1				
2	COURT OF APPEALS			
3	STATE OF NEW YORK			
4	BROWN & BROWN, INC.,			
5	Appellant,			
6	-against-			
7	JOHNSON,			
8	Respondent.			
9				
10	20 Eagle Street Albany, New York 12207 May 6, 2015			
11				
12	Before: CHIEF JUDGE JONATHAN LIPPMAN			
13	ASSOCIATE JUDGE SUSAN PHILLIPS READ ASSOCIATE JUDGE EUGENE F. PIGOTT, JR.			
14	ASSOCIATE JUDGE SHEILA ABDUS-SALAAM ASSOCIATE JUDGE LESLIE E. STEIN			
15				
16	Appearances:			
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24	Karen Schiffmiller Official Court Transcriber			
25	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Number 92, Brown &			

1	Brown v. Johnson.
2	Counselor, would you like any rebuttal
3	time?
4	MR. GRIFFITHS: Yes, two minutes, please,
5	Your Honor.
6	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, counselor, go
7	ahead.
8	MR. GRIFFITHS: Good afternoon, Alun
9	Griffiths for plaintiff-appellants, may it please the
10	court.
11	Your Honors, as there are a number of legal
12	issues
13	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Is this against
14	is this this provision from the Florida main
15	outfit here, against the public policy of New York?
16	MR. GRIFFITHS: Your Honor, it is not. I
17	think there are two
18	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Why not?
19	MR. GRIFFITHS: Well, there are there
20	are two points there. Your Honor, first of all, the
21	standard that this court has established for a public
22	policy exemption for a choice-of-law clause, which
23	the Fourth Department determined was reasonable
24	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yeah.
25	MR. GRIFFITHS: is extraordinarily

1	high. It's only in very rare circumstances where
2	_
3	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Why isn't this one of
4	those rare circumstances?
5	MR. GRIFFITHS: Because, Your Honor
6	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: You don't consider
7	the burden on the the person who has the
8	the covenant or the anti-solicitation provision? Why
9	isn't that contrary to our law?
LO	MR. GRIFFITHS: Well, Your Honor, the
L1	the Fourth Department was pointing to one component
L2	of the test set forth tripartite set forth in
L3	Seidman, a hardship to the a hardship to the
L4	employee
L5	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Well, each component
L6	matters, right?
L7	MR. GRIFFITHS: Well, it does, Your Honor,
L8	but we need to look at the core underlying policy
L9	there. And I would submit that the core policy in
20	New York and Florida in this area is fundamentally
21	aligned, in the sense that both jurisdictions are
22	concerned with preserving economic mobility
23	JUDGE STEIN: Yeah, but under Florida law,
24	that's the prime consideration. Under New York law,

that's one consideration in looking at - - - in

looking at a lot of other factors, but it's clear 1 2 that - - - it's clear to me that the - - - that the 3 employee's interest and - - - and also the - - - the public interest is - - - is a primary consideration 5 under New York law, and it's - - - it's forbidden 6 under Florida law. 7 MR. GRIFFITHS: Well, Your Honor, I would 8 say the public interest is not forbidden under 9 Florida law. And I think if you look at how the 10 cases are decided in Florida - - -11 JUDGE STEIN: Well, the effect on the - - -12 on the employee is - - -13 MR. GRIFFITHS: The particularized effect -14 15 JUDGE STEIN: - - - is described. MR. GRIFFITHS: - - on the employee, and 16 17 it's the - - - it's the individualized effect on the 18 employee. That's the word in the Florida statute. 19 But if you look at the actual cases as they're 20 decided, including the cases that they've cited in 2.1 their brief, if you look at page 19 of our reply 22 brief, we've - - - we - - - we've set this out. In 23 every instance, whether the court is enforcing the

restrictive covenant or limiting it or not enforcing

it, when we look at how - - -

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1	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Can we limit it?
2	MR. GRIFFITHS: when we look
3	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Can we limit it? Can
4	we say this is all right, and the other is not all
5	right? Is that practical in relation to Florida law?
6	MR. GRIFFITHS: You mean, in terms of the
7	application of Florida law?
8	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yeah, we said
9	if we're
LO	MR. GRIFFITHS: Well, Your Honor
L1	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: if we're saying
L2	some of it is anathema in New York, some of it is
L3	okay, is that a workable thing?
L4	MR. GRIFFITHS: I would say none of it is
L5	anathema in any sense, but, Your Honor, I it's
L6	
L7	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Assuming some of it
L8	is, can you pick and choose? Could we pick and
L9	choose?
20	MR. GRIFFITHS: It's it's what
21	you should do, Your Honor, is apply Florida law
22	across the board, unless and until in its application
23	to a specific issue, that gives rise to something
24	that becomes repugnant or fundamentally obnoxious
25	- or truly obnoxious to use the court's term, to a

fundamental New York policy.

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JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: But why isn't it, counsel, a not - - - why is it obnoxious to say that you cannot consider the economic impact on a - - - on a given individual when you're applying this particular - - -

MR. GRIFFITHS: Well, it's - - - you cannot consider, Your Honor, the - - - the - - - the - - - the individualized hardship on that individual, and that could mean a number of things. It could mean, for example, while a twenty-five mile geographical restriction on the employee in terms of non-solicitation, might impose some hardship on that person, because she would not - - he, she or he would need to move outside of that area. That's the kind of thing the Florida courts do not consider.

But they do consider - - - and if you look at the cases, they - - - they - - - they examine very carefully whether that employee will be able to continue practicing their profession. So they'll say, like in the Med - - Medi-Weightloss cases, which they cited, where the - - - where the covenants were enforced, in each case the court looked at whether this weight-loss counselor would have employment opportunities out - - and then - - - and

they consu - - - concluded that they would, because it was geographically and temporarily - - -temporarily limited to the twenty-five mile zone of -CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Counselor, if we say Florida law is no good and is - - - is obnoxious or whatever you want to call it, what happens if we use New York law in your case? MR. GRIFFITHS: Well, and again, we feel

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MR. GRIFFITHS: Well, and again, we feel just as strongly, Your Honor, that on the record - - - the very limited record now before the court - - - there was no basis for the Fourth Department to conclude, as a matter of law, that B&B, the Brown & Brown - - -

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So you want to let the complaint go forward, and then see if there's bad faith or whatever and $-\ -\$

MR. GRIFFITHS: That would be a - a - a - a - a - a - an appropriate outcome here, Your Honor, we would - - we would - - we would submit, referring this back to the trial court and allowing the parties to - - - to develop a full record. The - - - the - - - the burden on defendants on - - although, our ultimate burden at trial would be to prove an absence of coercion or overreaching, their burden on this motion

1 would be to show that as a matter of law, there was 2 no way that Brown & Brown could prove an absence of 3 overreach - - - and they haven't done that. JUDGE STEIN: Well - - - well, if you look 4 5 at the timing of it, if you look at the agreement 6 itself, if you look at what's in the record, what - -7 - what more - - - what issues of fact would there be 8 to actually - - -9 MR. GRIFFITHS: Well - - -10 JUDGE STEIN: - - - try at a hearing? 11 MR. GRIFFITHS: Well, Your Honor, - one 12 issue of fact would be the de - - - would be the 13 defendant Johnson's state of mind as she was - - - as 14 she - - - as she was coming in to that first day of 15 work. It's not just the first day of work; it's 16 what's leading up to it. And there are significant 17 gaps in the record. It doesn't - - - she - - - this 18 is a - - -19 JUDGE STEIN: Well, how does her state of 20 mind prove or disprove the employer's bad faith? MR. GRIFFITHS: Well, it's - - - it's the -2.1 -- well, I would say, it -- - it -- - it 22 23 certainly - - - it certainly goes to the issue of 24 whether there was coercion, her state of mind. And I

think you need to look at this person - - - not as

1 somebody fresh out of college or getting her first 2 job, but rather as a sophisticated professional. 3 had a good job at Blue Cross. She was moving on to a 4 better job here. She - - - she - - -5 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: So are you - - - are 6 you suggesting that because she was getting a better 7 job, that's sort of equivalent to getting some sort 8 of promotion and - - -9 MR. GRIFFITHS: It - - -10 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: - - - she therefore 11 got some benefit from - - -12 MR. GRIFFITHS: I - - - I believe it 13 absolutely is, Your Honor. I - - - I believe - - -14 and - - and I - -15 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: But - - - but if that's true, why then didn't the employer show her or 16 17 tell her about the restrictive covenant before the 18 first day of employment? 19 MR. GRIFFITHS: Well, Your Honor, and I - -20 - I think the evidence would show, on - - - on - - on a full record, that in fact she was aware that 2.1 22 there was an employment agreement, and - - - and that goes to the need for a deposition. Here is somebody 23 24 at Blue Cross with a good job wanting to move on to

another job; I think it's reasonable to ask credibly

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JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Was there someone from your side who says that she was told or provided a copy of a handbook or some sort of - - --

MR. GRIFFITHS: Your Honor, on the first day of work, she was not pressured into signing that agreement. She - - - we encouraged her, in fact, to look at it, to consider it. We pointed out the restricted covenant - - -

JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Well, she's already now changed her position. She's left one job and come to another job, so - - -

MR. GRIFFITHS: But - - - but - - -

JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: - - - even if she had four more days to look at it, you're saying then if she signed it, she's on board, but if she doesn't, now she has no job?

MR. GRIFFITHS: We're - - - we're not saying that, Your Honor. And in fact, what we're saying, and - - - and this is - - - this is in the record as well, that - - - that - - - that other employees who have joined Brown & Brown have consulted with their attorneys before - - - before signing the agreement, and there's nothing in the record saying that - - - that she wouldn't have a job

1 if she didn't sign it exactly as written. 2 The fact is, you know, an em - - - an 3 employment agreement is - - - is - - - is a customary part of the - - - of the job she was in. There's 5 every good reason to think she would have known that 6 coming in. And on the record now before the court, when - - - there hasn't even been a deposition of 8 this individual, it's just - - -9 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, counsel. 10 You'll have your rebuttal. Let's - - -11 MR. GRIFFITHS: Thank you. 12 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: - - - let's hear from 13 your adversary. 14 MR. ZARLOCK: May it please the court, 15 Preston Zarlock for the respondents. I just want to 16 address two issues - - -17 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Counsel, let me start 18 by asking you, why shouldn't we have some discovery 19 here? 20 MR. ZARLOCK: Well, first of all, at the 2.1 time the summary judgment motion was made, they 22 hadn't asked for any discovery. We had served 23 discovery demands and received responses. They had 24 served no demands. It's a red herring. This issue

wasn't raised before the trial court, and it was only

1 raised at the Appellate Division. 2 Secondly - - -3 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Are there any issues of fact - - -4 5 MR. ZARLOCK: No. 6 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: - - - as to what went 7 on in terms of your client and what they tried to do? 8 MR. ZARLOCK: No, it is absolutely 9 undisputed in the record. They submitted an 10 affidavit and what - - - they submitted several 11 affidavits on the summary judgment motion. What 12 those affidavits said was that on her first day of 13 work was the - - - when she was first presented with 14 this. Now they tried to say, of course, that at that 15 time she could have done X or she could have done Y, but it is absolutely undisputed in the record that 16 17 she didn't see it, they didn't mention it, until the very first day of her job - - -18 19 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Why is that bad faith, 20 though, counsel? Why is it - - - isn't it kind of 2.1 common knowledge that when you start a job there 22 might be some sort of - - - I don't know - - -23 JUDGE FAHEY: Paperwork. 24 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: - - - yeah, paperwork, 25 things that you have to be aware of, and as your

adversary points out, this was not her first job.

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MR. ZARLOCK: It's true that it wasn't her first job, Your Honor, but it - - - it was her - - - she was leaving a place where she did not have such an agreement at Blue Cross and Blue Shield and coming to, you know, a somewhat different environment, albeit still in the insurance case. So she wouldn't have knowledge of that - - -

JUDGE PIGOTT: How long did she work there at B&B?

MR. ZARLOCK: She worked from 2006 to, I believe, 2011.

JUDGE PIGOTT: You see what strikes me is, as - - - as Judge Abdus-Salaam is saying, you know, you - - - you take on a job, and all of a sudden, somebody says, well, by the way, we don't provide healthcare; we don't provide dental. We don't - - - you know, you got to join a union. And - - - and I don't think it's bad faith, you know, when - - - I mean, when people go to a job and you find out there are conditions that you didn't otherwise - - - otherwise know. And where the Appellate Division said that they failed to show that she received a benefit for her signature, I just thought that was a non sequitur. I - -

MR. ZARLOCK: Well, I think - - - I think, 1 2 Judge - - - to address one issue that come - - - has 3 come up a couple of times. The Appellate Division did use the words "bad faith," okay. But I think if 4 5 you look at this court's decision in BDO and also 6 this court's decision in Columbia Ribbon, it - - - it 7 said, look, the employer - - - you know, essentially 8 the covenant is overbroad, undisputed. The - - -9 JUDGE PIGOTT: The covenant is overbroad? 10 MR. ZARLOCK: The restrictive covenant is 11 overbroad, yes. 12 JUDGE PIGOTT: In this case? 13 MR. ZARLOCK: Yes. 14 JUDGE PIGOTT: Who said that? 15 MR. ZARLOCK: Well, the Fourth Department 16 said it, but the reason - - -17 JUDGE PIGOTT: Yeah, but - - - but when I 18 looked at it, what they said is, don't take our 19 clients. And then - - - and all we're saying is the 20 clients you got and the ones you got in the pipeline. 2.1 I thought it was extremely restrictive. 22 MR. ZARLOCK: No, actually - - - the - - -23 the - - - actually, this covenant is not limited to 24 the ones you work with. It's limited to any customer 25

of any kind of BBNY.

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Why couldn't - - -1 2 JUDGE PIGOTT: Well, yeah - - -3 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Why couldn't we apply 4 it to just the ones she worked with? 5 MR. ZARLOCK: Well, that would be what this 6 court said in BDO, you know, it is overbroad, and 7 then the employer must demonstrate - - - you know, 8 quoting this court's analysis - - - the employer must 9 demonstrate "an absence of overreaching, coercive use 10 of dominant bargaining power, or other anti-11 competitive misconduct." 12 And similarly in Columbia Ribbon by this co 13 - - - this case, said, you know, that's equitable 14 relief. And certainly, I would note that this 15 argument was never raised to reargument, okay, and so 16 arguably, it's not even before the court. 17 Secondly, I think the - - - the balancing -18 - - the case specific analysis is essentially 19 discretional. And as long as they considered the 20 elements, there's - - - there's an issue about 2.1 whether this court - - -22 JUDGE PIGOTT: I looked at this - - - she's 23 an actuary, right? 24 MR. ZARLOCK: Yes.

JUDGE PIGOTT: They're - - - they're gold.

1 I mean, they are - - - they are really special 2 people, because it's a very difficult job and 3 particularly in the insurance industry, so it's surprising to me that we're saying almost like she's 4 5 a wounded fawn here, and - - - and they say, well, 6 she failed to show she received a benefit for her 7 signature, which I still don't understand - - - that 8 she was presented with a contract on her first day of 9 work. I - - - I don't know why anybody's saying 10 that's a terrible thing. And then they say, well, it 11 was seven years after BDO. Well, it's a Florida 12 outfit. I mean, they're not bound by BDO. 13 MR. ZARLOCK: I'd like to respond to both 14 of those, Judge. First of all, this court found in 15 BDO, it expressly is a factor in overreaching. "If 16 the employ" - - -17 JUDGE PIGOTT: I know it is, but in BDO - -18 19 MR. ZARLOCK: Okay. 20 JUDGE PIGOTT: - - - it's a New York case 2.1 and this - - -22 MR. ZARLOCK: Sure. 23 JUDGE PIGOTT: - - - and this is a Florida, 24 Florida issue. 25 MR. ZARLOCK: Well - - -

1 JUDGE PIGOTT: So to say you people down in 2 Tallahassee aren't paying attention to what we're doing up here in Albany, just didn't seem to follow. 3 MR. ZARLOCK: Well, sure, let me - - - let 4 5 me follow up on that issue. Well, first of all, this 6 is New York insurance industry, New York Ms. - - -7 Ms. Johnson, New York BBNY, the parent, okay, who is 8 attached - - - let's face it - - - solely for 9 litigation purposes - - - it's a party by their own 10 agreement - - -11 JUDGE PIGOTT: Well, you're saying that - -12 - you're saying that - - -13 MR. ZARLOCK: No, no, Judge - - -14 JUDGE PIGOTT: - - - but that's not - - -15 MR. ZARLOCK: - - - no, I'm not just saying 16 that. If you look at the employment agreement, it 17 says the company is BBNY, except for paragraphs 8, 9, 18 and 10, which are the enforcement provision. 19 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Well, the Supreme 20 Court found that, but the Appellate Division said 2.1 otherwise. 22 MR. ZARLOCK: Yeah, the Appellate Division 23 felt - - -24 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: It was a reasonable 25 relationship and - - -

1 MR. ZARLOCK: Yeah, they felt that there 2 But I think another thing which - - - I mean, 3 it's undisputed in the record - - - that the parent didn't even sign the thing until 2010. 4 5 JUDGE PIGOTT: Well, these are all issues 6 that - - - that - - - that your opponent 7 in his argument whatever - - -8 MR. ZARLOCK: Sure. 9 JUDGE PIGOTT: - - - but let me go to the 10 fourth one they said. 11 MR. ZARLOCK: Absolutely. 12 JUDGE PIGOTT: They said partial 13 enforcement implies bad faith. That the severability 14 issue - - - and in fact, BDO says exactly the 15 opposite, that BDO's the one that - - - that applied 16 a severability issue on - - - on their contract. 17 MR. ZARLOCK: Well, I think - - - I think 18 BDO looked at the second issue, whether it could be 19 part - - - put down - - -20 JUDGE PIGOTT: How could a severability 2.1 clause be bad faith? I mean, I would think the fourth - - -22 23 MR. ZARLOCK: No, the sev - - - the 24 severability, Judge, there's plenty of undisputed 25 evidence in the record to establish coercive conduct,

initial first day, the fact that it's overbroad. And
I would lo - - - I want to answer one question Your
Honor had before. In BDO, this court looked to its - - not only its prior precedent, but decisions in
other states. You know, assuming - -
JUDGE PIGOTT: Yeah, but I haven't read
Wyoming. I mean, if - - - if somebody says, you

JUDGE PIGOTT: Yeah, but I haven't read

Wyoming. I mean, if - - if somebody says, you

know, well, you should have known what was going on
in Butte, Montana. Well, I didn't, you know, I'm

sorry.

MR. ZARLOCK: Well, Judge, I think - - - we've noted that - - - again, in a New York context, it's certainly considered - - it can be considered that it would be applying New York law. Secondly, Judge, we've also cited cases in our brief, BDO had - - was cited in two cases involving Brown & Brown, Inc.

JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: We only apply New York law, counsel, if the cho - - - if there is a conflict, because there is a choice of law in the agreement. It's Florida law, correct?

MR. ZARLOCK: Yeah, there is - - - the agreement that was signed the first day of work does provide for Florida law, correct.

JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: So we would only be

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applying New York law if there's a conflict of laws.

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MR. ZARLOCK: And there is. Clearly, if you look at the - - - and I want to - - - the Florida law, it's not just - - - I think the most egregious part probably is the not considering hardship, but it also is in there, it says that first of all, the court "shall modify". It's not the discretional analysis this court provides in BDO to sever, but shall - - "and shall do so to the greatest extent possible". And that the burden isn't - - - is on - - - demonstrating it's overbroad is on the employee, and that even where violative of public policy, that's not enough to violate it.

I mean, the whole - - - it's a unified statute, and to address one thing the court asked counsel, there is no precedent on a contractual choice of law for picking and choosing a hybrid choice of law. I mean, I think - - -

JUDGE PIGOTT: Well, BDO did. In other -
- in BDO, they said you can't - - - you can't

surcharge the employee that's - - - that's no longer

with you if they take your - - - your customer,

because what they said was if you - - - if you - -
if you take our customer, you've got to pay us 150

percent of what - - - of what you get or something.

MR. ZARLOCK: Sure, essentially.

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apply, but the rest of it was fine. So they did a severability in that case. And when I looked at this one, which says "the limitations to any insurance or bond business of any kind or character from any person, firm, or corporation, or other entity that is a customer or account of the New York offices of the company during the term of this agreement or from any prospective customer or account to whom the company made proposals about which an employee had particular knowledge, or in which the employee participated during the last six months of the employee's employment," which seems to me has the time and place and everything else to be pretty boxed.

MR. ZARLOCK: Well, actually, not, because BDO, any customer. It's not limited strictly to the one she worked with. BDO expressly said that that's overbroad. Now if the court is going to change the holding of BDO, I guess, you know, that's a different issue. But under BDO, that's overbroad. It's not simply the customers that she dealt with.

And on the other issue the court said about do they know of BDO down in Florida? BDO is probably the seminal case on restrictive covenants in the

United States. It's been cited in two - - -1 2 JUDGE PIGOTT: Well, I get that. I - - - I 3 just didn't think that the Appellate Division should 4 say to a Florida company you - - - you're not 5 following New York law, and you should have known it 6 by now. 7 MR. ZARLOCK: You know - - - you know, I do 8 think, Judge, you know, in - - - in - - - certainly 9 in Scott v. Skavina, they - - - the Third Department 10 case - - - essentially said the same thing. You 11 know, there are some aspects of the Fourth 12 Department's language. You know, you don't need an 13 expressed finding of bad faith, but the circumstances 14 which are undisputed, you know, which essentially - -15 - first day of employment, under BDO, that's a 16 factor. She wasn't made a partner, you know, like 17 the BDO person, where you start getting into the 18 issues which establish that - - - establish some type 19 of basis for the covenant - - -20 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Is that the only - - -2.1 in BDO, because you get a promotion, is that the only 22 way that you can avoid bad faith, giving someone someone sort of benefit, like a promotion? 23 24 MR. ZARLOCK: Well - - -

JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: What about getting a

better job? Is that - - -

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MR. ZARLOCK: Yeah, I mean, it's still an initial con - - - you can argue for any new job that it's an initial contract of employment. I mean, if it's a better job at the same company you've been, then it might suffice. But, you know, she left her other place. And this is something which I think is - - - I forgot - - - I forgot who - - - who focused on this particular aspect - - but it was presented to her after she left her former employee. If you had - - -

JUDGE PIGOTT: Yeah, but she didn't at any point - - - that's why I asked you how long she'd worked there - - - she didn't at any point say, boy, did I get screwed; now I - - - now I can't go back to Blue - - -

MR. ZARLOCK: She didn't - - - she didn't know about it until she gets a letter - - -

JUDGE PIGOTT: I can't go back to Blue

Cross, and here I've signed this document and I'm -
- and I'm stuck. I mean, she got fired, right?

MR. ZARLOCK: She did. She got fired, and that's, you know, another reason which I think has to do with overreaching in these types of circumstances, by the employer, where you have an agreement which -

1 - - which would purport to restrict her in two years 2 -- - for two years -- - throughout New York State, 3 and for no severance of any kind. You know, I know that the Fourth 5 Department, you know, said, look at the involuntary 6 termination issue is only relative for injunctive 7 relief. Now I think, while I agree with the Fourth 8 Department on - - - on Post and what it dealt with on 9 the facts, I do think that involuntary termination is 10 - - - is a factor that should be relevant in 11 overreaching as well, okay, but, you know, that's 12 another basis for affirmance on different grounds 13 than the court below. 14 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: But generally New York 15 is an employee - - -16 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Go ahead, Judge. 17 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: - - - is an employee 18 at will state - - -19 MR. ZARLOCK: That's correct. 20 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: - - - so there isn't -2.1 - - I mean, she could be fired for no reason or - - -22 MR. ZARLOCK: That's absolutely true, but 23 you know, the - - - the court, I mean - - - and 24 again, I understand, you know, the emp - - - the

employee choice doctrine of this court as expressed

1 in Post and in Morris, I believe. But the, you know, 2 there is a certain mutuality of obligation that's 3 discussed in - - - in Post, which talks about that mutuality being relevant not strictly to the 5 severance benefit lost, but also to the covenant itself. And again, that's just something which I 6 7 think is relevant not just on an injunctive context, 8 but also on a summary judgment context for damages. 9 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, counsel. Let's 10 hear from your adversary. 11 MR. ZARLOCK: Thank you, Your Honor. 12

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CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Thanks, counsel. Rebuttal, counselor.

MR. GRIFFITHS: Well, Your Honors, the - -- the - - - the - - - the mandate of BDO Seidman under New York law is clear. The - - - the - - - the - - - the evaluation of whether there's been impermissible coercion or bad faith on the part of the employer is based on a fact-intensive, case-bycase, specific analysis. And what the Fourth Department did here, we would submit, is - - - is directly contrary to that because they, in effect, tried to create a per se rule, a per se rule that because Ms. Johnson signed the - - - the - - - the employment agreement on her first - - - first - - -

1 first day of employment - - -2 JUDGE PIGOTT: What do you think they 3 should have said? What do - - - what do you - - - if you - - - if you could write for the Fourth 4 5 Department, what would you be saying? 6 MR. GRIFFITHS: What - - - what we would be 7 saying for the Fourth Department is this should be 8 referred back to the trial court to - - - for 9 development of a full record, because that 10 determination cannot be made absent full discovery. 11 JUDGE PIGOTT: What's - - - what's missing? 12 MR. GRIFFITHS: Well, what's missing is, 13 number one, a full understanding of - - - of - - - of 14 what Ms. Johnson was thinking, and - - - and - - -15 throughout the negotiation process, from the time she 16 was at Blue Cross up until the day she - - - she came 17 to - - - to - - - to - - -18 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: So why did you wait 19 until she moved for - - - or the defendants moved for 20 summary judgment before you asked for discovery? 2.1 MR. GRIFFITHS: Well, Your Honor, and again 22 --- I --- that is --- I'm glad you brought that 23 up. This - - - this summary judgment motion was made 24 --- I believe it was --- and it's in the record -

- - thirty days after issue was joined. This is not

1 something which had been out there for months and 2 months. We - - - there was a - - - they made a - - -3 they - - - we sought to amend the complaint. There 4 was - - - there was some motion practice which was 5 withdrawn. We put in an answer. Thirty days later, 6 this motion was made. 7 There hadn't even been significant document 8 discovery, much less a deposition. So to suggest 9 that discovery is a red herring when - - - when - - -10 when there - - - where there hadn't really been any 11 meaningful opportunity to - - - to have discovery, 12 and that's very clear from the record, I - - - I 13 think is --- is --- is -- is really a misnomer. 14 JUDGE STEIN: Why didn't you argue that in 15 the trial court? MR. GRIFFITHS: Well - - - well, Your 16 17 Honor, we - - - we did say in the trial court - - -18 it's - - - it's in the brief and it is in one of the 19 affidavits - - - we - - - we made the point that - -20 - that the record was insufficiently thin, and that 2.1 this motion was being made at a - - at a very, very

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, counselor.

MR. GRIFFITHS: Thank you, Your Honors.

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Thank you both.

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adjourned)

CERTIFICATION

I, Karen Schiffmiller, certify that the foregoing transcript of proceedings in the Court of Appeals Brown & Brown, Inc. v. Johnson, No. 92, was prepared using the required transcription equipment and is a true and accurate record of the proceedings.

Hour Laboffmille.

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