1	COURT OF APPEALS
2	STATE OF NEW YORK
3	
4	PEOPLE,
5	Appellant,
6	-against-
7	No. 6 MICHAEL S. BRUMFIELD,
8	Respondent.
9	
10	20 Eagle Street Albany, New York 12207
11	January 06, 2015
12	Before:
13	CHIEF JUDGE JONATHAN LIPPMAN ASSOCIATE JUDGE SUSAN PHILLIPS READ
14	ASSOCIATE JUDGE EUGENE F. PIGOTT, JR. ASSOCIATE JUDGE JENNY RIVERA
15	ASSOCIATE JUDGE SHEILA ABDUS-SALAAM
16	Appearances:
17	KELLY CHRISTINE WOLFORD, ADA MONROE COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
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20	DAVID R. JUERGENS, ESQ.
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25	Sara Winkeljohn Official Court Transcriber

1	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Number 6, People v.
2	Brumfield.
3	Counsel.
4	MS. WOLFORD: Good afternoon, Your Honors.
5	May it please the court, Kelly Wolford
6	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Would you like any -
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8	MS. WOLFORD: on behalf of the
9	People.
10	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: You would you
11	like any rebuttal time, counsel?
12	MS. WOLFORD: I would, Your Honor. I'd ask
13	for two minutes.
14	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Two minutes. Sure,
15	go ahead.
16	MS. WOLFORD: Thank you. This afternoon
17	we're asking the court to review an Appellate
18	Division decision which reversed a judgment of
19	conviction of the defendant, finding that the defense
20	attorney properly crossed out portions of the waiver
21	of immunity.
22	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Counselor, is this
23	whole thing moot?
24	MS. WOLFORD: Actually, I thought maybe
25	that's where you would go; absolutely not, for a few

1 reasons. 2 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Go ahead. 3 MS. WOLFORD: One of which is that this is a situation where the People do not have a right to 4 5 ask for a stay to this court. So unlike a situation where a defendant has a right to stay the 6 7 proceedings, the People have no statutory right to 8 such a stay. 9 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Is that what you mean 10 - - - when you say that, do you mean that you 11 couldn't have just made a direct appeal to the - - -12 the issue or - - -13 MS. WOLFORD: Well - - -14 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: - - - instead of - - -15 instead of representing to the grand jury, that you 16 couldn't appeal the Supreme Court or the - - - the 17 Appellate Division's - - -18 MS. WOLFORD: Well, we did do both in this 19 case. 2.0 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Okay. 21 MS. WOLFORD: Because what we did was we 22 asked this court for leave to appeal, which is

required. We need leave to come here. So when we

lost at the Appellate Division, we asked for leave.

But then we're stuck with a situation where we have a

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defendant who had been convicted of a - - - of a felony offense, who now stands unindicted even, under the Appellate Division's decision, and we don't know whether or not this court is going to accept the case to be heard.

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So now we have a situation where we have - we have almost a Hobson's choice situation. And
instead of Hobson, we picked both. We - - - we
decided, in an effort to speed up the process
regardless of the decision of this court, should - - should this court either not - - not be inclined
to take the case for - - to hear it on appeal, or
we get to this point and the court decides the
Appellate Division was right, now we're ready to go
with the defendant's case.

Unfortunately, what happened and what I

will - - - what I do want to talk about with respect

to the mootness situation is City Court in this case

refused our request to adjourn the matter and wait

for this court's decision. And this is where the

problem arises and why this is something that is not

mute - - or moot because we can't ever stop that

from happening. And a city court then would have the

ability to take away from this court its ability to

decide an issue of law that was clearly presented on

1 - - - and, you know, Your Honor, granted leave on. 2 So we're in a - - - we're in a very 3 difficult situation here because we asked for leave. We wanted this court to hear it. And now we have a 4 5 city court who has dismissed the case in the interest of justice, and we're stuck here in a situation where 6 7 the first question is is it moot. I would ask the court to consider the fact that this will continue to 8 9 repeat itself under these situations because - - -10 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: But can it be 11 addressed if it repeats itself? 12 MS. WOLFORD: Can it be? 13 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yeah. MS. WOLFORD: It can be addressed right 14 15 here if there - - -16 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: I mean, yeah, but - -17 18 MS. WOLFORD: - - - if the opportunity's 19 out there. 20 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: - - - but will it? 21 But you know the test. Will it escape attention 22 later on, as one of the reasons why you take it even 23 though it might - - - or you decide it even though it 2.4 might appear moot. 25 MS. WOLFORD: Right.

1 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Why couldn't this be 2 resolved if it comes up again? It's the form you're 3 using. Your point is let's - - - let's just decide 4 now so that there's no question. 5 MS. WOLFORD: Right. 6 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: But - - - but it 7 won't evade adjudication later, right? If it comes up, it will - - - it will be addressed. 8 9 MS. WOLFORD: But we are in a situation 10 here - - -11 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: If you're using the 12 form. That's all I'm saying. If - - -13 MS. WOLFORD: I'm sorry. 14 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: - - - if you continue 15 to use the form, it's not going to evade resolution 16 in the courts, though, right? 17 MS. WOLFORD: Well, it - - - it very well could evade resolution in the courts. 18 19 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Why, because no one 20 else would challenge it? 21 MS. WOLFORD: Well, we have a difficult time getting to this - - - to this level. So now 22 23 we're stuck with an Appellate Division decision that 2.4 is binding on us, so we need to follow that Appellate

Division decision. And getting to this court is not

as a matter of right. 1 2 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So you're here. It 3 took you awhile, and you want to get it resolved? 4 MS. WOLFORD: Absolutely, Your Honor. 5 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay. Go ahead. MS. WOLFORD: And I do think the merits are 6 7 worth - - - are worth discussing here because it is an issue of statewide importance. 8 9 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So - - - so talk to 10 the merits. Why - - - why isn't what they agreed to 11 enough? MS. WOLFORD: Well, let's start with the 12 13 impact of an im - - - of a waiver of immunity. 14 Because - - -15 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay. MS. WOLFORD: - - - immunity is the grand-16 17 all end-all of criminal cases. CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yes. Go ahead. 18 19 MS. WOLFORD: So unlike a guilty plea, 20 where if the court does not do a sufficient legal 21 colloquy and the People can now try it, if you don't 22 do a sufficient colloquy in the grand jury to a 23 waiver of immunity, the defendant gets immunity. 2.4 Done; we can't go forward. There's no out. So

instead of a situation where we have - - - we have

some sort of redress if it's not done correctly, here the defendant gets, potentially, a windfall.

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So we have a situation that is very important to prosecutors across the state. And I - - I can say, having been a young prosecutor at one time, one of the most dangerous and scary parts of being a prosecutor is making sure you do that right, because you never want a person to come in and be granted immunity because you didn't follow the right steps.

So with that in mind, we have to look at what he crossed out, and I - - - I will analogize it back to the - - - the guilty plea - - -

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So why don't you take it - - - take it down the - - - the different things that - - - that were crossed out and why that represents noncompliance with CPL 190.45.

MS. WOLFORD: Okay. So the one thing I do want to suggest to you is that we have to look at 190 - - - 190.45 in context of everything we do where a defendant waives his rights.

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Right.

MS. WOLFORD: So a waiver of rights in a guilty plea, a waiver of right to counsel, a waiver - - waiver Miranda.

1	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Right.
2	MS. WOLFORD: In every one of those cases,
3	we have to make sure that that is a knowing,
4	intelligent, and voluntary waiver. So now we take
5	the form that was presented to Mr. Brumfield and the
6	fact that he crossed out even such a simple thing as
7	I understand I have the right to an attorney.
8	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yeah. But again, if
9	he complied with the statute, the whole issue is are
LO	they in compliance with the statute.
L1	MS. WOLFORD: Right. Okay. So
L2	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Right?
L3	MS. WOLFORD: the statute requires -
L4	
L5	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Isn't that the
L6	the bottom line issue?
L7	MS. WOLFORD: Right. The statute requires
L8	that he waive that he waive his right to self-
L9	incrimination and prospective immunity under the
20	state of under the state statute.
21	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Right.
22	MS. WOLFORD: So he didn't cross out those
23	limited portions. However, by crossing out the rest
24	of it, he did make some material alterations and

prevented us from being able to ensure that he was

1 knowing, intelligently, and voluntary waiving his 2 rights. 3 JUDGE PIGOTT: Could you ask him that at 4 the time that he appears in front of the grand jury? 5 MS. WOLFORD: Did we ask him? Could we? JUDGE PIGOTT: Do you realize - - - do you 6 7 realize you have a right to an attorney and if you 8 can't afford one we'll get you one? Even though he 9 crossed it out on the written document, you could ask 10 him at the time of the grand jury? 11 MS. WOLFORD: We could have asked him that 12 before the grand jury. This is the way that it had 13 been taken care of in the past, because he has a 14 right to talk to his attorney outside the presence of 15 the grand jury. And the attorney can go over with 16 him in detail, like you would expect in a - - - in a 17 guilty plea situation. JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Well, what is - - -18 19 JUDGE READ: But what are you - - - you're 20 not - - - are you still using the form or you're not 21 still using the form? MS. WOLFORD: Well, after - - - after the 22 23 Appellate Division decision, we did have to alter the 2.4 form to some degree.

JUDGE READ: What's wrong with just

reciting on the form, as I think the Chief Judge was 1 - - - was suggesting, literally what's in the 2 3 statute? MS. WOLFORD: Well - - -4 5 JUDGE READ: Why does it have to be embellished? 6 7 MS. WOLFORD: It doesn't - - -8 JUDGE READ: Or explained. Explained, I 9 should say. 10 MS. WOLFORD: The effort in - - - in - - -11 the effort in explaining the form is to ensure that 12 we had a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver 13 of immunity. That is our obligation. We stand in 14 the place of the court in the - - - in the grand 15 jury. So in this circumstance, what the defense 16 argument actually is is you over-advised my client of 17 his rights. That's my job, he says. That's my job, 18 not your job as the People. Well, I suggest 19 otherwise, because the People are in the position of 20 the court. It is the court's job to - - -21 JUDGE RIVERA: Well, I think his argument 22 is that his client has the right to testify before 23 the grand jury as long as he's in satisfaction of the 2.4 requirements of the statute, and you've imposed more

than the statute requires. Can I just go back? What

- - - what are the alterations in the form? You said 1 the form has been altered. 2 3 MS. WOLFORD: He actually took the form and 4 crossed out para - - - paragraphs. 5 JUDGE RIVERA: No, no, no. I'm sorry. 6 form you currently use. MS. WOLFORD: The form that we currently 7 8 use? 9 JUDGE RIVERA: Yes. 10 MS. WOLFORD: It basically is what he left with addition to the - - - the - - - paragraph 6, or 11 12 I'm sorry, paragraph 4 of the immunity waiver which -13 - - which still deals with the fact that he tried to 14 make this a limited waiver of immunity, which is not 15 something that they can unilaterally do. That is something that must be negotiated and it can only 16 17 occur - - -18 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: How has the new form 19 worked for you? 20 MS. WOLFORD: I - - - well, they'll sign 21 the form now at this point. And this is, quite 22 frankly - - -23 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So is that a - - - a 2.4 problem when - - - isn't the whole goal of this - - -25 this exercise to - - - to - - - to have the right to

1	to testify be scrupulously protected? Isn't
2	that
3	MS. WOLFORD: Abs
4	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: what we
5	what we want to do and not not if there
6	are things in the form if underlined
7	- that are not do not re re reflect
8	noncompliance with the statute, why are we making
9	such a big deal about it?
10	MS. WOLFORD: Well
11	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: You you know,
12	let's say you put it in the form but let's say for
13	the sake of argument that they're not essential in
14	terms of complying with the statute. Why are we
15	_
16	MS. WOLFORD: I
17	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: getting into
18	this? He crossed out. And as, I think it was Judge
19	Pigott said, if you want to ask him about something,
20	well, you could have done it when he's on the
21	you know, at the at the he's testifying.
22	Why
23	MS. WOLFORD: Well, I do think
24	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: why couldn't
25	you do it that way?

MS. WOLFORD: I do think that in order to 1 2 have it be appropriate - - - an appropriate waiver of 3 immunity, we have to ask them - - - we have to make 4 sure that they are knowing, intelligently, and 5 voluntary waiving. So we have - - - we have a number of issues here. They have to know what their rights 6 7 are before they can waive them. JUDGE READ: He had - - - he did have a 8 9 I mean he had an attorney there, right? 10 mean it might be different - - -11 MS. WOLFORD: Right, but - - - and - - -12 and oftentimes, and even in the police situation, we 13 do have an attorney present. But we - - - we're 14 assuming here, as we stand here today, that the 15 attorney who was representing him understood the 16 grand jury proceeding, understood what would happen 17 when they walked into there. CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: But he crosses out I 18 19 have a right to counsel, but I have counsel, I think, 20 is what Judge Read is saying. 21 MS. WOLFORD: Right. 22 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: What does it matter? 23 MS. WOLFORD: He - - - he crossed out the 2.4 portion that said my counsel can't participate in the

proceedings, that I understand that.

1 JUDGE PIGOTT: I know - - - I know district 2 attorneys have a lot of worry about protecting 3 defendants' rights for a number of reasons. But if 4 we look at this now, you sent it back to a grand 5 jury. They no billed him, directed the filing of the prosecutor's information. How are you going to un-6 7 ring that bell? MS. WOLFORD: Well, I would suggest that 8 9 under - - - in CPL 470, and I think - - - I 10 apologize; the number is escaping me. 470.40(2) does 11 ha - - - does take into account this potential 12 situation where we don't have a second - - - we don't 13 have a second jeopardy issue here. 14 JUDGE READ: So if we agree with you on the 15 merits on this, then effectively it's the - - - the 16 first conviction of the felony stands, right? 17 MS. WOLFORD: Right, absolutely. It's like 18 19 JUDGE READ: That's your argument? 20 MS. WOLFORD: - - - the Appellate Division 21 never - - - the Appellate Division decision didn't 22 exist. And that makes sense if you think about it, 23 because we're not in a pre-conviction setting here. 2.4 We are post-jury conviction with respect to Mr.

Brumfield at the point in time when the convic - - -

the conviction's reversed. 1 So we have a - - - we wouldn't want a 2 3 situation, I don't think, in our criminal justice system where a grand jury considering different 4 5 evidence down the line has the ability to supersede a trial conviction. That - - - that would be something 6 7 that we never hear of in our - - - in our criminal justice - - -8 9 JUDGE READ: This is not a superseding 10 indictment? 11 MS. WOLFORD: No, we had no indictment at 12 the time. It had been reversed by the Appellate 13 Division. 14 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, counsel. 15 MS. WOLFORD: Thank you. CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: And you'll have your 16 17 rebuttal. Let's hear from your adversary. MR. JUERGENS: Good afternoon, David 18 19 Juergens. I'm representing Michael Brumfield. 2.0 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Counsel, talk about 21 the mootness issue first. 22 MR. JUERGENS: I would say that - - -23 People v. Franco. The principle should be applied 2.4 where if a first grand jury has an indictment,

nothing wrong with it, the People present the same

charges to a second grand jury. That second grand jury takes action inconsistent with the first grand jury. The first grand jury's action's a nullity. It's null and void.

JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: So what about the - - the situation that your adversary posits where the
Appellate Division has overturned the conviction and
essentially vacated the indictment and there - - according to her there's no indictment - - -

MR. JUERGENS: And - - - and - - -

JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: - - - at that point?

MR. JUERGENS: And - - and at that point, they took a calculated risk. They could have just stood pat, pursued their direct appeal, tried to get the conviction reinstated. They took a calculated risk and they presented the exact same case to a second grand jury. Only this time, Mr. Brumfield got a chance to tell his side of the story to the grand jury. The grand jury heard that evidence. They dismissed the felonies. They sent it back to City Court as misdemeanors as it was originally charged, because it didn't become felonies until eight months after the original arrest when a prosecutor decided hey, he's not taking a plea.

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So what's the

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consequence of their risk that they took?

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MR. JUERGENS: Well, if they would have obtained a valid indictment and lost their direct appeal, they could have had a second trial and reprosecuted them. They didn't get that. The nature of the criminal action fundamentally changed when the second grand jury dismissed the felonies. Now you have one criminal action that is now a misdemeanor criminal action.

And an anomaly arises if we consider the People to be allowed to go on with their direct appeal, because you could have one criminal action with two appeals. You could have the People filing a notice of appeal to appeal Judge Johnson's dismissal in the interest of justice of the misdemeanor case, and we have this appeal.

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Counsel, is it important to know whether their form is good, the old one or the new one?

MR. JUERGENS: Well, they've changed it, and the most egregious paragraph is paragraph 4 where they're asking the defendant to give them a blank check and that any questioning on any topic is fair game. And they've taken that out of their new waiver. They've also changed their new waiver to,

instead of an acknowledgement of a right to counsel, they just have a little warning up there. And I would also submit that if you're reading a waiver of indictment and you cross it out and initial it, you've already read that. I mean, that's evidence that the - - -

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JUDGE PIGOTT: Well, you're making a leap of, you know, reaching a conclusion. And one - - - one thing that I think the trial courts look at in all of our decisions is how many 440s are we going to get as a result of the decision by the Court of Appeals.

MR. JUERGENS: Well, the 440s I think will flow if the Peop - - - if the - - - if this court rules that their original indictment is the required form in the state of New York. And that if we have forms maybe in some other county that don't have this acknowledgement of right to counsel, don't have this we can cross-examine, ask you about anything, and also you have to agree in advance of unlimited future use of whatever testimony you give, I think that's going to - - - that's going to open the floodgates. And that's where we're going to have - - -

JUDGE READ: What about these forms, either the - - - the form that - - - in this case or the

revised one - - - are they unique to Monroe County?

Do other counties - - -

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MR. JUERGENS: I - - - I can only say that the - - - the one form I saw from Wayne County was similar to the original form. I don't know if they've modified it. But there's really - - - there's really no reason for them to be adding on this extra material. I mean, they have no lawful authority to force the defendant to give a blank check or to agree to things that are not required statutorily.

Mr. Brumfield gave written notice that he wanted to testify. He showed up when it was scheduled. He signed a waiver of immunity that said that I give up all my rights of - - - Fifth Amendment right to, you know, not incriminate myself with respect to this traffic stop incident, and you're asking me to sign a piece of paper that says you can ask me about anything. I may have - - - I don't know what you're going to ask me. I'm - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: What does this second waiver look like, the one that he signed, the second waiver?

MR. JUERGENS: I submitted a copy to the court, but it is very similar. It includes the language that I would say is the - - - the effective

	language per the statute. And that's the only
2	language that they really need because then they're
3	protected. The defendant how can the defendant
4	sign that and come back later and says well, you know
5	what, I really should get immunity because even
6	though we've got clear language here that says I'm
7	waiving immunity, I I think I should get it
8	because you didn't tell me I had a right to an
9	attorney, you know, even though I have an attorney
10	next to me. And you didn't you know, you
11	didn't get me
12	JUDGE PIGOTT: Stranger things have
13	happened, Mr. Juergens.
14	MR. JUERGENS: Well, that's but
15	basically what we have is, you know, their argument
16	all rests on a false premise that their original
17	waiver is it. It's golden, and all those paragraphs
18	must be in there, and that's simply
19	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: In a nutshell, your
20	argument is you complied with the statute?
21	MR. JUERGENS: That's that's
22	that's correct.
23	JUDGE READ: And that's all that's
24	required?

MR. JUERGENS: That's correct. And - - -

1 and - - - and I'm - - - and I especially don't like 2 paragraph 4 because that almost violates the - - -3 the - - - the DA's duty of fair dealing. I mean 4 they're supposed to give the defendant notice of what 5 topics are going to be subject to the grand jury 6 investigation. And, you know, as far as - - -7 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: They can't go all 8 over the place? 9 MR. JUERGENS: Yeah. And as far as Mr. 10 11 incident that I'll, you know, be free to testify on,

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Brumfield knows, you know, I've got this traffic stop and they want me to sign off on who knows what. And that's - - - you know, that - - - that - - -

JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Well, when - - - when the defendant elects to go into the grand jury, though, doesn't the defendant open up his background for credibility reasons and other reasons? And if the DA does a background check and finds out that there's something about him that, you know, might undermine his credibility in the grand jury, wouldn't they be allowed or want to use that? And if it turns out that he answers in some way that suggests that he has committed some other crime, wouldn't they be able then to maybe indict him on that crime?

MR. JUERGENS: They have some - - - they

have some ability to, for credibility purposes, conduct a cross-examination. They certainly don't have a right to ask him about any pending uncharged crimes that he - - he's not required to waive immunity on that.

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The situation that I think they're getting confused about is if there's more than one case that they're presenting and they want - - - you know, the defendant says well, I want to testify about case A and not case B, they can say no, it's all or nothing, you know. And in some cases maybe they say well, we'd rather just go ahead and have him testify on A and, you know, forget about B for now.

But it has to be in writing, and that's the defendant's burden to get that express agreement in writing. They're turning it upside down and saying now that we have to agree in advance to questioning on whatever, you know, they feel like they want to present in this particular grand jury presentation.

I think the second grand jury presentment here highlighted the original error in preventing Mr.

Brumfield from testifying because - - -

JUDGE PIGOTT: What should have been the remedy then? I - - - they sent - - - they sent you away, right?

1 MR. JUERGENS: They - - - yes, they - - and that's - - - and that's what was the prejudice is 2 3 them - - - not them trying to, you know, advise the 4 defendant of all these rights and stuff. The - - -5 the prejudice flowed from them saying you can't 6 testify. Goodbye. 7 JUDGE PIGOTT: So - - - so, I mean, and I'll pick on Ms. Wolford a minute about this. So if 8 9 we were - - - if we were to agree with the People, we 10 would be reinstating an indictment in which, while the defendant wanted to testify, he was not allowed 11 12 testify - - -13 MR. JUERGENS: Right. JUDGE PIGOTT: - - - because of his - - -14 15 16

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MR. JUERGENS: Right, and also keeping in the mind that the time he did testify, the grand jury heard his side of the story and threw out the felonies and sent it back to a - - a misdemeanor criminal action like it was originally. So I think I've got two pretty strong points that - - that I would ask the court to consider.

A valid indictment is a Constitutional imperative, and the basic argument on the second presentation is that that original indictment, which is in a dismissed status, now becomes forever dead

and cannot be resurrected because there has been an independent action by the second grand jury making that null and void. And is the rare factual procedural circumstance that I don't know that's going to run to the court's attention anytime soon.

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But I think given all the facts that the - the unanimous five judges in the Appellate
Division should be affirmed. An alternate ground
would be that the People at this point in time really
don't have a right to get that null and void original
indictment conviction reinstated.

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, counsel. Thanks.

Counselor, rebuttal?

MS. WOLFORD: Thank you, Your Honor. Just

- - - just as a preliminary matter, I feel somewhat

like we're in a civil lawsuit here, as I seem to be
- - it seems like our action after the Appellate

Division, which is binding on us, is now being used

against us at the - - - at the Court of Appeals, and

we are simply just trying to follow the laws as - -
as - - by the Fourth Department at this point.

JUDGE PIGOTT: Couldn't you have not indicted him or - - - yeah, not indicted him on the first one unless and until you got a - - - a ruling

from county court saying this - - - this - - - this 1 2 waiver is good or this waiver is not good? 3 MS. WOLFORD: The county court here decided the waiver was - - - that we did the right thing. 4 5 JUDGE PIGOTT: I see. And then - - - then 6 the Appellate Division - - -7 MS. WOLFORD: And then we went to trial, 8 right. 9 JUDGE PIGOTT: Then you're stuck. 10 MS. WOLFORD: And then the Appellate 11 Division reverses. So we're in a - - -JUDGE PIGOTT: Because if - - - if we agree 12 13 with you, he has a right to appear in the front of 14 the grand jury. You don't dispute that. And - - -15 and when you sent him away, he didn't have a right to 16 appear. Then he appears in the second one. Why 17 would we want to resurrect one in which he wanted to 18 appear, apparently? 19 MS. WOLFORD: He - - - he only has - - -20 right, and that's what we're assuming, because if we 21 - - - he only has a right to appear under statute. 22 And the statue specifically requires that he sign a -23 - - a waiver of immunity which includes right against 2.4 self-incrimination, the privilege against self-25 incrimination, and the statutory immunity provision.

1 By - - - by crossing out the portions of the waiver, 2 which I have to - - - I want to point the court to. 3 It's page 38 and 39 in the record. It very clearly 4 says you're giving up your right to self-5 incrimination. You're giving up your right to prospective immunity, and then the rest is an 6 7 advisement of rights. And - - -8 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: But he sign - - - but 9 he did sign one? 10 MS. WOLFORD: He - - - no, he crossed out 11 all the advisement of rights and signed. JUDGE PIGOTT: But - - - but I mean he 12 13 signed - - - he signed the - - - the - - - the - - -14 the amended one, right? 15 MS. WOLFORD: Right, after he already knew 16 all of this litigation had occurred. So we're - - -17 we're assuming a lot when we look at what happened 18 after the Appellate Division's - - - the Appellate 19 Division's decision in this case, because we now are 20 being asked - - - we're being held to a standard that 21 we had to follow based on Appellate Division decision 22 in order to allow any defendant into the grand jury. 23 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: What - - - what about 2.4 Judge Pigott's point though that you're reinstating

something where he wanted to testify and he couldn't?

1 MS. WOLFORD: But he chose not to go in by 2 - - - by crossing out that portion of the waiver that 3 was important, and I think probably the most 4 important portion of that waiver is the - - - is the 5 limited immunity portion of the waiver, because as 6 was stated, he could have brought up anything. 7 had two pending criminal charges but we were just 8 putting in one, there was nothing to prevent him from 9 coming in there and saying hey, grand jurors, by the 10 way, I want to talk about this other incident because 11 I feel like I was done wrong, and he goes into that 12 and suddenly, we gave him tran - - - we gave him 13 limited immunity because he crossed out the portions. 14 Now he's got full immunity on a case we weren't even 15 presenting, and he did that himself. That is absolutely an - - - an untenable situation for the 16 17 People.

JUDGE PIGOTT: That's - - - that's kind of paranoid, though, isn't it? I mean - - -

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MS. WOLFORD: It isn't, though, Your Honor, because what happens is when we walk into the room and we go through the waiver of immunity, we say to him, so-and-so, this is your opportunity to tell the grand jurors what you have to say. We don't do direct examination. We give them an opportunity to

1 say what they want to say. If he choo - - - chooses 2 to take it on a tangent and go in a place that he 3 chooses - - -4 JUDGE PIGOTT: So if he says, after I 5 killed my mother, they stopped me in the - - - in the 6 car with a weapon and now I'm charged with a weapon. 7 And you think that's going to immunize him against 8 the murder charge? 9 MS. WOLFORD: It could, and he could do 10 that himself without - - - without us asking a single 11 question. 12 JUDGE RIVERA: You're arguing that your 13 concern is that a - - - a defendant may go into the 14 grand jury and admit to some other crime? 15 MS. WOLFORD: If he - - - if he goes in and 16 does what this individual did and crosses out the 17 part - - - part of the waiver that makes the immunity waiver all encompassing, then he knows going in that 18 19 he has immunity for everything except what we 20 specifically told him he doesn't. 21 JUDGE RIVERA: I don't know that it makes -22 - - I don't know that it makes immunity all 23 encompassing. It just disagrees with the language 2.4 you've used.

MS. WOLFORD: Well, he crossed it out so

1	now it's gone.
2	JUDGE RIVERA: Yeah, he disagreed with the
3	language you used.
4	MS. WOLFORD: Well, he doesn't get a right
5	to disagree with the language that we use.
6	JUDGE RIVERA: But yes, but the point
7	of the case is whether or not you are able to change
8	the language of the waiver to encompass all of these
9	other rights or concerns that are reflected in the
10	language. That's
11	MS. WOLFORD: Well, I do think
12	JUDGE RIVERA: That's the merits of the
13	case.
14	MS. WOLFORD: I do understand that that's
15	the merits of the case, but in this in this
16	particular instance, he he tried to
17	unilaterally create a limited a limited waiver
18	of immunity. By doing so, had he been successful in
19	doing that, he could have immunized himself. And in
20	this particular case he could have immunized
21	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay.
22	MS. WOLFORD: himself to the felony.
23	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, counsel. We
24	get both of your arguments. Appreciate it.

MS. WOLFORD: Thank you, Your Honor.

1	CHIEF	JUDGE	LIPPMAN:	Thank	you	so	much.
2	(Court	is a	djourned)				
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CERTIFICATION

I, Sara Winkeljohn, certify that the foregoing transcript of proceedings in the Court of Appeals of People v. Michael S. Brumfield, No. 6 was prepared using the required transcription equipment and is a true and accurate record of the proceedings.

Considerich and

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