDGE PIGOTT: when we come down on
7	somebody? What do we say?
8	MR. WEISBURST: Well, let me go back to
9	where the Appellate Division went wrong. And it's
10	important to remember this this case is at the
11	motion to dismiss stage. And we the dismiss -
12	the Appellate Division over reversed the
13	Supreme Court and granted dismissal of our complaint,
14	and it did so based on a mistake a legally
15	mistaken view of restaurants and parks. It basically
16	concluded, as the City has argued, that restaurants
17	are per se proper park uses, that you don't even go
18	past that. As long as it's a restaurant, it's okay;
19	you don't need to go to the state legislature for
20	authority for it. And that was where that was
21	where the Appellate Division went wrong.
22	JUDGE GRAFFEO: A lot of parks have
23	restaurants.
24	MR. WEISBURST: They do, and not none
25	of those restaurants first of all, the most

1 important restaurant that was challenged was in this 2 court's 795 Fifth Avenue case. And this court did 3 not dispose of the case using a per se rule; it looked at the facts and circumstances. 4 5 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: But looking - - -MR. WEISBURST: Prior - - -6 7 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: - - - at the facts here, what is so intrusive? It's just that you can't 8 9 have these large speaking - - -10 MR. WEISBURST: Well, it's that, but - - -11 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: - - - is that the 12 main - -13 MR. WEISBURST: - - - it's als - - - it als 14 15 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: - - - the main thrust 16 of your problem? 17 MR. WEISBURST: It also displaces recreational activities from inside the Pavilion 18 space. And we - - - you can see this also in the 19 20 addendum - - -21 JUDGE SMITH: Any use displaces other uses. 22 MR. WEISBURST: It does, but this is a very 23 small park and the opportunities for recreation are -24 - - are limited. Let me contrast this - - -25 JUDGE SMITH: Why is that - - - why should

1 courts, rather than the Parks Commissioner, make a 2 judgment like that, say this park is so small that 3 it's not really good to put a restaurant in because 4 there are so many other things. I can see the point, 5 but why is that an argument - - - why - - - how can we overrule the Parks Commissioner's judgment on 6 7 that? 8 MR. WEISBURST: It's not - - - it's not 9 this court that would be overruling; it's this court saying that the state legislature has to decide. And 10 11 there's a very important reason for that. This case 12 - - - the City stands to make 300,000 dollars-plus a 13 year, and it received an 8-million-dollar donation. 14 JUDGE SMITH: Yeah, but I mean - - -15 MR. WEISBURST: There's a pressure on the 16 City - - -17 JUDGE SMITH: And most trustees, I agree 18 with you, don't have that kind of conflict of 19 interest. But this isn't a pure trust, in that 20 sense. I mean, it isn't - - - it isn't the law that 21 every time the City makes money on a use, that the 22 state legislature has to approve it. 23 MR. WEISBURST: It is the law in parks, I 24 would submit. 25 JUDGE SMITH: It is? And what says that?

1	MR. WEISBURST: Any
2	JUDGE GRAFFEO: Are there other parks in
3	the City that have gone to the legislature for their
4	restaurants?
5	MR. WEISBURST: There are. And in fact,
6	the most similar example
7	JUDGE GRAFFEO: Give us some examples.
8	MR. WEISBURST: Bryant Park is a similar
9	example. That case, it did not go to litigation, but
10	the City voluntarily went to the state legislature to
11	get approval. It received approval from the state
12	legislature.
13	And Judge Graffeo, I would like to go back
14	to your question about why is this park different;
15	there are tons of restaurants in other parks. This
16	is this is really a unique park. And the
17	Bryant Park is the most close analogy. If you look
18	at something like Central Park, it's it's
19	orders of magnitude larger.
20	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yeah, but
21	MR. WEISBURST: It's 800
22	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: what percentage
23	of space it's a very small percentage that this
24	restaurant is going to occupy, right?
25	MR. WEISBURST: It's it's a small

1 percentage of the park as a whole, but this is a 2 small park and - - -3 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: No, but that's what 4 I'm saying, though - - -5 MR. WEISBURST: - - - and because - - -6 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: - - - if you're 7 talking about scale and Central Park, here you're 8 talking about a tiny percentage of it. 9 MR. WEISBURST: But because the park is so 10 small, you're going to have a bar serving alcohol to 11 people two feet from a playground. CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Aren't there 12 13 restaurants all around the square in Union Square, 14 where people are serving alcohol? 15 MR. WEISBURST: There are - - -16 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: All - - - literally 17 all around the park? 18 MR. WEISBURST: There are, but not - - -19 not a few feet from the playground. And moreover, 20 the fact that those restaurants exist totally 21 undermines one of the factors that this court should consider. 22 23 JUDGE SMITH: You're almost out of time. 2.4 Could you talk about the lice leesense (sic) - - -25 MR. WEISBURST: Absolutely.

1	JUDGE SMITH: loose (sic) lease
2	license issue?
3	MR. WEISBURST: And I can return to it in
4	rebuttal if I run out of time. But the most
5	important precedent on this issue is the Miller case,
6	very similar facts. You had
7	JUDGE SMITH: Yeah, I mean, I read I
8	was puzzled, because it seemed to be based on a
9	a charter provision that said leases are only ten
10	years. I mean, what what's the ultimate source
11	of the rule that you can't have a lease in a
12	parkland?
13	MR. WEISBURST: Well, it go it's part
14	of the public trust doctrine, and Miller
15	JUDGE SMITH: Yeah, I understand, but what
16	what says that? Yeah, the
17	MR. WEISBURST: I think the rationale is
18	that you're not allowed to
19	JUDGE SMITH: No, not the rationale; what
20	says it? Is there a statute? Is there a case? I
21	mean, Miller Miller applies a a charter
22	provision that, as far as I can tell, isn't
23	applicable here. What
24	MR. WEISBURST: I believe it's
25	JUDGE SMITH: Where is the source I

1 mean, I understand - - - everybody seems to say, 2 including your adversaries - - - everybody says, oh, 3 you can't have a lease; you can only have a license. 4 So I'm sure you must be right. I'm just sort of 5 curious as to where it comes from. MR. WEISBURST: I think it comes from 6 common law. Van Cortlandt Park described the public 7 trust doctrine, both of its branches, both park 8 9 versus nonpark, as well as - - -10 JUDGE SMITH: Okay, but you don't - - - it 11 comes from common law, but you don't have a case to 12 cite, right off hand, that says it? 13 MR. WEISBURST: Well, Van Cortlandt Park 14 says that, we think. 15 JUDGE SMITH: Okay. 16 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Why isn't it a 17 license? 18 MR. WEISBURST: Why isn't it a license? CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: The City could 19 20 terminate - - -21 MR. WEISBURST: You've got a fifteen-year -22 23 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: - - - there are 24 conditions, all kinds of conditions. 25 MR. WEISBURST: The most important reason

1	is because the Chef the private business is
2	investing 1.3 million dollars upfront, and the City
3	has said that we needed to give a fifteen-year term
4	to the Chef in order so that he could recoup his
5	investment. And that length of term suggests that
6	whatever the provisions of the agreement say about
7	termination, it, as a matter of fact, is not going to
8	be terminated.
9	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, counselor.
10	JUDGE SMITH: Well, as a matter of fact
11	_
12	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: I'm sorry, Judge
13	Smith.
14	JUDGE SMITH: Is it a question of whether
15	as a matter of fact it's going to be terminated or -
16	let's suppose suppose, hypothetically
17	I mean, you're saying I don't care what the lease
18	says; there's a wink and a nod that they're not going
19	to terminate. That's essentially what you're saying?
20	MR. WEISBURST: May I answer?
21	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yes, of course.
22	MR. WEISBURST: Okay.
23	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Sure.
24	MR. WEISBURST: The
25	JUDGE SMITH: Is that a fair summary of

1 what you're saying? MR. WEISBURST: It's not just a wink and a 2 3 nod, in answer to your question, Judge Smith. It's 4 the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing. You 5 can't treat a contracting partner, who you know has invested one million dollars, and fire them the next 6 7 day. 8 JUDGE SMITH: Even though he signed the 9 document that says throw me out whenever you want? 10 MR. WEISBURST: Well, it doesn't quite say 11 that; it says - - -JUDGE SMITH: As long as it's not arbitrary 12 13 and capricious. MR. WEISBURST: Right, and that's an 14 15 ambiguous term which we haven't had the opportunity 16 to - - -17 JUDGE SMITH: So in your view, if - - -18 let's just suppose, hypothetically, there to be a new 19 administration in the City, and hypothetically that 20 administration might be less friendly to private 21 business than the previous administration, and the 22 new Parks Commissioner might say, you know what, I've 23 read Mr. Weisburst's argument here and I'm convinced 24 this is a terrible idea and I'm terminating. Can't 25 he do that under the lease, as written?

1	MR. WEISBURST: He would be subjecting
2	himself to a suit by the Chef for violating the
3	arbitrary and capricious clause
4	JUDGE SMITH: You think is it your
5	position that Chef could win that suit in the teeth
6	of that termination clause?
7	MR. WEISBURST: I think that Chef would get
8	past a motion to dismiss, certainly.
9	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, thanks,
10	counselor. You'll have your rebuttal.
11	Counselor?
12	MS. BRENNER: May it please the court. I
13	am Deborah Brenner. I am here on behalf of the City
14	and its concessionaire, Chef Driven Market.
15	Restaurants are not the same as water
16	treatment plants or safety museums.
17	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Well, what about here
18	where the restaurant is taking over this public
19	speaking area that your adversary says is is
20	iconic in nature, that there were all kinds of
21	significant events in the life of the City
22	MS. BRENNER: Well, periodically, Your
23	Honor
24	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: taking place
25	there?

1	MS. BRENNER: Periodically, that was true,
2	but there were also large periods of time when the
3	Pavilion was off limits to any members of the public.
4	It was actually used as a storage area for the Parks
5	Department and for staff to use. And so obviously
6	that can't be challenged. I mean, that's a
7	that's a legitimate use. And as long as it is being
8	used for a a park purpose, it is up to
9	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: How is this
10	restaurant a park purpose? Tell me.
11	MS. BRENNER: Restaurants, historically,
12	have been held to be
13	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: What about this
14	MS. BRENNER: a facility
15	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: this
16	restaurant, this one?
17	MS. BRENNER: Well, restaurants, in
18	general, are they facilitate the free use
19	JUDGE SMITH: You say that's the end of the
20	inquiry? It's a restaurant; goodbye.
21	MS. BRENNER: Generally, yes, Your Honor.
22	I mean, I could envision a case where if ninety-eight
23	percent of a park were being turned into a food
24	court, that that might be a problem.
25	JUDGE SMITH: Well, why did Justice

1 Markowitz have to write that long, long opinion in 2 the 795 case, if all he had to say was oh, it's a 3 restaurant, so don't bother me. 4 MS. BRENNER: Well, that's basically what 5 this court said when reviewing that decision. They said - - - I mean, it's true that - - - that this 6 7 court affirmed the denial and dismissal of that 8 complaint and allowed the case to go forward to 9 trial. But once it was reviewing the trial evidence, 10 it only considered the record to the extent that it 11 established three facts. One, restaurants have 12 usually and historically been placed in parks. Two, 13 they are generally regarded as appropriate, as the 14 Luna Park restaurant was in this - - - in this park 15 for over - - - over a decade. 16 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yeah, but that was 17 more of a concession stand, right? 18 MS. BRENNER: No, Your Honor, oh, no. That 19 was a sit-down restaurant with table service. 20 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: How many - - -21 MS. BRENNER: It also served - - -22 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: How many people did 23 it serve? 2.4 MS. BRENNER: - - - alcohol. Tt. - - -25 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: How many people did

1 it serve? 2 MS. BRENNER: I think it was comparable. Ι 3 couldn't tell you; I - - - I could get that information for the court - - -4 5 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: It's okay. MS. BRENNER: - - - if you wish. 6 7 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Go ahead. 8 MS. BRENNER: - - - but it is comparable in 9 size to the restaurant that's - - -10 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: But they're saying -11 12 MS. BRENNER: - - - contemplated here. 13 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Their main argument 14 is that you're destroying the character of the park. 15 Why is that not the case? 16 MS. BRENNER: Because, Your Honor - - -17 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: You would agree, if 18 you had a restaurant that destroyed the character of 19 the park for the public, that wouldn't be a good 20 public use, right, or a valid use? 21 MS. BRENNER: Do I personally agree with 22 that? I do. But I'm not the Parks Commissioner. 23 Destroying the character of a park is a discretionary 2.4 determination. As long as - - -25 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So it's a - - -

1	MS. BRENNER: the use
2	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: decision for
3	the policy makers, period?
4	MS. BRENNER: It is, as long as it's a use
5	that has been determined to be an appropriate park
6	use, which this court determined in 795 Fifth Avenue
7	
8	JUDGE SMITH: So
9	MS. BRENNER: it was determined
10	JUDGE RIVERA: You were about to say three;
11	what was the third one?
12	MS. BRENNER: The third one that there is -
13	appropriate discretion resides, under the City
14	charter, in the Parks Commissioner to make a
15	determination that a restaurant would would
16	serve the public the public good.
17	JUDGE GRAFFEO: So what distinguished this
18	situation from the parks where the City had to go to
19	the state legislature for special legislation?
20	MS. BRENNER: Right. And the only case
21	- the the Bryant Park is the only park where
22	that has happened in recent history in New York, that
23	I'm aware of, and that plaintiffs have put forth.
24	The reason that that the City went to the
25	legislature was because that was a lease. A lease is

1 different from a license. The reasons why leases are 2 different is because they are - - - although 3 temporarily, they do alienate public park land, lands 4 that have been entrusted to the public for park uses. 5 And because a lease was contemplated, and ultimately came to being in that case - - - I believe it was a 6 7 thirty-five year term - - - the City could not 8 terminate the lease, except for cause or certain - -9 10 JUDGE GRAFFEO: What is it in this arrangement that makes it a license and not a lease? 11 12 MS. BRENNER: So many things. First of 13 all, the arbitrary and capricious limitation is no 14 limitation at all. The City has retained the right 15 to terminate this - - - this license whenever it 16 deems appropriate. 17 JUDGE RIVERA: So what does that language 18 mean then? 19 MS. BRENNER: Not - - -20 JUDGE RIVERA: But what - - -21 MS. BRENNER: What it means - - -22 JUDGE RIVERA: - - - would that language 23 mean? 2.4 MS. BRENNER: What it means is it can't do 25 it in bad faith, which is true in any contract - - -

1 whether it's in there or not, the court will read it 2 in - - - and that it can't do it for an irrational 3 reason. 4 JUDGE RIVERA: But what would that mean? 5 But that sounds to me like limits. MS. BRENNER: Well, it's a limit that - - -6 7 I mean, I can't imagine that - - - that the law would 8 be - - -9 JUDGE SMITH: But you say that limit would 10 exist if the clause weren't in there because public 11 officials - - -12 MS. BRENNER: Because we're the City. 13 JUDGE SMITH: - - - could never be 14 arbitrary and capricious. 15 MS. BRENNER: That's correct. 16 JUDGE SMITH: I understand - - - then how -17 - - but - - - but a couple of questions. One, why 18 would anybody sign - - - why would Chef sign a - - -19 a lease which has a nominal fifteen - - - or excuse 20 me, a license which has a nominal fifteen-year term 21 when Mayor de Blasio can kick 'em out tomorrow? MS. BRENNER: Well, I think it's a 22 23 calculated risk, Your Honor. The last licensee who 24 had that - - - that license was - - - was the 25 operator of Luna Park - - -

1	JUDGE SMITH: So
2	MS. BRENNER: which was amazingly
3	successful, very popular and stayed in place for over
4	a decade.
5	JUDGE RIVERA: Well, isn't the real answer
6	that if the City does go around entering these kinds
7	of agreements and then just breaches them the next
8	day or terminates at will, as you say it has the
9	right to do, that no business will enter these
10	agreements
11	MS. BRENNER: And that
12	JUDGE RIVERA: and that would be to
13	the detriment of the City and the public?
14	MS. BRENNER: Certainly, and that would be
15	a motivation for the City to retain the right to do
16	so and not to exercise that right.
17	JUDGE SMITH: You're saying it's just a
18	business there's no legal limitation; it's just
19	a business limitation.
20	MS. BRENNER: That's correct, Your Honor.
21	JUDGE SMITH: My other question is, if the
22	what's the point of the clause in the lease
23	that says you can terminate for cause on thirty days
24	if you can terminate without cause on twenty-five
25	days?

1	MS. BRENNER: Well, that's that's a
2	mystery to me, Your Honor, but I really couldn't
3	answer that question. But of course, it's not
4	directly at issue in this case because it's very
5	clear that the City does have the right and I
6	would point out as well, it has a supremacy clause,
7	notwithstanding any other part of the agreement. So
8	the fact that there are and it also expressly
9	provides that the City will not reimburse capital
10	expenditures or any other expenses in the event of a
11	revocation.
12	JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Counsel, I'd like to
13	
14	JUDGE RIVERA: Why
15	JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: go back to the
16	original issue about whether this is this is -
17	your strongest argument is this is a motion to
18	dismiss, and they we have to look at what the
19	complaint pleads. And you're saying what about the
20	pleadings? That they're not sufficient to withstand
21	a motion to dismiss?
22	MS. BRENNER: That's correct, Your Honor.
23	When viewed against the backdrop of the 795 Fifth
24	Avenue case, and the arguments that were put forth at
25	trial there, and the way that this court dealt with

1 them, this court said, you know, the fact that there 2 are lots of other restaurants in the area, the fact 3 that they're easily accessible because it was at the 4 edge of the park, the fact that it was going to be a 5 very expensive restaurant, the fact that it was going 6 to be mostly at ground level rather than among the 7 trees and the verdant greenery, that is not relevant. 8 That as long as the Commissioner has the discretion, 9 that this is a valid park purpose, that the 10 Commissioner has the discretion to place a restaurant 11 in the park, the court's inquiry reaches the end of 12 its rope. 13 JUDGE RIVERA: What about his point about 14 the public speech in the Pavilion? 15 MS. BRENNER: The public speech in the 16 Pavilion is - - -17 JUDGE RIVERA: Does that make a difference? 18 MS. BRENNER: - - - an issue that's been 19 thrown around in this case but never really fully 20 briefed, Your Honor. There certainly - - - this 21 restaurant will take up 2.1 percent of the park, 22 which means that 97.9 percent of the park is 23 available for public speaking. If you're familiar 24 with the park, there - - - and it's also in the 25 record - - - there is another plaza on the south end

1	of the park, which also has steps, which is
2	frequently used for public speech.
3	JUDGE RIVERA: Isn't that also where
4	there's a subway exit?
5	MS. BRENNER: The subway is on
6	JUDGE RIVERA: There may
7	MS. BRENNER: actually on both ends,
8	Your Honor. There's a subway entrance in the north
9	and also
10	JUDGE RIVERA: But as I recall, there's
11	almost a gazebo over the subway exit on the south
12	side that you're discussing. It sounds to me perhaps
13	a little bit different than the Pavilion on the north
14	side.
15	MS. BRENNER: It's definitely different. I
16	mean, the Pavilion is the only covered structure in
17	the park. But I would also point out that the
18	the Pavilion will be available for six months out of
19	the year. Now, the plaintiffs are saying that that's
20	not feasible because of the elements. But it is a
21	covered structure. And I would note that the
22	arguments that they made in the lower court, when
23	they were trying to challenge the holiday market,
24	which takes place during the six-week period that's
25	probably the coldest point of the year, they were
1	

1 saying that they were being displaced from using the 2 south - - - the south plaza when they like to bask in 3 the sun and engage in soapbox orations. It's very 4 plain. I mean, this is a park that's heavily used 5 year round, and maybe at the very coldest days of the 6 year you would have some difficulty. But heat - - -7 heat lamps can be placed. I mean, really, the First 8 Amendment issues here, there's adequate time, place 9 and manner, alternate channels that can be used even 10 if - - -11 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Counsel, are you 12 saying that a restaurant - - - you said that what the 13 restaurant charges is not really important. If the 14 restaurant were a restaurant that charged 100 dollars 15 for appetizers, and of course entrees and everything 16 else would be a lot more than that, that would be 17 okay because - - -18 MS. BRENNER: Well, there are some - - -19 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: - - - it's a 20 restaurant? 21 MS. BRENNER: There are some park 22 restaurants in the city that do have substantially 23 higher prices. I mean, this - - - the RFP is in the 24 record; it asks for proposals for - - -25 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: No, I'm not talking

1	about this particular
2	MS. BRENNER: Okay.
3	JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: I'm talking about your
4	premise, which seems to be that as long as the
5	restaurant is a park purpose and the other two
6	factors that you mention, that's the end of the
7	inquiry. So I'm asking if a restaurant wanted to
8	charge 100 dollars for appetizers, and of course, you
9	know, proportionately more for entrees and so on,
10	it's still a park purpose, so it's okay, even though
11	only maybe a very few people would be able to eat
12	there?
13	MS. BRENNER: I would say that is correct,
14	Your Honor. It's obviously not this case, because
15	the the you know, the plaintiffs can make
16	allegations, and they think that that's enough to get
17	them past a motion to dismiss, but we have a written
18	instrument, and there's an approved menu with prices
19	that must remain the same, other than CPI increases,
20	unless Parks gives prior written permission to raise
21	them. And we're talking about, by Manhattan
22	standards, some very reasonable prices at the lower
23	end. We have, you know, 7.95 for salads, 8.95 for
24	sandwiches, and, like, a dollar or 2 dollars for
25	brunch and breakfast items. I mean, the plaintiffs
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1 keep pointing to the most expensive things on the 2 menu which can be twenty-five, thirty-five dollars. 3 And that may, you know, prove too expensive for 4 certain park users. But there's no admission fee; 5 there's no requirement that you spend a certain 6 amount of money. 7 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, counselor. 8 MS. BRENNER: And so - - - okay. 9 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Thanks, counselor. 10 MS. BRENNER: Thank you very much. 11 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Appreciate it. Counselor, rebuttal? 12 13 MR. WEISBURST: Sure. Thank you, Chief 14 Judge Lippman. 15 I'd like to start with Bryant Park. My 16 adversary misstated the State law that was passed. 17 It was not just because it was a lease. It - - -18 record, page 204, there's actually a copy of this 19 law, and it mentioned specifically that it was going 20 to be used as a restaurant. So if - - - if the state 21 legislature was good enough for deciding Bryant Park, 22 it should be good enough for deciding this. 23 JUDGE SMITH: Well, but her point, as I 24 understand it, is they needed legislation because a 25 lease was involved. You don't dispute that?

1	MR. WEISBURST: We think that they needed
2	legislation both because a lease was involved
3	JUDGE SMITH: You think
4	MR. WEISBURST: and because it was -
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6	JUDGE SMITH: You think there were other
7	reasons, but you're not saying that on that
8	even on your adversary's theory, they could have gone
9	ahead in Bryant Park without a without state
10	legislation?
11	MR. WEISBURST: No, we agree that Bryant
12	Park involved a lease. We think that this case also
13	involves a lease.
14	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yeah, but you don't
15	think every restaurant has to be go up to the
16	state legislature; that's the specific issue that
17	triggers it
18	MR. WEISBURST: No no, but go
19	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: is the lease
20	issue?
21	MR. WEISBURST: going back to Judge
22	Abdus-Salaam's point, we're at a motion to dismiss,
23	and my adversary's reading of 790 (sic) Fifth, we
24	- with respect, is wrong. 795 Fifth had sustained a
25	complaint that alleged a restaurant was a nonpark

1 It allowed those plaintiffs to go to trial and use. 2 prove their case. And the key dispositive factor in 3 the lower court, after that trial had happened, was 4 that the park - - - the part of the park that was 5 going to be used for the restaurant was a previously 6 unused, scraggly portion of the park. This Pavilion 7 is the exact opposite of that. It's a very actively 8 used - - - historically, it was used for speeches. 9 It occasionally has been renovated and not useable 10 for a few years, but if you look back over the course of a hundred years, it's been frequently used for 11 12 recreational and public speaking activities. 13 JUDGE SMITH: I mean, I agree with you, but 14 what your adversary says is that Justice Markowitz's 15 opinion is very minute, but when we got to review 16 that case, we wind up saying, you know, "Without 17 showing the type and location of the restaurant to be 18 unlawful, plaintiffs ought not to succeed in 19 preventing public officers from exercising their best 20 judgment." Doesn't that support her "all restaurants 21 are okay" rule? 22 MR. WEISBURST: It doesn't, because that 23 reserved the - - - for plaintiffs the right to argue 24 that the type and location was unlawful. And I want 25 to point out - - -

1 JUDGE SMITH: And that's what you're 2 arquing. 3 MR. WEISBURST: - - - this is very important, is that 795 Fifth cited a case called 4 5 Blank v. Browne. It was a previous Appellate Division case which said that a snack bar in a park 6 7 was - - - was improper. And there was another case called Williams v. Hylan, which was prior to 795 8 9 Fifth, which also had said that a restaurant was 10 improper. All we're asking here is the opportunity 11 to make that showing. And ultimately, all we're 12 asking is the opportunity to have the state 13 legislature decide this. This court has - - - and I would like to 14 15 refer this court to Van Cortlandt Park where Chief 16 Judge Kaye said this is a very longstanding doctrine; 17 it requires state legislative approval as a check and 18 balance on local city officials. And for this court 19 to say that restaurants are per se park uses would 20 really be - - -21 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: We wouldn't - - -22 MR. WEISBURST: - - - overturning that 23 doctrine. 2.4 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: We wouldn't have to 25 conclusively say that every restaurant is okay in

1	order to decide for your adversary?
2	MR. WEISBURST: No, and in fact, the
3	balancing test that could be applied, which we've
4	tried to lay out in our briefs, could be rather
5	strict. But we think we meet that. We think
6	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay.
7	MR. WEISBURST: if there were
8	if you could pick any place in the city, any park to
9	put a restaurant, this is the wrong place, and we
10	should be able to have a chance to satisfy that test.
11	Thank you.
12	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, counsel.
13	Thank you both. Appreciate it.
14	(Court is adjourned)
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2	CERTIFICATION
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4	I, Sharona Shapiro, certify that the
5	foregoing transcript of proceedings in the Court of
6	Appeals of Union Square Park Community Coalition,
7	Inc., et al. v. New York City Department of Parks And
8	Recreation, et al., No. 17 was prepared using the
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