Karen Schiffmiller

1	COURT OF APPEALS
2	STATE OF NEW YORK
3	
4	CONASON, et al.,
5	
6	Respondents,
7	-against- No. 14
8	MEGAN HOLDING, LLC, et al.,
9	Appellants.
10	
11	20 Eagle Street Albany, New York 12207
	January 13, 2015
12	Before:
13	CHIEF JUDGE JONATHAN LIPPMAN
14	ASSOCIATE JUDGE SUSAN PHILLIPS READ ASSOCIATE JUDGE EUGENE F. PIGOTT, JR.
15	ASSOCIATE JUDGE JENNY RIVERA ASSOCIATE JUDGE SHEILA ABDUS-SALAAM
16	
17	Appearances:
18	UMAR A. SHEIKH, ESQ. MARINO PARTNERS LLP
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20	White Plains, NY 10603
21	JAMES B. FISHMAN, ESQ.
22	FISHMAN & MALLON, LLP Attorneys for Respondent
23	305 Broadway, Suite 900 New York, NY 10007
24	
25	Karen Schiffmiller

1 Official Court Transcriber CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Number 14, Conason v. 2 Megan Holding. 3 Counselor, would you like any rebuttal 4 time? 5 MR. SHEIKH: Yes, Your Honor, three 6 minutes, please. 7 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Three minutes for 8 rebuttal time. Go ahead. You have it. 9 MR. SHEIKH: May it please this honorable 10 court and its honorable judges, my name is Umar 11 Sheikh and together with my co-counsel, Misha Wright, 12 we're of the firm, Marino Partners LLP, and represent 13 the appellants, Megan Holding, LLC and Emmanuel Ku. 14 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Counsel, what was 15 decided in the Housing Court proceeding? 16 MR. SHEIKH: The Housing Court proceeding, 17 the only thing that was decided was a warranty of 18 habitability claim. 19 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: But was there a 20 finding of - - - of - - - that there was considerable 21 evidence of fraud on your client's part? 22 The judge made what we MR. SHEIKH: 23 consider to be dicta, Your Honor, because those 2.4

findings were not necessary to the judgment on the

warranty of habitability.

CHIEF JUDGE LIP

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CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So if it's only
habitability, it's - - - it's not the overcharge
issue, and your basic argument is that therefore you
should be able to - - - you do contest a fraud, and
you should be able to raise it, and the judge's
findings in that regard were not relevant to that - not not relevant, but were dicta in relation to
habitability.

MR. SHEIKH: Yes, Your Honor. Our position is that there's no collateral estoppel effect - - - CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Right.

MR. SHEIKH: - - - so that the trial court

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: You should be able to argue that issue now.

 $$\operatorname{MR}.$ SHEIKH: Correct, and that - - - and that would be subject to a trial.

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay.

MR. SHEIKH: Now, interestingly, what does have collateral estoppel effect from the Housing Court action is that the lease - - - there was a finding that there was a lease here, and that was necessary in order to provide the respondents with a warranty of habitability award.

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: What about the piercing the corporate veil, is that - - - is that established through what the Housing Court judge did?

MR. SHEIKH: No, not at all, Your Honor.

There was no claim in the Housing Court for piercing the corporate veil. That claim was first interposed in the Supreme Court. We have raised a statute of limitations defense to the piercing claim itself, but in addition, our second argument is that the piercing claim could not possibly have been subject to a summary judgment finding, because there were issues of fact on - - - on - - on both sides. And the trial court here made the determination on a piercing claim based on almost nothing except that the principal was a ninety-nine percent owner of the subject entity.

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Well, she's looking at what she has in front of her and she's making certain findings. You're saying they're gratuitous, basically?

MR. SHEIKH: Well, Your Honor, I think, you know, based - - - based on the conflicting affidavits or the supporting affidavit given by Mr. Ku, you know, he gives support for what the respondents claim is a - - is enough to pierce the corporate veil.

1	JUDGE RIVERA: Well, he didn't commingle
2	funds from the LLCs?
3	MR. SHEIKH: No. Our position is not
4	JUDGE RIVERA: Never?
5	MR. SHEIKH: No. Our position what
6	Mr. Ku says in his affidavit is that funds are taken
7	from one LLC
8	JUDGE RIVERA: Right.
9	MR. SHEIKH: right back into
10	his personal name. And then he uses them to fund
11	other LLCs. That's not commingling. That's not
12	- I am taking rent that is
13	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: The judge thought it
14	was commingling, didn't she?
15	MR. SHEIKH: I I think that's subject
16	to an expert, Your Honor. And there's no expert
17	determination here.
18	JUDGE PIGOTT: But what expert do you
19	expect to call
20	MR. SHEIKH: The expert we're
21	JUDGE PIGOTT: expect them to call?
22	MR. SHEIKH: It would have to I think
23	the respondents would have to call a forensic
24	accountant to establish any type of commingling.
25	JUDGE PIGOTT: Isn't it a legal question?

1 MR. SHEIKH: Whether there's commingling? 2 JUDGE PIGOTT: I agree with you it's facts, 3 but I mean, other than that, you got a corporation 4 and you got activity, I - - - what do you need an 5 accountant for? MR. SHEIKH: Well, I think, you know, 6 because - - - I think it goes beyond that, Your 7 The issue is - - - what - - - if - - - in 8 Honor. 9 order to establish commingling, the first step, like 10 you're saying, is to establish the facts that there 11 was commingling. The respondents haven't done that. 12 What they've shown is that there are a lot of 13 transfers, you know, regard - - - you know, around 14 all of these corporations. But they've never 15 established - - -16 JUDGE RIVERA: Well, there's no dispute you 17 have complete - - - your client has complete control and dominion over all the corporations, correct? 18 19 MR. SHEIKH: He's the ninety-nine per - - -20 JUDGE RIVERA: There's no dispute that he 21 does indeed use funds from one LLC for paying off 22 bills and for the use and benefit of another LLC. 23 that correct? 2.4 MR. SHEIKH: That is disputed, Your Honor.

JUDGE RIVERA: All right, so - - - that's

disputed?

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MR. SHEIKH: That is disputed.

JUDGE RIVERA: I thought you just said he took one from one LLC, gave - - - put - - - put it in his own account, and then used it to pay off another LLC. How's is that not what I just described?

MR. SHEIKH: From a taxation point of view, once he takes it from the LLC, he's taking a withdrawal from one LLC, and then he's making a contribution. Once he takes the money out of one LLC, it's not that LLC's funds anymore. He's created a taxable event - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: Is it not possible the judge, as a matter of law, could disagree with that particular characterization and conclude that that's commingling?

MR. SHEIKH: Well, I'm sure the judge could. But that's what we dispute.

JUDGE RIVERA: Is there not a lack of corporate formalities when you do that with the funds?

MR. SHEIKH: I don't think so. And that was never established. It was never established whether these - - - these transactions were or without corporate formalities.

1 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Well, counsel, going 2 back to when your - - - your client held - - - he was 3 a ninety-nine percent owner of this LLC, right? He 4 had a ninety-nine percent share of the ownership? 5 Was that during the time of the transactions involved here, the 2009 to 2011? Was he the ninety-nine 6 7 percent owner at that point? MR. SHEIKH: At that point in time, either 8 9 ninety-nine percent or a hundred percent. 10 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Okay. 11 MR. SHEIKH: I don't remember from the 12 record, Your Honor. But - - - but certainly - - -13 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: But you - - - you have 14 an argument - - -15 MR. SHEIKH: - - - at least ninety-nine. 16 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: - - - that he - - - he 17 was not in dominion and control of this corporation at the time of the actual transactions. And is that 18 19 based on - - - what is that based on? 20 MR. SHEIKH: I don't think our argument is 21 that he didn't have dominion and control during the 22 The argument is that the - - - the 23 transactions that the respondents point to as 2.4 evidence of commingling and piercing occur well after 25 the events complained of. So this is not commingling

1 or fraud taking place in 2003. The commingling - - -2 if it is - - - is based on bank statements from 2011 3 forward. 4 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: So you're saying for 5 these taxable events that you were talking about, he wasn't doing that back in 2003, 2005, 2009. He just 6 7 decided to do that in 2011 or - - -8 MR. SHEIKH: There's no - - -9 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: - - - or beyond? 10 MR. SHEIKH: There's no evidence in this 11 record of that, Your Honor, that he was - - - what -12 - - what - - - there was - - - this record does not 13 include any bank statements from 2003 or any evidence of financial transactions from 2003. 14 15 JUDGE RIVERA: Counsel, your white light is 16 on. Could you address the statute of limitations 17 issue, please? MR. SHEIKH: Yes, Your Honor. I think the 18 19 statute of limitations issue is very clear. The 2.0 statute is clear and unambiguous. There's - - -21 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: But there are 22 precedent to statute - - - precedents to statute of 23 limitations issue is clear? 2.4 JUDGE READ: In partic - - - well, Thornton 25 and Cintron, didn't we in those cases at least

1	implicitly decide against you on this issue?
2	MR. SHEIKH: I don't think so, Your Honor.
3	In
4	JUDGE READ: Explain why not.
5	MR. SHEIKH: Well, in both of those cases,
6	Thornton, Grimm, Cintron, the statute of limitations
7	in, at least in this context, was not at issue.
8	JUDGE READ: Well, I understand that. But
9	didn't we implicitly have to decide against you on
LO	this to make the decisions we did in those
L1	cases? I think Judge Smith even said something about
L2	that in his dissent, did he not?
L3	MR. SHEIKH: No, I I disagree, Your
L4	Honor. I think this case can be separate from
L5	and I see my time has expired. May I answer your
L6	question?
L7	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Separate how?
L8	Explain how this case is distinguishable from those
L9	cases?
	MR. SHEIKH: Thornton and Grimm and those
20	
20	line of cases all dealt with damages. It all dealt
	line of cases all dealt with damages. It all dealt with how do we determine the the rents, when
21	

time-barred. So there's - - - there's not - - -

1 we're not talking about a damages calculation. We're 2 talking about a liability determination. JUDGE PIGOTT: What's the four - - - what's 3 the statute of limitations? 4 5 MR. SHEIKH: Four years. JUDGE PIGOTT: And - - - and that's based 6 7 on what statute? 8 MR. SHEIKH: That's based on 213(a), Your 9 Honor, the CPLR. 10 JUDGE PIGOTT: So you're saying be - - -11 because they filed in September of 2013, they're too 12 late. Their - - - their time expired in April of 13 that year? MR. SHEIKH: Well, the - - - just to 14 15 correct the dates, the - - - the statute 213(a) 16 provides its own accrual period, making it one of the 17 most clear statute of limitations - - - I - - - if not the clearest statute of limitations that the 18 19 legislature has ever written. The accrual period 20 starts from the first overcharge alleged, which 21 there's no dispute is November 2003. Four years after that, their acc - - - their statute of 22 23 limitations expired October 31st, 2007. 2.4 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Counsel, aren't you -25 - - you're reading that statute in a vacuum when you

1 don't look at how it's been interpreted by the court?

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MR. SHEIKH: No, Your Honor, I think - - - because I don't think the court has addressed this question yet.

JUDGE PIGOTT: Didn't - - - I'm going to repeat what Judge Read said. Judge Smith took umbrage at the majority in - - in those two cases, saying, you know, the statute is as clear as it can be, and you people keep putting in fraud and, you know, all of these adjectives, as if somehow that abrogates the statute, and it doesn't.

But what the majority, it seemed to me, was saying, was that when you got fraud on the front-end, how do we know when the overcharge starts, because you were - - - or not necessarily you, but the - - - the defendant is - - - is defrauding the - - - the plaintiff, and in that way, the court, because we don't know what - - you know, where to measure.

MR. SHEIKH: That's certainly true, but,
Your Honor, the distinction in both of those cases is
that the rent registration statements were not timely
filed or were tainted. Here we have rent
registration statements that were filed. There was
nothing here preventing the respondents from timely
filing their claim.

1	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, counsel.
2	MR. SHEIKH: Thank you, Your Honor.
3	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: You'll have your
4	rebuttal. Let's hear from your adversary.
5	MR. FISHMAN: May it please the court
6	excuse me my name is James Fishman for the
7	respondents in this case. With me is
8	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Counsel, start with
9	the statute of limitations.
10	MR. FISHMAN: Well, Your Honor, I I
11	think the thing that runs through all of these cases,
12	Thornton
13	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: I know our
14	precedents.
15	MR. FISHMAN: and Grimm, Cintron
16	_
17	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Explain how this case
18	fits in to those cases.
19	MR. FISHMAN: Well, I think you have to
20	- one thing that counsel said is that what what
21	all those cases deal with damages. They don't;
22	they deal with fraud. And fraud is the key issue
23	that runs like a thread through all of these cases.
24	JUDGE READ: Well, it is true
25	MR. FISHMAN: It's landlord misconduct.

1 JUDGE READ: He does have a point, doesn't he, that we didn't explicitly decide the statute of 2 3 limitations question that's present in this case in 4 those cases. 5 MR. FISHMAN: Well, in Grimm, the - - - the 6 ruling was - - -7 JUDGE READ: What about Cintron? 8 MR. FISHMAN: I'm sorry? 9 JUDGE READ: What about Cintron? 10 MR. FISHMAN: Cintron is even clearer. 11 Cintron - - - I - - - I know Your Honor was with the 12 majority in Cintron, where - - - where you could not 13 have a clearer example of landlord misconduct to ignore rent reduction orders for sixteen years. 14 15 Here, we have proved fraud. We have fraud that was 16 established. We don't have an indicia of fraud like 17 you had in Grimm. 18 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Counsel, go - - -MR. FISHMAN: We have fraud that was found 19 20 by a judge. 21 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Counsel, comment - - -22 please explain your - - - your position is that the 23 civil court found fraud - - -2.4 MR. FISHMAN: Yes.

JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: - - - and that

1	defendant was or collaterally estopped
2	MR. FISHMAN: Right.
3	JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: from challenging
4	that. And he says, no, we weren't collaterally
5	estopped, because the fraud finding was dicta. Why
6	is that
7	MR. FISHMAN: Well, Judge Schneider
8	JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: why is that
9	-
10	MR. FISHMAN: found that Emmanuel Ku
11	was unbelievable in all regards.
12	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yeah, but she did
13	deal with the habitability.
14	MR. FISHMAN: Yes.
15	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: It was the basis of
16	that decision, right?
17	MR. FISHMAN: Well, that was the only thing
18	she awarded relief on.
19	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: How about the
20	overcharge issue?
21	MR. FISHMAN: I understand. And that was
22	the only thing she actually awarded relief on.
23	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So what weight do we
24	give to her "findings" on this issue?
25	MR. FISHMAN: I think you have to give

1 substantial weight, because she heard - - - took testimony not only from Mr. Ku directly; she took 2 3 testimony from three or four other witnesses that we 4 presented that all proved that this fictitious tenant 5 never existed. JUDGE PIGOTT: Okay, but let's assume - - -6 7 let's assume you've got an auto accident and you say 8 - - - and the two charges against the defendant are 9 they were speeding and he ran a red light. And the 10 jury comes back and says, we found that he ran a red 11 light. I'm - - - in further proceedings, can you say 12 well, you're collaterally estopped from asserting 13 that you were - - - that - - - that you were 14 speeding? 15 MR. FISHMAN: I don't think that's a - - -16 a correct analogy, Your Honor, with all respect, 17 because first of all, Judge Schneider had the 18 opportunity to view all of this, and - - -19 JUDGE PIGOTT: Whatever - - - what - - -20 but whatever the court chose to do, the only thing 21 she said was, I don't believe you on your - - - on 22 your habitability and that's where I'm going to rule. 23 I am not going to rule on anything else and didn't.

MR. FISHMAN: I think you also have to look

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So how come - - -

at why the landlord didn't have the opportunity to present evidence before the Housing Court. The landlord chose not to litigate. He put up his hands and said, I'm not - - I'm not going to testify; I give up; I'm not going to do anything further. And then he puts in post-trial memo.

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And the Abady case, which both Judge Kenney and the Appellate Division relied on, said a default judgment under those circumstances is subject to collateral estoppel effect. Now the other issue is this - - -

JUDGE PIGOTT: Judgment, judgment. The judgment was on habitability.

MR. FISHMAN: I understand.

JUDGE PIGOTT: He can not litigate habitability.

MR. FISHMAN: Okay. Judge, the other point is this, even without collateral estoppel, there was nothing to stop this landlord from putting in evidence before Judge Kenney in the Supreme Court saying, oh, no, Suzuki Oki exists, and here's proof of it. Oh, no, I did - - - I did all these improvements; here's my receipts. They did nothing. If you look at this record, their response to our summary judgment motion was practically nothing. Mr.

	ku sat on his hands
2	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yeah, but the bottom
3	line is that the rent overcharge was dismissed
4	without prejudice.
5	MR. FISHMAN: Exactly. And then it was
6	refiled in the Supreme Court
7	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yeah.
8	MR. FISHMAN: within the time period
9	allowed by the
10	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: But but how
11	does that impact on these different findings that
12	- or whatever you want to call it, that the judge
13	-
14	MR. FISHMAN: I think these findings are -
15	certainly, even if it's not collateral estoppel,
16	and I submit that it is
17	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: What if it's
18	what if we agree that it's dicta?
19	MR. FISHMAN: Well, even if it's dicta,
20	it's evidence before Judge Kenney. And Judge Kenney
21	was free to view it for whatever purposes on a
22	summary judgment motion, because it certainly is
23	relevant. It certainly is an identity of parties
24	_
25	JUDGE PIGOTT: It's collateral stoppel,

1 isn't it? I mean, it - - - going back to my auto - -- my auto accident thing. You're saying, he was free 2 3 to say that jury was wrong, and if the jury didn't 4 address it, he could just say, based on that 5 evidence, I'm not letting it in. I - - - I don't 6 know that you could lose your license because a jury 7 8 MR. FISHMAN: Well - - -9 JUDGE PIGOTT: - - - didn't make a finding. 10 MR. FISHMAN: - - - certainly the court 11 heard the testimony, heard the evidence - - -12 JUDGE PIGOTT: One court did. 13 MR. FISHMAN: I'm sorry? 14 JUDGE PIGOTT: One court did. 15 MR. FISHMAN: Yes. And but what I'm saying 16 though is that Mr. - - - Megan and Mr. Ku were 17 certainly free to come before Judge Kenney in the 18 Supreme Court, and say - - -19 JUDGE PIGOTT: How can you do that? 20 MR. FISHMAN: - - - wait a minute; those 21 things didn't happen. Here's why. 22 JUDGE PIGOTT: I get your point. But what 23 you're saying is that this guy is such a rotten guy, 2.4 don't - - - don't give him his day in court, because 25 he's just a rotten guy. He - - - nobody believed

1	him, so you you Supreme Court or the
2	Court of Appeals in the State of New York, you can
3	just say, we don't like you
4	MR. FISHMAN: But he had his day in court,
5	Judge.
6	JUDGE PIGOTT: and we're going to
7	rule against you.
8	MR. FISHMAN: He had his day in court and
9	he chose not to use it. He voluntarily chose not to
10	use it.
11	JUDGE PIGOTT: He's the petitioner.
12	MR. FISHMAN: That's the problem here.
13	JUDGE PIGOTT: He was the petitioner. Your
14	counterclaims went forward. And you and you
15	succeeded on one and not on the other.
16	MR. FISHMAN: Well, Judge
17	JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Are you saying, Mr.
18	Fishman, that he had a fair and full and fair
19	opportunity to litigate
20	MR. FISHMAN: Absolutely.
21	JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: the issue of
22	fraud?
23	MR. FISHMAN: He had four lawyers in that
24	case.
25	JUDGE PIGOTT: Yeah, but you had everybody

1	there and the judge dismissed it.
2	MR. FISHMAN: Well
3	JUDGE PIGOTT: So why are we supposed to be
4	bound by it?
5	MR. FISHMAN: Well, I think, Judge, that
6	because he had a full and fair opportunity and
7	because
8	JUDGE PIGOTT: But it was your burden. It
9	was your burden and you didn't meet it
10	MR. FISHMAN: Well
11	JUDGE PIGOTT: because the judge said
12	
13	MR. FISHMAN: Well
14	JUDGE PIGOTT: I'm not
15	MR. FISHMAN: because there was a
16	document that wasn't submitted, which was submitted
17	in Supreme Court. Had that document
18	JUDGE PIGOTT: Whatever reason
19	MR. FISHMAN: been submitted, I
20	suspect this never would have come before this court.
21	However, the issue is, again, they had every
22	opportunity in response to the Supreme Court action
23	to come forward with facts in response to a summary
24	judgment motion. Their obligation is to lay bare
25	their proof. They didn't do it. They didn't come

1 forward with anything. We - - -2 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: And they should be 3 precluded from doing it now? MR. FISHMAN: Absolutely. Because they had 4 5 the - - - they had two chances to do it. They had a chance to do it in Housing Court and they chose not 6 7 to. And then in Supreme Court, they put in a three-8 page affidavit for Mr. Ku which said nothing about 9 Suzuki Oki, about the fictitious repairs, about the 10 fictitious rents, about not providing the rent stabilization rider. 11 He was silent. That's the opportunity. 12 13 he doesn't - - - if he wants to avoid collateral 14 estoppel, give the court some facts to - - - to rely 15 on to say, okay, you're right. We're not going to 16 rely on Judge Schneider, but give us something. 17 There was nothing there. It's empty. JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Counsel, in the veil-18 19 piercing issue - - -2.0 MR. FISHMAN: Yes. 21 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: - - - your position 22 here is that Mr. Ku was, you know - - - he - - - he 23 dominated this corporation - - -2.4 MR. FISHMAN: Yes.

JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: - - - and let's assume

for the purposes of this discussion that it was during the relevant time period that these transactions were going on. What if there were other persons involved in the LLC and maybe there had been some shifting of responsibilities over time, how would we decide a veil-piercing issue, you know, a question on - - on facts like that? Not when you have a hundred percent owner, but - -

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MR. FISHMAN: Well, I'm not sure - -
JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: - - a ninety-nine
percent owner.

MR. FISHMAN: - - I can answer that,
because that's not what happened here. But clearly,
Mr. Ku was either ninety-nine or hundred percent the
owner, and one - - one specific thing that - - that counsel for appellants has always tried to
ignore, but it's really the smoking gun document
here, and I ask the court to refer to page 242 of the
record, which is the application that Mr. Ku
submitted personally for a loan from the New York
Community Bank, and this was in August of '09, which
is only four months after he filed a nonpayment
proceeding against my clients in the Housing Court.

And on page 242 of the record, there's a section for a schedule readily marketable secured - -

1 - I'm sorry; I'm reading the wrong page. It's 244. There's a column for assets, and under the column 2 3 "solely owned", meaning by the applicant, he lists 4 seventeen different properties, which are actually 5 all LLCs. And he says, those are worth sixty-six million dollars. 6 7 JUDGE PIGOTT: But that's true. He owns them all. 8 9 MR. FISHMAN: Well, the LLCs do, actually. 10 JUDGE PIGOTT: Well, that - - - you see, 11 you're fighting over whether or not you can list that 12 as - - - as a - - - something you can list on a 13 credit statement. MR. FISHMAN: Well - - -14 15 JUDGE PIGOTT: Now, maybe - - - maybe 16 you're right, maybe you're wrong, but the bank is the 17 one that gets to decide that. It's - - - it's sort 18 of like when you talk about the taxes. 19 MR. FISHMAN: But it's disregarding the 20 corporate forum, Judge. 21 JUDGE PIGOTT: Because of the fraud, the 22 IRS - - - the IRS has got a claim - - -23 MR. FISHMAN: Right. JUDGE PIGOTT: - - - but that doesn't mean 2.4 25 that whatever happens with the corporations, you can

1 crash the - - - the corporate veil's been very tough 2 to crack. 3 MR. FISHMAN: The standard is disregarding the corporate forum and causing harm. And this is a 4 5 - - - as clear an example of disregarding the 6 corporate forum I can think of to say I personally 7 own all these buildings. JUDGE PIGOTT: But that - - - that's 8 9 something for the bank to complain about. 10 MR. FISHMAN: Well, it may be, but this is 11 how he runs his business generally. JUDGE PIGOTT: But if - - - if somebody 12 13 owns twelve taxis - - - you know, we - - - you know, the whole black and white taxi stuff - - - and they 14 15 want to list them for the next time they want to 16 borrow some money from the bank, you can't say, oh, 17 ho, now all of these taxis are responsible for my 18 accident when I got run down by the taxi. 19 going to say you can't do that, because you - - - you 20 know, that's not sufficient to - - - to - - - to 21 pierce the corporate veil, is it? 22 MR. FISHMAN: Well, I think, you know, you 23 have to look at the whole host of things that were -2.4 - - that were listed in our brief - - -

JUDGE PIGOTT: Right, and you did - - - and

1	you got a summary judgment
2	MR. FISHMAN: and that we did.
3	JUDGE PIGOTT: that's what
4	MR. FISHMAN: I understand. But he didn't
5	produce anything in response. Again, he's he
6	had a one paragraph
7	JUDGE PIGOTT: But you have to establish
8	your entitlement to a judgment as a matter of law
9	_
10	MR. FISHMAN: Yes.
11	JUDGE PIGOTT: before they have to
12	come up
13	MR. FISHMAN: It's a legal issue, Your
14	Honor.
15	JUDGE PIGOTT: And you believe you
16	you believe you established your your
17	entitlement?
18	MR. FISHMAN: Yes, I do, Judge, and I think
19	it's a legal issue, which the judge was entitled to
20	rule on, based upon what was presented to her
21	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, counsel, we
22	understand your argument.
23	MR. FISHMAN: Okay.
24	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Let's hear rebuttal
25	from the other side.

1	MR. FISHMAN: Thank you.
2	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Thank you, counselor
3	Counselor?
4	JUDGE PIGOTT: Your clients were pretty
5	quiet.
6	MR. SHEIKH: Your Honor, I think with
7	regard to that financial statement, I think you hit
8	the nail on the head. You know, that's a document
9	that's submitted to the bank, and really the only one
10	that can complain whether that document is being used
11	to further fraud is the bank.
12	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yeah, but can
13	who
14	JUDGE PIGOTT: Did he make that argument?
15	Pardon me.
16	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: No, I was just going
17	to say the same thing.
18	JUDGE RIVERA: Yeah.
19	MR. SHEIKH: I'm sorry.
20	JUDGE PIGOTT: I made that argument. Did
21	he?
22	MR. SHEIKH: No, and and exactly. I
23	think I think it's for the bank to complain
24	about that.
25	JUDGE PIGOTT: But I'm not sure I heard

that in - - - in his affidavits - - - in opposition 1 2 to their motion. 3 MR. SHEIKH: No, that was not in Mr. Ku's affidavit. 4 5 JUDGE PIGOTT: You can't rely on me. 6 MR. SHEIKH: But I mean I will say this, 7 the - - -8 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Why didn't you 9 contest these - - - these issues - - -10 The piercing the co - - -MR. SHEIKH: 11 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: - - - before the 12 court? 13 MR. SHEIKH: The piercing the corporate veil issue was contested. In - - - in that three-14 15 page affidavit from Mr. Ku, he explains all of the 16 issues that the respondents say are the basis for 17 piercing the corporate veil. One of the things that they say is that all 18 19 these corporations share the same addresses over the 20 years. And he says, absolutely, because I have a 21 management company that is used to run all of these 22 companies, and so it's a central place for all these 23 companies to, you know - - - for the rents to come in 2.4 and for us to process everything, and that's - - -

that's why there's the same address.

1 Do they have the same phone number? 2 management company uses one phone number. 3 don't have their own phone number, because they're 4 single-purpose entity LLCs. There would be no point 5 for any of these LLCs to have a phone number, because nobody calls them. All right? They call the 6 7 management company that runs the building for them. But I think - - - and - - - and in that 8 9 affidavit he spells out - - - he - - - and he talks 10 exact - - - also about the - - - about the 11 transactions, where he says, look, this is not 12 commingling, right? And I think that, you know, 13 based on this record - - -14 JUDGE RIVERA: But again - - - but the 15 judge could have rejected that as a matter of law. 16 MR. SHEIKH: Well, I think it's an issue of 17 fact, right? Whether there's - - -18 JUDGE RIVERA: Not - - - not if you - - -19 not if your client agrees that this is how he used 20 the funds and he characterizes it as something else. 21 MR. SHEIKH: I think commingling to me, 22 Your Honor, is something like - - - so rent comes in 23 for Megan Holding, right? It's - - - it's Megan 2.4 Holding's rent, right? And then Megan Holding starts

paying bills for Guru Holding, right? Now that's

1	clearly Megan's money and it's used being used
2	to pay Guru Holding's bills, you know, I think that
3	may be commingling.
4	JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: You're saying what
5	happens here with your client is that Megan Holding
6	gets money, contributes it contributes that
7	money to Guru Holding, so Guru Holding can pay its
8	own bills.
9	MR. SHEIKH: No, it
10	JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Is that is that
11	what you're saying now?
12	MR. SHEIKH: it doesn't go directly
13	from Megan to Guru. It goes from Megan, right, and -
14	
15	JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: To the management
16	company?
17	MR. SHEIKH: Not to the management company.
18	To Mr. Ku. He takes the distribution. Right? So
19	I'm saying now, once he takes the distribution,
20	that's his money.
21	JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: And then he
22	contributes it to
23	MR. SHEIKH: And then he contributes to
24	Guru Holding.
25	JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Guru.

JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Guru.

1	JUDGE RIVERA: And what what does
2	that mean, he contributes? What is that?
3	MR. SHEIKH: It he's investing money
4	into that LLC. So you can imagine some of these
5	buildings have more tenants than others. Some of
6	them are big buildings; some of them are small. Some
7	of them are cash-rich entities. Some of them are
8	- are completely you know, from a cash point of
9	view, they may be
10	JUDGE RIVERA: It sounds it sounds
11	like he controls the entire Monopoly board.
12	MR. SHEIKH: Well
13	JUDGE RIVERA: And he's just moving pieces
14	around.
15	MR. SHEIKH: Exactly. But to make the
16	distinction that it's not commingling. I see, Your
17	Honors, my time has expired.
18	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: That's okay. Finish
19	your answer to Judge Rivera's question.
20	MR. SHEIKH: But that that would be
21	the difference between commingling. But then there's
22	the second issue is that even if he's doing that, how
23	is that defrauding the respondents here? What would
24	be defrauding the respondents

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, counsel.

1	MR. SHEIKH: is if he's if he's
2	taking the money and leaving the LLC without
3	sufficient
4	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, thank you both.
5	Appreciate it.
6	MR. SHEIKH: Thank you, Your Honors.
7	(Court is adjourned)
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CERTIFICATION I, Karen Schiffmiller, certify that the foregoing transcript of proceedings in the Court of Appeals of Conason v. Megan Holding, LLC, No. 14, was prepared using the required transcription equipment and is a true and accurate record of the proceedings. Hour Laboffmills. Signature: Agency Name: eScribers Address of Agency: 700 West 192nd Street Suite # 607 New York, NY 10040 Date: January 20, 2015