1	COURT OF APPEALS
2	STATE OF NEW YORK
3	
4	MATTER OF STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY
5	
6	Appellant,
	-Against-
7	No. 38
_	FITZGERALD
8	Respondent.
9	Respondent.
10	20 Eagle Street
1.1	Albany, New York 12207
11	February 12, 2015
12	
	Before:
13	CHIEF JUDGE JONATHAN LIPPMAN
1.4	ASSOCIATE JUDGE SUSAN PHILLIPS READ
14	ASSOCIATE JUDGE EUGENE F. PIGOTT, JR. ASSOCIATE JUDGE SHEILA ABDUS-SALAAM
15	ASSOCIATE JUDGE LESLIE E. STEIN
	ASSOCIATE JUDGE EUGENE M. FAHEY
16	
1 7	Appearances:
17	HENRY MASCIA, ESQ.
18	RIVKIN RADLER LLP
	Attorneys for Appellant
19	926 RXR Plaza
20	West Tower, 9th Floor
20	Uniondale, NY 11556
21	FRANK BRAUNSTEIN, ESQ.
	FRANK J. LAINE, P.C.
22	Attorneys for Respondent
22	449 South Oyster Bay Road
23	Plainview, NY 11803
24	
	Sharona Shapiro
25	Official Court Transcriber

1	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Let's go to number
2	38.
3	Counselor, go ahead. We're ready for you.
4	You want any rebuttal time, counselor?
5	MR. MASCIA: Yes, three minutes, Your
6	Honor.
7	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Three minutes, sure.
8	Go ahead, counselor.
9	MR. MASCIA: May it please the court. My
10	name is Henry Mascia, attorney for State Farm.
11	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Counsel, what's the
12	problem here? The the policy that we're
13	talking about seems to have very clear language when
14	it says any other vehicle driven by Krauss (sic).
15	What's confusing about that?
16	MR. MASCIA: There's nothing confusing
17	about it. This court held, in Amato, that the term
18	"motor vehicle", in Insurance Law 3420(f), is limited
19	to the class of vehicles described in VTL 388. And
20	that excludes police vehicles.
21	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: But are you relying
22	on Amato? What are you
23	MR. MASCIA: Yes.
24	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: I because it
25	seems that this is so vague; in this context, it

1	excludes police vehicles?
2	MR. MASCIA: No, in general, the term motor
3	vehicle excludes police vehicle.
4	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So you could never
5	have if you have a police officer driving a
б	car, it can never come under the policy?
7	MR. MASCIA: No, that's not what that
8	means.
9	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: What does it mean? I
10	don't
11	MR. MASCIA: It
12	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: To me, it seems to
13	fit our situation here.
14	MR. MASCIA: Well
15	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Unless you exclude
16	all police vehicles in all situations.
17	MR. MASCIA: Because the anyone who
18	purchases SUM coverage, on their own private vehicle,
19	is a named insured. So they're covered regardless of
20	whether they're occupying a motor vehicle or walking
21	down the street; they'd still be covered. So for
22	example, in this case, Knauss, Officer Knauss, he had
23	his own SUM coverage, so he'd be covered in the
24	accident.

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: But you're driving a

1	vehicle
2	MR. MASCIA: Correct.
3	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: and your policy
4	says something about whether you're covered when
5	you're, you know, driving any other vehicle. Why is
6	that not
7	MR. MASCIA: Because the legislature
8	specifically
9	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: determinative?
10	MR. MASCIA: excluded police vehicle
11	from that definition.
12	JUDGE PIGOTT: Why did they do that?
13	MR. MASCIA: Why did they do that? I think
14	it's part and parcel of the entire statutory scheme.
15	Police vehicles are excluded from VTL 388 in
16	vicarious liability and Insurance Law 3420(e) and (f)
17	and VTL 312.
18	JUDGE PIGOTT: Why'd they do that?
19	MR. MASCIA: Why did they exclude police
20	vehicles from all of those?
21	JUDGE PIGOTT: What's the logic of this? I
22	understand, you know, the case when you've got a
23	self-insured city, but I'm I'm mystified why
24	you wouldn't get coverage.

MR. MASCIA: Are you saying why is that the

1 definition in the policy? 2 JUDGE PIGOTT: You're saying 388 applies; 3 125 could apply just as well, which is what, I guess, the lower court - - - and I'm just wondering why - -4 5 - why would you exclude vehicles that drive on our 6 highways from coverage? MR. MASCIA: Well, because those police 7 vehicles are not required to have uninsured motorist 8 9 coverage, and the owners of those vehicles are not 10 vicariously liable, and the owners of those vehicles 11 are not even given the option to purchase SUM 12 coverage. So that's why they're - - - that's why 13 they're excluded as a class of vehicles. 14 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yeah, but I think 15 that the judge is saying we get it when there's a 16 self-insurer, you know, like the City of New York. 17 MR. MASCIA: Um-hum. 18 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: But why does this fit 19 It doesn't - - here? 20 MR. MASCIA: I think what - - - I think 21 what you're getting at - - -22 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: And why doesn't 125 23 apply? I don't - - -2.4 MR. MASCIA: Well, 125 doesn't apply 25 because VTL 388 is specifically mentioned in the

statute. And the definition of a term in the statute 1 2 has to be the same as the definition of the term in 3 the policy. That's what this court has done for 4 decades, and there's no reason to depart from that. 5 And the reason is the legislature mandated this 6 policy, and the legislature established the contents 7 of this policy. So if you want to know what the 8 policy means, you look to the statute. 9 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Well, I first look at 10 11 MR. MASCIA: That's what the court did in 12 Wagoner. 13 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: - - - the language of 14 the - - - of the policy - - -15 MR. MASCIA: Um-hum. 16 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: - - - and then see 17 what the statutory framework is around it. 18 MR. MASCIA: Yeah, and the policy - - - the 19 policy doesn't define motor vehicle. So if the 2.0 policy doesn't define motor vehicle, then - - - then 21 this court has instructed, for many decades now, that 22 you look to the statute. And the reason is because 23 the legislature is the - - - is the body that 2.4 mandated State Farm to issue this policy. Therefore

25

the definition - - -

1	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: It seems to be plain
2	language to me.
3	MR. MASCIA: Oh.
4	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Plain language of the
5	policy endorsement.
6	MR. MASCIA: You can't apply the plain
7	language of the term "motor vehicle".
8	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: You're saying we
9	can't do it in a vacuum? Is that what you're saying?
10	MR. MASCIA: Exactly. Just like the court
11	that's exactly what the court did in Wagoner.
12	JUDGE FAHEY: Well, you're saying the
13	policy language Judge Lippman, the policy
14	language is correct, but you're just saying that the
15	legislature has defined it such that this category of
16	vehicles is exempt, right?
17	MR. MASCIA: Correct.
18	JUDGE FAHEY: That's really basically what
19	you're saying.
20	Tell me, is there a distinction that has to
21	be drawn between SUM coverage for uninsured vehicles
22	Amato was uninsured vehicles, right?
23	MR. MASCIA: Correct.
24	JUDGE FAHEY: and underinsured
25	vehicles, which usually is supplemental coverage that

1	you're purchasing on top of, and it's an option that
2	somebody takes too. Is there a distinction you need
3	to draw there?
4	MR. MASCIA: Correct. The Appellate
5	Division drew that distinction, but this court has
6	instructed that SUM coverage is an extension of
7	uninsured motorist coverage. And so they can't apply
8	to two separate classes of vehicles, and they can't
9	have two different definitions for the same word.
10	And they're the same policy. And this court has
11	recognized that they're part of the same statute.
12	They were only renumbered
13	JUDGE FAHEY: They are from the same
14	statute
15	MR. MASCIA: subsequently.
16	JUDGE FAHEY: but actually, you make
17	different decisions on them. One's required, right -
18	
19	MR. MASCIA: Correct.
20	JUDGE FAHEY: uninsured?
21	Underinsured is not required.
22	MR. MASCIA: It's required to be offered -
23	
24	JUDGE FAHEY: All right.
25	MR. MASCIA: to the insured.

1	JUDGE FAHEY: But it's not required to be
2	purchased?
3	MR. MASCIA: Correct.
4	JUDGE FAHEY: Okay.
5	MR. MASCIA: But this court has held that
6	they are part of the same policy, and so they can't
7	have two different definitions.
8	JUDGE FAHEY: So but because of that
9	option, could there be a distinction drawn between an
10	underinsurance question and its definition of a
11	vehicle, and an uninsured question vehicle and
12	its definition of a vehicle?
13	MR. MASCIA: I don't think so, because that
14	would be because that would be inconsistent
15	with this court's decisions in Rafellini and
16	JUDGE FAHEY: No, that's okay, go ahead;
17	finish your thought. I understand what you're
18	saying.
19	MR. MASCIA: Can you repeat your question?
20	I'm not I think it may have been not
21	JUDGE FAHEY: That's all right. Let's go
22	on to the next question.
23	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Go ahead, Judge.
24	What else?
25	JUDGE FAHEY: Just one last question.

1 Following up on what Judge Pigott had asked, I would wonder what is - - - you might not know - - - what's 2 3 the legislative policy behind this? What's the 4 purpose of this exclusion? 5 MR. MASCIA: Well, the legislature excluded these police vehicles, farm vehicles and fire 6 7 vehicles all as a whole class. They excluded them 8 from all of these different provisions. So you have 9 to interpret the provisions in uniformity. And - - -10 JUDGE FAHEY: I see. So it's a vehicle definition, as it applies to municipal vehicles, and 11 12 it applies across the board - - -13 MR. MASCIA: Correct. JUDGE FAHEY: - - - that exclusion. So it 14 15 was a policy decision that they made. 16 MR. MASCIA: Exactly. It was a policy 17 decision that they made. And they - - - if the 18 legislature specifically defines a term in the 19 statute, then the policy mandated by that statute has to have the same definition. That's an unremarkable 2.0 21 principle of law that this court has followed for 22 decades. 23 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, counselor. 2.4 JUDGE FAHEY: Thank you.

MR. MASCIA: Thank you.

1	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Thanks, counselor.
2	Counselor?
3	MR. BRAUNSTEIN: Good afternoon. Frank
4	Braunstein for the respondent.
5	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Counsel, are police
6	vehicles excluded in the context of this policy
7	endorsement?
8	MR. BRAUNSTEIN: Absolutely not, Judge.
9	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Why not? Why not?
10	MR. BRAUNSTEIN: What State Farm is now
11	arguing is that VTL 388 provides a definition of the
12	term "motor vehicle" that should be used in this
13	policy. VTL 388
14	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Where do you get the
15	definition that's used in this policy?
16	MR. BRAUNSTEIN: Every court to have
17	considered the issue, which is basically the Second
18	Department and the Fourth Department
19	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yeah?
20	MR. BRAUNSTEIN: has said 125. It's
21	the broadest definition, and what
22	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: And if it's 125, it's
23	not excluded?
24	MR. BRAUNSTEIN: A hundred percent not.
25	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: And you acknowledge

if it's - - - whatever it is, 388, it is excluded? 1 2 MR. BRAUNSTEIN: No, Judge, because 388 3 doesn't define motor vehicle. We're proceeding from 4 a false premise here. 5 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: What does it define, 6 and why do we use it in Amato? 7 MR. BRAUNSTEIN: Be - - - motor vehicle - -- VTL 388 addresses vehicles and motor vehicles as 8 9 two separate things. And it says any vehicle or 10 motor vehicle - - - any vehicle or motor vehicle - -11 - let me - - - let me start that again. A vehicle is 12 any - - - any vehicle as defined under 125, except it 13 excludes fire vehicles and police vehicles. CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: And what was Amato 14 15 directed at? I gather - - -16 MR. BRAUNSTEIN: Amato was directed - - -17 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: - - - that Amato, you 18 believe, is not under general application, relates to the self-insured situation of a - - -19 2.0 MR. BRAUNSTEIN: Well, it's very simply - -21 - Amato looked at the statutory scheme to really 22 realize that the legislature did not intend to 23 require the City of New York to go out and buy 2.4 insurance for police vehicles.

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So that's - - -

MR. BRAUNSTEIN: And that - - -

2.0

2.4

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: - - - what that was all about, Amato?

MR. BRAUNSTEIN: Exactly what it was all about. And that's what 388 says. If you're - - - if you're a vehicle or a motor vehicle, right, you need to have liability insurance, except for police and fire vehicles. And that's what Amato was all about, was to prevent municipalities from having to go out and buy commercial insurance policies.

Every other time the legislature has wanted to exclude a police vehicle from the broad definition of motor vehicle, it says so. And there's - - - there are examples. You know, VTL 311, VTL 359, VTL 388, all say a motor vehicle is as defined in 125, which unquestionably includes police vehicles, and then excludes police or other vehicles for a specific statutory purpose. The statutory purpose, in 388, which this court addressed in Amato, was to prevent municipalities, like I said before, from having to go out and buy coverage. They should be allowed to self-insure.

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So when you get back to Judge Pigott's original question about legislative purpose, you think that the purpose here all fits

1 together, that - - - that Amato makes sense in terms 2 of self-insured municipalities and that this 3 endorsement basically comes under 125 and that we can 4 just look at the plain language and it's - - -5 MR. BRAUNSTEIN: Correct, because I think 6 any way you look - - -7 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: I mean, that's your 8 argument, in essence, the plain language of the - - -9 MR. BRAUNSTEIN: Right, the plain - - -10 yeah, I mean, because as you kind of suggested 11 before, I mean, every decision out of this court has 12 been to read these terms broadly. There is no 13 decision that's ever said let's look at some more 14 restrictive definition. How would anyone in the 15 state of New York know what provision to look at? 16 There - - - there are several definitions of the term 17 VTL - - - excuse me "motor vehicle". 18 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: The case that I 19 mentioned, Amato, has already determined that "motor 2.0 vehicle" doesn't include police vehicles in this 21 You're saying no case out of this court - - state. 22 MR. BRAUNSTEIN: No. 23 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: - - - has limited - -2.4 25 MR. BRAUNSTEIN: Amato said - - - I'm No.

sorry, but my understanding of Amato is Amato says it only requires - - - the State only requires liability insurance to be issued on vehicles as defined in 388.

And 388 says a vehicle is - - - or I should just say - - simplify it - - - a vehicle is a 125 vehicle, excluding police, fire and farm vehicles. And that's only for the requirements of - - -

2.0

2.4

JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: So you're saying there's a distinction, under Amato, between motor vehicles and vehicles.

MR. BRAUNSTEIN: Not so much that the court made that express distinction, no. I don't - - - I don't know that the court made that express distinction. But the context what - - -

JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: If we didn't make that distinction, then does that mean there is a distinction or there's no distinction?

MR. BRAUNSTEIN: I think there actually is a distinction because, like I said, 388 does not define - - - does not define the term "motor vehicle". 388 says a vehicle is a motor vehicle as defined in 125, and excludes police, fire and farm vehicles. That's really what the statute says. And then, as Amato went on to say, if police vehicles don't have to have liability insurance purchased for

them, and the requirement for uninsured motorist 1 2 coverage is derived from the requirement to have 3 liability insurance, then municipalities don't have 4 to buy the coverage or provide the uninsured motorist 5 coverage. JUDGE PIGOTT: I don't have it in front of 6 7 me, but what - - - where's 388? What's it entitled? 8 What's the chapter? Isn't it the permissive use 9 business? 10 MR. BRAUNSTEIN: It is. It is. 11 JUDGE PIGOTT: Is that its main purpose, was the presumption of permissive use? 12 13 MR. BRAUNSTEIN: Permissive use, and it directed which vehicles had to have liability 14 15 insurance, I guess because they - - - in a way, I 16 guess you could say they go hand in hand, because the 17 liability insurance is purchased by the owner, who's 18 vicariously liable, so they kind of do go hand in 19 hand in that respect. 2.0 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, counselor, 21 anything else? 22 MR. BRAUNSTEIN: That's it, Your Honor. 23 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay. Thank you. 2.4 Counsel, rebuttal?

MR. MASCIA: Yes.

1	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Go talk about
2	Amato a little bit. I gather you disagree with
3	with your adversary on what Amato is driving at and
4	what it means?
5	MR. MASCIA: Yeah, I mean, in order
6	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: You don't think it
7	was all about a self-insured municipality like in New
8	York City?
9	MR. MASCIA: Sure, those were the facts.
10	And you could distinguish the facts of any case, but
11	the question is whether the distinction matters. And
12	what matters in Amato is that this court held that
13	the term "motor vehicle", the definition of that term
14	is limited to the class of vehicles described in VTL
15	388.
16	JUDGE PIGOTT: So that gets me back to the
17	why.
18	MR. MASCIA: That condition has to apply -
19	
20	JUDGE PIGOTT: because you've got a
21	guy who's a passenger in an automobile who's
22	seriously hurt. He's you know, the target
23	- the defendant vehicle, say, is 25/50 I'm not
24	sure if it's in and it's nowhere near enough to

cover for the damage. The driver, with some

1 foresight, has supplemental underinsurance coverage 2 and wants to use it to assist his passenger, and in 3 the policy it says it will, and then somehow we say, 4 well, because he's a firefighter or a police officer, 5 it doesn't apply. MR. MASCIA: Well, it's not because he's a 6 7 police officer. It's just because - - - and - - -8 and I think if we just talk about the statutory 9 scheme as a whole, I think - - - I think that can 10 answer your question. I mean, VTL 388 basically says 11 the owners of a certain class of vehicles are 12 vicariously liable for their use. And then - - - and 13 then Insurance Law 3420(e) says that insurance policies issued in the State have to covered insure -14 15 - - vicarious liability. 16 JUDGE PIGOTT: Right. 17 MR. MASCIA: And - - -JUDGE PIGOTT: Well, you're saying it's the 18 19 vehicle, not the fact that he's a police officer. MR. MASCIA: Exactly. 2.0 21 JUDGE PIGOTT: All right. 22 MR. MASCIA: Exactly. Exactly. 23 JUDGE PIGOTT: So are we saying that 2.4 passengers in police vehicles are less covered than

if they were in their - - - in a personal vehicle?

Because if he'd been in - - - if the - - - if the owner was in his personal vehicle, SUM would kick in automatically, right?

2.4

MR. MASCIA: Exactly, and here's the reason why. The reason why is because if he was in - - - now it's his personal vehicle, that particular vehicle has SUM coverage. Police vehicles don't have - - they're not required to purchase any insurance, so that's why they are excluded from that class. And - - and if you look at the priority of coverage - - and I think this may get to the heart of your question - - if you look at the priority of coverage, the coverage of the vehicle is first. So it makes sense that - - that police vehicles are not included, because - -

JUDGE PIGOTT: Well, except that the SUM is the overlay. In other words, the offending vehicle, if he's got 25/50, all of a sudden, but for this fact that it's a police vehicle, may have half-a-million dollars' coverage because of a premium that the - - - that the owner paid.

MR. MASCIA: Right.

JUDGE PIGOTT: And we're saying, well, unfortunately, we don't provide that for police and fire.

MR. MASCIA: Right, and the reason is

because the police and fire vehicles themselves are

never required to have uninsured motorist coverage,

and they don't even get the option to get SUM

coverage which would have covered it. Do you see

what I mean? And so - - 
JUDGE PIGOTT: It's hard to believe they's

2.4

JUDGE PIGOTT: It's hard to believe they're out of luck.

MR. MASCIA: Yeah, well, if I could just make - - -

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Go ahead. The last answer. Go ahead, counsel.

MR. MASCIA: Sure. I mean, I think there's

- - - there's also - - - it - - - it goes the other

way as well. I mean, it's totally fortuitous that 
- - that Officer Fitzgerald would get coverage here.

I mean, it all depends on the happenstance of whether

the driver happens to get - - have SUM coverage on

their own vehicle. But ultimately, there's - 
there's more at stake here than, you know, who

recovers what from this car accident. What hangs in

the balance is the uniformity of the statutory scheme

and the respect for this court's precedent. And

State Farm's position maintains that uniformity

intended by the legislature - -

1	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay.
2	MR. MASCIA: with respect to this
3	court's precedent.
4	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Thank you both.
5	MR. MASCIA: Okay.
6	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Appreciate it.
7	(Court is adjourned)
8	
9	
10	
11	
12	
13	
14	
15	
16	
17	
18	
19	
20	
21	
22	
23	
24	
25	

## 

## 

## CERTIFICATION

I, Sharona Shapiro, certify that the foregoing transcript of proceedings in the Court of Appeals of Matter of State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. Fitzgerald, No. 38, was prepared using the required transcription equipment and is a true and accurate record of the proceedings.

Shanna Shaphe

Signature: \_\_\_\_\_

AAERT Certified Electronic Transcriber CET\*\*D-492

Agency Name: eScribers

Address of Agency: 700 West 192nd Street

Suite # 607

New York, NY 10040

Date: February 22, 2015