1	COURT OF APPEALS
2	STATE OF NEW YORK
3	
4	PEOPLE,
5	Respondent,
6	-against-
7	No. 18 ADRIAN P. THOMAS,
8	Appellant.
9	
10	PEOPLE,
11	Appellant,
12	-against-
13	PAUL AVENI,
14	Respondent.
15	
16	20 Eagle Street
17	Albany, New York 12207 January 14, 2014
18	Before:
19	CHIEF JUDGE JONATHAN LIPPMAN
20	ASSOCIATE JUDGE VICTORIA A. GRAFFEO ASSOCIATE JUDGE SUSAN PHILLIPS READ
21	ASSOCIATE JUDGE ROBERT S. SMITH ASSOCIATE JUDGE EUGENE F. PIGOTT, JR.
22	ASSOCIATE JUDGE JENNY RIVERA ASSOCIATE JUDGE SHEILA ABDUS-SALAAM
23	
24	
25	

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1 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: People v. Thomas and 2 People v. Aveni. 3 Counsel, would you like any rebuttal time? MR. FROST: One minute, Your Honor. 4 5 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: One minute? Okay. MR. FROST: Chief Judge Lippman, Judges, 6 7 good afternoon. I'm Jerome K. Frost. I am the 8 attorney for Adrian Thomas, the appellant. 9 To my left is Ingrid Effman - - -10 MS. EFFMAN: Good morning. 11 MR. FROST: - - - a colleague and friend 12 who has participated in Mr. Thomas' case in the 13 beginning. She tried it and she's going to spend three of the allotted fifteen minutes arguing the 14 15 Dunaway point. 16 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, go ahead. 17 MR. FROST: I quote the world's leading 18 authority on Criminal Interrogations and Confessions, 19 describing a situation, "If you don't tell me about 20 the sexual contact you had with your daughter, your 21 kids will be taken away, and you will never see them again." 22 23 One of the guidelines co - - - governing 2.4 confession admissibility is that the confession must

be essentially the product of the suspect's freewill.

When the impetus for confessing is to avoid a jail cell or to be able to see one's children, the statement is clearly the result of compulsion.

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JUDGE SMITH: Well, wait a minute. You say

- - almost everyone who confesses is hoping either

to avoid or to minimize his time in a jail cell. Are

you saying that renders it involuntary?

MR. FROST: I'm saying, Your Honor, that the author of that statement, John Reid, the coauthor of Criminal Interrogations and Confessions, states that this type of conduct is unacceptable and is clearly compulsory.

JUDGE GRAFFEO: What is it - - -

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Counsel, what - - - what was at risk here? What - - - what - - - what was it, in a nutshell - - - what's the most egregious part of - - of this lack of freewill that - - - that was imposed upon your client? What - - - what's the - - - the particularly - - - the most egregious thing that they said, that resulted in - - - in what he admitted to?

MR. FROST: Mr. Reid and I would agree on this, Your Honor. About an hour into Mr. Thomas' first interrogation, the police threatened four times to arrest his wife, prosecute her, if he did not

implicate himself. It was a credible threat. Six hours before, the same two policemen accompanied Child Protective Service workers to Mr. Thomas' home, and removed his crying children from his presence.

JUDGE SMITH: Well, also, wasn't there - - wasn't there a - - - didn't they, in effect, tell
him that his child - - - knowing his child was
already dead, that - - - that he needed to confess to
save the child's life?

MR. FROST: That's probably the worst thing they said to him, Your Honor. That was a combined threat, deception and promise. It was a cruel hoax in which Sergeant Mason offered in exchange for Mr. Thomas' buying into his hoax that Matthew was still alive, and if only he would agree with Sergeant Mason's supposed - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: So how - - - how is this deception any different from other deceptive tactics that the police are able to use?

MR. FROST: It's a threat, Your Honor.

Your son is going to die if you don't buy into what I say. It's a promise. If you buy into what I say, these doctors, who were feverishly working on your dead son, might be able to save him.

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So is there a rule as

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1	to where you draw the line in in interrogations
2	like this? Where where do they step over line?
3	Are you able to to put it into some kind of a
4	rule?
5	MR. FROST: There's a bright line rule,
6	Your Honor.
7	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: What's the bright
8	line rule?
9	MR. FROST: The bright line rule
10	Constitutional rule it's a state case law rule,
11	and it's a rule under CPL 60.45(2)(a). In Lynumn
12	against Illinois, the police threatened Beatrice
13	Lynumn, if she did not confess, she'll go to prison
14	for ten years
15	JUDGE PIGOTT: Wait, wait, what
16	MR. FROST: and we'll take your kids.
17	JUDGE PIGOTT: What's the rule we're
18	looking for?
19	MR. FROST: You don't let me put it,
20	if I may answer you indirectly, Your Honor. I don't
21	believe that there's a person in this courtroom who
22	doesn't cherish someone so much
23	JUDGE PIGOTT: But what's the rule? I
24	- I
25	MR. FROST: The rule is you don't threaten

1 a person's vital interests, such as the freedom of 2 his spouse, taking away his children - - -3 JUDGE PIGOTT: Well, how about if - - - if 4 he says, you know, unless you confess here, unless 5 you tell us what's going on, we're going - - - we're 6 ultimately going to find out and you're doing life in 7 jail, is that - - - is that coercive? MR. FROST: The threat of doing life in 8 9 jail, I would suggest, is coercive, Your Honor. Now, 10 if you confess - - - it implies that if you confess, 11 you're not going to do life in jail - - -12 JUDGE PIGOTT: All right. If he says he -13 14 MR. FROST: - - - we'll do something better 15 for you. 16 JUDGE GRAFFEO: If - - - if the - - - if 17 the wife - - - say we have a hypothetical situation that's similar to this, Mr. Frost. If the wife says 18 19 he did it, and then the police go in and say - - - or 20 she doesn't say that, but the police go in and tell 21 him that your spouse has thrown you in. 22 MR. FROST: Well, actually she didn't. 23 we want - - -24 JUDGE GRAFFEO: No, but what - - - what

we're trying to figure out is we've - - - we've got

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1
          precedent that says the police can use deception. So
 2
          what we're trying to figure out is when do you go - -
 3
          - when do you enter - - -
 4
                    MR. FROST: There's - - -
 5
                    JUDGE GRAFFEO: - - - this area of
 6
          inappropriate interrogation, because they can use
 7
          some tactics. So we're - - - I'm trying to
 8
          distinguish what would be acceptable or what would
 9
          not be acceptable.
10
                    MR. FROST: There's a limit, and there's a
11
          clear limit, Your Honor. You don't - - -
12
                    JUDGE READ: Are you saying you have to
13
          look at the whole thing? You have to - - -
14
                    MR. FROST: No, absolutely not.
15
                    JUDGE READ: So you're asking us to change
16
          our rule.
17
                    MR. FROST: I'm asking the court to - - -
18
          I'm not asking the court to change rules. I'm asking
19
          the court to apply the bright line rules that already
20
          exist about - - -
21
                    JUDGE SMITH: I'm still - - - I thought
22
          this was about - - -
23
                    JUDGE GRAFFEO: I thought - - - I thought -
2.4
25
                    MR. FROST: - - - threats and deceptions.
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1	JUDGE GRAFFEO: I thought our rule was that
2	involuntariness is determined by the totality of
3	circumstances.
4	MR. FROST: I respectfully submit that it's
5	not, Your Honor. In Anderson
6	JUDGE READ: That's not our rule?
7	MR. FROST: the court says
8	JUDGE READ: That that's not our rule? You
9	you
10	MR. FROST: I think the judges have
11	the trial judges have seized upon this rule so they
12	can find what circumstances they want to support what
13	they want to accomplish.
14	JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: So what do you say is
15	the rule, counsel? That's where we started.
16	MR. FROST: I say you threat don't
17	threaten to arrest people's wives, whom you know are
18	innocent, so that you can implicate by
19	implicating yourself, whom you also know to be
20	innocent.
21	JUDGE PIGOTT: Well, that's a narrow rule
22	and and and I don't think you'd want to
23	go that I mean, let's as let's assume for
24	a moment that they're not married.

MR. FROST: It makes no difference, Your

1	Honor.
2	JUDGE PIGOTT: So your rule's a little
3	broader. It's not just spouses.
4	MR. FROST: My my rule is you don't
5	threaten a person's vital interest.
6	JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: But it's okay to do
7	some of the other things?
8	MR. FROST: Touch the other children. You
9	the freedom of their spouse.
10	JUDGE SMITH: You you well, you
11	say you can't even you can't even threaten the
12	suspect's own freedom, but of but they do that
13	all the time, don't they? I mean, isn't it's
14	almost isn't that almost inherent in the
15	in the process of saying, look, tell us the truth
16	_
17	MR. FROST: That is also improper, Your
18	Honor.
19	JUDGE SMITH: and we really will go
20	easier on you?
21	MR. FROST: If you if you read Inbau
22	and Reid, which I spent almost all of last week
23	reading, promises of immunity, promises of leniency,
24	threats to prison
25	JUDGE PIGOTT: So what can they do? I

JUDGE PIGOTT: So what can they do? I

1	mean, the police have somebody and they and
2	they they suspect that they're the ones the
3	held up the First National Bank down the road, and
4	they want to ask him if, in fact, he did it. Now
5	-
6	MR. FROST: They can ask him that.
7	JUDGE PIGOTT: And he's going to say, I
8	don't know what you're talking about.
9	MR. FROST: And he can say that.
10	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: What if what if
11	they
12	MR. FROST: But but they can't
13	threaten
14	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: What if they say
15	-
16	MR. FROST: to arrest his wife.
17	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: What if they said, we
18	know this is an accident, so don't worry about it;
19	you're not going to get arrested. Is that okay?
20	MR. FROST: Absolutely not. And
21	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Is that what happened
22	here in your view?
23	MR. FROST: Your Honor, it happened here
24	sixty-seven times.
25	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yes

1	MR. FROST: I counted them.
2	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: that's what I'm
3	asking you.
4	MR. FROST: Well, it
5	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So that's one of the
6	most egregious things that they did to say
7	MR. FROST: Absolutely, absolutely.
8	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: we know this is
9	an accident
10	MR. FROST: No matter
11	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: you're not
12	going to be arrested. Just tell us the truth.
13	MR. FROST: No matter what you did no
14	matter what you did, it's an accident. It's more
15	than a promise of leniency. It's
16	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: That's a destroy
17	- that what's the what's wrong
18	MR. FROST: It's absolvo te I absolve
19	you.
20	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: What's wrong with
21	that? That's a lie; that's what wrong with it? It's
22	a falsehood?
23	MR. FROST: What's wrong with it? It's a
24	promise of leniency. It's a promise of
25	JUDGE PIGOTT: Well, let let me

1 MR. FROST: - - - absolution. 2 JUDGE PIGOTT: Mr. Frost, I get your point 3 that - - - that, you know, sometimes people who are 4 under arrest, you know, want to play the hero, in the 5 sense that the police say, we're going to arrest your 6 parents; we're going to arrest your spouse; we're 7 going to arrest your kids, or whatever. And they 8 say, well, you know, I'm going to be the hero. I'm 9 going to falsely confess to what I know my wife did 10 with respect to this child. 11 MR. FROST: Do I know what my wife did not do in this case, Your Honor? 12 13 JUDGE PIGOTT: You're not - - - you're not listening. I - - - I - - -14 15 MR. FROST: I understand. Is that okay with you? Is that all right with you, Your Honor? 16 17 JUDGE PIGOTT: Okay. 18 MR. FROST: Heaven help us. 19 JUDGE PIGOTT: No, I'm trying to - - - I'm 20 agreeing with you that there are situations like that 21 where someone wants to play the hero that will 22 testify falsely. You don't want people to testify 23 falsely. The police don't want people to testify 2.4 falsely.

MR. FROST: Yes, they do. Yes, they do.

_	JUDGE PIGOTT: Okay.
2	MR. FROST: They absolutely do, Your Honor.
3	JUDGE READ: You want to talk a little bit
4	about the expert testimony?
5	MR. FROST: Certainly. The prosecutor in
6	the Appellate Division stated no, no; I concede that
7	the case would not be legally sufficient without the
8	defendant's confession. The facts prove him right.
9	So that puts us, first of all, in the LeGrand
10	context. There is no without that confession,
11	there is no evidence in any way
12	JUDGE SMITH: So why why why
13	does that why does that make the expert
14	testimony that you proffered admissible?
15	MR. FROST: Besides, Your Honor, for the
16	indication there'd be no other evidence
17	implicating Mr. Thomas, or even as far as I'm
18	concerned that a crime was committed, that is a
19	powerful consideration in governing the trial court's
20	exercise of its
21	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: What did
22	MR. FROST: discretion.
23	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: What would the expert
24	let's focus in, and quickly, because you'll
25	have your short rebuttal time What what would

the experts' testimony have done for the fact finder?

What - - - what context would it have put him into

that would have been helpful to the fact finder?

MR. FROST: Well, our use of excerpts from

the actual interrogation, the expert would first state, Your Honor, that false confessions do exist.

And they do exist; it's been demonstrated by the exoneration cases - - -

JUDGE SMITH: Well, not only they do exist, but they're - - - as he put it - - - more common than you might think. I mean, I - - - no one would say they're totally nonexistent.

MR. FROST: I can say, Your Honor, based upon my experience - - - I'm going to put Mr. Thomas' case aside - - - I disagree with Dr. Cassell. I tried two cases in the 1980s involving false confessions, and my client was acquitted in both. So I guess that would tell us that the rate of false confessions is a hundred percent.

JUDGE SMITH: But - - - but - - - but I

think it's agreed in this record that nobody can

prove the rate. In fact, there's - - - no one - -
you don't claim that you can prove to scientific

certainty what the rate is at - - what the rate is

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1 MR. FROST: How could - - - how could you 2 possibly prove it? 3 JUDGE SMITH: Okay, but - - - but you can -4 5 MR. FROST: You have to know how many false confessions there are. 6 JUDGE SMITH: Is it - - - is it - - - what 7 8 my question really is, is - - - is it enough - - - is 9 it - - - is there scientific quality, because 10 obviously not precision, to putting an expert on the 11 stand saying, you know, I don't know what the rate 12 is, but there's a lot more of these than you would 13 ever have any idea. MR. FROST: Your Honor, I would venture to 14 15 say there are tens of - - -16 JUDGE SMITH: No, I'm not - - - I'm asking 17 you of the fact. I'm asking whether if that - - -18 that is proper expert testimony. 19 MR. FROST: It - - - when you're dealing 20 with social psychology, which deals with human 21 behavior and human nature, and not with a hard 22 science like physics or chemistry - - -23 JUDGE PIGOTT: No, but if you've got a 2.4 situation - - - let's say you got a murder/suicide, 25 and the - - - one person is - - - the murdered person

1	is dead on the floor and the suicide missed, and he
2	came in and he says, yeah, I did it; I you
3	know, I killed her, and I intended to kill myself,
4	but I didn't. You don't need an expert to come in to
5	say that may be a false confession.
6	MR. FROST: Uh
7	JUDGE PIGOTT: So they're not
8	MR. FROST: Not if he said it when the cops
9	arrived at the door obviously, Your Honor.
10	JUDGE PIGOTT: Well, you're making
11	MR. FROST: But you're saying the
12	circumstances
13	JUDGE PIGOTT: You were suggesting that all
14	of all confessions are false
15	MR. FROST: Well, maybe she tried to shoot
16	him, and he took the gun away and shot her.
17	JUDGE PIGOTT: I'm almost done.
18	MR. FROST: Who knows?
19	JUDGE PIGOTT: Okay.
20	MR. FROST: It could be. It depends on the
21	context. It depends on the circumstances in which it
22	happened. You know, let me say this.
23	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Counsel, finish up;
24	your light is on; go ahead.
25	MR. FROST: All right.

1	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Finish your thought;
2	go ahead.
3	MR. FROST: About time my light went on,
4	Your Honor.
5	The testimony of Dr. Ofshe was obviously
6	relevant. Without it, there's no other without
7	the confession, there's no other evidence. He is
8	obviously qualified in the field; he's practicing for
9	over twenty-five years. He's testified on 316
LO	occasions, federal court, state court, Daubert
L1	jurisdiction, Frye jurisdiction, military court.
L2	JUDGE PIGOTT: But the point the
L3	point, I think, is that in un in LeGrand there
L4	were reasons to suspect that the eyewitness
L5	identification may be shaky. And so
L6	MR. FROST: There's no reason to suspect
L7	that here, Your Honor?
L8	JUDGE PIGOTT: No, I I'm coming
L9	around to your side; you just you got to let me
20	
21	MR. FROST: Thank you.
22	JUDGE PIGOTT: get there.
23	MR. FROST: Keep that light on.
24	JUDGE PIGOTT: So your point is, that if
25	this if there are questions as as to the

1	validity of this thing, that there ought to be expert
2	testimony to say why he would have done what he did
3	and why it may be false. And a jury ought to hear
4	that.
5	MR. FROST: Yeah, right. He would testify
6	that there are false confessions, that there are
7	certain types of conduct that are police techniques
8	that are common to false confessions, and that these
9	this type of a improper conduct is present
10	here.
11	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, counsel, good.
12	You'll have your rebuttal. Let's hear from your
13	_
14	MR. FROST: Thank you.
15	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: from Ms.
16	Effman.
17	MS. EFFMAN: May it please the court
18	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Counsel, do you want
19	any rebuttal time of your three minutes?
20	MS. EFFMAN: No, Your Honor.
21	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay.
22	MS. EFFMAN: No, Your Honor.
23	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Go ahead.
24	MS. EFFMAN: I'll be sho I'll be
25	short and brief. All the statements made by Mr.

Thomas, during the first interrogation and his second interrogation, which was preceded by sixteen hours at Samaritan Hospital, committed to a secure mental facility, must be suppressed as fruits of an unlawful arrest, detention without probable cause, starting from the first moment Mr. Thomas was taken in a police car from his residence, after his children had been removed from his care Sunday evening to the Troy Police Department.

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And after being there for two hours, subject to accusatory questioning, things such as Mason and Fountain told him, the officers said, someone murdered this baby; someone slammed this baby into a hard object. One of the two of you did it, referring to him and his wife.

JUDGE GRAFFEO: But - - is it the two hours that you're focusing on or what the police officer said?

MS. EFFMAN: Focusing on both, Your Honor.

The two hours - - -

JUDGE GRAFFEO: Because we've got cases with nineteen hours, forty-eight hours of interrogation. Two hours is a relatively short time frame in light of other cases that our court has examined.

1 MS. EFFMAN: When you take into account the 2 fact that the accusatory nature of the questioning 3 was such that an innocent person, free of any 4 wrongdoing, would not feel that they were free to 5 leave. And even if he you assume he came to the station voluntarily for this initial interrogation, 6 7 by the end of the initial interrogation, after being 8 confronted with evidence that the police thought he 9 was guilty, by telling him that they're going to come 10 after him criminally - - -11 JUDGE SMITH: I'm a little - - - I'm - - -12 I'm - - - maybe I'm confused. What are you arguing, 13 other - - - Mr. Frost already argued that the 14 confession's involuntary. Are you arguing the same 15 point, or is there - - - is there a different one 16 here? 17 MS. EFFMAN: People - - - that the police lacked cause to detain him. This was - - - he was in 18 19 custody. And it - - -20 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: And it does - - - and 21 it doesn't matter what they said to him as to what 22 his status was. You're saying, in effect, he 23 couldn't leave? 2.4 MS. EFFMAN: He - - - he - - -

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: He was in custody?

1	MS. EFFMAN: He was in custody, an innocent
2	person free of wrongdoing, which is a standard
3	JUDGE SMITH: So so the
4	relevancy
5	MS. EFFMAN: particularly
6	JUDGE SMITH: the relevance, if I
7	understand it, the accusatory nature of the
8	questioning is relevant to show that it was a
9	custodial interrogation?
10	MS. EFFMAN: He was being interrogated in
11	custody; he was not free to leave.
12	JUDGE SMITH: Okay, you got through, okay.
13	MS. EFFMAN: And the end of the first
14	interrogation, he was taken into custody
15	clearly, by the execution of the Officer
16	Fountain on the Mental Hygiene form under 941, it
17	clearly states, Officer Fountain says, I'm taking
18	Adrian Thomas into custody, and asked, in fact, to be
19	notified of his release from the hospital. And after
20	Mr. Thomas spent sixteen hours in Samaritan Hospital,
21	placed he didn't consent to go there. He was
22	told he was going there to get help.
23	JUDGE PIGOTT: He states
24	MS. EFFMAN: He never consented.
25	JUDGE PIGOTT: I think the People say it's

a mixed question as to, you know, whether this arrest was unlawful or not. They had facts in which they believed that there was reasonable cause to believe that he may have done something.

MS. EFFMAN: It's not - - -

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JUDGE PIGOTT: How do - - - how do we get out of the mixed question issue?

MS. EFFMAN: It's - - - it's not a mixed question, Your Honor. First of all, the court applied the wrong standard. They mixed up the standard for voluntariness with the - - - with the standard for custody. Was a person reasonably innocent of a crime - - - free to leave at that point in time?

They also didn't have a base in the record for finding Mr. Thomas consented. Under Gonzalez, this court set forth four factors, amongst other factors, which the court has to look at to determine whether or not Mr. Thomas consented. Did he voluntarily and fully consent to being in police custody during this whole period of time or did he - - was he subject to overbearing, official coercion or submission to a lawful authority?

You have to look at the background of the consenter. Mr. Thomas has a 10th-grade education.

1	Never been convicted at a crime. You have to look at
2	that. You have to look at the circumstances as to
3	whether he was in custody under arrest. You have to
4	also look at the circumstances of
5	JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Can I can I just
6	
7	MS. EFFMAN: whether he was ever told
8	he was free to leave.
9	JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Yeah, can I just ask,
10	are you saying that while he was in the facility
11	under observation about whether he might be insane
12	or, you know, going insane, he was in custody then?
13	Or was that voluntary?
14	MS. EFFMAN: He was in custody then,
15	absolutely, without his consent, beyond
16	JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Didn't he ask to get
17	some help?
18	MS. EFFMAN: It's the scope of his
19	consent was to talk to someone.
20	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay.
21	MS. EFFMAN: Going to talk to someone does
22	not amount to being involuntarily committed.
23	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, counsel. Thank
24	you, counsel.
25	MS. EFFMAN: Thank you.

1	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, Ms. Kelly Egan
2	Go ahead, counsel.
3	MS. EGAN: Yes, may it please the court,
4	counsel, my name is Kelly Egan arguing on behalf of
5	the respondent.
6	There is ample
7	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Counsel?
8	MS. EGAN: Yes, Judge?
9	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: What about the
10	the law the officers saying 67 times that we
11	know what happened was an accident, and 140-some-odd
12	times that he wouldn't be arrested? How do you
13	square that with with a voluntary statement on
14	his part?
15	MS. EGAN: We need to look at the totality
16	of the circumstances, Judge. And here
17	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: But but those
18	are a lot of instances of creating a totality of
19	- of what this questioning, this interrogation
20	MS. EGAN: Yes, if
21	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: was all about?
22	MS. EGAN: If we want to pick out
23	individual statements made by the officers
24	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: But what with those
25	particular statements

1	MS. EGAN: With those particular
2	statements?
3	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: that you're not
4	going to be arrested? We know this is an accident,
5	so just tell us, so you can go home.
6	MS. EGAN: He was told he was not going to
7	be arrested at this time; he was not going to be
8	arrested tonight. They were very clear with him that
9	he was not immune from criminal prosecution.
10	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: They were not trying
11	to deceive him? Or lure him into
12	MS. EGAN: They were certainly applying
13	pressure to him, and they wanted to him to
14	speak with them.
15	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: What is what is
16	acceptable pressure? We asked your adversary the
17	same thing. What's okay and what's not okay in terms
18	of deception, when you're interrogating a defendant?
19	MS. EGAN: Deception is permissible so long
20	as it does not overbear the subject's will as to
21	whether he feels free to make a statement. And it is
22	permissible so long as it doesn't create a
23	substantial risk of a false confession.
24	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: What about what
25	about what your adversary highlighted, threatening

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1
          towards people who are very close to you and saying
 2
          things that aren't true about - - - that you're going
 3
          to put them in great - - at great risk or in great
 4
          harm. Is that okay, or can you get a rule - - -
 5
                    MS. EGAN: We can't draw - - -
 6
                    CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: - - - around that
 7
          kind of situation?
 8
                    MS. EGAN: Judge Lippman, we can't draw a
 9
          bright line rule. There's a grey area as to even
10
          what constitutes a threat. Cases have held that
11
          telling him - - -
12
                    CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: In this case, was
13
          there a threat to - - -
14
                    MS. EGAN: No - - -
15
                    CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: - - - his wife?
16
                    MS. EGAN: - - - there was not, Judge.
17
                    CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: No?
18
                    MS. EGAN: They told him they were going to
19
          speak - - -
20
                    CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: There was no - - -
21
          there was no - - -
22
                    MS. EGAN: - - - to his wife.
23
                    CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: What were they going
2.4
          to - - - just say?
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                    MS. EGAN: They said they would speak to
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          his wife. They were going to scoop his wife up.
 2
          They did not threaten to arrest his wife.
 3
                    JUDGE SMITH: But you - - - you say that
 4
          we're going to scoop your wife up is not a threat?
 5
                    MS. EGAN: No, it's not a threat in the
          sense that it's not - - -
 6
 7
                    JUDGE SMITH: Okay, they wanted to - - -
                    MS. EGAN: - - - an improper statement.
 8
 9
          Certainly, it's designed - - -
10
                    JUDGE SMITH: If they were going to scoop
11
          my wife up - - -
                    JUDGE RIVERA: They took him out of his
12
13
          home - - -
                    JUDGE SMITH: - - - I'd think it was a
14
15
          threat.
16
                    JUDGE RIVERA: They - - - they took him out
17
          his home. What - - - doesn't scoop imply the same
          kind of physical - - -
18
19
                    MS. EGAN: They didn't - - -
20
                    JUDGE RIVERA: - - - treatment of his wife?
21
          I'm not understanding.
22
                    MS. EGAN: They didn't take the defendant
23
          out of his home. They went back and asked the
2.4
          defendant to accompany them, and he went with them
25
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willingly.

1 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: No, no, but the statement about the wife, in the context of this 2 3 situation and what was happening, isn't that really 4 something that would, to you, be traumatic if you 5 were in that situation? MS. EGAN: Well, Judge, we're looking at 6 7 the defendant in this situation, and no - - -8 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yes, I mean the 9 defendant. 10 MS. EGAN: - - - I - - - this was not an improper tactic. Yes, it was designed to apply 11 12 pressure, but you can see from his reaction. 13 Initially they spoke for nearly an hour with him 14 saying they were going to need to talk to his wife, 15 before he even made a statement, yeah, I'll take the 16 fall for my wife, and then he - - - he did not follow 17 that with a confession. They explained you can't just take the fall. You have to tell us what 18 19 happened. It was not an improper - - -20 JUDGE SMITH: What about - - - what about -21 22 MS. EGAN: - - - amount of pressure. 23 JUDGE SMITH: What about your child will 2.4 die - - - telling someone falsely your child will die 25 if you don't talk to us? If any - - is there

1	anything that could possibly overbear the will more
2	than that?
3	MS. EGAN: The detectives were clear that
4	the child was almost definitely going to die from the
5	outset, and that if he did live, he would never lead
6	a normal life.
7	JUDGE SMITH: Yeah, so you so
8	MS. EGAN: They told him
9	JUDGE SMITH: Yeah, but so, what what
10	what were they trying to accomplish when they -
11	when they told him the child was still alive and
12	the doctors needed something to save him?
13	MS. EGAN: They were hoping he would tell
14	them what had he would tell them what had
15	happened.
16	JUDGE SMITH: And is it and can
17	and isn't that an awfully powerful inducement?
18	MS. EGAN: It's an inducement. Is it an
19	improper inducement? Did it overbear his will to not
20	make an incriminating statement
21	JUDGE SMITH: I mean, if you I mean,
22	how how can you
23	MS. EGAN: I would say no.
24	JUDGE SMITH: How could it not overbear
25	- overbear your will if you think your child's life

even - - - my - - - even if - - - if there's even a 1 2 small chance of saving your child's life? How can -3 - - how can you say - - -4 MS. EGAN: We - - -5 JUDGE SMITH: - - - oh, well, it's okay; yeah, let the kid go, I'll - - - I'll stick to my 6 7 story. MS. EGAN: We need to look at the 8 9 defendant's reaction, and he - - - that was not 10 followed by - - -11 JUDGE PIGOTT: Maybe - - - maybe - - -12 JUDGE SMITH: Are you talking causation? 13 JUDGE PIGOTT: - - - an expert could straighten that out. Because if - - - if Judge Smith 14 15 is thinking one thing, and you're thinking another 16 thing, that it overbears or it doesn't overbear, 17 isn't there expert testimony that would assist the 18 jury in determining whether or not some of these 19 threats might intimidate a person into confessing to 20 something he or she did not do? 21 MS. EGAN: There is not. There is no 22 expert - - - no expert testimony was proffered that 23 demonstrated any reliable link between police tactics 2.4 and - - -

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: You don't think that

1 | the - - -

2.4

MS. EGAN: - - - whether someone would falsely confess.

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: - - - that the doctor would have offered any kind of testimony to explain what happens to somebody in this situation using the kind of tactics we're talking about? You don't think today, given everything that we know, that there's a science that's formed around this whole dynamic? Is that totally something that just doesn't make any sense or has no credibility in terms of what's happened over the last decade and more in this whole area of false confessions?

MS. EGAN: In terms of determining whether police tactics effect false confessions? No, there is no reliable agreed-upon principles or science that show that police tactics, which everybody claims are used - - -

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: There's no - -
there's no science that shows that there's some link

if you threaten your family, if you say your child is

going to die, if you - - - that kind of thing, there

- - - there is no science that - - - that you can put

your arms around - - -

MS. EGAN: None that would - - -

1	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: that that
2	should give some context to the fact finder about
3	what a confession might be all about?
4	MS. EGAN: None that was proffered by Dr.
5	Ofshe. And the manner in which you're phrasing that
6	question indicates that it's the way you're
7	phrasing it, it's an intuitive question, which
8	doesn't even require expert testimony.
9	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Then why is he
10	testifying the same doctor, in so many cases,
11	on this same issue?
12	MS. EGAN: He has not testified
13	specifically as to the effect of police tactics. The
14	vast majority of that testimony was very general
15	about individuals
16	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Do you think police
17	tactics do not affect whether there's going to be a
18	false confession or not? And you're saying there's
19	no science that backs that up?
20	MS. EGAN: No, if police tactics the
21	same tactics are used in every interrogation,
22	we would expect
23	JUDGE SMITH: Did he did he
24	distinguish between
25	MS. EGAN: to see a large number of

MS. EGAN: - - - to see a large number of

1 false confessions. JUDGE SMITH: In his testimony, did he 2 3 distinguish between tactics that would lead to false confessions and tactics that would lead to 4 5 confessions generally? MS. EGAN: He did. He believed that what 6 7 he termed "coercive motivators" increased the risk of obtaining a false confession. 8 9 JUDGE SMITH: I - - - I - - - I mean, I 10 read him as saying they increase the risk of a 11 confession, and I can't tell you whether it's true or 12 false. 13 MS. EGAN: Well, he had only looked at 14 cases that involved suspected false confessions, so I 15 don't know that any opinion he gave on that was even clear as to what tactics increased the risk of false 16 17 confessions. JUDGE SMITH: I mean, because of some of 18 what he says is not beyond the ken - - - I assume you 19 2.0 say that you don't really need an expert to tell you 21 that if you offer a guy leniency, he's more likely to 22 confess. 23 MS. EGAN: I don't believe you need an 2.4 expert testimony for that.

JUDGE SMITH: What about - - - what about -

- - what about the - - - his testimony on the more 1 2 specific technique that was used here of feeding the 3 details to the - - - I mean, in all those hours of 4 questioning, the defendant here basically never came 5 up with anything the police didn't feed him first. 6 Isn't that troubling and couldn't an expert say - - -7 shed some light on that? MS. EGAN: Dr. Ofshe didn't proffer any 8 9 evidence or testimony in terms of what they call 10 contamination or whether the details were provided to 11 the defendant. And when you watch the video - - -12 JUDGE SMITH: No, he said - - - he said the 13 right to do it is first you get him to confess, and 14 then, once you've - - - then you try to get out of 15 him details that will nail him to the confession that 16 you can't feed him. These guys didn't do that. 17 MS. EGAN: They offered many suggestions 18 that the defendant vehemently denied; in particular, 19 there's a period - - -20 JUDGE SMITH: Yeah, but that - - - yeah, 21 but - - - but that - - - that's - - - yeah, the fact 22 that they - - - he didn't take every suggestion is 23 not exactly powerful corroboration that the ones he 2.4 took are - - - are truthful.

MS. EGAN: But, Judge, this wasn't a fact-

2 fed him. They were hypothesizing what could have 3 happened to the child. 4 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: What about the sixty 5 mile per hour? That - - - that we know - - - that we 6 know scientifically, medically, that this had to be 7 with the force of sixty miles per hour. Show us what 8 you did that that sixty miles per hour - - - that's 9 not suggestive in a way that - - - that, you know - -10 - that would lead him to say something that - - -11 that maybe is not the truth? MS. EGAN: No, not in this case. Not when 12 13 you view this defendant's reaction to other 14 suggestions. 15 JUDGE PIGOTT: Do you think we decided 16 LeGrand wrong? 17 MS. EGAN: I believe LeGrand was a very different case, in that in LeGrand, the eyewitness 18 19 testimony of an eyewitness who made an ID seven years 2.0 after the fact was truly the only evidence linking 21 LeGrand to the victim. It was a stabbing in the New 22 York City streets of a cab driver. 23 Here, there's ample other evidence to 2.4 corroborate - - -25 JUDGE PIGOTT: So you think the court was

specific case where they had a smoking gun that they

1 wrong not to - - - not - - -MS. EGAN: - - - the reliability of his 2 3 confession. JUDGE PIGOTT: Do you think the trial court 4 5 was wrong not to have expert testimony in LeGrand? MS. EGAN: Have - - - not having the 6 7 benefit of reading the Frye transcript and seeing the state of the science, I would hesitate to answer that 8 9 question. But here - - -10 JUDGE GRAFFEO: But - - -11 MS. EGAN: - - - there is ample corroboration of the defendant's confession, which he 12 13 repeated the exact same confession twenty-four hours later to the CPS worker. 14 JUDGE PIGOTT: Well, as Mr. Frost pointed 15 16 out, I guess he's had a couple where there have been 17 false confessions, and I'm sure you'll concede that 18 there are, sometimes when they, you know what - - -19 I'll go back to my bank, and they say, how did you 20 get to the bank? And he said I took a bus. And they 21 said, you did not; you drove a 1992 Ford Fairlane. 22 He says, yeah, that's right; I drove the 1992 - - -23 and pretty soon they have the nicest, neatest, typed-2.4 up confession that all came from the interrogators.

And experts testify to that. I don't know

if this particular one would have, but I mean, the 1 2 fact of the matter is that there - - - there are 3 those techniques that are very good. I mean, the 4 police are very good at solving crimes. Sometimes, 5 in solving them, they may get the wrong person because they used tactics that shouldn't have used. 6 7 Would you agree? 8 MS. EGAN: I'm sorry. I lost track of the 9 question, Judge - - -10 JUDGE PIGOTT: Well, what I'm saying is - -11 MS. EGAN: - - - but certainly if you have 12 13 14 JUDGE PIGOTT: - - - you're - - - you're 15 convinced that this guy was not overborne in any way 16 whatsoever. We've had some conversations that if you 17 threaten to lock up somebody's spouse or say that their child will die unless they tell you something, 18 19 that that may overbear. You disagree. 20 Would an expert disagree with you, maybe, 21 and say, au contraire, this is exactly when the hero 22 thing comes in and - - - and a person like this

defendant will say, I'm going to save my wife; I'm

going to save my child; I'm going to falsely confess

and they can hang me from the highest rafter, but, by

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2.4

God, I will have done the right thing by lying. 1 2 MS. EGAN: And expert may disagree with me, 3 but the science that was proffered doesn't establish 4 the link. And as I was saying before, if the same 5 tactics are used in all interrogations, how are we to know whether they create a risk of false confession? 6 7 JUDGE PIGOTT: They're not - - - they're 8 not - - - they're not - - - these aren't - - -9 JUDGE GRAFFEO: There's - - - there's a bit 10 a different wrinkle in this case, because it's 11 contested as to what the actual cause of death of the 12 child is. The defendant's claiming that it was 13 infection, correct? MS. EGAN: The defendant claims that. 14 15 JUDGE GRAFFEO: And your doctors are claiming that it was from trauma. 16 So - - -17 MS. EGAN: Correct, Judge, as to any - - -JUDGE GRAFFEO: So wouldn't - - - wouldn't 18 19 - - - under LeGrand, wouldn't that expert testimony 2.0 about false confessions take on an even greater 21 importance, in light of the fact that there are some 22 competing medical explanations here for what 23 happened? 2.4 MS. EGAN: Given the facts of this case, I 25 don't believe there is a legitimate argument that the

1 child died from septic shock. His organs were donated to another child afterwards. Even one of the 2 3 defendant's experts conceded that had this child died of an overwhelming septic infection that caused organ 4 5 death, toxins to be released in his bloodstream, that 6 he would later go on to be an organ donor. 7 Any argument as to the sufficiency of that 8 evidence wasn't preserved, and we need to look at the 9 evidence in the light most favorable to the People, 10 if we're addressing that.

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JUDGE SMITH: But even - - - even if - - - even if you have a compelling case that the child died of head trauma, and obviously that makes you suspect that this guy - - - you can't - - - you can't convict this guy without his confession. I mean, you don't know how the child got the head trauma.

MS. EGAN: The confession was strong evidence for the People, but there is legally sufficient evidence outside of the confession.

JUDGE SMITH: So you're - - - so you're - - so you're saying that even if we were to suppress
the confession, you did not - - - we - - - we should
not dismiss; you want to retry the case?

MS. EGAN: Correct, Judge, the child died in the defendant's care. It was his son. The child

1 died of an injury that was established had to have been caused by an adult. The evidence showed that 2 3 only two adults had access to the child during the requisite time frame when he sustained this injury. 4 5 That the nature of the injury was such that no reasonable person would believe - - -6 7 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Isn't - - - counsel -8 9 MS. EGAN: - - - an infant can be handled 10 this way. 11 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: - - - wasn't that the 12 same doctor who thought that the rash on the child's 13 face had something to do - - - not with the soap, but 14 something else? Is that the expert you're talking 15 about, Dr. Edge, who said that there was a skull 16 fracture when apparently there was not? 17 MS. EGAN: If we're talking about the error in terms of a diagnosis of the skull fracture on an 18 19 X-ray, correct, that was Dr. Edge. And in reading 20 the X-ray what happened is there's a shadow in an 21 infant's skull where the plate - - -22 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: But isn't it Dr. Edge 23 who also said the child was murdered? 2.4 MS. EGAN: Dr. Edge said that, but Dr.

Jenny also established that the child's cause of

death was from head trauma.

JUDGE ABDUS-SALAA

2.4

JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Because - - - because the defendant - - - because she relied in part on the defendant's confession that he shook his baby or threw the baby hard onto the bed. Didn't Dr. Jenny also concede that, that she took into account this confession?

MS. EGAN: Look, she considered the confession, but in her diagnosis, she based it on what she had seen in Matthew and the autopsy, and Dr. Sikirica also testified as to the injuries sustained by Matthew. Matthew's injuries were consistent with a death from head trauma. The fact that he donated his organs is completely inconsistent with a death from an overwhelming bacterial infection.

JUDGE SMITH: And one of the - - - one of the defense experts more or less conceded there was head trauma, didn't he?

MS. EGAN: Yes.

 $\,$ JUDGE SMITH: The other - - - but the other one says no.

MS. EGAN: Moreover, back to the question on whether the expert testimony should have been admissible. It simply didn't pass the Frye standard here.

1 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Wait, wait. On that point, is Dr. - - is Cassell a doctor? 2 3 MS. EGAN: He is a professor of law. I 4 believe Dr. Leo is also a professor of law, and there 5 was a Dr. White (ph.), who also taught at a law school within the scientific community. It's not 6 7 self-limited to social scientists. Even considering 8 the experts that were discussed by Dr. Ofshe, Dr. 9 Kassin, there was a JP Blair (ph.), they don't agree 10 as to which of these tactics, if any, are dangerous. 11 Dr. Ofshe flat out stated that evidence 12 ploys and the length of an interrogation are not 13 inherently dangerous factors. Dr. Kassin, in the 14 literature that was admitted at the Frye hearing, 15 indicated that false evidence ploys present a great 16 danger. And JP Blair indicated that the length of 17 the interrogation is the tactic that presents the 18 danger. JUDGE PIGOTT: Well, then why - - - why is 19 20 this not beyond the ken of the average juror? 21 MS. EGAN: Because what was offered was not 22 beyond the ken of the average juror. 23

JUDGE PIGOTT: You've got three experts to say three different things, and you're saying, yeah, but juries already know.

2.4

MS. EGAN: Juries know false confessions 1 2 exist, but they don't - - - the experts don't agree 3 as to whether or what increases the risk of a false 4 confession. They think police tactics do, but 5 there's, in fact, no empirical evidence to show - - -JUDGE SMITH: Well, show as to what - - -6 7 MS. EGAN: - - - that they do. JUDGE SMITH: - - - Professor Cassell was 8 9 saying was that there's no - - - that the Frye test 10 isn't met. There's no acceptance in the scientific 11 community of - - - that these particular techniques lead to false confessions. You mean - - - he seemed 12 13 to assume that Ofshe said it. You seem to concede -- - concede that he said it. I'm not sure he said 14 15 it. But - - - but there's also an issue as to 16 whether it's - - - whether there's acceptance in the 17 relevant community. MS. EGAN: Yes, absolutely. There's also a 18 19 question as to whether what Ofshe suggested to do, 20 which was show one or two sentences pulled out of 21 various points of the transcript and say, this is 22 where they - - -23 JUDGE SMITH: It's more - - - more than one

MS. EGAN: - - - used this tactic.

2.4

or two.

1 JUDGE SMITH: I mean, you got a couple of 2 hundred, you're going home tonight, and - - - and if 3 it's just an accident, it's not a problem. 4 MS. EGAN: Correct, but there's no 5 consensus in the scientific community that that indicates that the confession was false or true based 6 7 upon those statements. 8 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, counsel, 9 thanks. 10 MS. EGAN: Thank you. 11 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Counselor, rebuttal. 12 MR. FROST: Just to correct, Judge Smith, 13 neither - - - both defense doctors testified that trauma had nothing to do with this child's death. 14 15 Your Honor, John Reid boasted - - -JUDGE SMITH: Is it, well - - -16 17 MR. FROST: Your Honor? 18 JUDGE SMITH: I - - - maybe we're - - -19 yeah, I think - - - I think we're saying the same 20 thing. The first expert said trauma had nothing to 21 do with the death, but he didn't say there wasn't any 22 When he was asked, he said maybe there was. 23 MR. FROST: I - - - I disagree, Your Honor. 2.4 But John Reid boasts that a survey of 112 25 interrogators over 2 years, 3,162 confessions, only

1 18 were suppressed. That's the - - - kind of like an 2 Ivory soap commercial, Your Honor. He says 99 and 3 44/100th percent pure confession. That doesn't float 4 like Ivory soap, Your Honor. It is balderdash. That 5 statistic is the result of secrecy, police perjury 6 and the court's misapplication - - -7 JUDGE SMITH: Isn't - - - isn't - - -8 MR. FROST: - - - of the totality of 9 circumstances rule - - -10 JUDGE SMITH: Isn't - - - isn't there - - -11 isn't there a less sinister - - - isn't there a less 12 sinister explanation? I know you don't seem to be 13 terribly - - - a terribly trusting man, but isn't - -14 - isn't it also - - - let's - - - let's assume that 15 the police do an excellent job, and that most of the 16 people they question are guilty. And from those people you can't get a false confession - - -17 MR. FROST: Your Honor - - -18 19 JUDGE SMITH: - - - if they're guilty. Dr. 20 Ofshe said, and this was one of the more interesting 21 things I thought he said, is if you want to do - - -22 you want to do it, do it right. Find out how many 23 innocent people were questioned and find out how many 2.4 of them confessed and what percentage you get.

MR. FROST: Guilty has nothing to do with

1 the question of coercion, Your Honor. The court's 2 misapplication - - -3 JUDGE SMITH: Unless it's something to do with - - - it has something to do with the question 4 5 of false confessions, which was what your expert was 6 supposed to be talking about. 7 MR. FROST: And coercion, Your Honor. The totality of the circumstances rule is a rule that 8 9 should be held in reserve and the blight - - - the 10 bright line rule should be applied because courts 11 have a way of finding, just as they did in the 99.4 12 percent of true, supposedly, noncoerced confessions, 13 those circumstances that suit them. And in fact, the Appellate Division in this case created five 14 15 circumstances that don't exist. 16 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, counsel. 17 MR. FROST: Thank you. CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Thank you. 18 19 All right, Aveni. 2.0 Counsel, do you want any rebuttal time? 21 MS. GIANFRANCESCO: Yes, Your Honor, three 22 minutes, please. 23 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Three minutes, sure, 2.4 you're on. Go ahead.

MS. GIANFRANCESCO: Thank you very much.

1 May it please the court, Raffaelina Gianfrancesco, on 2 behalf of the Westchester County District Attorney's 3 Office. 4 Your Honors, this case presents a legal 5 question as of whether the Appellate Division's 6 ruling that the deceptive practice used during the 7 custodial interrogation and in particular, lying to 8 the defendant that his girlfriend was still alive and 9 in need of information for her proper medical care, 10 were per se coercive tactics. 11 JUDGE SMITH: Did they say "per se"? MS. GIANFRANCESCO: Well, Your Honor, they 12 13 did not use the words "per se", however - - -JUDGE SMITH: Well, why - - - why isn't 14 15 this a mixed question is really what I'm getting at? MS. GIANFRANCESCO: It isn't a mixed 16 17 question, because what the Appellate Division did in this case is, in fact, conflate the legal question of 18 19 Miranda and the voluntariness of the confession. 20 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Why wasn't Miranda 21 undermined by what happened here? 22 MS. GIANFRANCESCO: Miranda was not 23 undermined, because as this court said in - - - in 2.4 Jimmy D., once the defendant is given his Miranda

rights, and he voluntary (sic) relinquished them - -

1	- and in this case, he did it not once, but twice,
2	three times the issue is the voluntariness of
3	the confession, not Miranda.
4	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: How can Miranda
5	survive, given the kind of tactic that was used?
6	MS. GIANFRANCESCO: Well, Your Honor
7	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: No matter what he
8	said.
9	MS. GIANFRANCESCO: Miranda can survive and
10	it did survive in this case, Your Honor, because the
11	defendant was brought in. At the time of his arrest,
12	he's initially given his Miranda rights
13	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: But what about the
14	threat that was implicit in what they said to him?
15	MS. GIANFRANCESCO: They told him it could
16	be a problem. It could be a problem. We're
17	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: What were they really
18	saying to him? What was the import of what they said
19	to him
20	MS. GIANFRANCESCO: Yeah.
21	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: if he didn't
22	admit to whatever they wanted him to admit to?
23	MS. GIANFRANCESCO: The import was part of
24	a deceptive tactic. The deception was your
25	girlfriend is still alive and she's in need of

1 medical care. The doctors need to know what drugs 2 she took. 3 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: And what would be the consequence to him if he didn't say it? 4 5 MS. GIANFRANCESCO: Could be a moral 6 consequence. It's his girlfriend. You're going to -7 - - your girlfriend's going to die if you don't tell us what drugs she took. Could be a possible legal 8 9 consequence. It's how - - -10 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: But here - - -11 MS. GIANFRANCESCO: Correct. CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yeah. 12 13 MS. GIANFRANCESCO: Correct, Your Honor. But what I think it is critical in this case is the 14 15 Appellate Division found without any support that 16 this was a gentleman who was fearing the face of 17 homicide charges, of life imprisonment. And it's clear, and I'm sure this court has reviewed these 18 19 videotapes, this defendant's will was far from being 2.0 overborne in this case. 21 JUDGE SMITH: I mean, if we - - - if we 22 disagree with the Appellate Division's view of what 23 the videotapes show, can we reverse? Don't they have 2.4 - - - I thought that they have fact-finding power; we

25

don't.

1 MS. GIANFRANCESCO: They do. You - - -2 this court - - - we're presenting this court with two 3 possible ways to reverse this case. And number 1, 4 that the Appellate Division applied the wrong legal 5 standard. They conflated Miranda and the voluntariness question. They never looked at the 6 7 totality of circumstances. And we've also illustrated to this court 8 9 that in fact - - -10 JUDGE GRAFFEO: Would that result in a 11 remittal as to apply the correct standard? Is that 12 what you're asking for? 13 MS. GIANFRANCESCO: No, the re - - - the 14 remittal would be merely to the legal sufficiency 15 question. The court never applied a weight to the 16 evidence. They never reviewed the sufficiency of the 17 evidence, including the defendant's confession - - -18 JUDGE SMITH: Are you - - - are you - - -19 MS. GIANFRANCESCO: - - - because they had 2.0 suppressed it. 21 JUDGE SMITH: If you don't - - - if you 22 don't want us to remit, you must be saying that this 23 was voluntary as a matter of law. MS. GIANFRANCESCO: That this confession 2.4

was voluntary and that the deceptive practices used

1	as a matter of the law did not fall under
2	circumstances which
3	JUDGE SMITH: Have we ev have we ever
4	
5	MS. GIANFRANCESCO: would have
6	suppressed it.
7	JUDGE SMITH: Have we ever made the rule
8	that there are some deceptive practices that are
9	always okay?
10	MS. GIANFRANCESCO: No, absolutely not.
11	JUDGE SMITH: Aren't you isn't that
12	what you're asking us to do
13	MS. GIANFRANCESCO: No.
14	JUDGE SMITH: to say you can
15	you can always threaten to threaten to arrest
16	his girlfriend?
17	MS. GIANFRANCESCO: No. What we're saying
18	is, is that this court said in People v. Tarsia in
19	1980, that deception can only be is is a
20	factor in the totality of the circumstances, and
21	would only undermine the defendant's will if it is so
22	fundamentally unfair or is accompanied by a threat or
23	a promise to induce a false confession.
24	Clearly, this is not a false confession
25	case. We don't have a threat or a promise which

would have induced the defendant to - - -1 2 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: There's - - - there's 3 no threat that would have - - - that would make him make a false confession here? 4 5 MS. GIANFRANCESCO: Not in this case, Your 6 Honor, no. There - - - it's clear when you look at 7 this video - - -8 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: What was the purpose 9 of the deception other than a threat to him? 10 MS. GIANFRANCESCO: The purpose of a 11 deception here was quite clear. We have a defendant 12 who was brought in - - -13 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: The purpose has got 14 to be to get the truth. 15 MS. GIANFRANCESCO: Correct, absolutely. And - - - and - - - and it's illustrated in the fact 16 17 that this defendant, when he first waived his Miranda 18 hours earlier and is told what happened, provides a 19 completely false statement. Now, at the time, the 20 police didn't know that statement was false. But 21 within the ensuing hours when they're conducting 22 their investigation, they've spoken to his mother, 23 his brother, and the friend that's in the home - - -2.4 JUDGE PIGOTT: Let me - - - let me re-ask

what Judge Graffeo, I think, asked. Let's assume

you're right, that the totality of the circumstances are such that - - - that the - - - the - - - well, that the Appellate Division did not apply the totality of the circumstances. We can't, right? We can't apply the totality of circumstances and make findings of fact.

2.4

So it would seem to me that we would have to remit it and say, apply the totality of circumstances, right?

MS. GIANFRANCESCO: If - - - if this court believes that that's the case; however, what we would be asking this court is to, number 1, recognize that the totality of circumstances was not applied, but that - - - and the facts as they stand, that this case would therefore - - - would be reversed and that the defendant's confession, in fact, was admissible and should not have been suppressed in this case.

Moreover, the - - - when police deception - - in order for it to reach a fundamental
unfairness, it necessitates the consideration not
only of that quality of the deception, but the
individual characteristics of the suspect, the nature
of that interrogation, and the other factors
identified by this court as being relevant in
determining if a suspect's will - - -

1	JUDGE SMITH: Then how how how
2	do we know that the Appellate Division did not
3	consider those factors?
4	MS. GIANFRANCESCO: Because what the
5	Appellate Division did, Your Honors number 1,
6	they came out and said that this case presents us
7	with an opportunity to decide whether or not the
8	police deception exceeded whether the police
9	tactics exceeded permissible deception. Deception is
10	but one factor to consider in the totality of the
11	circumstances.
12	JUDGE READ: So that's what you rely on to
13	say they applied the wrong standard?
14	MS. GIANFRANCESCO: Correct, Your Honor.
15	They did apply the wrong standard.
16	JUDGE SMITH: You're you're saying
17	there's no such thing as exceeding permissible
18	deception in itself?
19	MS. GIANFRANCESCO: No, I'm not saying
20	that, Your Honor. What I am saying is that there can
21	be deception which is fundamentally unfair. There
22	can
23	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Like what? Like
24	_
25	MS. GIANFRANCESCO: be. That

1 that - - -2 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Like what? What's 3 fundamentally unfair? If this isn't fundamentally unfair, what is? 4 5 MS. GIANFRANCESCO: Well, in my research -6 7 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Give us - - - give us 8 an example. 9 MS. GIANFRANCESCO: In my research, Your 10 Honor, the only time that this court has declared 11 something being fundamentally unfair based on deception is People v. Leyra, in that case. Other 12 13 courts that have viewed deception - - -14 JUDGE SMITH: What - - - I mean, what - - -15 remind us what happened there? 16 MS. GIANFRANCESCO: In Leyra, it was a 17 psychiatrist that was brought in by the police, and asked to interview the defendant. The defendant is 18 19 not told that this is a psychiatrist. He's told this 20 is someone who could help you; I'm going to seek help 21 for you. He's never told in his custodial 22 interrogation the actual ruse of - - - of the police, and - - - and in this court found that under those 23

circumstances, that that deception was fundamentally

unfair, the use of that.

2.4

1	And, you know, moreover, what I
2	JUDGE RIVERA: I'm sorry; what's your
3	position if if if the AD finds that the
4	deception is fundamental fundamentally unfair,
5	but there are other factors that they didn't
6	consider, that they should have considered them to
7	see if it outweighs the unfairness?
8	MS. GIANFRANCESCO: Well
9	JUDGE RIVERA: What's your what's
10	your position?
11	MS. GIANFRANCESCO: Your Honor, what I'd
12	like to point out is in referring to the decision of
13	the Appellate Division, because I don't think it's
14	even clear what the Appellate Division
15	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: But you're saying
16	_
17	MS. GIANFRANCESCO: was trying to
18	-
19	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: But you're saying
20	it's almost never that there could be tactics that
21	are fundamentally unfair. Is that what you're
22	saying?
23	MS. GIANFRANCESCO: I'm saying, to date,
24	there have been very few tactics that have been found
25	fundamentally unfair

1 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: And you can't - - -2 MS. GIANFRANCESCO: - - - however - - -CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: But you can't think 3 4 of others that that - - -5 MS. GIANFRANCESCO: No. 6 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: - - - might be 7 fundamentally unfair. Despite some of the extreme 8 situations that sometimes, you know, we see in - - -9 in these kind of interrogations. 10 MS. GIANFRANCESCO: Right. 11 JUDGE PIGOTT: Well, wasn't one of the 12 problems that you guys - - - I apologize - - - you 13 guys - - - the People can't appeal acquittals. I 14 mean, there could be acquittals all over the place 15 where - - - based on false confessions that - - -16 MS. GIANFRANCESCO: Correct, correct. 17 JUDGE PIGOTT: - - - they're done. 18 MS. GIANFRANCESCO: And going back to Chief 19 Judge Lippman's thing, deception is viewed as one 20 factor in the totality of the circumstance case. 21 I think when courts are viewing - - -22 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So is that - - - in 23 your answer to Judge Rivera's question, you're saying 2.4 that you could be fundamentally unfair, but then you 25 look at other things that might outweigh it? That's

1 not what you're saying. 2 MS. GIANFRANCESCO: No, no, no, absolutely 3 I'm saying it's sort of like, you know it when 4 you see it. If it were fundamentally unfair, I think 5 a court would come out and say, it's fundamentally 6 These circumstances aren't. The deception 7 in this case, as what the Appellate Division - - -8 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: What would you 9 describe it if you had to put it into a - - - a rule 10 of some kind? What's fundamentally unfair, beyond 11 those two words? 12 MS. GIANFRANCESCO: It - - - I think that 13 would be difficult to say, Your Honor, what's 14 fundamentally unfair. 15 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: The only thing - - -16 MS. GIANFRANCESCO: I think - - -17 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: The only thing is we know it if we see it. 18 19 MS. GIANFRANCESCO: Yeah, and I - - - and I 20 think what - - - this court has said it in Tarsia. 21 It's a standard that's being continually used. I 22 think that - - - and the Supreme Court itself - - -23 the United States Supreme Court, it says deception is 2.4 but one factor to view.

JUDGE GRAFFEO: So looking at the facts of

1 this case under what you're arguing is the proper 2 standard, what's the analysis? Why is this not 3 fundamentally unfair? 4 MS. GIANFRANCESCO: It's not fundamentally 5 unfair, Your Honor, because the defendant's will was not overborne. He's given his Miranda; he waives his 6 7 Miranda. He's asked a noninculpatory statement, what 8 drugs did this young lady take? And he provides 9 that. He is sitting in an interview room, provided 10 food, opportunity to sleep, cigarettes. He's got his 11 feet up on a chair. There's absolutely nothing in this 12 13 videotape that can demonstrate that this defendant 14 operated under the fear that he was going to face 15 life imprisonment if he didn't tell the detectives 16 what they wanted to hear. And in fact, the 17 detectives had no information with regard to the 18 evidence in this case. There was nothing to feed 19 him. JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: So you're - - - you're 20 21 saying - - -22 JUDGE RIVERA: So you have to some - - -23 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: - - - that just 2.4 because the detectives said it might be a problem for

you, that's not enough for him - - - for the

1 defendant to say, oh, they mean I'm going to be 2 spending the rest of my life in jail if I don't tell 3 them what happened. MS. GIANFRANCESCO: I wouldn't necessarily 4 5 say that's not enough. What I would say is this defendant didn't believe that that statement meant he 6 7 was going to face life imprisonment. I think, even 8 when the detectives asked that question on cross-9 examination, defense counsel says to him, so you meant it could be - - - he could face consequences -10 11 - - consequences. The detective's response was 12 something to that effect. 13 There's nothing in this record to point that the fear - - -14 15 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: But that's - - -16 that's the detective after being prepped to testify 17 on direct or cross-examination, but it's not what the detective meant; it's what the defendant understands 18 19 what the detective said to mean, isn't that - - -2.0 MS. GIANFRANCESCO: Yes. 21 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: - - - what we have to 22 look at? 23 MS. GIANFRANCESCO: Absolutely, Your Honor. 2.4 I would not disagree with that. And - - - and, you 25 know, I hope I answered you properly in the

beginning. The defendant in this case, there's no indicia in this videotape.

2.4

When the defendant himself questions, could I be possibly charged with something, or I know I'm in trouble, never once did the detective or the defendant himself raise the possibility of a homicide charge, of a murder charge. He was concerned with the violation of the order of protection, because he knew he was under arrest for that.

JUDGE RIVERA: So do you also - - - going back to something else you said before about what he looked like on the videotape. Are you saying you need a phys - - - physical manifestation of the stress to indicate that the will is overborne?

MS. GIANFRANCESCO: I think that's one - - $\,$ - one thing to consider, Your Honor. And I - - - and I think - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: Could someone like this, who's a long term drug user, you would say that's true? You need that?

MS. GIANFRANCESCO: I think that - - - I think yes. Taking into consideration that he's also a long time drug user; I think you have to take into consideration all the other circumstances that this court has recognized under People v. Anderson to

1 represent the totality of the circumstances. 2 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, counsel. 3 MS. GIANFRANCESCO: Thank you. 4 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Thanks, counselor. 5 Counsel? MR. WEISFUSE: May it please the court, 6 7 David Weisfuse for Paul Aveni. This is a case where 8 the Appellate Division specifically stated in its 9 decision that it considered the totality of the 10 circumstances. 11 JUDGE READ: So they didn't change - - -12 they didn't apply the wrong rule? That - - - in your 13 view, they applied the correct rule? 14 MR. WEISFUSE: They applied the correct 15 rule, Your Honor, and they reviewed in the decision 16 critical facts of this case. The fact that the 17 defendant made the earlier statement where he denied being with his girlfriend during the overdose and 18 19 that he had gotten a telephone call from his brother 2.0 to come to the house. And what happened - - -21 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So it was 22 fundamentally unfair viewed in the context of the 23 totality of the circumstances, or can it be so 2.4 fundamentally unfair that it's - - -

MR. WEISFUSE: Oh, this was a defendant who

1	did not want to confess. He was resistant. He
2	refused to
3	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So what is it that
4	they did that the interrogators did that was
5	fundamentally unfair?
6	MR. WEISFUSE: Oh, they threatened, in
7	essence, that if he didn't provide the information,
8	that his girlfriend's going to die.
9	JUDGE PIGOTT: Well, that's his perception
10	
11	MR. WEISFUSE: And he's going to
12	JUDGE PIGOTT: You know, he I mean,
13	he was lying from day one. He had a whole he
14	had a whole confession there that he finally admitted
15	he was lying about.
16	MR. WEISFUSE: Right. But but this
17	is what is the compulsion that, just as I gave as an
18	example, when a life is what is fundamentally
19	unfair is to threaten that if you don't provide us
20	with certain information, somebody's going to die.
21	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Is that in and of
22	itself enough?
23	MR. WEISFUSE: Yes. I gave as an example -
24	
25	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: No, but regardless of

1	the totality?
2	MR. WEISFUSE: Well, what the other states
3	have said is you look at the totality of the
4	circumstances, but you
5	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: When you have
6	MR. WEISFUSE: but qualitatively
7	-
8	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay.
9	MR. WEISFUSE: qualitatively, a
10	single factor in and of itself under the totality of
11	the circumstances.
12	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: It can be so it
13	fits within the general rule.
14	MR. WEISFUSE: Yes. Definitely.
15	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: It's not a different
16	rule.
17	MR. WEISFUSE: Definitely.
18	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay.
19	MR. WEISFUSE: And I gave as an example
20	-
21	JUDGE SMITH: But if if the Appellate
22	Division hearing had come out the other way, would we
23	would we bound to reverse them as a matter of
24	law?
25	MR. WEISFUSE: Well, I I would submit

1 that this is - - - they have the burden of proof 2 beyond a reasonable doubt. And when somebody says a 3 life is on the line, that does - - - you have the 4 Fulminante case. 5 JUDGE SMITH: So you're basically saying 6 yes to my question - - -7 MR. WEISFUSE: Yes, yes. 8 JUDGE SMITH: - - - we'd have a reversible 9 error if the other - - -10 MR. WEISFUSE: Where there's a credible 11 threat of violence in Fulminante, the United States 12 Supreme Court said, we have always said when there's 13 a - - - the majority - - - when there's a credible threat of violence, the statement is coerced. 14 15 JUDGE RIVERA: So here - - - here you're 16 saying because of the - - - the nature of this 17 deception, suggesting there's a - - - an immediacy to 18 the emergency that involves this third party, that 19 that - - -20 MR. WEISFUSE: Yes, yes. 21 JUDGE RIVERA: - - - overbears his will? 22 MR. WEISFUSE: A girlfriend who he cared 23 about, who's going to die. 2.4 JUDGE PIGOTT: But is that going to - - -25 is that going to make him lie about something?

1	MR. WEISFUSE: It doesn't matter. It's
2	going to make him to confess.
3	JUDGE PIGOTT: I understand that
4	MR. WEISFUSE: It doesn't matter. We're
5	not talking about false confessions, Your Honor.
6	JUDGE PIGOTT: I understand that.
7	JUDGE RIVERA: So in the case of an
8	emergency, we shouldn't be concerned about whether or
9	not the falsity is the consequence?
10	MR. WEISFUSE: Sure, right, exactly. It's
11	everybody has the right, with the privilege
12	against self-incrimination, of not to be a witness
13	against themselves.
14	JUDGE SMITH: Well, what if the what
15	if the the threat had been true? What if the
16	girlfriend really was in danger because
17	MR. WEISFUSE: Then there's no deception.
18	And under Quarles, you have no right to
19	JUDGE SMITH: Why why is he why
20	is he of any why is he any less coerced by the
21	true information than the false?
22	MR. WEISFUSE: It's I'll it
23	goes to the Miranda issue especially, Your Honor.
24	JUDGE PIGOTT: That's dodging the question,
25	because we're talking about the voluntariness, and

1 you - - -2 MR. WEISFUSE: It's deception. This court 3 has said in - - -4 JUDGE PIGOTT: And I guess I'll stop 5 talking now. MR. WEISFUSE: - - - People - - - no, this 6 7 court has cited from Caserino to Tarsia, a Second Circuit case called U.S. ex rel. Everett v. Murphy. 8 9 And in that case, this court has said that deception 10 alone is not enough; you need deception plus a threat 11 or a promise. And it is the deception that - - -12 that convinced - - - and really what the - - -13 JUDGE SMITH: So are you saying anything is 14 okay if it's true? That can't be true. You can say 15 if you - - - if you don't confess, I'm going to beat you over the head with this club - - -16 17 MR. WEISFUSE: Well, that - - - right. JUDGE SMITH: - - - and that can be 18 19 perfectly true, but it's obviously a little coercive. 20 MR. WEISFUSE: But I'm just saying in an 21 emergency-type circumstance, you don't have a right 22 to Miranda, and under Quarles, the police can say, 23 your girlfriend's in - - - in a - - - we have an 2.4 emergency.

JUDGE PIGOTT: But that's a different

issue. You're - - - you're saying that - - - that if they lie about that and that's the basis of not giving you your Miranda warnings, that's wrong. And I don't think anybody's arguing that. The question is when - - when he's being questioned, and he's - - and he's told what he was told, which was a deception, it's not something that would lend him to tell a falsehood. It's something that would lend him to tell a truth.

And that's why the totality of the circumstances are important in these situations, where, if by telling a fib, he ends up telling the truth, which is, yeah, I injected her with heroin, so, you know, he's thinking he's helping her - - unfortunately, she's dead - - but he told the truth.

MR. WEISFUSE: The truth doesn't matter when you're dealing with involuntariness or - - - in terms of a defendant has that privilege against self-incrimination, of not being a witness against himself.

So what I'm saying is, you can't force somebody to be this witness - - -

JUDGE PIGOTT: Well, let's assume for a minute that he was given Miranda warnings.

1 MR. WEISFUSE: Yes? 2 JUDGE PIGOTT: All right? And that - - -3 this - - - this scenario happens, where he says, tell 4 us the truth about what she took, because you may 5 save her life, even though she's already dead. he tells them the truth. Doesn't that help? I mean, 6 7 what's wrong with that? MR. WEISFUSE: It - - - it - - - when the 8 9 Miranda was violated in this case - - -10 JUDGE PIGOTT: I want to take that out for 11 a minute - - -12 MR. WEISFUSE: I'm sorry. 13 JUDGE PIGOTT: - - - because - - - because 14 we're talking about the tot - - - they're arguing 15 totality of circumstances, that even if there was a 16 deception here, and even if you were to find that it 17 went over the line in your view, or the Appellate Division's view, that's only one thing you - - - you 18 19 ask. And then asked the other - - - totality of the 20 circumstances such that the - - - the sum and 21 substance of this is, that he confessed to what he, 22 in fact, had done, and he got prosecuted for it. 23 MR. WEISFUSE: Right, but what I'm saying

is the Appellate Division did consider - - - they

listed ev - - - all these facts in their opinion,

2.4

1 including the fact that he was given the Miranda 2 warning, but they felt the coercion of the deception 3 plus the threat involved in this case - - -4 JUDGE PIGOTT: But I think that's your 5 opponent's point, is that's all they talked about. They didn't - - - they didn't go into the other 6 7 circumstances that determine all that. MR. WEISFUSE: Well, they - - - they went 8 9 into the circumstances that he denied it, and then 10 what was critical about the - - - the confession was 11 he denied being there. The confession puts him 12 there, because he knows about the heroin. 13 JUDGE PIGOTT: But it was true. They found 14 him there. I mean, it - - - I mean, it's - - -15 MR. WEISFUSE: But that got him to admit -16 17 JUDGE PIGOTT: And it got him to admit, A, that he was - - - that - - - that he lied before, B, 18 19 that he violated the OP, C, that he ran up into the 20 attic, and that's where they found him, and - - - and 21 - - - and a host of things that what they said to 22 him, led to the truth. 23 MR. WEISFUSE: I understand that, but that 2.4

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Counsel - - -

1 JUDGE READ: They couldn't lead him to the 2 truth in that way. 3 MR. WEISFUSE: Yes. 4 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: You're saying - - -5 MR. WEISFUSE: They could have confronted 6 him, you were there because we have - - - you can't 7 threaten, I submit, adverse consequences if you don't make this statement. 8 9 JUDGE PIGOTT: Even if the adverse 10 consequences are to someone else, like, this, this -11 12 MR. WEISFUSE: Yes. 13 JUDGE PIGOTT: - - - the girlfriend who died. 14 15 MR. WEISFUSE: And the adverse consequences was to him, because they also said that he would - -16 17 - it would be a problem for you and the - - - the officer said, to some effect - - - he said, and you 18 19 would be responsible. 20 JUDGE PIGOTT: And that - - -21 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Counsel, so if it's 22 coerced, it doesn't matter if it's the truth? That's 23 your point? 2.4 MR. WEISFUSE: Yes. 25

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN:

Okay.

1	MR. WEISFUSE: Yes, Your Honor. The other
2	thing is
3	JUDGE SMITH: Okay, but but is it
4	- I mean, is it suppose suppose the
5	detective says, you know, you really you're
6	going to be better if you confess you're
7	going to get less time than if you deny it and we
8	find you're lying. Is that coercive?
9	MR. WEISFUSE: I wouldn't say that by
10	itself, you could what I wanted
11	JUDGE SMITH: It's certainly a threat to
12	himself, isn't it?
13	MR. WEISFUSE: Right. But what I'd like to
14	address is the Miranda
15	JUDGE SMITH: Try addressing that one
16	first.
17	MR. WEISFUSE: Sure. Less time, that's a
18	promise. Yes, that would be coercive. But I
19	JUDGE SMITH: But isn't that done all the
20	time? I mean, isn't that the most normal thing in
21	the world to do
22	MR. WEISFUSE: What you're really doing in
23	this case is the most extreme form of coercion, a
24	human life.
25	JUDGE PIGOTT: Well, let me give you

1 another one. You've got two defendants and you got 2 them in separate rooms, and the one cop comes in and 3 says, your buddy just confessed and said you did the 4 whole darn thing, and now you're facing a big crime. 5 And of course, they're doing exactly the other to the other - - - is that - - - is that okay? 6 7 MR. WEISFUSE: Yes. 8 JUDGE PIGOTT: Okay. 9 MR. WEISFUSE: Yes, because it's - - - it's 10 deception about the evidence. This is really deception about the consequences of talking to the 11 12 police. That's why - - -13 JUDGE PIGOTT: But didn't you say, you're 14 going to be in trouble? 15 MR. WEISFUSE: What? JUDGE PIGOTT: 16 They said, if you don't tell 17 us the truth, you're going to be in trouble? MR. WEISFUSE: No, it's the consequences 18 19 that somebody is going die and you're then going to 20 be responsible. It's an extreme form of a threat. 21 JUDGE PIGOTT: But it was true. MR. WEISFUSE: Regardless of whether it's 22 23 true. 2.4 JUDGE PIGOTT: Okay. 25 MR. WEISFUSE: And the reason it's an ex -

- - Miranda, it was negated. First they give at 6:30 or 6:40, say, you have a right to remain silent. And then they say, it's imperative you give us the information. They spoke out of both sides. Miranda warnings were negated. They weren't clear.

2.4

JUDGE PIGOTT: But aren't - - - aren't all confessions - - - I was surprised that the - - - the police, here, didn't have it in writing, but don't all the confessions start out with a five - - - with the Miranda warnings up on top, and he signs it, and then he confesses all - - -

MR. WEISFUSE: He didn't sign anything.

JUDGE PIGOTT: I know. I'm using it as an example.

MR. WEISFUSE: And they say that - - JUDGE PIGOTT: But now the whole - - -

MR. WEISFUSE: - - - he didn't sign the

Miranda card, because we don't have a place for the

defendant to sign it. None of the vid - - - the

video's a partial video. And I think that is very

significant in this case. It's Showtime; after you

get the confession, after you do the ruse, and none

of that is on the video, then you start the tape.

All of a sudden by magic, the officer's able to press

all the right buttons and the tape goes on.

JUDGE SMITH: Well, does - - - well, is 1 there - - - what is the - - - what is the fact as 2 3 found below? Did he get the Miranda warnings or not? 4 MR. WEISFUSE: Yes, they said they gave him 5 Miranda warnings. But what I'm saying is those Miranda warnings were negated. The Appellate 6 7 Division found there was no knowing and intelligent waiver of Miranda rights under the totality of the 8 9 circumstances. And the District Attorney's 10 Association of the State of New York agrees with us 11 in their brief that you can't use deception to get 12 somebody to waive Miranda. 13 And that's what this really was. This was deception to waive Miranda. You're told the 14 15 consequences - - -16 JUDGE SMITH: Well, wait - - - wait - - -17 MR. WEISFUSE: Yes? JUDGE SMITH: Well, wait a minute. First 18 19 they - - - we - - - they read - - - it's admitted 20 they read him his rights, and they did the - - - I 21 assume that means that - - - and he agreed to speak 22 to them. And you're saying after that they coerced 23 him? 2.4 MR. WEISFUSE: Yes. 25 JUDGE SMITH: Why - - - and why - - - and

1 why is that a Miranda warning, except in the - - - a 2 Miranda problem except in the sense that everything 3 is a Miranda problem? I mean, it's - - -4 MR. WEISFUSE: Because Miranda applies 5 throughout the interrogation. That's what Berghius said - - -6 7 JUDGE SMITH: Well, the Fifth Amendment 8 applies throughout the interrogation. 9 MR. WEISFUSE: No, the United States 10 Supreme Court said in - - - in Berghius v. Thompkins 11 that Miranda applies throughout the interrogation. JUDGE PIGOTT: Yeah, but I - - -12 13 JUDGE SMITH: What does that mean? 14 JUDGE PIGOTT: What I was saying before, 15 you get written confessions all the time. 16 MR. WEISFUSE: Yes. 17 JUDGE PIGOTT: And on the top of them they got the Miranda warnings. The guy signs it and he 18 19 still confesses to the whole darn thing. 20 MR. WEISFUSE: But as I pointed out in 21 various cases, like in Hurd v. Terhune, the - - -22 they asked if - - - then he agreed to talk to the 23 police, they asked him questions, he answered them. 2.4 They got to a question, which he didn't answer, and

then they said, the jury's not going to like it.

1 they said - - - and the court held that that was a Miranda violation. 2 3 Well, they said - - - the government said, well, we don't have a Doyle issue. The introduced 4 5 the refusal at the trial. So what the court said is 6 Berghius says, Miranda applies throughout the 7 interrogation and applies as to every question that is asked. And - - -8 9 JUDGE SMITH: Well, obviously - - - they 10 don't mean you have to repeat the warnings every 11 time. What do they mean? MR. WEISFUSE: Well, what they can't do is 12 13 what Maryland, New Jersey, Kentucky, and all these other states cited in my brief have said, they can't 14 15 talk out of both sides of their mouth. They can't 16 say, you have a right to remain silent, and then say, 17 this is between you and me. That's a Miranda violation. That's what about five or six different 18 19 states have said. 20 JUDGE SMITH: And they can't - - - and if 21 you say something, they can't say, look, that's not -22 - - that's not credible, the jury's never going to 23 believe that.

MR. WEISFUSE: That's different. That's not going to the rights. This goes to the very right

2.4

1 in Miranda when they say, it's imperative you give us 2 this information. We got a medical emergency. 3 Doesn't that negate the right to remain silent at 4 that point? 5 JUDGE PIGOTT: But they waived it. 6 waived his right to remain silent. 7 MR. WEISFUSE: He doesn't waive until he 8 answers the question. He doesn't know what question 9 is going to be asked. 10 JUDGE PIGOTT: Well, of course not. 11 I respectfully submit those MR. WEISFUSE: 12 new Supreme Court cases in Berghius say it applies to 13 every question. JUDGE PIGOTT: But if - - - if he waives 14 15 his - - - if he waives his Miranda rights, and they 16 start asking him, you know, how old are you, where 17 were you born, you know, you were living in this 18 place, and isn't it true you had an order of protection. So far, okay, right? 19 20 And then at some point you're saying that 21 they have to re-remind him that, you know, you have 22 the right to remain silent; I'm now going to ask you 23 another series of questions. 2.4

MR. WEISFUSE: No, they can't negate the

They can't use deception to negate the right,

25

right.

by saying, we have a medical emergency. Just like 1 2 all these other states, and - - - and particularly 3 Lee v. State in Maryland said, they can't say, oh, after an hour of interrogation, this is just between 4 5 you and me. That, they held, was a - - -JUDGE SMITH: But you're - - - you're 6 7 giving us a number of rules about what they can and 8 can't do. Are you - - - but are you not arguing, 9 even in the alternative, that here this was just a 10 finding of fact on a mixed question; we have no power 11 to review it? MR. WEISFUSE: It's definitely a mixed - -12 13 - I pointed that out in my brief. 14 JUDGE SMITH: So - - - so if - - -15 if we - - - and if we agree with you on that, then 16 we're all - - - this all an interesting, but beside 17 the point, discussion of whether - - - whether 18 they're negating - - -19 MR. WEISFUSE: Yes, yes. 20 JUDGE SMITH: - - - Miranda or not negating 21 22 JUDGE PIGOTT: And you say the Appellate 23 Division said right in their opinion that they - - -2.4 they reviewed in this in - - - under the totality of 25 circumstances?

1	MR. WEISFUSE: Yes, it's right in there.
2	They specifically express that there was no knowing,
3	intelligent, voluntary waiver of rights.
4	JUDGE PIGOTT: That's okay, okay.
5	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay. Thank you,
6	counsel.
7	MR. WEISFUSE: Thank you.
8	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Counsel, rebuttal?
9	MS. GIANFRANCESCO: Yes. Your Honor, my
10	adversary's argument with regard to Miranda is
11	illustrative of how the Appellate Division applied
12	the erroneous legal standard in this case. This is
13	not a Miranda case. The defendant was given his
14	Miranda rights
15	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: He's arguing that
16	_
17	MS. GIANFRANCESCO: He waived them
18	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Miranda
19	continues throughout the questioning is his is
20	his premise. You disagree with that?
21	MS. GIANFRANCESCO: The defendant
22	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Once you give
23	once you once you waive your rights, finished.
24	MS. GIANFRANCESCO: No, absolutely not. At
25	any point that you

1	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So then what are you
2	arguing?
3	MS. GIANFRANCESCO: At any point, the
4	defendant could have told the detectives here, I'm
5	not going to talk. When the detectives asked him how
6	did she inject herself I'm not answering that
7	question.
8	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: But you can't be
9	- the detective can't undermine the the Miranda
LO	rights later by the by the nature of the
L1	questions that they ask.
L2	MS. GIANFRANCESCO: It could be possible,
L3	but that's not what was done in this case. The cases
L4	that my adversary cites are cases where the
L5	detectives are telling the defendant, we could talk
L6	to you off the record. Well, we know that's not
L7	possible under Miranda. That eviscerates
L8	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Let me ask you
L9	another question then an answer to what we just
20	asked your adversary. Why isn't this a mixed
21	question, and just finished, end of story?
22	MS. GIANFRANCESCO: Because, as I started
23	this argument, Your Honor, the wrong legal standard
24	was applied.

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: But - - - but given -

1 - - did you - - - do you contest your adversary's 2 contention that the Appellate Division at the outset 3 said, we're evaluating this in terms of the totality of the circumstances? 4 5 MS. GIANFRANCESCO: Oh, the Appellate Division clearly stated in this - - - in this 6 7 decision that it's a totality of circumstances, but 8 I'd like to point out the reason and - - - and show 9 how it conflated the Miranda and the voluntariness 10 issue. 11 JUDGE SMITH: Could you quote - - - quote 12 the language when you say they did that. 13 MS. GIANFRANCESCO: Yes, I will, Your Honor. It says that "either he would tell them what 14 15 he knew, or he would face the probability of life imprisonment if Camillo died. In light of the 16 17 detective's implicit threat of a homicide charge, if the defendant remained silent, we cannot conclude 18 19 that the defendant voluntarily waived his Fifth 20 Amendment privilege against self-incrimination." 21 JUDGE SMITH: But why can't that be read as 22 a finding of fact? 23 MS. GIANFRANCESCO: Your Honor, because 2.4 that's - - - that's - - - that's a legal decision

that the court made. The court took - - -

1 JUDGE SMITH: I mean, voluntariness can 2 always be legal, but it can also always be factual. 3 We cannot conclude that the - - - that this was a voluntary confession. 4 5 MS. GIANFRANCESCO: But - - -JUDGE SMITH: It seems factual to me. 6 7 MS. GIANFRANCESCO: The - - - the issue of 8 voluntariness, maybe it is a mixed question of law 9 and fact, but what the Appellate Division did in this 10 case is took those facts and applied the wrong legal 11 standard to them when it concluded that he 12 voluntarily waived his Fifth Amendment privilege. 13 It then - - - the next statement that it 14 made was, it says that "the detectives used the 15 threat to overcome the defendant's will and this was 16 so fundamentally unfair as is to deny him due 17 process", as an aside. They're calling this a 18 Miranda issue. What the Appellate Division did here, 19 Your Honor, was legally erroneous. 20 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, counsel. 21 you both. 22 MS. GIANFRANCESCO: Thank you. 23 Thank you. MR. WEISFUSE: 2.4 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Appreciate it. 25 (Court is adjourned)

CERTIFICATION

I, Karen Schiffmiller, certify that the
foregoing transcript of proceedings in the Court of
Appeals of People v. Adrian P. Thomas, No. 18, and
People v. Paul Aveni, No. 19 were prepared using the
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