1	COURT OF APPEALS
2	STATE OF NEW YORK
3	
4	PEOPLE,
5	Respondent,
6	-against-
7	No. 77 RICKY A. LYNCH,
8	Appellant.
9	
10	Judicial Institute 84 North Broadway
11	White Plains, New York 10603 April 28, 2015
12	
13	Before: CHIEF JUDGE JONATHAN LIPPMAN
14	ASSOCIATE JUDGE SUSAN PHILLIPS READ ASSOCIATE JUDGE EUGENE F. PIGOTT, JR.
15	ASSOCIATE JUDGE JENNY RIVERA ASSOCIATE JUDGE SHEILA ABDUS-SALAAM
16	ASSOCIATE JUDGE LESLIE E. STEIN ASSOCIATE JUDGE EUGENE M. FAHEY
17	
18	Appearances:
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25	Sara Winkeljohn Official Court Transcriber

1	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: People v. Lynch,
2	number 77.
3	Counsel, would you like any rebuttal time?
4	MR. SMITH: Yes, Your Honor. Three
5	minutes, please.
6	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Three minutes. Sure,
7	go ahead.
8	MR. SMITH: Okay. Mr. Chief Judge and may
9	it please the court my name is Edward Smith. I'm
10	with the Legal Aid Society of Suffolk County, and I
11	represent the appellant in today's case.
12	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Counsel, aren't these
13	very different why aren't these very different
14	issues? The issue of the form that was filled out at
15	the motor vehicle bureau in as distinct from
16	the license or whatever he was showing when he was
17	pulled over in Westchester?
18	MR. SMITH: Mr. Chief Judge, I think that
19	there are there are several reasons
20	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: What's yeah.
21	MR. SMITH: why. And I think that a
22	a straightforward
23	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Why aren't they
24	different proofs, different why isn't why
25	aren't they dis

1	JUDGE READ: They were five months
2	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Why aren't they
3	distinct?
4	JUDGE READ: They were five months apart,
5	too, right? Or something like that.
6	MR. SMITH: They were five months apart but
7	but a temporal interregnum in between the two
8	actions does not necessarily mean that they are not a
9	continuing offense.
10	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yeah. But aren't
11	they two different documents here?
12	MR. SMITH: There's no doubt that there are
13	doc two different documents at issue.
14	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Doesn't that matter,
15	or does it matter?
16	MR. SMITH: I don't believe that it
17	matters.
18	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Why not? Why not?
19	MR. SMITH: And I think I think this
20	court's ruling in, for example, in Johnson v.
21	Morgenthau might provide some might shed some
22	light on that. And there, the court found that
23	possession of a weapon across multiple jurisdictions
24	could be a continuing offense despite the fact that
25	it occurs in multiple jurisdictions.

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: But here there's a
different again, different piece of paper or
card
MR. SMITH: Different piece
CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: in the two
cases.
MR. SMITH: Different piece of paper or
card. But but I I suppose that
CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: I mean it's not the
same weapon in a different place. It's a different
thing that he's presenting that makes for, again, the
two different charges.
MR. SMITH: Fair enough. And I and I
think that a legally significant distinction between,
say, the weapon and the forged documents in this
case, would be that the second forged document, that
is the ID card
CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: It's just a a
reflection of the first? Is that what you're saying?
MR. SMITH: Not well, it could be
looked at as a reflection of the first, but it's
certainly inextricably intertwined with the first.
That is had he not filled out the first form, he

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: But there were two

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          different proofs here, right?
 2
                    MR. SMITH: Two - - - I - - - I'm sorry.
 3
                    CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: In other words, the
          son turned him in on the first issue, and on the
 4
 5
          second issue the cop is looking at the - - - the
 6
          false, whatever it is, license or ID.
 7
                    MR. SMITH: That - - - that's correct.
          Although - - - although there's - - -
 8
 9
                    CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So does that matter?
10
                    MR. SMITH: Well, this is - - - well,
11
          that's correct. Although the - - - the second - - -
12
                    CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Distinct proof, I
13
          guess, yeah.
14
                    MR. SMITH: The - - - the - - - the second
15
          - - - the second event that you mentioned occurred
16
          first.
17
                    CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yeah.
18
                    MR. SMITH: The - - - the officer who
19
          pulled him over in Westchester County - - -
20
                    CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Right.
2.1
                    MR. SMITH: - - - occurred first.
22
                    CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN:
                                           Right.
                    MR. SMITH: But the - - - but the - - - but
23
24
          the fact - - - but the - - - but the test for whether
25
          or not there's one continuing offense or whether
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there is one criminal transaction is not whether 1 2 there's two separate angles of proof to be taken. 3 The issue - - - the issue, if you really boil it down, is whether there's one offense or whether 4 5 there's one criminal transaction. That's what 6 section - - -7 JUDGE RIVERA: Well, the - - - the second 8 forged document you're talking about can be used for 9 many purposes, right? It's got multiple purposes. 10 MR. SMITH: That's correct. 11 JUDGE RIVERA: So even though he's got to file what you're saying the MV-44, I think - - -12 13 MR. SMITH: That's right. 14 JUDGE RIVERA: - - - to get that ID, he can 15 us that ID for any purpose, so doesn't that break this - - - what it sounds to me like you're connect -16 17 - - connecting between the MV-4 - - - 44 and the - -18 - the ID? 19 MR. SMITH: That's possible, Judge Rivera. 20 But I don't think that that - - - there - - - there's 2.1 no evidence in the record in this case that he used 22 it for any other purpose other than to drive a 23 vehicle and have it pose as - - - as a license. 24

Certainly, if the district attorney could raise some

kind of, you know, evid - - - could present some kind

1 of evidence then - - -JUDGE RIVERA: But does the - - - do the 2 3 People need to do that? MR. SMITH: I think so in order - - - in 4 5 order to - - - to dissipate any kind of jeopardy question. They - - - they must show that there's not 6 7 some single purpose or objective such that there's 8 one criminal venture in - - - in play. 9 JUDGE READ: What's the rule - - - what's 10 the rule you're asking for? 11 MR. SMITH: The - - I think that the rule 12 that we're asking for is that in - - - in - - - when 13 it - - - when it comes to cases like this that 14 involve successive forgeries or - - or forgeries 15 that - - - that hinge upon one another - - -16 JUDGE READ: Well, is the - - - the rule is 17 limited to forgeries that you're asking for? 18 MR. SMITH: I - - - I think so. And I - -19 - and I - - - and - - - and here's why. I think 20 that, for example, as - - - as Judge Lippman brought 2.1 up before, it's - - - it's different when you have 22 one weapon and say carry it across several 23 jurisdictions. Say then when you fill out a forged 24 document in one jurisdiction, that necessarily gives

rise to another forged document that you could only

obtain by filling out the first and carry it into another jurisdiction.

JUDGE STEIN: So - - -

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JUDGE READ: Okay. So your rule's limited to forgeries. And then, again, what is your rule then? I interrupted you and didn't let you continue.

MR. SMITH: That - - - that's okay, Judge

Read. The - - - the - - - the rule - - - the rule

that we're asking for is eith - - - either, one, that

those constitute one continuing offense under

40.20(1). Or, in the alternative, that provided that

there is one sin - - - that - - - that there is no

showing that the purpose of filling out the first to

obtain the second is - - - is - - - is dissipated,

provided that that's not shown by the People, that

that constitutes one single criminal - - - criminal

transaction.

JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Counsel - - -

JUDGE STEIN: So would this rule apply if - if he not only used the license that he obtained
by a forged motor vehicle form to drive a car, but he
then also used it to open a bank account and then he
- - he wrote bad checks and, you know, did - - used it for multiple purposes. Would that - - - that

affect your rule, or would that fall within your rule?

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MR. SMITH: I don't - - - I think that

would - - - that would fall within my rule. But I

think in that case my def - - - my - - - my client

would be in much hotter water. I think - - - I think

my client would lose in that case. Those - - - those

would clearly constitute separate offenses because

the purpose had changed.

JUDGE STEIN: It's the - - - the use of the - - - of - - - of what happened you're saying is what makes a difference?

MR. SMITH: That's correct. And - - - and

I think that's consistent with, for example, this

court's ruling in People v. Okafore, which - -
which is, actually, one year following Johnson v.

Morgenthau, where the court said that intent was a

relevant fact. That that - - - that int - - - that

intent was relevant to determine whether they are one

offense - - -

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: But back - - - but back to what Judge Stein is saying. So you're saying the rule is that as for forged instrument second, that's the rule. You could do other things and you would not be able to get a - - - the - - - the checks

1 that you're, you know, bouncing or whatever the hell 2 you're doing. That - - - that - - - that all is a 3 consequence of the forgery. That could represent different transactions, even though they all eminent 4 5 - - - eminate from the first one. 6 MR. SMITH: That - - -7 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: In - - - in this case 8 you're saying it doesn't. 9 MR. SMITH: That's correct. 10 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: It's not a different 11 - - - it's one - - - one continuum. 12 MR. SMITH: That - - -13 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Counsel, would it have 14 made any difference if the first forged document was 15 a nondriver ID card as opposed to a - - - a driver's 16 license? Would it have made any difference if you 17 had a - - - a nondriver ID card and then you do something with that? Would that have made a 18 19 difference instead of - - - instead of being stopped 20 by the police and pres - - - presenting a forged ID, 2.1 driver's ID? 22 MR. SMITH: I'm trying to understand the 23 question. So - - - so - - - so say you - - - you - -24 - you start with the nondriver ID card and then from

there use that forged ID card - - -

1 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: To get some - - -2 MR. SMITH: --- to then --- to then 3 commit some other forgery in the second degree. 4 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: To get anoth - - -5 yeah, to commit another forgery or to get a - - - a -6 - - a license later on. MR. SMITH: I - - - I - - -7 8 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: But there's a - - -9 you're saying that there's - - - the temporal issue 10 is not really an issue. If it took a couple years, 11 for example, to get the license, the forged license, 12 from the nondriver ID, you say that's - - - that's 13 still the same transaction? 14 MR. SMITH: I think that it would be the 15 same transaction provided that the defendant's purpose in obtaining the nondriver ID in the purp - -16 17 - in the first place was to later obtain a driver's license. And if that showing could be made, then - -18 19 - then certainly, yeah, I think it would - - -20 JUDGE FAHEY: So - - - so to follow up 2.1 you're saying that what really matters is the intent. 22 I went and got this - - - this object, this license, because I intended to drive and I intended to write 23 24 bad checks and I intended to do those things in my

initial act, then they aren't discrete acts.

MR. SMITH: That's - - - that's - - -1 2 JUDGE FAHEY: That's the core of your 3 argument. 4 MR. SMITH: That - - - that - - - I think 5 that - - -6 JUDGE FAHEY: That the intent carries the 7 day. 8 MR. SMITH: That's the crux of what we're 9 saying, and that's the crux of - - -10 JUDGE FAHEY: Okay. 11 MR. SMITH: --- the whole ---12 JUDGE FAHEY: I don't know if I agree with 13 you but just so I understand it. That's a good place 14 for me to start, anyway. 15 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay. 16 JUDGE RIVERA: So can I - - -17 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: I'm sorry, Judge 18 Rivera. 19 JUDGE RIVERA: I'm still having difficulty 20 with this argument given the nature of the IDs that 2.1 we're talking about. I mean I understand your point 22 that if you're getting a - - - a licensure through 23 this ID, even if it has these other purposes, the - -24 - the intent is to get it for this main purpose. But 25 I - - - with this particular ID, lots of people get

that ID not to drive, especially in New York City, right? One could have the ID for other purposes because it is seen as a personal identification document.

2.1

MR. SMITH: Tells the State that that's who you are.

JUDGE RIVERA: So - - - so I'm finding the argument somewhat difficult to follow, because there is an understanding that this is used for multiple purposes and required as such. If you want to get a job this may be the kind of ID you show. If you want to get in a plane, this may be the kind of ID you show. If you go to a building where they have high security, it may be the only photo ID that you have. So I'm finding it a little bit difficult to follow exactly how you can cabin the rule as you presented it.

MR. SMITH: I - - - I think that - - - - I well, the way - - - I a way to cabin the rule, I mean at least in this case, and - - I and I - - I can say this much, at least to clarify in terms of the facts of this case, is that certainly a nondriver ID card could be used for a multitude of purposes.

JUDGE RIVERA: Um-hum.

MR. SMITH: But there's nothing on this

record that ind - - - that indicates that such a 1 2 multitude of purposes was in play here. 3 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, counsel. Thanks. You'll have your rebuttal. 4 5 MR. SMITH: Thank you. 6 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Let's hear from your 7 adversary. 8 MS. LAMM: If it please the court, Ronnie 9 Jane Lamm of counsel to Thomas J. Spota, District 10 Attorney of Suffolk County. 11 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Counsel, how do you 12 like the test that your adversary laid out that it's 13 the intent that really carries the day? 14 MS. LAMM: I believe that there is already 15 a test for this problem, and that's in CPL 16 40.20(2) (b) that even if it - - - we would consider 17 it to be one transaction, there are exceptions to the 18 transaction as laid out by the legislature. And in 19 this case the exceptions, if we would consider this 20 to be one transaction - - -2.1 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Assume it is. Go 22 ahead. 23 MS. LAMM: - - - assuming that it is, there 24 are exceptions laid out. And the fact that it's 25 distinct and - - - and - - - and different and the

1	elements are are different on in each
2	case. It
3	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: What's different?
4	Tell us that.
5	MS. LAMM: In order to prove in Westchester
6	
7	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: The the proof
8	that I mentioned before?
9	MS. LAMM: The the the proof
10	that he showed it to a ID card to a police
11	officer during a lawful traffic stop is entirely
12	different than the proof needed that he forged an
13	- that he actually
14	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yeah.
15	MS. LAMM: was in possession of a
16	forged document, that he forged the document at the
17	motor vehicle bureau five months prior to that.
18	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So the son the
19	son is the proof on the one in the motor vehicle.
20	MS. LAMM: The son is the
21	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: And the and on
22	the other one it's it's the officer
23	MS. LAMM: Corr
24	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: is the proof,
25	and that that makes all the difference here?

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MS. LAMM: There - - - the difference is not only that. The difference is on a birthdate of thirty years' difference, which is - - - is very easily recognizable to - - - to a layman. So the motor vehicle bureau has - - has pictures of - - - of the defendant. They took a picture of him. He signed for it there. And the people who were at the motor vehicle could testify to that. So the proof is entirely different - - besides the son. The son, of course, is our greatest proof.

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Right. But the son was the - - - $\!\!\!$

MS. LAMM: The greatest proof.

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: - - - the precipitating issue here.

MS. LAMM: Absolutely. So the elements are different, the facts are different. And if we rely on this court's decision in the 1985 case of People v. Prescott where a woman was accosted in a garage, a parking garage, her pocketbook was taken, they never found the defendants at the time, the culprits at the time. But they had gone to an A&S store and used one of the credit cards from this woman's wallet. They called the - - - A&S called the police because they - - - they saw that it was a stolen credit card. The

defendant was charged and convicted of possession of 1 2 a forg - - - of a stolen credit card. 3 At a later date, the defendants were indicted for the original crime. And this court had 4 5 decided that it was two sets of elements, two sets of 6 facts, and neither one of the facts or elements were 7 germane to either one of the cases. They were - - -8 they were different. In - - - so that in that case, 9 relying on - - - on Prescott we believe that the 10 People absolutely - - -11 JUDGE STEIN: So - - - so - - - so you're 12 saying you could prove either case in this - - - in -13 - - in what happened here without the other? 14 MS. LAMM: Correct. Correct. And - - -15 and that - - -16 JUDGE READ: Your - - - your advers - - -17 your advertory - - - your adversary is suggesting 18 that maybe forgery's different. Maybe this forgery 19 is different. You - - - you disagree with that, I 20 take it? 2.1 MS. LAMM: I - - - absolutely. 22 JUDGE READ: What's - - - what's wrong with 23 treating it differently, though, if the int - - - if 24 the intent was to get the license?

MS. LAMM: The - - - the intent was to get

an ID card, if not a license. The - - - this ID card 1 2 could have been used for innumerable different - - -3 JUDGE READ: But - - - but his point is there's not really proof of that here. 4 5 MS. LAMM: No. There is no proof of it 6 here, and - - - and he's correct in that. But to 7 limit a rule to - - - in such a narrow focus such as 8 forgery - - -9 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Well, it's an unusual 10 kind of charge - - -11 MS. LAMM: It's - - - it's - - -12 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: - - - you know, 13 forgery. It is - - - it is - - - it is a little 14 different than - - - than other case in terms of 15 determining intent, what you're trying to do. I mean it - - - it - - - it's not totally unreasonable to 16 17 say let's look at this as a different subset, is it? 18 Or is it? 19 MS. LAMM: I would believe that it is, 20 because I believe that the law is very clear in - - -2.1 in what - - - what we need to do if we go back to CPL 40.20, and there's no need to - - - to come up with a 22 new rule. 23 24 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So you think the

statute is - - - is - - -

1	MS. LAMM: It is adequate.
2	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: crystal clear
3	and that's it?
4	JUDGE PIGOTT: If if the
5	MS. LAMM: Yes.
6	JUDGE PIGOTT: if the defendant was
7	getting on an airplane and he needed ID and he
8	and he showed the ID and he got on the airplane and
9	flew wherever's he going, has he committed another
10	crime besides the forgery?
11	MS. LAMM: Absolutely. He's committed a
12	crime of false identification and and criminal
13	possession, again, of of so we're talking
14	about a number of different crimes.
15	JUDGE PIGOTT: So so if there's
16	there's nothing he can do. Ever everything he
17	does where he flashes this thing is another crime?
18	MS. LAMM: The People would think so.
19	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, counselor.
20	Thanks.
21	MS. LAMM: Thank you very much.
22	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Counsel, rebuttal?
23	MR. SMITH: Thank you once again, Mr. Chief
24	Judge. Just a number of things. Not notice
25	the shift in the People's argument. They shift to an

argument that essentially would lay down a same-1 2 evidence test. That the methods of proof, or at 3 least as they begin, the methods of proof of both the offenses differ, and, therefore, they constitute two 5 separate offenses or two separate criminal 6 transactions. I think it was brought up a little bit 7 before. 8 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yeah. 9 MR. SMITH: But the test is not whether or 10 not the offenses arise out of the same evidence. 11 test is whether or not the elements are the same. 12 And criminal possession of a forged instrument is the 13 same - - - it has the same elements in Westchester 14 County as it does in Suffolk County. CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: 15 Is your argument that 16 one is the fruit of the other, and therefore it's the 17 same? 18 MR. SMITH: I - - -19 JUDGE READ: Or consequence, maybe. 20 MR. SMITH: I - - - I think - - - I think 2.1 that it's a natural consequence. That - - - that - -22 - that - - - that - - - and - - - and 23 there's a reason that the legislature - - -24 JUDGE RIVERA: The point of the MV-44

forgery is this card. The end game is this?

1	MR. SMITH: The end exactly.
2	JUDGE RIVERA: To get this second document?
3	MR. SMITH: I think I think that
4	that's exactly right.
5	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So there could be a
6	bunch of documents that are the end game, right? Is
7	it only this particular document or are there other
8	documents?
9	MR. SMITH: As far as filing an MV-44 form?
10	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yeah.
11	MR. SMITH: As far as I know. I mean I
12	don't know off the top of my head. But as far as I
13	know, an MV-44 form is only used to obtain a
14	nondriver ID.
15	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So that's
16	that's its purpose, period, and therefore, it's one
17	and the same for all?
18	JUDGE STEIN: Why why would it be
19	different if if he had acquired a an
20	- an illegal weapon and three years later used that
21	weapon to assault or or murder someone? Why -
22	why why wouldn't that follow the same
23	reasoning as your forgery reasoning?
24	MR. SMITH: Because because
25	because the use of the the use of the weapon to

1 commit some other crime would be a separate offense 2 completely. But - - - but - - - but the fact - - -3 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: It's not the natural 4 consequence? 5 MR. SMITH: It's not the natural 6 consequence. Maybe the - - -7 JUDGE PIGOTT: Well, then let's take that 8 to - - - let's take that to the charges that were 9 filed on November 12th. He - - - he had a 509 10 unlicensed operation, AUO, and then a false 11 impersonation. Are you suggesting that both of those 12 can't stand, each of them can't stand, or what? 13 MR. SMITH: I'm not sugg - - - well, all of 14 those charges has - - - have stood. He pled - - - he 15 pled guilty to all those charges. 16 JUDGE PIGOTT: I understand. But - - - but 17 you're saying that this is all a part of a - - - a one charge. So could he be charged with unlicensed 18 19 operation? 20 MR. SMITH: I think so, yes. 2.1 JUDGE PIGOTT: Could he be charged with 22 false impersonation? MR. SMITH: Yes. Because that's - - -23 24 that's a totally separate act that he committed, 25 falsely presenting himself to the police officer

1 independent of whether or not he possessed the 2 nondriver ID card in Westchester. The same can't be 3 said for - - - for the charges that were filed in 4 Suffolk County. 5 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Well, but - - - but if 6 - - - if the charge, the first crime, is that he 7 presented a false application, that's completed when 8 he submits the application whether he gets the ID or 9 not, correct? 10 MR. SMITH: That's right. 11 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: So he's already 12 13 14 15

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committed a crime by submitting a false application. And then because he gets an ID and then uses it that's another crime. He didn't have to get the ID in order to complete the first crime. All he had to do was submit the false application.

MR. SMITH: That's - - - that's a - - - I mean that - - - that's - - - that's certainly - - - I - - - I can't say that that's an unreasonable characterization of what happened here, but it totally ignores the question of intent that this court has placed some emphasis on in prior - - - in prior case law. If - - - if I may just conclude by -

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Very quickly,

1	counsel, final word. Go ahead.
2	MR. SMITH: with with a final
3	word with a final word about about
4	Prescott, which
5	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Sure.
6	MR. SMITH: which my friend on the
7	other side placed some emphasis on.
8	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yep. Go ahead.
9	MR. SMITH: Prescott involved two separate
LO	offenses. Robbery is clearly a distinct offense from
L1	criminal possession of stolen property in in
L2	that it involves a forceful taking of property.
L3	Possessing the property is is is simply
L4	completely different.
L5	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, counsel.
L6	MR. SMITH: Different animal.
L7	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Thank you.
L8	Thank you both. Appreciate it.
L9	(Court is adjourned)
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CERTIFICATION

I, Sara Winkeljohn, certify that the foregoing transcript of proceedings in the Court of Appeals of People v. Ricky A. Lynch, No. 77 was prepared using the required transcription equipment and is a true and accurate record of the proceedings.

Consideril as D

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