| 1  | COURT OF APPEALS  |
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| 2  | STATE OF NEW YORK   |
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| 4  | PHILIP CAPRIO AND PHYLLIS CAPRIO,  Respondents,                           |
| 5  |   |
| 6  | -against-<br>No. 116  |
| 7  | NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF TAXATION AND FINANCE, et al., Appellants.    |
| 8  | inpertanes.   |
| 9  | 20 Eagle Street   |
| 10 | Albany, New York 12207<br>June 04, 2015                                   |
| 11 | Before:   |
| 12 | CHIEF JUDGE JONATHAN LIPPMAN  |
| 13 | ASSOCIATE JUDGE SUSAN PHILLIPS READ ASSOCIATE JUDGE EUGENE F. PIGOTT, JR. |
| 14 | ASSOCIATE JUDGE JENNY RIVERA ASSOCIATE JUDGE SHEILA ABDUS-SALAAM          |
| 15 | ASSOCIATE JUDGE LESLIE E. STEIN ASSOCIATE JUDGE EUGENE M. FAHEY           |
| 16 | Appearances:  |
| 17 | JUDITH N. VALE, ASG   |
| 18 | NEW YORK STATE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL Attorneys for Appellants    |
| 19 | 120 Broadway<br>New York, NY 10271  |
| 20 | JOHN G. NICOLICH, ESQ.  |
| 21 | INGRAM YUZEK GAINEN CARROLL & BERTOLOTTI, LLP                             |
|    | Attorneys for Respondents<br>250 Park Avenue                              |
| 22 | New York, NY 10177  |
| 23 |   |
| 24 |   |
| 25 | Sharona Shapiro<br>Official Court Transcriber                             |

| 1  | CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Number 116, Caprio.           |
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| 2  | (Pause)  |
| 3  | CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Counselor, do you             |
| 4  | want any rebuttal time?                            |
| 5  | MS. VALE: Three minutes, yes, Your Honor.          |
| 6  | CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay. Go ahead,               |
| 7  | counselor.   |
| 8  | MS. VALE: May it please the court. Judith          |
| 9  | Vale for the State appellants.                     |
| 10 | CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Counselor, what's the         |
| 11 | test as to whether it can be retroactive or not?   |
| 12 | MS. VALE: The test is the three-pronged            |
| 13 | balancing test from Replan and from James Square.  |
| 14 | CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: How does that test            |
| 15 | work in your favor?                                |
| 16 | MS. VALE: It works in our favor because we         |
| 17 | have a strong curative public purpose here for the |
| 18 | retroactivity                                      |
| 19 | CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: What's the curative           |
| 20 | public purpose?                                    |
| 21 | MS. VALE: The pu Baum the pur                      |
| 22 | the purpose was                                    |
| 23 | CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Other than to get             |
| 24 | more money for the State; I get that.              |
|    |  |

MS. VALE: No, no, no, the main - - -

1 everything is clear that the main purpose here was 2 because Baum and Mintz upset the settled law at the 3 time. 4 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So it's a curative 5 purpose to say that - - - that you want to overturn the Mintz decision? That's curative? 6 MS. VALE: Yes, it's curative because up 7 until Baum and Mintz - - -8 9 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: I don't - - -10 MS. VALE: - - - purchasers had - - -11 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: I don't get that. 12 What's the theory that it could be curative? 13 MS. VALE: Because up until Baum and Mintz, 14 purchasers were getting the asset-sale benefits, and 15 nonresident sellers were paying the taxes. And then 16 Baum and Mintz upset everything, turned it upside 17 down, and suddenly purchasers didn't know if they were going to get to keep the asset-sale benefits 18 19 that they had already been taking. 2.0 JUDGE STEIN: What is there to show us what 21 was happening before Baum and Mintz? Because I think 22 that's - - - that's really sort of the crux of this. 23 MS. VALE: Absolutely, Your Honor. I think 2.4 it is very important to look at what was happening

before Baum and Mintz, and all of the evidence in the

1 record shows that before Baum and Mintz, the State 2 was taxing this and nonresident sellers were paying 3 those taxes. 4 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: But Judge Stein's 5 question, counsel, is what is that evidence. MS. VALE: Absolutely. You have the 6 7 legislative findings; you have the legislative 8 history. You have a public opinion in Haskell, from 9 1997, saying that the deemed asset-sale gain passes 10 through. You have Publication 88, also public in 11 2006, saying that installment income under 453 - - -12 JUDGE PIGOTT: Are there a lot of tax 13 returns that you could point to where this was paid before, and all of a sudden, because of these two 14 15 decisions, it didn't happen anymore? 16 MS. VALE: Yes, there - - - DTF estimated 17 that there's going to be millions of dollars in refunds - - -18 19 JUDGE PIGOTT: But before. In other words, 2.0 you're saying people were paying this tax - - -21 MS. VALE: Um-hum. 22 JUDGE PIGOTT: - - - they were paying it 23 willingly, gladly, and were thrilled to be part of 2.4 New York, and then these two decisions came out that

said they don't have to pay it anymore, and they were

| 1  | all upset. I'm kidding. But and then, so now          |
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| 2  | you've fixed it, so everybody's going back and paying |
| 3  | the taxes. Is there proof that people were really     |
| 4  | paying the taxes beforehand?                          |
| 5  | MS. VALE: Yes, that's why there would be              |
| 6  | unintended refunds. I mean, there wouldn't be a       |
| 7  | refund possible                                       |
| 8  | JUDGE PIGOTT: I understand that.                      |
| 9  | MS. VALE: unless people had paid the                  |
| 10 | taxes. And DTF looked at this, and                    |
| 11 | JUDGE RIVERA: But those you're                        |
| 12 | saying those refunds are pre-Baum and Mintz, or       |
| 13 | whatever that window would be?                        |
| 14 | MS. VALE: I I don't know which one -                  |
| 15 |   |
| 16 | JUDGE RIVERA: Because post-Baum and Mintz,            |
| 17 | people might stop or say that they want the           |
| 18 | refunds, right?                                       |
| 19 | MS. VALE: Well, they're they're                       |
| 20 | probably post-Baum and Mintz, but the some of         |
| 21 | the I mean, in time, people would have sought         |
| 22 | the refunds after Baum and Mintz because that's what  |
| 23 |   |
| 24 | JUDGE RIVERA: Okay. That's what                       |
| 25 | MS. VALE: suddenly overturned the                     |

| 1  | law.  |
|----|---|
| 2  | CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: But that                         |
| 3  | MS. VALE: But because the tax years stay              |
| 4  | open  |
| 5  | CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: But that's different.            |
| 6  | That's the theory that yes, the State will get        |
| 7  | will will not lose money. You'll you'll               |
| 8  | be able to to get more revenue if you overturn        |
| 9  | Mintz, but but again, curative means something.       |
| 10 | MS. VALE: Yes, curative does mean                     |
| 11 | something. But this court said, in James Square,      |
| 12 | that a main curative purpose is stopping unintended   |
| 13 | refunds. That is different that is                    |
| 14 | qualitatively different than seeking new money that   |
| 15 | you never expected to get. And the reason for that    |
| 16 | is because  |
| 17 | CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: But unintended                   |
| 18 | refunds, you mean in the future?                      |
| 19 | MS. VALE: Well, the tax years stay open               |
| 20 | for three years; I think that's the critical point    |
| 21 | here. So once Baum and Mintz hit and and              |
| 22 | overturned settled law, people could seek refunds for |
| 23 |   |
| 24 | JUDGE STEIN: That's the question.                     |
| 25 | MS. VALE: prior years.                                |

JUDGE STEIN: How do we know that that was 1 2 settled law? Because, clearly, Baum and Mintz said 3 something. The question is, did Baum and Mintz say 4 something that was really the practice all along, and 5 nobody was saying anything about it, or did it change 6 what was happening all along? How do we know what 7 was happening before Baum and Mintz? 8 MS. VALE: Absolutely. You look to, first 9 of all, legislative findings, which specifically 10 found that the settled practice was - - -11 JUDGE FAHEY: Well, let me - - - let's slow 12 down there. Let's talk about that a second. 13 follow up on that, because the legislative amendment, as I understood this, the DTF statement as to the 14 15 longstanding practices, those were actually - - -16 that amendment preamble was actually drafted by DTF, 17 isn't that correct? MS. VALE: Well, DTF did seek this 18 19 amendment because Baum and Mintz - - -2.0 JUDGE FAHEY: So - - - so they - - -21 MS. VALE: - - - had upset the law. 22 JUDGE FAHEY: Okay. So they - - - they 23 drafted it. Because I looked at it, and there wasn't 2.4 any citation to any statute, regulation or DTF 25 document, though that did come later. There weren't

any citations to the letter from the DTF Commission 1 2 that Governor Paterson had commented on in the bill. 3 And that's why, when we search the record, we're kind 4 of struggling here to find out where in the record, 5 as Judge Stein's original question was, points to 6 something besides, you know, an argument or a 7 rhetorical argument as to why this amendment should go forward. 8 9 MS. VALE: Absolutely, Your Honor. 10 that's where you look to the other evidence, which is 11 the public opinion in Haskell, in 1997, saying these 12 deemed asset-sale gains pass through. 13 JUDGE PIGOTT: Well - - -14 MS. VALE: And you look to Publication 88, 15 also public - - -16 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Judge - - -17 MS. VALE: Sorry - - -

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: - - - go ahead.

MS. VALE: - - - go ahead.

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JUDGE PIGOTT: But I wanted to go back to my original question, because I think I understand it now. You're saying that let's say a hundred people paid this tax, and they paid it because that's what the law was. All of a sudden, out come these two decisions, and since then, seventy of those one

hundred are coming back asking for refunds on this, 1 2 that they had previously paid and had not - - - had 3 no objection to. And that proves that this - - these two decisions were clearly out of the - - - out 4 5 of the norm - - -6 MS. VALE: Yes, that's part of - - -7 JUDGE PIGOTT: - - - and therefore - - -8 MS. VALE: It's part of - - -9 JUDGE PIGOTT: - - - therefore the curative 10 aspect of it. 11 MS. VALE: Yes, that is part of the proof. 12 It's showing that, A, there was a lot of public 13 information out there at the time, in 2007, saying

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It's showing that, A, there was a lot of public information out there at the time, in 2007, saying the deemed asset sale pass through and that installment also pass through. And when you have other nonresident sellers actually paying the tax, back in 2007, it shows that the reasonable expectation in 2007 was that New York was treating these as deemed asset sales, both giving out the benefits of the deemed asset sale and collecting the taxes.

JUDGE READ: So they can have had no reliance? There's - - - you've talked about the one factor, the public purpose, but there are two others; one was the reliance and the other is the length of

time. Does this relate to the reliance too? You're saying they couldn't have relied on it because those - - - because of the 1997 decision?

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MS. VALE: Yes. Yeah, it does relate to the reliance, because you - - - you don't have as much of a reasonable, settled reliance in immunity if all of the evidence at the time was suggesting that New York was going to tax these kinds of transactions. And reliance - - -

JUDGE STEIN: Can you distinguish the installment sales portion of it from the deemed asset sale, or do those two - - - have those two always gone together? Because it seems to me that the focus in this case, by the plaintiffs, is the installment issue, not necessarily the deemed asset sale, although they're a little connected.

MS. VALE: Yeah, I think it's a hard to break it apart. I mean, it's all part of one transaction that's happening at one time. And even back in 2007, it was clear that if you had installment, if you were delaying your gain through the 453, through the provision that plaintiffs rely on, it still had to pass through. We also think that's the most reasonable reading of prior law. But I think it's also shown that that was the way that

both DTF and other taxpayers were treating it back in 2007.

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And you can look at that PowerPoint from 2002. There's actually a warning in there to auditors saying, people are trying to use the delay to make all of the deemed ass - - - to make that case a real asset sale, make all of that gain vanish, and suddenly not have to pay New York taxes. And so back in 2002, DTF was aware of this and was not allowing that kind of treatment. And it also just doesn't make sense. It doesn't make - - -

JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: I think your adversary or the plaintiffs here are saying that that might have been internal policy, but it wasn't public, that they couldn't have found that out, I guess, themselves. So what about this, with - - - the PowerPoint, for example, was internal, so what was public?

MS. VALE: Well, you have the Publication 88, which says installment - - - with an S corp., if you have installment payments, they have to pass through and get reported on the shareholder's personal income tax. So you have that publication, and although the - - - the PowerPoint is an internal presentation, it's back in 2002, and it's to the

auditors who then go out and enforce this - - 
JUDGE FAHEY: Didn't the notes to the

PowerPoint - - - weren't there something in the notes

that was neg - - - and I've got language that - - -

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7 fraction unless the nonresident shareholder's stock

I'm looking at my notes here, "The gain would not be

included in the numerator of the New York source

8 in the corporation is employed in another trade or

9 business carried on in New York by the shareholder,"

10 which is tracking the language of the exemption that

11 the petitioners are relying upon. And that was in

the notes attached to the PowerPoint presentation.

MS. VALE: That piece actually is coming - - coming out of the Haskell opinion; if you look at
it, it's almost a cut and paste. And that's talking
about - - it is talking about the liquidation piece
that happens in all of these transactions. A
liquidation happens whether you delay the payment or
not.

JUDGE FAHEY: You're saying you weren't relying on that, then? That's not your interpretation of it, even though it was the notes in the PowerPoint presentation?

MS. VALE: Well, I think it's still - - - that note is still true when you're talking about - -

- I guess I have to - - - you have to break it down into the deemed asset sale and the liquidation, and we're saying that the deemed asset-sale portion that was calculated here - - plaintiffs did a calculation for their deemed asset sale; you can see it in the record at pages 385 to 387. That portion of the gain still has to pass through. And that the delay of just delaying one month - - -

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JUDGE STEIN: How about one day?

MS. VALE: Or day. It could - - - it could absolutely be a day. Under plaintiff's theory, that would make all of the deemed asset-sale gain just vanish, and suddenly assets that were used to do, in this case, fifty percent of the business in New York, all of a sudden there's no taxes at all.

JUDGE STEIN: Do you know how the federal tax, the IRS treats the deemed liquidation for tax purposes?

MS. VALE: We think that you have to look to the 453B to understand the federal treatment. That piece brings the whole treatment around full circle. And in 453B, it says both the shareholders and the corporation are getting the benefit of a delay, but once the shareholder recognizes gains or losses, you have to look to 1366(b), which is the

1 pass-through rules. So you have to still look back 2 to the corporation to know which pots of money are 3 coming from which source, so that the pot of money that was coming from the deemed asset sale should 4 5 still pass through. That was how we understood federal law. We think that's the most reasonable 6 7 reading of federal law, and it's the way that DTF and 8 other taxpayers were treating these transactions back 9 in 2007, which you can see from all of the evidence. 10 And I just want to point out - - -11 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Counselor - - -MS. VALE: - - - they just have - - -12 13 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: - - - finish your 14 thought. 15 MS. VALE: Finish the thought. Plaintiffs had the burden here, and they produced no evidence to 16 17 - - - to show that it would have been a reasonable, 18 settled expectation, in 2007, to think you were going 19 to get immunity. 2.0 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, counselor. 21 Let's hear from the other side. 22 MR. NICOLICH: Thank you, Your Honor. 23 Nicolich, representing the Caprios, the - - -2.4 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Counsel, was it a

reasonable expectation back in 2007?

| 1  | MR. NICOLICH: The reasonable expectation              |
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| 2  | that this was not taxable for many, many              |
| 3  | CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Based on what?                   |
| 4  | MR. NICOLICH: reasons.                                |
| 5  | CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Based on what?                   |
| 6  | MR. NICOLICH: Because, as as the                      |
| 7  | State continues to say, it's supposed to be federal-  |
| 8  | state conformity. The federal statutes and the        |
| 9  | federal regulations clearly treat this 338            |
| 10 | transaction, the purchaser gets to treat it as a sale |
| 11 | of assets, but the regs make very clear that the      |
| 12 | seller continues to treat it as a sale of stock.      |
| 13 | It's considered a liquidation under the federal       |
| 14 | statutes. The statutes are very clear                 |
| 15 | JUDGE STEIN: So are you talk does                     |
| 16 | this apply whether it's an installment sale or not?   |
| 17 | MR. NICOLICH: That                                    |
| 18 | JUDGE STEIN: Or does it                               |
| 19 | MR. NICOLICH: That applies whether it's an            |
| 20 | installment sale or not, correct.                     |
| 21 | JUDGE READ: And you rely for that on your             |
| 22 | interpretation of the federal law?                    |
| 23 | MR. NICOLICH: My interpretation the                   |
| 24 | regulations give examples and say that this is        |
| 25 | treated as a liquidation. And the federal statute     |

1 says a liquidation of a corporation is treated as a 2 shareholder's sale of stock. 3 JUDGE READ: That's in the Revenue Code? 4 MR. NICOLICH: That's in the Revenue Code, 5 and as the State points out in their briefs, there's supposed to be federal-state conformity - - -6 7 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: So your position - - -8 MR. NICOLICH: - - - so we follow that 9 principle. 10 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: - - - is that you 11 relied on the way the feds treated this to interpret how the State would treat it? 12 13 MR. NICOLICH: That's because that's exactly what the federal-state conformity requires. 14 15 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: But you didn't think 16 that - - - as the dissent in the Appellate Division 17 pointed out, that it might have been important to get 18 an opinion - - - a tax opinion from a lawyer or 19 someone else to that effect? 2.0 MR. NICOLICH: The Caprios were 21 well-represented at the time. This issue was never 22 raised at the trial court, so we never had the 23 opportunity to go in and put that kind of evidence, 2.4 if that was something that was required.

JUDGE STEIN: I'm a little con - - - I wish

- - - I'd just like you to clarify something for me.

In your complaint, you repeatedly refer to the tax on gain recognized on payments received from installment obligations.

MR. NICOLICH: Correct.

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JUDGE STEIN: Does it matter whether this is a deemed asset sale or an asset sale or - - - that's - - -  $\!\!\!$ 

MR. NICOLICH: Well, it matters, because under the federal regulations that we followed, the regulations are directed to a 338(h)(10) transaction, and specifically gives an example of when that transaction is effected with an installment payment, and very clearly lays out, in example 10, that when the installment payment is made years later, it is treated as a payment for the sale of stock.

JUDGE STEIN: But you're arguing that whether it's a day later or a year later, it doesn't matter what the transaction was; if there's now an installment payment, rather than an immediate payment, it changes the entire character of the sale and it's not taxable. Is - - -

MR. NICOLICH: No, that's not quite right in two points.

JUDGE STEIN: Okay.

| 1  | MR. NICOLICH: First                                   |
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| 2  | JUDGE STEIN: How am I wrong?                          |
| 3  | MR. NICOLICH: in terms of the                         |
| 4  | installment, you have to understand that when counsel |
| 5  | says it was a day later or a month later, there       |
| 6  | actually were two payments here                       |
| 7  | JUDGE STEIN: I understand that, but the -             |
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| 9  | MR. NICOLICH: and one was done                        |
| 10 | JUDGE STEIN: the vast majority was                    |
| 11 | one month after                                       |
| 12 | MR. NICOLICH: One month after.                        |
| 13 | JUDGE STEIN: the deemed asset sale.                   |
| 14 | MR. NICOLICH: But the federal law, 453,               |
| 15 | requires requires this circumstance, when             |
| 16 | there's a second payment, to be treated as an         |
| 17 | installment transaction, unless the taxpayer          |
| 18 | specifically elects not to. So the default is it's    |
| 19 | treated as a installment sale.                        |
| 20 | JUDGE STEIN: That begs the question: why              |
| 21 | would installment payments be treated differently?    |
| 22 | MR. NICOLICH: And                                     |
| 23 | JUDGE STEIN: Why would it matter if it was            |
| 24 | the day be the day of the the sale or a               |
| 25 | month later? Why does that make a difference?         |

1 MR. NICOLICH: That's the way the law is 2 written. 3 JUDGE RIVERA: Can I ask, what's the consequence of that, the federal level? What - - -4 5 how does that work - - -MR. NICOLICH: On the federal - - -6 7 JUDGE RIVERA: - - - for your client? MR. NICOLICH: - - - level, the difference 8 9 is there's a capital gains tax, so it gets capital 10 gains tax treatment. 11 JUDGE RIVERA: All right. That's - - - that's a 12 MR. NICOLICH: 13 difference there, and of course the payment of the 14 tax is delayed for when - - - until when the 15 installment payments are received. 16 Okay. 17 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Counsel? 18 JUDGE FAHEY: So that's the real purpose of 19 the installment payments? That's why they're 2.0 structured that way, to deal with the capital - - -21 the capital gains problem? 22 MR. NICOLICH: And - - - under federal tax 23 law, I believe they are. In - - - in this case - - -2.4 I mean, there were two reasons the - - - the - - -25 why this is not taxable. Both 338(h)(10), as Baum

| 1  | and Mi as Baum indicates, this is a sale of          |
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| 2  | stock; sale of stock to nonre by nonresidents        |
| 3  | are not taxable.                                     |
| 4  | JUDGE FAHEY: Um-hum.                                 |
| 5  | MR. NICOLICH: And sorry, I lost my                   |
| 6  | thought.   |
| 7  | JUDGE FAHEY: Go ahead.                               |
| 8  | MR. NICOLICH: Okay.                                  |
| 9  | JUDGE FAHEY: Don't let me throw you off.             |
| 10 | JUDGE PIGOTT: Well, the big deal                     |
| 11 | your argument is due process. You're saying that the |
| 12 |  |
| 13 | MR. NICOLICH: Yes, it's due                          |
| 14 | JUDGE PIGOTT: retroactive                            |
| 15 | application of this is a denial of                   |
| 16 | MR. NICOLICH: And this court has been very           |
| 17 | clear that in James Square, sixteen to thirty-two    |
| 18 | months retroactivity was improper                    |
| 19 | JUDGE READ: So three and a                           |
| 20 | MR. NICOLICH: and violated due                       |
| 21 | process.   |
| 22 | JUDGE READ: three-and-a-half years                   |
| 23 | is just too long?                                    |
| 24 | MR. NICOLICH: Yes, it's too long. They               |
| 25 | make an argument that, well, a prolonged period      |

should be allowed because this is a curative statute.

This is not a curative statute.

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JUDGE STEIN: What is your proof that before Mintz and Baum, the - - - the practice was different? How have you met that burden?

MR. NICOLICH: Well, in two ways. Number one, clear application of the federal law, federal regulations, and the fact that state law incorporates them.

But as Your Honor pointed out earlier, page 154 of the record, this is part of the PowerPoint presentation. This is their own evidence. "A nonresident shareholder is taxed on the pass-through of the gain from the deemed sale of the assets, but only to the extent the gain is derived from New York sources. The gain would not be included in the numerator of the New York source fraction unless the nonresident shareholder's stock in the corporation is employed in another trade or business carried on in New York State by the shareholder." This is the New York State Tax Department's own document. So they have no evidence that shareholders in this situation were being taxed before this.

JUDGE RIVERA: What about Haskell?

MR. NICOLICH: And if they were - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: What about Haskell and - - - well, depending on how you - - - what about - - -

MR. NICOLICH: Haskell - - - if I can just find it a second. Page 164 of the record; this is Haskell: "Note when a resident or nonresident shareholder actually disposes of the shareholder's stock, any gain on the actual sale of the stock is not recognized by the shareholder for federal or New York State personal income tax purposes." This is under a 338 - - a deemed liquidation, which is what we're talking about. Deemed liquidation is what happened under the federal law and - - and federal regulations.

JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: But is there any difference - - I'll go back to my earlier question about - - is there any distinction that this is an installment sale because it's treated under a different section of the IRS Code?

MR. NICOLICH: Well -- but the IRS regs, they treat 338 transactions, which is what this is, specifically addresses installment sales and says that a payment under an installment sale is a payment for the sale of stocks. So those provisions work together.

I don't know if I've answered your

1 question, but - - -2 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, counselor. 3 Anything else, counselor? MR. NICOLICH: No. If you have no more 4 5 further questions for me - - -6 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Thank you, counselor. 7 Counselor, rebuttal? 8 JUDGE READ: It is true we've never proved 9 anything as long as three-and-a-half years before, 10 have we? 11 MS. VALE: No, that's not true. There are 12 plenty of cases where it stretches back longer than 13 three years if you have a curative or clarifying 14 amendment. In Varrington, it was longer than three 15 years. In Canisius College, it was longer than three 16 years. The duration is not a free-floating factor 17 where you just pick a number and say it's enough or it's not enough. That doesn't make sense. You have 18 19 to look at why you need that duration. 2.0 JUDGE READ: So this goes back to the 21 public purpose argument that you made before? 22 MS. VALE: Yes, it all gets tied together. 23 The curative and clarifying nature of this amendment 2.4 affects all of the due process factors. And you

needed the three years because that's how long the

tax years stay open. And so if you picked a random number, if you picked one-and-a-half years, then for the other one-and-a-half years, you'd still have the chaos from Baum and Mintz, you'd still have purchasers not knowing what they're supposed to do with the asset-sale benefits that they already took, how they're supposed to keep track of different valued assets under federal and New York systems, and you'd still have unintended refunds flowing for that time period.

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And I want to stress, what plaintiffs are trying to say is that a guess at what might be a reading, in order to get total tax immunity, is somehow a settled, reasonable expectation that gives them a due process right.

JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: But they're saying this is more than a guess. They're saying they looked at the way the feds treated this, and there's supposed to be federal-state conformity, so they relied on what the feds do in assuming, essentially, that New York would treat it the same. So what's your response to that?

MS. VALE: We don't think that's the most reasonable reading of federal law, because they are ignoring 453B, and even example 10 points to 453B and

1 to 1366 and says you have to look to the pass-through 2 rules, and that is a very important piece of the 3 federal treatment. 4 JUDGE READ: So you're saying the federal 5 law is ambiguous? 6 MS. VALE: Yes, and - - - I mean, we don't 7 think it's ambiguous; we think the reasonable reading 8 was our way, but at most, they have identified an 9 ambiguity, what might be a disconnect between the 10 federal system and the New York system, and that 11 doesn't create a reasonable, settled expectation, 12 back in 2007, to tax immunity. And the deemed 13 asset-sale part of this transaction is key; it's the 14 heart of the transaction. It is not just a 15 liquidation. And what plaintiffs are saying is that 16 that delay, that one-day or one-month delay, would 17 make all the difference in the world. It would mean that all of the deemed asset-sale gain gets 18 transformed into stock-sale gain and is not taxable. 19 2.0 JUDGE RIVERA: But the deemed - - - well, 21 I'm sorry. But the deemed asset doesn't occur - - -22 this fiction doesn't occur without the liquidation, 23 no? 2.4 MS. VALE: There is always - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: It's part and parcel; you

1 can't do one without the other, correct? 2 MS. VALE: But there's always a deemed 3 asset sale and there's always a liquidation - - -4 JUDGE RIVERA: Liquidation. 5 MS. VALE: - - - whether you have an 6 installment sale or not, and so under plaintiff's 7 theory, people like the Burtons, who didn't delay 8 their payments, would have to pay the taxes; the 9 deemed asset sale would pass through and they would 10 have to pay. But the Caprios wouldn't, because they 11 delayed payment by one month. We don't think that's 12 the way to read federal law. We don't think that's 13 the way New York ever treated these transactions, which is clear from the record. And it wouldn't make 14 15 sense to do it that way. Why would New York give out 16 the asset-sale benefits but not collect the 17 asset-sale taxes? JUDGE RIVERA: I mean, what's the point - -18 19 2.0 MS. VALE: That doesn't make sense. 21 JUDGE RIVERA: What's the point of the 22 regulation he's referring to? 23 MS. VALE: Of? 2.4 JUDGE RIVERA: What's the point of that 25 federal regulation?

1 MS. VALE: To have the liquidation? I mean, it's the - - - there's a bunch of different 2 3 mechanical steps that happen in order to make this tax fiction, with very real consequences, work. And 4 5 part of the process is that they do the liquidation. 6 But that shouldn't make all of the deemed asset-sale 7 gains, that were calculated in this case, just vanish into thin air. That's not fair to other taxpayers 8 9 who would still have the pay the taxes under 10 plaintiff's theory, and it's not fair to purchasers, 11 who would get thrown into limbo about whether they 12 should get to keep the benefits if now nobody's 13 paying the taxes. 14 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, counselor, 15 thanks. 16 MS. VALE: Thank you. 17 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Thank you both. 18 Appreciate it. 19 (Court is adjourned) 20 21 22 23

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## CERTIFICATION

I, Sharona Shapiro, certify that the foregoing transcript of proceedings in the Court of Appeals of Caprio v. New York State Department of Taxation and Finance, et al., No. 116, was prepared using the required transcription equipment and is a true and accurate record of the proceedings.

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