1	COURT OF APPEALS
2	STATE OF NEW YORK
3	
4	PEOPLE,
5	Respondent,
6	-against-
7	No. 1 MICHAEL DIACK,
8	Appellant.
9	00 Test le Green
10	20 Eagle Street Albany, New York 12207
11	January 05, 2015
12	Before:
13	CHIEF JUDGE JONATHAN LIPPMAN ASSOCIATE JUDGE SUSAN PHILLIPS READ
14	ASSOCIATE JUDGE EUGENE F. PIGOTT, JR. ASSOCIATE JUDGE JENNY RIVERA
15	ASSOCIATE JUDGE SHEILA ABDUS-SALAAM
16	Appearances:
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23	
24	
25	Penina Wolicki Official Court Transcriber

1	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: And we're going to
2	start with number 1, People v. Diack. Is that the
3	right way to pronounce it?
4	MS. MANLEY: I believe it's [Dee-ack].
5	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: [Dee-ack]? Close
6	enough. Okay. Go ahead, counsel. Do you want any
7	rebuttal time?
8	MS. MANLEY: I'd like to reserve two
9	minutes for rebuttal, Your Honor.
10	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Two minutes for
11	rebuttal. You're on. Go ahead.
12	MS. MANLEY: May it please the court, my
13	name is Kathy Manley, and I represent Michael Diack.
14	Counties and municipalities are preempted
15	by state law where there's either a conflict between
16	what the state law allows and what
17	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: What about the
18	MS. MANLEY: the the local laws
19	
20	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: level ones
21	counselor? What what is what is done now
22	about the level ones? And why are the local counties
23	preempted from doing something that is not
24	particularly addressed in regard to level one?
25	MS. MANLEY: Well, it it is addressed

1	in regard
2	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Tell us how.
3	MS. MANLEY: to level
4	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Tell us how, and how
5	that preempts?
6	MS. MANLEY: ones. The state
7	probation and parole regulations apply to almost all
8	level ones whose under supervision, whose
9	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: But there's not a
10	particular residency, right?
11	MS. MANLEY: It is a residence. It's a
12	-
13	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: On a one?
14	MS. MANLEY: A 1,000-foot rule on anyone
15	who has a minor victim. And that's what is always
16	put forth as the
17	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yeah, but but
18	in the in the most general terms, there aren't
19	residency restrictions on one without some of these
20	conditions, right?
21	MS. MANLEY: It applies
22	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Some of these
23	circumstances?
24	MS. MANLEY: Well
25	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So so assume

you're dealing with level one, and there's not one of
the circumstances that - - - whether it be a minor
child, probation, whatever it might be. Why can't
the county do local legislation regarding those level
one people and residency?

MS. MANLEY: Okay. Well, I would say that
that run counter - - runs counter to state policy

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MS. MANLEY: Okay. Well, I would say that that run counter - - runs counter to state policy in that the state has studied this extensively and passed these regulations and said that - - -

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Even - - - are you arguing that it's a conflict or that it violates preemption in that the state has taken over the field?

MS. MANLEY: I would say both, Your Honor.

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Where's - - - on the first part, the conflict - - - where's the conflict?

MS. MANLEY: The conflict would be that the state - - - I would say that the state has chosen to allow people who are not under supervision or do - - - don't have a minor victim, or don't - - - you know, don't fall within the locational restrictions under the state, that the state has chosen to say that under its policy of wanting to protect the public and facilitate reentry, that it's not appropriate to have

1 residence restrictions on those people. And there's 2 no evidence that it makes anyone safer. There's 3 actually evidence - - -JUDGE PIGOTT: Could it have said that in 4 5 some way - - -6 MS. MANLEY: - - - to the contrary. 7 JUDGE PIGOTT: - - - fashion, or form, 8 before eighty villages, towns, counties, decided that 9 they were going to put these restrictions in? 10 MS. MANLEY: Ex - - - excuse me? I missed 11 the first part of that. JUDGE PIGOTT: Well, there - - - according 12 13 to your opponent, there's about eighty communities -14 - - maybe you put it in your brief, too - - - that 15 have done one or the other of these things. 16 state has taken no action to say they're wrong. They 17 continue, I guess, to proliferate. Can't that be 18 some evidence that the state has no interest in the 19 level ones? 20 MS. MANLEY: I would say no, that it's not 21 up to the state to say that preemption - - - I mean, 22 the state hasn't - - - the state has expressly said 23 that preemption applies in terms of what it said in 2.4 the regulations, coming out and saying that it's - -

- this is an issue to be addressed by the state's

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1	coordinated and comprehensive approach, and that it's
2	not appropriate for any one community to bear an
3	inappropriate burden in housing registered sex
4	offenders, because another community attempted to
5	shift responsibility onto other areas.
6	JUDGE READ: So your main argument's field
7	preemption?
8	MS. MANLEY: Field preemption is is a
9	big part of my argument. I also think conflict
10	preemption applies.
11	JUDGE READ: It can't be both?
12	MS. MANLEY: It can be both. It can
13	definitely be both.
14	JUDGE READ: It can be both?
15	MS. MANLEY: And I I believe it is
16	both. I believe because if there can be a
17	conflict and there can also be an intent to occupy
18	the field, and I think we do have both here, these -
19	the language in those regulations, I would say,
20	is basically an express preemption.
21	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Let's let's
22	talk about from a policy perspective that on the one
23	hand, you have the your argument that you want
24	to have these people close to services or education

or whatever it might be, that they need to be close

	to. And if you have the local counties restricting
2	where they can live, it may work against that general
3	philosophy. On the other hand, where there's no
4	express prohibition, do the counties have a right to
5	be concerned about what they view and and
6	I understand your argument that it may not in the end
7	but just safer communities don't the
8	counties, or do they, have the right to say that gee,
9	for the safety of our citizens, we want to restrict
10	where offenders can can live? Isn't there a
11	conflicting policy on both sides?
12	MS. MANLEY: Well
13	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Or is it that
14	or is it that your policy is what matters, because
15	you've preempted the field?
16	MS. MANLEY: Well, I would say yes, the
17	state has preempted the field. There's a very
18	comprehensive and detailed scheme of sex offender
19	management, and this
20	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yeah, but no express
21	prohibition against
22	MS. MANLEY: Well
23	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: this?
24	MS. MANLEY: There I would say the -
25	the regulation language is basically an express

prohibition. But even if it weren't to be construed that way, there is an intent to occupy the field based on the comprehensive scheme. And the counties can't just go - - - it's - - - it's counter to what the state - - - the state's rules are - - -

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JUDGE PIGOTT: Well, look at - - - look at the Nyack case involving the - - - the drug place.

The state took the position that - - - that drug rehabilitation center - - - they don't have to comply with the zoning laws. We said they do. And - - - and we said that because the - - - the town or village or county, you know, has certain interests that may not exactly match what - - what the state wants to do, but as long as is does no harm, they should honor it. Where's the harm here?

MS. MANLEY: Well - - - well, I think that case is distinguishable in several ways from the situation here. I think there's a distinction between zoning, regulating land use, where localities have a strong ability under the Municipal Home Rule Law and the cases to regulate the growth and shape of their communities. And here we're talking about people, not land use. It's not a zoning case. So that's one distinction. Preemption is less often found in zoning cases.

Also, in the Nyack case, there was a statement that the word "comprehensive" being used by the state was not enough to show an intent to occupy the field. But here we have much more than that. We have these probation and parole regulations. We have re - - residence restrictions in a number of instances where the state felt it was appropriate, both probation, parole, homelessness - - - which is an interesting example - - -

JUDGE READ: So your - - - your argument would be where - - - where the state hasn't required it, they considered it and rejected the need for it.

MS. MANLEY: I believe so, especially looking at the language of the regulations and some of the other things that the state's done, such as the civil confinement laws. So - - - and that goes to the policy argument too. If somebody is - - - has a mental abnormality such that they cannot control their sexual misconduct, then they can be civilly confined or placed under strict and intensive supervision which can and does, often, include residence restrictions.

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: You agree that ones are differences than thr - - - twos and threes?

MS. MANLEY: Yes, ones are different than twos and threes. And - - -

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CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: But not different enough that they're outside the - - - your argument is not different enough that they're outside the scheme the - - - the state's comprehensive package here? Is that - - -

MS. MANLEY: Well, I don't think it would make any sense to say that these very harsh residence laws in a county or a town or a village only apply to level ones and don't apply to those who might need them more who are a higher level of sex offender. So I think the state has looked at it and - - and said in their, you know, regulations that it should only apply to people under supervision, which is when you may need this the most, when you're, you know, just coming out of prison, you - - if you've successfully completed supervision, you're less likely to need it.

But the appellate term decision would say that okay, for people under supervision, the 1,000-foot rule in the state law applies. But once they've successfully completed supervision, then these often

harsher laws under the county or the town or the village kick in, and it might be a 2,000-foot rule; it might be a quarter-mile rule - - -

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JUDGE PIGOTT: Well, of course their answer to that - - - $\!\!\!\!$

MS. MANLEY: - - - it varies a lot. They overlap.

JUDGE PIGOTT: - - - their answer to that is that the state has its interest in the ones and twos, and once it lets go of them, that doesn't mean we're stuck with them. We - - - we, the county, town, or village, you know, can impose then what we want to do, which is the 1,000, 2,000 or 500 feet - - foot rule.

MS. MANLEY: Well, I think there's a lot of problems with that. As one example, in - - - when Schenectady County instituted its - - - I believe it was a 2,000-foot rule, it's been since invalidated. It pushed people into certain corners of the county, including, I believe, the Village of Scotia, and then Scotia went ahead and passed a harsher law to push people back out of there. And people - - - you know, so these laws are used - - without any evidence that they protect anybody, they're used to push people and banish people from whole communities, and

you get this kind of "not in my backyard" thing where they push people into another community, and then that community wants to press - - - pass a harsher law. So it's - - - it's just a big problem.

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Thanks, counselor. Appreciate it.

Counsel?

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MR. GARTNER: Kenneth Gartner; Lynn,
Gartner, Dunne & Covello, appellate counsel to
Carnell Foskey, Nassau County Attorney, for the
People of New York, respondent.

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Counselor, given the last point that we were talking about, is it workable to let every county have different distances that you have to stay away from or you can't be closer than, when you have the state certainly exercising a great deal of thought and interest in what to do with one, twos, and threes, and under what conditions there should or should not be residency restrictions? Is this workable that we say, well, if there's one little corner of this that's not addressed, the - - - the locality can - - can address it? Can that work, in regard - -

MR. GARTNER: Well - - -

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: - - - to this? Let -

1 - - let's talk about the bigger preemption rather 2 than the conflict issue. The state has a - - - a 3 plan to deal with this. Why is it okay - - -4 MR. GARTNER: Okay, well - - -5 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: - - - for the counties to each do their own thing? 6 7 MR. GARTNER: Okay. I mean, first of all, 8 there are actually 117 localities that was cited as 9 having enacted these things. And, you know, there 10 has been no reaction by the state to this. The - - -11 JUDGE PIGOTT: Well, I don't think a lot -12 - - I mean, I could be proven wrong on this, but I 13 doubt that a lot of deep thought went into passing 14 these, and I can't imagine a legislator wanting to 15 vote against one. 16 MR. GARTNER: Okay. 17 JUDGE PIGOTT: And - - - and so the 18 reaction to - - - to having them passed is one thing. 19 But when you - - - when you think about it, if - - -20 if you've got a - - - let's have a family, you know, 21 and a - - - the father, for one reason or another, 22 gets caught up in a - - in a level one, such as 23 what happened here, he's got to move. He's got to

sell his house. He's got to move his kids. He's got

to move his family because the town or village that

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he's in says you're within a 1,000 feet of a school 1 2 or a park, so you can't live in your house. 3 MR. GARTNER: Well, there's no question 4 that if a specific law enacted by a municipality or a 5 locality were challengeable on Constitutional grounds or other grounds because it was overbroad - - - I 6 7 know there's been discussion about the fact that it's 8 felt that New York City, that they - - - you know, 9 everyone is herded into one small area. I know that 10 right now there's a case - - - there was a decision 11 on August 28th by Judge Patricia Chen in the Eastern District, Wallace v. New York, in which there's a 12 13 broad-based challenge to a number of residency laws 14 being placed. 15 But that's not really the issue here. 16 issue here is simply the issue of preemption. And I 17 know that in the - - - that in the Wallach v. Town of 18 Dryden case, which this court recently decided, since 19 the briefs here were completed, which involved a 20 supersession clause - - -21 JUDGE READ: That was a zoning case, wasn't 22 it? 23 MR. GARTNER: It was - - - that was a 2.4 zoning case, but - - -

JUDGE READ: Why doesn't that make a big

1	difference?
2	MR. GARTNER: Excuse me?
3	JUDGE READ: Why doesn't that make a big
4	difference?
5	MR. GARTNER: Well, it
6	JUDGE READ: Zoning has always been a
7	matter of local control and interest, as we said.
8	MR. GARTNER: And yet zoning isn't
9	mentioned in Article 9, Section 2 of the New York
LO	State Constitution, which provides for the municipal
L1	home rule powers of counties, localities,
L2	municipalities. It that as long as it falls
L3	within the ambit of the the home rule powers,
L4	these localities are allowed to enact things, unless
L5	they're preempted by the state.
L6	Now, I haven't done a detailed review, but
L7	from my look at all the cases in which preemption was
L8	found in which there was not a supersession clause -
L9	so right away the state isn't saying we want to
20	supersede, we want to preempt, and we're looking
21	through tea leaves to try to find whether the state
22	has intended to do it
23	JUDGE READ: It's pretty comprehensive net
24	of tea leaves, isn't it? As your

MR. GARTNER: Okay, but - - -

1 JUDGE READ: - - - opponent pointed out - -2 3 MR. GARTNER: Right. But in each of those 4 cases, it's more akin to what Judge Breitel addressed 5 in Wombat Realty v. State, involving the Adirondack 6 Park Agency, where he said this was something in 7 which the state enacted a comprehensive scheme at a 8 single legislative session to fill the field, and 9 we're far - - -10 JUDGE PIGOTT: But take a look - - - I 11 mean, the correction law, the mental hygiene law, the 12 penal law, the executive law, the social services 13 law, they've spoken on this issue in almost every 14 area that you can think of that would affect the 15 particular individual, and in this case, sex 16 offender. And it - - - the argument can and has been 17 made, that's pretty comprehensive. 18 And - - - and for the localities to then 19 say, well, after you do everything you do, we're 20 going to do something more - - -21 MR. GARTNER: Well - - -22 JUDGE PIGOTT: - - - and we're going to 23 say, if you want to live in Jefferson County, which 2.4 doesn't have any of these rules, that's fine with us.

But you're not going to be - - - you're not going to

1 come to our county and be within a certain area. 2 MR. GARTNER: But as this court pointed out 3 in both People v. Cook and Village of Nyack, the mere fact that they didn't prohibit the - - - something 4 5 like this, doesn't mean that there's a conflict. So 6 there's no conflict preemption, because you have a 7 land - - -8 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: But there's no 9 invitation either to - - - are you interpreting that 10 by not specifically prohibiting it, they're in 11 effect, inviting each county to do whatever they want 12 to do? 13 MR. GARTNER: Well, unless - - - unless - -14 - yes, unless if there's field preemption - - - if 15 you field preemption, then of course, they can't do 16 it. But People v. Cook and Nyack said, if you simply 17 say that by not prohibiting - - - that by not prohibiting it, they've allowed it, you're going way 18 19 too far, and you're in effect, eviscerating the home 20 rule constitutional right of municipalities that - -21 22 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Is there field 23 preemption here - - - why isn't there field 2.4 preemption here, as - - - as - - -

MR. GARTNER: Excuse me?

1 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: - - - has been - - why isn't there field preemption here? As been said, 2 3 there - - - this is a pretty comprehensive scheme. 4 MR. GARTNER: Okay. I mean, because again, 5 as - - - Judge Breitel went to pains in the Wombat 6 Realty to say it was a single legislative enactment -7 - - a comprehensive enactment - - -8 JUDGE READ: So if there's a single - - -9 MR. GARTNER: - - - of a single session. 10 JUDGE READ: - - - if there's a single 11 enactment that makes it more likely to be field 12 preempted than if there're several statutes? 13 MR. GARTNER: I think - - - I think that 14 when you have four different pieces of legislation 15 enacted over a thirteen-year period by four different 16 legislatures, in none of which - - - although the 17 legislature knows how to write supersession clauses -18 - - did they include one, and in none of which did 19 they address residency in these types of situations. 20 In none of them did they address it. 21 The - - - that in cases they said, okay, 22 that in certain - - - in certain instances where you 23 have sex offenders meeting certain criteria, that 2.4 there have to be certain restrictions placed, while

they're on parole and while they're on the - - - or

while they're on probation - - -

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JUDGE PIGOTT: But that doesn't get you back to what Ms. Manley was talking about with respect to homeless - - - that no thought went into this with respect to them - - - with respect to the developmentally disabled, who may be required to be in a particular facility, but can't be if - - - if these zoning laws apply?

I thought of and I didn't research
thoroughly, youthful offenders. I mean, it - - - it
says even if you're adjudicated, it doesn't say
"convicted", do you have to move if your son's a
level one, because you - - - you know, the house that
you've owned for twenty years is next to the park? I
guess the answer is yes, depending on what part of
the state you live in?

MR. GARTNER: I mean, that - - - that may be a possibility in some cases. But again, the question is, this may be an area that's ripe for state legislative enactment, but thus far, the state hasn't legislated in this area, and I don't think - - - let's put it - - - if you put it to vote in the legis - - -

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: But there's a theory behind the legislation that we have so far, and the

theory is this balance between protecting the - - the public and yet at the same time understanding
that these people have to be near services and
whatever else - - employment, whatever it might be.

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Isn't that - - - putting aside the particular legal niceties, isn't there a picture here that's quite evident as to what the state is trying to do and where they think that - - - that they need to have a hard and fast residency requirement - - -

MR. GARTNER: I - - -

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: - - - and where they don't, because of this balance? So - - - so when you look at the big picture from the most visceral point of view, you know, nobody ever preempts the field, if you're going to say that there's - - - there's one little nook and cranny which you didn't specifically prohibit, and therefore we're going to fill it - - - don't you run that danger that - - - that where there is, let's say for the sake of argument, an obvious prescription that the - - - the legislature and the state has laid out, aren't we going to eviscerate all - - all of these kinds of areas where - - where we've really - - common sense would tell you that the field is preempted?

MR. GARTNER: I - - - I don't think so,

Your Honor. I think that each of the state legislations was aimed at a specific area that came to their attention, that first they enacted SORA. Then they enacted SARA (ph.). Then they enacted Then they enacted Chapter 568 of the laws. And each of these was addressing a discrete matter that had become a matter of some urgency for the - -- the state.

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In none of these cases, were they giving an overall view towards taking over and filling out the field and conducting the type of deep thought that we're talking about that - - - that - - - for instance, when they enacted the restriction that said that - - - that someone who has - - - whose victim was under eighteen, who's a level three, can't go within 1,000 feet of a school, they weren't even thinking about residency. They were saying, keep these people away from the schools, but they weren't thinking about residency specifically, at all.

And I think that in times like - - - again, in the Wombat Realty, with the Adirondack Park

Agency, where they were able to say, here the state meant to fill the field, they wanted to preempt the zoning requirements of all these municipalities - - -

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yeah, but as Judge

Read indicated, isn't zoning a very different issue?

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MR. GARTNER: Well, yeah, but - - - but again, that's an a - - - that's an area where even zoning was preempted because the state - - - and despite the absence of the supersession clause - - - carefully created an entity and a structure that was going to - - - that was meant to preempt all of the development within the Adirondack Park area.

Here you have four separate pieces of legislation enacted over a thirteen-year period, by four separate legislatures. Each of these pieces of legislation aimed to - - - you know, it was almost like putting your finger in the dike as - - - as the leak springs.

JUDGE PIGOTT: Well, if you go - - - if you go back to your 117, and use my probably bad example of somebody's son - - - child being a level one and they having to move because of their child, it just strikes me that when - - - when most of the studies show that a lot of the - - - a lot of the sex abuse and things that happen, happen inter-familially, and on the computer, I mean, moving - - - moving them, you know, out of their house and having them sell, and the kids having to get new schools, all because Junior got on the computer and did some - - - did

1 some bad things, doesn't make sense. And - - - and 2 but that's what your legislation says. That's what -3 - - that's what the zoning thing - - -4 MR. GARTNER: And I'm saying that - - -5 that might pose a constitutional issue. But I don't 6 believe that it's a preemption issue. 7 JUDGE PIGOTT: You're saying it's not raised in this - - -8 9 MR. GARTNER: Yes. 10 JUDGE PIGOTT: - - - in this - - - okay. 11 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay. Thanks 12 counsel. 13 MR. GARTNER: Thank you. 14 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Counselor, rebuttal? 15 The state does MS. MANLEY: Thanks. 16 clearly have a comprehensive scheme. And the fact 17 that it was - - - there were different pieces of it 18 passed at different times, I would say, shows even 19 more strongly that it's a very comprehensive scheme. 2.0 It covers all of sex offender management. 21 Even back when SORA was passed in 1995, at 22 that time, the legislative history stated that it was 23 a balanced and comprehensive approach because - - -2.4 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: But counsel, wouldn't 25

it be easy for the legislature to say expressly that

we are prohibiting people from living in certain areas, no matter what level they are required - - - whatever level they're required to register, one, two or three? Wouldn't that just be easy for the legislature to do?

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MS. MANLEY: I don't - - - that might be easy. But I think it would be inappropriate, because when the agen - - - when the agencies studied this, they found out that that would be counterproductive. They don't want to have residence restrictions for everybody.

And just - - - just very recently, the

Association for Treatment of Sexual Abusers came out

with a report in, I believe, August 2014 or perhaps

more recently, saying that sex offender residence

restrictions do not reduce sexual offending or

increase community safety, and that they actually

cause more problems than they solve.

And the cases - - - People v. Cook is distinguishable, because in that case they stated there's no need for statewide uniformity, and what was happening there is - - - was - - - with the local laws was not contrary to state policy, and here I think it clearly is, based on the language in the probation and parole regulations. It - - -

JUDGE PIGOTT: But wouldn't those be arguments for the legislature? In other words, regardless of what we do, if we upheld the laws here, and the legislature didn't like our decision, it could fix it.

It could. But I mean, that's MS. MANLEY: not how the preemption argument works. Very often this court has found preemption when there's - - even if there's not an express statement when - - such as in the Con Edison case, where the state evinced an attempt to preempt the field, and also in the Lansdowne case, that was a conflict case where the - - - there was a cabaret, as to whether they could be closed at 4 a.m. or 4:30. The state said they could be open until 4:30 and then the locality said - - - or the - - - the locality said 4 o'clock. Anyway, there was a conflict there. And I believe that applies here as well as field preemption.

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay. counsel. Thank you both.

(Court is adjourned)

CERTIFICATION

I, Penina Wolicki, certify that the foregoing transcript of proceedings in the Court of Appeals of People v. Michael Diack, No. 1 was prepared using the required transcription equipment and is a true and accurate record of the proceedings.

Penina waich.

Signature:

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