1	COURT OF APPEALS
2	STATE OF NEW YORK
3	
4	EMPIRE CENTER FOR NEW YORK STATE POLICY,
5	Appellant,
6	-against-
7	No. 77 NEW YORK STATE TEACHERS' RETIREMENT SYSTEM,
8	Respondent.
9	
10	EMPIRE CENTER FOR NEW YORK STATE POLICY,
11	Appellant,
12	-against- No. 78
13	TEACHERS' RETIREMENT SYSTEM OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK,
14	Respondent.
15	
16	20 Eagle Street
17	Albany, New York 12207 March 26, 2014
18	Defense
19	Before: CHIEF JUDGE JONATHAN LIPPMAN
20	ASSOCIATE JUDGE VICTORIA A. GRAFFEO ASSOCIATE JUDGE SUSAN PHILLIPS READ
21	ASSOCIATE JUDGE ROBERT S. SMITH ASSOCIATE JUDGE EUGENE F. PIGOTT, JR.
22	ASSOCIATE JUDGE JENNY RIVERA ASSOCIATE JUDGE SHEILA ABDUS-SALAAM
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25	

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2	Appearances:
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23	
24	Sharona Shapiro

1	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: 77 and 78.
2	Counselor, would you like any rebuttal
3	time?
4	MS. SMITH: Three minutes, please, Your
5	Honor.
6	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: How much?
7	MS. SMITH: Three minutes, please.
8	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Three minutes. You
9	have it. Go ahead.
10	MS. SMITH: Thank you. Good afternoon,
11	Your Honors. My name is Alia Smith, and I represent
12	the Empire Center, an organization dedicated to
13	informing the public about the operations of
14	government.
15	This case is about whether State agencies
16	can reverse course, after nearly thirty years, and
17	reinterpret a provision of FOIL in a way that makes
18	no sense.
19	JUDGE READ: Why did they reverse course,
20	by the way, do you know?
21	MS. SMITH: Why did they reverse course?
22	JUDGE READ: Yeah, why did they rever
23	because apparently they were giving out the names for
24	a long period of time, and then in 2009, or
25	something, they changed.

1 MS. SMITH: That's correct, Your Honor. In 2 2010, the Police Pension Fund decided to stop giving 3 the names, and there's no particular reason given in the record why they - - - why they changed course. 4 5 JUDGE READ: Okay. JUDGE GRAFFEO: What infor - - -6 7 JUDGE READ: Because I couldn't find a 8 reason; I just wondered if there was one. 9 JUDGE GRAFFEO: What information is your 10 organization specifically looking for that they 11 didn't receive? Just the names, or you want 12 information beyond the names? 13 MS. SMITH: The - - - the agencies, the 14 Teachers' Retirement Systems, have provided other 15 information apart from the names. What's at issue in this case is just the names to go along with the 16 17 other data that's been - - -CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Why couldn't you 18 19 fulfill your purpose without getting the names? Why 2.0 are the names so critical? 21 MS. SMITH: The names are critical because 22 the underlying purpose of FOIL is to expose the 23 actions of government, but also to enable citizens to 2.4 expose fraud and waste and investigate - - -

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: But the numbers do

1 tell you a story, right, without the names? 2 MS. SMITH: The numbers tell you a story, 3 but it's an incomplete story, and it's a story that could be more meaningfully and usefully told with the 4 5 names. JUDGE SMITH: You want to be able to tell 6 7 the story of the guy who's getting a million and a half dollars of public money in pensions. 8 9 MS. SMITH: That's correct. 10 JUDGE SMITH: Put a name to the story. 11 MS. SMITH: That's correct. You know - - -JUDGE SMITH: Because it attracts more 12 13 attention, it's more interesting. MS. SMITH: Well, and because the Empire 14 15 Center's mission is to expose how government funds 16 are being spent. 17 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Well, I assume you 18 want to expose it and you want to solve the problem, 19 right, cure what's happening? 2.0 MS. SMITH: I do believe that is an aim of 21 the Empire Center. 22 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: I mean, that is your 23 ultimate aim, right? 2.4 JUDGE READ: Well, I would expect, too, 25 that if you're entitled to it, it doesn't matter what

1 you want to do with it, particularly, as long as it's 2 not illegal. 3 MS. SMITH: Well, it's true, Your Honor, 4 that for the most part, under FOIL, the purposes of 5 getting information is not relevant. However the - -6 7 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Tell us why you're entitled to it under the statute. 8 9 MS. SMITH: With pleasure, Your Honor. 10 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: The difference, 11 particularly, between retiree and beneficiary. 12 MS. SMITH: Correct. There - - - there's 13 two provisions of the same - - - there's two clauses 14 of the same provision of FOIL. 15 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Right. 16 MS. SMITH: The first one says, "Nothing in 17 this article shall require the disclosure of a home address of an officer or employee, former officer or 18 employee, or retiree of a public employees' 19 2.0 retirement system." The very next clause says, "Nor 21 shall anything in this article require the disclosure of the name or home address of a beneficiary of a 22 23 public employees' retirement system."

And so reading those two clauses, in

conjunction with each other, it's clear that retiree,

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1	in the first clause, means all retirees drawing
2	public pensions, and beneficiary means those
3	designated to receive benefits in the event of death.
4	JUDGE PIGOTT: Well, it's either redundant
5	or they mean different things.
6	MS. SMITH: It and rules of statutory
7	construction, Your Honor, suggest that you can't
8	interpret a statute in such a way as
9	JUDGE GRAFFEO: You're saying
10	MS. SMITH: to make one provision
11	redundant.
12	JUDGE GRAFFEO: You're saying the term
13	beneficiary does not encompass the retirees?
14	MS. SMITH: Correct. The retirees, on the
15	one hand, are the actual former government servants
16	drawing public pensions, and the
17	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Why, in a common
18	sense look at that statute, wouldn't we include
19	someone who's receiving a pension as a beneficiary?
20	MS. SMITH: When you look
21	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Putting aside right
22	now rules of statutory construction. I mean, isn't
23	it isn't that the general meaning, that
24	beneficiary means, you know, a pensioner?
25	MS. SMITH: It's it's impossible to

look at it in a vacuum when you've got this interest 1 2 3 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: There is no common 4 meaning, is that what you're saying? 5 MS. SMITH: Oh, no, there is a common I think that - - - that most of you would 6 meaning. 7 have to agree that if you're talking about someone who is the beneficiary of a retirement system, that 8 9 would be the person designated to receive benefits in 10 the - - - in the event of death, espec - - -11 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: I don't think most of 12 us would have to agree; we might or we might not, but 13 it's obviously a close question. MS. SMITH: Well - - -14 15 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So tell us why your 16 interpretation is better than the obvious, you know, 17 other interpretation. And I'm sure they feel that 18 it's just as clear to them the way they interpret the 19 provision. 20 MS. SMITH: Well, let me answer that in two 21 ways, Your Honor. 22 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Sure. 23 MS. SMITH: First, as we discussed earlier, 2.4 all principles of statutory construction suggest that 25 you have to interpret a statute in a way that doesn't

1 make one term superfluous, which that definition does. The second is - - -2 3 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Well, you're saying 4 that, but it could be - - - as Judge Pigott said, it 5 could be two different meanings of two different 6 terms. 7 MS. SMITH: There's - - - there's no way to interpret the statute that doesn't - - - sorry; let 8 9 me rephrase. 10 JUDGE SMITH: I think your point is that 11 nobody would say retirees you can't give the - - -12 you give the names; beneficiaries you don't, if 13 beneficiaries included retirees. 14 MS. SMITH: That's correct, Your Honor. 15 The - - - the way that - - - that the funds are 16 interpreting the statute, beneficiary and retiree 17 mean the same thing. And I don't think the legislature would have used different terms to mean 18 the same thing. 19 20 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: What in the 21 legislative history supports your position? 22 MS. SMITH: The legislative history, 23 honestly, Your - - - Your Honor, is relatively 2.4 neutral. It uses the same phrases that the final

legislation actually used, names and addresses for

beneficiaries and names for retirees - - - I'm sorry, just addresses for retirees. But just - - -

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CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: What, from a policy perspective, is wrong with their interpretation of the - - - the two different meanings? Why wouldn't that be a logical scheme that the legislature might devise?

MS. SMITH: To answer that question, you have to look to the underlying policies of FOIL itself. This court, and the FOIL statute itself, has made repeatedly clear that its intention is to open the government and to provide maximum access to data, and that in the event of an ambiguity, which I don't think there is here, but even in the - - - if there were, a tie goes to disclosure. In other words, if there's any doubt about whether the meaning of a statute should permit disclosure or should - - -

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Well, assuming you're right as to the policy benefits or the - - - that it's a better policy to be transparent and to get as much information out to the public, and that's the general definition or the general purpose attributed to FOIL, still you would have to resort to statutory construction; if it's clear one way or the other or more clear, assuming that it's a close issue, you

1	still have to go with what the statute says, right?
2	MS. SMITH: You absolutely have to go with
3	what the statute says, and I'd also like to point out
4	
5	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Even if the overall
6	policy is disclosure is the better course.
7	MS. SMITH: The overall policy is
8	disclosure is the better course, and and
9	numerous FOIL cases have said that when interpreting
10	FOIL as a statute you need to bear that in mind.
11	I also want to point out that for nearly
12	thirty years the statute has been interpreted one
13	way. There wasn't seen to be any ambiguity in it
14	whatsoever, that agencies disclosed this information,
15	the Committee on Open Government, which is the
16	committee tasked with interpreting FOIL and giving
17	guidance to the court and others
18	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yeah, but you have
19	court cases, though, that are interpreted the way
20	your adversary provides, right?
21	MS. SMITH: I disagree, Your Honor.
22	There's one court up until this recent
23	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Our court? What does
24	
25	MS. SMITH: Your court

MS. SMITH: Your court - - -

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: What do you make of our - - of our case law on it?

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MS. SMITH: Your 1983 case in Veterans (sic) Police. That case came up right after this statute was enacted. The request for information by the Veterans Police Association was to allow the Veterans Police to solicit retirees of the police pension fund.

The issue was litigated on privacy grounds, because this statute didn't exist. Shortly before the briefing was completely submitted to this court, the legislature enacted Section 89(7). The fund put in a one-paragraph reply brief saying the statute now governs and you need to dismiss the case. This court then, in a one-page opinion, said yes, the statute - - statute governs, and therefore, you don't get the information you wanted, which was the names and addresses.

JUDGE SMITH: But in fact we - - - on your theory, if we had been a little more careful or a little more precise, we would have said you don't get the addresses; you can have the names.

MS. SMITH: Your Honor, I don't think that issue was ever presented to you.

JUDGE SMITH: Okay. I understand that

1	point. Nevertheless, it would have been more correct
2	to say you can't get the addresses.
3	MS. SMITH: I think yes, today one
4	might say that. In that case
5	JUDGE READ: Well, could anybody
6	MS. SMITH: however, they were
7	looking I'm sorry.
8	JUDGE READ: The focus of that case was on
9	the addresses, is what you're saying?
10	MS. SMITH: Absolutely. It was clear from
11	the beginning, in the pape from the papers
12	-
13	JUDGE SMITH: They wanted to do a mailing.
14	MS. SMITH: They wanted to do a mailing,
15	and so getting just the names wouldn't have been of
16	interest to them. They never asked for just the
17	names. Typically, if you want a portion of what
18	you're asking for, you request redaction from the
19	court.
20	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So you think we
21	didn't really mean what we said, or we weren't
22	focusing on
23	MS. SMITH: I think that wasn't the
24	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: on what we said
25	about the names.

1 JUDGE READ: Or we were asked a different 2 question. 3 MS. SMITH: That's correct. Both correct, 4 yes, Your Honor. 5 JUDGE GRAFFEO: Can you address why there's 6 no privacy concern with the disclosure of names? 7 MS. SMITH: Under 87(2)(b), Your Honor? JUDGE GRAFFEO: Yes. 8 9 MS. SMITH: Yes, I'd be happy to. 10 court has rep - - -JUDGE GRAFFEO: Particularly in light of 11 12 modern technology. 13 MS. SMITH: Yes. This court, and FOIL itself, make clear that lists of names of employees 14 15 and their salaries have to be made available to the 16 public. That's been reinforced again and again, not 17 only for employees, but for others drawing government 18 money, included licensed veterinarians, applicants 19 for public housing, physicians, people who got 20 parking tickets. 21 In addition, the Committee on Open 22 Government has repeatedly held that this information 23 has to be public. And there has been no case in 2.4 which this court has ever held that the fact that you

can potentially discover addresses with names is

sufficient to withhold information under the privacy 1 2 exemption when there is a public interest in the 3 disclosure of the names - - -JUDGE SMITH: Is it not - - -4 5 MS. SMITH: - - - as there is here. 6 JUDGE SMITH: Isn't it true, as I think we 7 were saying a few minutes ago, in fact, part of your 8 purpose in getting these names, frankly, is to 9 embarrass people? You say people deserve to be 10 embarrassed, but nevertheless, to embarrass some 11 people? 12 MS. SMITH: It would be certainly to root 13 our fraud is something that the Empire Center is 14 looking to do. 15 JUDGE SMITH: Or even people who, although 16 not - - - not necessarily crooks, are getting a 17 pension that anybody would think was overgenerous. 18 MS. SMITH: The idea behind the privacy 19 exemption is that the privacy interest must be 20 warranted. And in this case, exposing - - -21 JUDGE SMITH: So if you say if you're doing 22 something embarrassing, you have no right not to be 23 embarrassed? 2.4 MS. SMITH: That's correct, Your Honor. 25 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: What about the

federal case on the - - - their FOIA, you know, that says that - - - that the - - - the privacy interests do outweigh the need of the - - - the public to know how taxpayer money is being spent?

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MS. SMITH: The - - - they cited two federal cases, Your Honor. One was a solicitation case, which I think is in a different category. The other one was the Long case, in which they held that certain - - - the names of certain employees in sensitive occupations could be withheld. And that's also not the case here.

And - - - and just to follow up on that, there are a number of State cases which have addressed this exact issue, from other states, where someone has sought the names of retirees drawing public pensions, privacy objections have been asserted, and the courts, over and over again, have said, no, the mere fact that you can theoretically get an address is not enough. That happened very recently, just this year, in Nevada. New Hampshire held the same thing. California - -

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So you don't think the privacy interests really outweigh the policy considerations then?

MS. SMITH: Absolutely not, especially in

light of the fact that there's no evidence in the 1 2 record, whatsoever, that anyone's privacy has, in 3 fact, been invaded, over the numerous years that this information has been available. 4 5 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, counsel. 6 You'll have your rebuttal. Let's hear from your 7 adversary. 8 MS. SMITH: Thank you. 9 MR. LANG: Good afternoon, Your Honor. 10 Jeffrey Lang, on behalf of the State - - -11 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Counsel, why isn't -12 13 MR. LANG: - - - Teachers' Retirement 14 System. 15 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: - - - why isn't their interpretation of the statute a more logical one? 16 17 Why wouldn't it - - - they used the two different 18 words "retirees" and "beneficiaries". Why doesn't 19 that make sense in terms of the overall purpose of 2.0 this legislation? 21 MR. LANG: Well, I don't think it makes 22 sense because the term in the statute is a 23 beneficiary of a public employee - - - employee's 2.4 retirement system. And so taking that phrase, the

natural and ordinary meaning of that phrase is

1 someone who is receiving a pension benefit. 2 JUDGE PIGOTT: Would you concede that they 3 could mean different people? 4 MR. LANG: I'm sorry? 5 JUDGE PIGOTT: Would you concede that they could mean a different - - - different people? 6 7 other words, if - - - you know, if I die and my wife 8 is - - - is a beneficiary of my retirement system, 9 the way - - - the way counsel's reading it, you would 10 not be able to get her name, but you would be able to get mine, you know, assuming I'm a retiree, through 11 12 FOIL. 13 MR. LANG: That - - - well, I think it includes both. 14 15 JUDGE PIGOTT: No, no, I'm saying, would you concede that there are two different classes of 16 17 people, one of which could be called beneficiaries and one of which would be called retirees? In other 18 19 words, my wife would not be a retiree; she'd be a 20 beneficiary of a retirement system. 21 MR. LANG: Oh, certainly. JUDGE PIGOTT: So there are two different -22 23 - - there's definitions to those two names that would 2.4 - - - that could make them separate. 25 MR. LANG: Right. Well, in our - - - in

1	our interpretation of of retiree, I mean, the -
2	so the statute says that a former officer or
3	employee or a retiree of a public employee's
4	retirement system, that you don't have to disclose
5	the home address. And, you know, under our
6	interpretation, if you're a former employee or a
7	former officer, once you start receiving a pension
8	benefit, at that point you also become a beneficiary,
9	under the ordinary
10	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So in your view
11	MR. LANG: nontechnical
12	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: there can be
13	retirees who aren't beneficiaries.
14	MR. LANG: I mean, they would be
15	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: And that's what
16	that's what the one provision
17	MR. LANG: Sure.
18	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: relate
19	MR. LANG: I mean, they would be a small
20	number. Most retirees
21	JUDGE RIVERA: But then you
22	MR. LANG: would be beneficiaries.
23	JUDGE RIVERA: But then you're not reading
24	as the sentence, right? You're sort of decoupling
25	it, and you're refusing to recognize that they might

1	be mutually exclusive, that there's a purpose to the
2	to the language following the colon
3	semicolon.
4	MR. LANG: Well, no, I I don't
5	actually think that's the case. I mean, I think
6	we're we're saying that
7	JUDGE RIVERA: You're saying just look at
8	the word "beneficiary" as opposed to look at it in
9	this context.
10	MR. LANG: Well, if you just look at the
11	word "beneficiary", the word "beneficiary" is just
12	broader than how petitioner wants to read it, which
13	is
14	JUDGE RIVERA: No, I understand
15	MR. LANG: a contingent beneficiary.
16	JUDGE RIVERA: No, I understand your
17	argument, but I'm saying you're asking us to look at
18	it outside of the context of the provision, which
19	_
20	MR. LANG: I
21	JUDGE RIVERA: which strikes me as
22	against the rules of statutory construction.
23	MR. LANG: No, I mean, I I think
24	- well, I think the context of the provision is that
25	phrase, beneficiary of a public employee's retirement

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1
          system. And I think - - -
                    JUDGE RIVERA: As opposed to what's before
 2
 3
          it, though. So why aren't they mutually exclusive?
                    MR. LANG: Well, I think they're - - - you
 4
 5
          know, we've proposed a definition of a retiree which
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 7
                    JUDGE SMITH: You say there are retirees -
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 9
                    MR. LANG: - - - doesn't pull - - -
10
                    JUDGE SMITH: - - - there are retirees who
11
          don't get pensions?
                    MR. LANG: There can be retirees who don't
12
13
          get pensions. For example - - -
                    JUDGE SMITH: A few.
14
                    MR. LANG: A few, if you - - -
15
16
                    JUDGE SMITH: And those - - - and those
17
          guys - - - those guys, the names can be released?
18
                    MR. LANG: That's right. And then - - -
19
                    JUDGE SMITH: Why would anyone - - -
20
                    JUDGE RIVERA: And - - - yeah.
21
                    JUDGE SMITH: - - - write a statute to say
22
          that?
23
                    JUDGE RIVERA: Where would the concern be
2.4
          for that group? That's true.
25
                    MR. LANG: Well - - - well, I mean, the
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concern would be - - - it has to do with the - - -1 2 the privacy concern for a person once you start 3 receiving the pension benefit. So what you - - -4 JUDGE READ: I quess that's what I want to 5 --- what would be --- why would the ---6 assuming your interpretation is correct, why would 7 the legislature want to make that distinction? 8 other words, why is my name disclosable now, but at 9 the point when I retire it wouldn't be? I mean, 10 what's - - - what would be the logical reason why the 11 legislature would want to do that? Do I have more 12 privacy once I become a retiree or a greater 13 interest? MR. LANG: Well, I think that - - - I think 14 15 you do, but the - - - and the reason that you do is 16 that before you're not receiving any amount of money, 17 any - - - a pension benefit. Once you start 18 receiving - - -19 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So you say that what 20 they're saying is that if you're receiving a - - - a 21 benefit, you're not protected, but if you're not 22 receiving a benefit you are, because you're not one 23 of those people who - - - who should be subject? 2.4 What - - - what - - -

MR. LANG: I'm sorry, I think it's the opp

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- - - if you are receiving the benefit - - -
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 2
                    CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yeah, that's what I'm
 3
 4
                    MR. LANG: - - - then you are protected - -
 5
                    CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Right. Why - - -
 6
 7
                    MR. LANG: - - - because you are in fact -
 8
 9
                    CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Why does that - - -
10
          why is that - - -
11
                    JUDGE READ: But I'm not - - -
                    CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: - - - a logical way
12
13
          to look at it?
                    JUDGE READ: But I'm not if I receive a
14
15
          salary? But once I become - - - once I start to
16
          receive a benefit, then I am protected - - -
17
                    MR. LANG: Well, if you - - -
                    JUDGE READ: Or at least my name can't be
18
19
          disclosed. Why - - - why does that - - - what would
20
          be the reason for that?
21
                    CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: In a FOIL statute.
22
                    JUDGE READ: Yeah.
23
                    MR. LANG: Right, under - - - so under the
2.4
          FOIL statute, the reason would be if - - - if you are
25
          a former employee or if you are a retiree who's not a
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1	beneficiary; in other words, if you're a if
2	you've retired but you haven't yet hit the age at
3	which you can obtain a pension benefit, and you're
4	not receiving anything, then you have less of a
5	privacy interest, because the the privacy
6	invasion here is the link between the
7	JUDGE SMITH: But I think the question
8	_
9	MR. LANG: name
LO	JUDGE SMITH: is what about the guy
L1	who's receiving a salary?
L2	JUDGE GRAFFEO: Right. The day before I
L3	retire
L4	MR. LANG: Um-hum.
L5	JUDGE GRAFFEO: I'm still an
L6	employee.
L7	MR. LANG: Right.
L8	JUDGE GRAFFEO: My name and salary can be
L9	obtained through a FOIL request.
20	MR. LANG: Absolutely.
21	JUDGE GRAFFEO: The next day, I'm retired,
22	I know that your bene I know that your retiree
23	benefit doesn't come right away, but presume the
24	pension comes the next week. You're saying there's a
25	different disclosure standard?

1	MR. LANG: Well, I'm saying there is a
2	different disclosure standard because
3	JUDGE GRAFFEO: And I guess we're
4	MR. LANG: at that point
5	JUDGE GRAFFEO: asking you what's the
6	policy reason to make that distinction.
7	MR. LANG: Well, the policy reason for
8	making the distinction is when you're an active State
9	employee, you're still making government decisions,
10	so there even though there's a privacy
11	invasion, State employees accept that privacy
12	invasion because there are transparency reasons for
13	allowing people to see the salaries of
14	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: What about the
15	taxpayer's right to know who's receiving a pension
16	and how much they get? Why is that much different
17	than you mean, because now they're not making
18	decisions and therefore they're in a they
19	should be protected as
20	MR. LANG: Right. I mean, that's
21	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: What's the logic? I
22	guess that's what I
23	MR. LANG: No, that's that's
24	absolutely right. Once they once they stop
25	working for the State and they've completed their

State service, at that point, and they're receiving a pension, there is potential harm from releasing the information. I mean, for example, once it's on - - - it's on petitioner's Web site, anyone has access to it. I mean, it can - - - it's another piece of personal information about you, your name and your pension benefit, and your - - - the - - - your date of retirement and so on. If it's out on the Internet, it could be used for identity theft. For example - - -

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CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Would you - -
MR. LANG: - - it could be used - -
CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Would you agr - -
MR. LANG: - - by scam artists.

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Would you agree that overall there's a better public - - - the better public policy argument is that these things should all be open to the public, in the most - - - in the broadest context, that people of the public should know not only who their employees are but who gets pensions and how much, that there could be a salutary public purpose to allowing that to be known? That this organ - - - this particular organization tries to highlight ways in which taxpayers' dollars are abused or taken advanta - - - is it a better public

1 policy argument, or do you challenge that? MR. LANG: Well, I - - - you have to 2 3 remember there's a lot of information already out 4 there, the aggregate information as well as each 5 person's individual information. It's just that their name is redacted. And so I would challenge it 6 7 only to the extent that they say they want the information for - - -8 9 JUDGE SMITH: Isn't there a legitimate 10 public interest in being able to take a horrible 11 example of a real person - - - I mean, obviously 12 painful for the person, put his picture and name in 13 the paper and say this guy is getting 287,000 dollars 14 at taxpayer expense and it's an outrage? 15 MR. LANG: Well - - -16 JUDGE SMITH: Isn't it - - - can't the 17 media legitimately do that, and don't they serve a 18 purpose when they do? 19 MR. LANG: Well, I mean, I'm not denying 20 that there's some purpose to - - - to that. I just 21 think it needs to be balanced against all of the 22 potential harms to the mass of retirees - - -23 JUDGE PIGOTT: Those harms that you 2.4 outlined, you know, could happen to any one of us now

because we're - - - you know, they can get all of our

1	information, they can do identity theft, they can do
2	so I don't know what happens, you know, the day
3	after Judge Judge Graffeo retires that all of a
4	sudden you say, well, now we're going to protect you
5	from all of that. I mean, I understand I
6	understand your point, but the the argument
7	that you're making that you want to protect retirees
8	from identity theft, I'm not sure that works.
9	JUDGE READ: I guess what you're saying, we
10	take that risk as long as we're drawing a salary?
11	MR. LANG: Right, well
12	JUDGE RIVERA: I would think the State is
13	more concerned when I'm employed for you
14	MR. LANG: Well
15	JUDGE RIVERA: of my identity being
16	stolen.
17	MR. LANG: Well, I think there is that risk
18	when you when you are an employee. But again,
19	because there's the countervailing interest in
20	knowing the the names. But the point is these
21	are people who have spent their entire career in
22	State service.
23	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So
24	MR. LANG: I mean, when does it end?
25	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So you're argu

1	MR. LANG: You know, the rest have been
2	_
3	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: You're arguing that
4	the purpose of FOIL is met by your interpretation.
5	MR. LANG: Absolutely.
6	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: I guess you're both
7	arguing that.
8	JUDGE PIGOTT: Just before you go I
9	know your red light's on, but if I did a little
10	grammar work here, we can we can delete about
11	two lines, and we can say, "Nothing in this article
12	shall require the disclosure of the home address of
13	an officer or employee, former officer or employee,
14	or beneficiary of a public employee's retirement
15	system or of an applicant for appointment" et cetera.
16	We can wipe out everything that talks about a retiree
17	of a public employment system, right, because you say
18	beneficiary means that.
19	MR. LANG: That's right. I mean, even
20	- even under the statute, the the term retiree
21	is redundant
22	JUDGE PIGOTT: So this is surplus
23	MR. LANG: of a former employee.
24	JUDGE PIGOTT: it's surplusage in the
25	in the statute.

	MR. LANG: There is surplusage in the
2	statute.
3	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, counsel, let's
4	hear from your co-counsel, and we'll go from there.
5	MS. FREEDMAN: Good afternoon, Your Honors.
6	May it please the court. My name is Elizabeth
7	Freedman, and I am appearing for the New York City
8	Teacher's Retirement System.
9	Your Honor, we do agree with the position
10	taken by the State that the names of the retirees, of
11	the beneficiaries here, are exempt from disclosure
12	under FOIL under the plain not only plain
13	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: You're not saying
14	they must be withheld, right? You're saying they can
15	be.
16	MS. FREEDMAN: They can be withheld,
17	exactly; they're exempt from disclosure.
18	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: You're saying that
19	they should have the discretion
20	MS. FREEDMAN: Absolutely, Your Honor.
21	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: as to whether
22	or not to
23	MS. FREEDMAN: Absolutely.
24	JUDGE GRAFFEO: Did you disclose
25	MS FREEDMAN: Under

1 JUDGE GRAFFEO: - - - this information in 2 previous years? 3 MS. FREEDMAN: Your Honor, it is possible that this information was disclosed in previous 4 5 years, but certainly estoppel doesn't apply to bind an agency - - -6 7 JUDGE GRAFFEO: No, I - - -8 MS. FREEDMAN: - - - to continue. 9 JUDGE GRAFFEO: - - - was just wondering 10 what policy - - - what aspects of public policy would 11 have caused the change. 12 MS. FREEDMAN: That - - - I think after 13 looking at the law, and certainly this court's decision in Veteran Police Association, I think that 14 15 decisions were made regarding whether or not this 16 information really did have to be disclosed under 17 FOIL. And I think the legislature made a very clear choice here. And I think the legislature spoke in 18 19 Section 89, subdivision (7) to exempt - - -20 JUDGE SMITH: No, but there were - - -21 MS. FREEDMAN: - - - exactly this information. 22 23 JUDGE SMITH: During those years, when you 2.4 were disclosing the information, do you have any

anecdotes of a terrible invasion of privacy that

happened as a result?

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MS. FREEDMAN: Not to my knowledge, Your

Honor, but I do know that in the context of the

police department, certainly there would be,

certainly, concerns about releasing that information.

But the statute doesn't speak only to the police

department; it speaks to all public employment - -
employee, retirees, and beneficiaries. And very

simple - - -

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: You know, we have seen - - - there have been a lot of media attention to people in the fire department and the police department with pensions that - - - that the contention is they're not appropriate. The world hasn't come to an end, though, right?

MS. FREEDMAN: Well, Your Honor, the information that the petitioners seek can certainly been - - be obtained. In fact, they did get a wealth of information about pension amounts. The only thing that they did not receive; they didn't ask for home addresses.

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: But it's not as - - but you agree that it's not as graphic if you don't
have the individual. It's a - - - it's a more a
numbers thing which doesn't really draw a picture of

1 what's going on. 2 MS. FREEDMAN: Well, Your Honor, I would 3 disagree with that. I think that you can certainly 4 draw a picture without linking the name to the amount 5 6 JUDGE PIGOTT: Let me give you an example. 7 There used to be a comedian on TV who - - - who would 8 do the sports, and he would say I'll give you a 9 partial baseball score, 4 to 3, 6 to 7, 2 to 1. And he'd say, oh, you want to know the - - - you want to 10 11 know the player - - - the teams too: Yankees, 12 Dodgers, Phillies, and Red Sox. You don't get the 13 information. I mean, you know the scores and you 14 know the teams, but until you can put them together, 15 you don't know what's going on. 16 MS. FREEDMAN: But we have to look at under 17 - - - certainly under the privacy considerations, how relevant is that information to what the petitioners 18 19 are seeking - - -20 JUDGE PIGOTT: Suppose the - - -21 MS. FREEDMAN: - - - to do. 22 JUDGE PIGOTT: Suppose the information 23 showed that - - - we'll use teachers - - - that 2.4 teachers' pensions are woefully inadequate.

MS. FREEDMAN: And they want to publish the

1 amounts that the teachers are getting, that they - -2 - and they can certainly publish the amounts that the 3 teachers are getting without linking the names under 4 the privacy considerations. 5 JUDGE PIGOTT: No, I mean, why not use the 6 names? Here's a teacher, thirty-five years, and her 7 pension is - - - is 1,700 dollars a year. 8 MS. FREEDMAN: Well, Your Honor, for the 9 very reason that I think that would be an unwarranted 10 invasion of personal privacy because, for one thing, 11 it could be embarrassing and for no reason. You're 12 embarrassing somebody because, look, they've worked 13 all those years and they're not making what other 14 people think they should be making. 15 JUDGE PIGOTT: But on the other hand, if it 16 was extremely generous, and people are worried about 17 pensions in the State of New York, that would be 18 embarrassing too. 19 MS. FREEDMAN: It could be embarrassing, 20 Your Honor, but again, that comes under the violation 21 22 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: But don't - - -23 MS. FREEDMAN: - - - of the invasion of - -2.4

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN:

But don't you - - -

1 MS. FREEDMAN: - - - personal privacy.

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CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: - - - don't you come back to the - - - to your issue? Your argument is really a statutory construction, because from the policy perspective, look at the world we live in today, where pensions are so under a microscope, public pensions, some places, you know, it's - - it's the enemy, it's the cause of - - - all of the financial troubles in the world come from excessive -- - or at least the financial troubles of government come from excessive pensions. Couldn't you arque that in the modern world, certainly from the policy perspective, that - - - that the public has a right to know, on the one hand, and yet on the other hand, doesn't your argument really come down to if you can demonstrate that that may be the case policy-wise, but when a legislature passed this statute, this is what they meant, and the statutory construction, you know, leads us to that inescapable conclusion.

Would you - - - would you - - - I know

you've been - - - you've been saying it, but can you

seriously argue that in this day and age it's not a

salutary public purpose, whether it's too low

pensions or too high pensions? And today, again,

there's so much attention to the financial troubles

1 of pension - - - pension systems and to abuses in the 2 system. Couldn't - - - on the one hand, isn't that a 3 pretty convincing argument? And on the other hand, I 4 think you certainly, you know, can make a statutory 5 construction argument to balance that. But do you -6 - - do you really dispute the generally positive 7 nature of - - - of letting the public understand, and 8 see it in a way that they can understand, not just 9 pure numbers? 10 MS. FREEDMAN: Well, Your Honor, I think 11 that the public can understand, by virtue of 12 disclosing the - - - the numbers, the amounts of the 13 pension. I don't think there's any reason to expose the name with the - - -14 15 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So essentially, you 16 believe the pri - - - aside from whatever arguments 17 you're making about interpreting the statute, that 18 the privacy interests outweigh the - - -19 MS. FREEDMAN: Absolutely, Your Honor, 20 especially in this - - -21 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: - - - the interest of 22 disclosure. 23 MS. FREEDMAN: - - - in this day and age of Internet access and all the possibilities of fraud 2.4

and harassment, which the legislature did think about

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2 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So you think the mod

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MS. FREEDMAN: --- in drafting the statute.

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: - - - the modern world may cut the other way? You're arguing - - -

MS. FREEDMAN: I think the modern world actually supports a more - - - that this would be an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. This is what the court held in New York State United Teachers v. Brighter Choice, that the names could be withheld from disclosure of current teachers, people who were currently in the charter schools, because it so easily could be linked to a home address. And I think the court does need to take that into consideration, but also the very plain language of not only the violation of privacy statute but also the Public Officers Law, Section 89(7), where the legislature made clear its intent, as this court then correctly interpreted in Veterans Police Association, that the names and the addresses were exempt from disclosure. And that should certainly be upheld; there's no reason to change it now. If anything, the opposite is true; there's even more of a reason to -

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2 | CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, counselor.

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Thanks, counsel.

MS. FREEDMAN: Thank you, Your Honor.

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, counselor, rebuttal.

Counselor, what about the - - - the latest
- - - the latter argument that your adversary makes
that in the world that we live in today, you know,
with the Internet and all these things going all over
the place, that it really pushes us towards a view
that, gee, maybe it's not such a good idea, in terms
of privacy interests. How do you counter that?

MS. SMITH: For thirty years, including, you know, the past ten years, in which the Internet has been a presence in all of our lives, this statute has been interpreted the same way, which is to allow the disclosure of names of retirees drawing pensions. And for that entire span, including during the Internet age, there is zero evidence in the record, whether it's as to teachers, police officers, or anyone else, that there has been any significant invasion of privacy, that anyone has been even mailed

1 un - - - unwanted junk mail. There's been - - -2 there's no evidence at all that there's a privacy 3 interest. And as Your Honor pointed out, there is 4 overwhelming public interest in this, not just to 5 look at the aggregate data, but to root out cases of fraud. 6 7 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Is your argument that if the shoe fits, wear it? 8 9 MS. SMITH: I'll take that, Your Honor, 10 yes. 11 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay. MS. SMITH: You know, and - - - you know, 12 13 Judge Smith talked about embarrassment, as did - - -14 as did counsel, but be - - - something being 15 embarrassing is not necessarily the same thing as 16 being private. And in any event, the statute is 17 meant to uncover not just things that require public 18 discourse like, you know, whether someone's pension 19 is too high, but to actually uncover fraud. And we -20

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yeah, but you'd agree to that - - - that you could put out the names of somebody who's not - - - didn't do anything wrong, doesn't - - - no kinds of fraud or abuse of the system, and that person maybe doesn't want their - -

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1	- their perfectly appropriate pension, name, address
2	to be out there. But what's your answer to that?
3	That that you've gotten a public pension and
4	the taxpayer's entitled to know
5	MS. SMITH: Right. The statute
6	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: whether you
7	want it or not.
8	MS. SMITH: Right. The statute
9	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Now, I'm talking
10	about from a policy protecting privacy
11	interest.
12	MS. SMITH: Right. The although
13	someone may prefer not to have their name
14	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: That's what I'm
15	asking.
16	MS. SMITH: raised, the policy
17	interest and the public interest in disclosure vastly
18	outweighs that preference. And when you look at the
19	statute, it makes a clear distinction between
20	government servants former government servants
21	and people, you know, drawing public pensions, on the
22	one hand, versus beneficiaries, who never signed up
23	for public service. And the distinctions that have
24	been drawn by the other side don't recognize that

that's a fundamental distinction that the legislature

was making. That's why public employee's salaries are disclosed. JUDGE SMITH: So your point is that the legislature that wrote the statute basically resolved these policy issues for us, and that's all we need to do; it said names and addresses for one group, names for the other. MS. SMITH: Absolutely, Your Honor, that's exactly right. CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay. MS. SMITH: Thank you. (Court is adjourned)

CERTIFICATION

I, Sharona Shapiro, certify that the foregoing transcript of proceedings in the Court of Appeals of Matter of Empire Center for New York State Policy v. New York State Teachers' Retirement System, No. 77, and Matter of Empire Center for New York State Policy v. Teachers' Retirement System of the City of New York, No. 78 was prepared using the required transcription equipment and is a true and accurate record of the proceedings.

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