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2	COURT OF APPEALS
3	STATE OF NEW YORK
4	BRANCH,
5	Appellant,
6	-against- No. 93
7	COUNTY OF SULLIVAN,
8	Respondent.
9	
10	20 Eagle Street Albany, New York 12207 May 7, 2015
11	Before:
12	CHIEF JUDGE JONATHAN LIPPMAN
13	ASSOCIATE JUDGE SUSAN PHILLIPS READ ASSOCIATE JUDGE EUGENE F. PIGOTT, JR.
14	ASSOCIATE JUDGE JENNY RIVERA ASSOCIATE JUDGE SHEILA ABDUS-SALAAM
15	ASSOCIATE JUDGE LESLIE E. STEIN ASSOCIATE JUDGE EUGENE M. FAHEY
16	
17	Appearances:
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24	
25	Karen Schiffmiller Official Court Transcriber

1 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: We're going to start with number 93, Branch v. County of Sullivan. 2 3 Counsel? MR. SUSSMAN: May it please the court, my 4 5 name is Michael Sussman from Goshen, New York. I represent the appellants, may it please the court. 6 7 This case arises from the death - - -8 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Counsel, what's the -9 - - what's the County's role here? Why - - - why are 10 they in this lawsuit? 11 MR. SUSSMAN: The County is the sponsoring 12 organization under New York State Law - - - Education 13 Law 63 - - -14 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yeah, but what about 15 the practical aspects? Let's take - - - before we get into the statutory aspect - - - do they run this 16 17 school? MR. SUSSMAN: Yes, practically they - - -18 19 they support and they appoint - - -20 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: The daily operations, 21 they run? 22 MR. SUSSMAN: We - - - we believe they do, 23 Your Honor. We believe that the County appoints a 2.4 majority of the board of trustees. The County passes 25 a budget and passes upon every major contract of the

1	institution. A county
2	JUDGE RIVERA: If the County wanted
3	MR. SUSSMAN: I'm sorry.
4	JUDGE RIVERA: If the County wanted to put
5	in place an AED, but the trustees did not, who gets
6	the final word?
7	MR. SUSSMAN: County. It's the County's
8	property. The County has the final word. The County
9	would say
10	JUDGE RIVERA: I thought they had
11	transferred the property.
12	MR. SUSSMAN: I'm sorry?
13	JUDGE RIVERA: I thought they had
14	transferred the property.
15	MR. SUSSMAN: It they transferred the
16	dorms improvidently, as we've argued, in 1999
17	illegally, because under New York State Law, they
18	must maintain control of all property for the
19	dormitory system. They did not
20	JUDGE RIVERA: So although you say the
21	- the transfer is not valid, as far as they're
22	concerned, it is valid, so at if at the time
23	they had wanted to put in place an AED, how could
24	they have done so?
25	MR. SUSSMAN: The rest of the property,

1 Your Honor - - - it's an integrated campus. The rest 2 of the property is County owned. Had they required 3 it, and - - - and used their common law duty to 4 ensure proper habitability here and proper 5 maintenance of the facility, they would have simply 6 indicated that it was County policy to have an AED in 7 public places - - - this being a public place under their control. 8 9 So I don't believe there would have been 10 any issue whatsoever in their asserting that 11 authority. 12 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: You say under their 13 control. What does it mean? I mean, the - - -MR. SUSSMAN: Well, control - - -14 15 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: - - - is the County 16 literally taking the time to oversee the school each 17 and every day? MR. SUSSMAN: Well, the - - -18 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: You're saying they're 19 20 ultimately - - -21 MR. SUSSMAN: The County - - - the County, 22 Your Honor, our position is that the majority of the 23 board, and in fact the entire board from the 2.4 perspective of indemnification, the - - - the entire

board with regard to being officers under County Law

1	53, are in fact County officers. That's how we
2	understand the law in New York.
3	JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Aren't they really
4	-
5	MR. SUSSMAN: Therefore I'm sorry.
6	JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Aren't they trustees
7	of the college?
8	MR. SUSSMAN: Well, the question it's
9	assert
10	JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Are you saying
11	are they both or are they just are they
12	trustees of the college? Even though the County, as
13	you say, appoints the majority of the board, because
14	it's a ten-member board
15	MR. SUSSMAN: One nonvoting member.
16	JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: and the County
17	appoints five of those members.
18	MR. SUSSMAN: Right.
19	JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: But the County doesn't
20	appoint five other members. So how is it that the
21	County is in charge of this school, when there are
22	five members
23	MR. SUSSMAN: No
24	JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: that aren't
25	appointed by the County.

MR. SUSSMAN: And I understand your question. No - - - no other entity, other than the County, has responsibility for reviewing contracts, owns the property, and has a responsibility for the strict kind of oversight, which it, the County, as local sponsor, has. And again, while I understand the Chief Judge's desire not to look at the statutory language, I think - - - I think 6301(2) has to be looked at.

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Go ahead.

MR. SUSSMAN: It says explicitly - - - CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Tell us.

MR. SUSSMAN: - - - that the County as sponsor, does establish and operate a community college. That's what it says. That's what the language says. Now what does it mean to say operate a community college? It says - - when you combine this with County Law 53 - - that its officers, its County officers, are in control of that school. It is required to indemnify for any lawsuit that's filed under 6308.

So it - - - it seems to me that if one is arguing that there's juridical independence, that could easily be established under state law, but it's not. There are other entities that are established

1 for educational purposes, which are deemed municipal 2 corporations. 3 JUDGE RIVERA: So - - - so then what - - what - - - what does 6306(5) mean? "The board of 4 5 trustees shall have the care, custody, control and management of the lands, grounds, buildings, 6 7 facilities, equipment used for the purposes of such 8 college and for all other property belonging to such 9 college." 10 MR. SUSSMAN: It's entirely consistent with 11 our interpretation. This is the point. There's no 12 inconsistency between saying that the way the County 13 operationally functions is through a board of 14 trustees. It's like saying in any other - - -15 there's a police agency. The police agency - - -16 JUDGE RIVERA: No, I understand, but as 17 Judge Abdus-Salaam has already pointed out, the board 18 is not solely - - - it doesn't consist solely of 19 County appointees. 20 MR. SUSSMAN: But even if it doesn't - -21 JUDGE RIVERA: It's not their board. MR. SUSSMAN: It is their board, because 22 23 it's responsible for indemnifying a suit brought 2.4 against any of them for an omission. There's no

distinction made in the law between those who were

appointed by the County, five of the nine voting 1 members, and the other four. 2 3 JUDGE RIVERA: For purposes of indemnification, but for purposes of control, it 4 5 looks like (5) - - - otherwise, wouldn't (5) say the 6 County? 7 MR. SUSSMAN: The - - - the point is there's no distinction drawn in the provision you're 8 9 talking about, and every agency and unit of 10 government - - - of the County government - - - is 11 operationalized through individuals who have the 12 authority - - -13 JUDGE RIVERA: Okay. 14 MR. SUSSMAN: - - - to proceed. 15 JUDGE RIVERA: So then how about 6306(2) 16 that talks about the board of trustees adopting the 17 curricula, preparing a budget that they submit - - -18 MR. SUSSMAN: They do that as County 19 officers. JUDGE RIVERA: - - - granted to the County, 20 21 that they discharge such other duties may be 22 appropriate or necessary for the effective operation 23 of the college. 2.4 MR. SUSSMAN: There's no question - - - no 25 one is - - - I'm not arguing that this - - - the

1 board of trustees has no duties. I'm arguing that 2 when they transact their duties juridically, the 3 board of trustees do so as agents of the County. And 4 that - - -5 JUDGE PIGOTT: How do you - - - how do you 6 address the dormitory issue for the fact that the 7 dorm wasn't owned by the - - - by the school? MR. SUSSMAN: Well, it's fairly obvious to 8 9 us that a transfer of property vested in the County, 10 as - - - as the court is aware from reading the 11 papers, all property of the community college is to 12 be not merely initially deeded to the sponsor. 13 sponsor is to maintain control of that property. 14 That can only be altered in New York by a resolution 15 passed not only by the board of trustees, but by the 16 state university system, indicating that the 17 particular property is not necessary for a purpose 18 relating to the community college. 19 JUDGE READ: Why didn't you sue - - -20 MR. SUSSMAN: First of all - - -21 JUDGE READ: Why didn't you sue the 22 community college? 23 MR. SUSSMAN: Because we didn't believe it

necessary. We believe the County is the juridical

body responsible for its operations.

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1 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yeah, but in 2 practical - - - in practical terms, why didn't you 3 sue them? 4 MR. SUSSMAN: That's prac - - - that's the 5 practical terms. We believe the County's 6 responsible. JUDGE FAHEY: Well, the prob - - - the prob 7 8 9 MR. SUSSMAN: We believe the notice require 10 - - - I'm sorry. 11 JUDGE FAHEY: The problem with that is, is 12 that the County or SCC even itself and a number of 13 other community colleges have brought suit in their own name and no one's ever challenged before that the 14 15 concept of - - - that they didn't have a separate 16 juridical existence. They - - -17 MR. SUSSMAN: It - - -18 JUDGE FAHEY: You see the problem. MR. SUSSMAN: I see - - - I see conflicts 19 20 in the jurisprudence in our state. I cited, Your 21 Honor, respectfully, to a number of cases in which 22 where an individual who's employed by a County 23 community college gave notice to the community 2.4 college; they were told they needed to give notice to

the County, because the County, in fact, is the

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1
          responsible agency - - -
 2
                    JUDGE FAHEY: Well - - -
 3
                    JUDGE PIGOTT: Can - - can I go back to
 4
 5
                    MR. SUSSMAN: The Wendel case. Excuse me,
 6
          I'm sorry.
 7
                    JUDGE PIGOTT: No, please finish.
                    MR. SUSSMAN: No, go right ahead.
 8
 9
                    JUDGE PIGOTT: Can I - - - can - - - I want
10
          to go back to this dorm. If - - - if the dormitory
11
          burned down, who collects the insurance?
12
                    MR. SUSSMAN: The County.
13
                    JUDGE PIGOTT: Really?
14
                    MR. SUSSMAN: Absolutely.
15
                    JUDGE PIGOTT: The - - - the corporation
16
          that owns it doesn't get it?
17
                    MR. SUSSMAN: No. The - - - the - - - I
          mean, I don't know - - - first, we don't have any
18
19
          information about what insurance they have. But the
20
          County, as the agency which is responsible for the
21
          operation of the community college, ought to be the
22
          one collecting the - - - there should be insurance in
23
          its name.
                    JUDGE PIGOTT: If there's a - - - if
2.4
25
          there's - - - SCCC Dormitory Authority takes out
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1 insurance because they own the building and it burns 2 down, you're saying that they don't get the money, it 3 goes to - - -4 MR. SUSSMAN: I'm saying - - -5 JUDGE PIGOTT: - - - it goes to the County? MR. SUSSMAN: I'm - - - to be precise, I'm 6 7 saying they're not allowed to own the building. 8 JUDGE PIGOTT: Well, I quess - - -9 MR. SUSSMAN: The struct - - - the struct -10 - - but it does matter, because the structure is - -11 JUDGE PIGOTT: Well, let me ask you this. 12 13 Suppose you get a matrimonial - - - somebody gets the 14 house; somebody doesn't get the house. Well, I 15 should have gotten the house, and therefore you sue 16 him saying even though he doesn't own it, he should 17 have gotten the house and therefore he's responsible for the slip and fall on the sidewalk. 18 19 MR. SUSSMAN: Assuming that the should've 20 gotten the house - - -21 JUDGE PIGOTT: Yeah. 22 MR. SUSSMAN: - - - in your example, Your 23 Honor, was by judicial decree, I have no problem 2.4 acknowledging - - -25 JUDGE PIGOTT: Okay.

MR. SUSSMAN: - - - what you're saying.

Here, there was no contemporaneous challenge to the illegal transfer. The first challenge that transfers by my client to recognizing and apprehending the structure of the state's system, which is not really challenged - - it's very clear. And she's the first person who's raised that. As the court may say, why is she raising it? She's raising it because in fact, it affects significantly her rights. That transfer should never have occurred and it's void ab

JUDGE PIGOTT: Would you have been safer - I guess this is another way of asking what was
said before - - if you'd sued the dormitory
corporation, sued the community college, sued the
County, and then throw them out later, at least you
got them all in and you can figure out what's going
on.

initio under the law of New York State.

MR. SUSSMAN: Well, you could always say you'd be safer, but sometimes you - - - you decide strategically who has the responsibility. And here it's my view the County has a responsibility and these other entities are not actually - - - the court says they can sue and be sued. I don't see that in - - I don't see that in the 6301 statute.

1 JUDGE FAHEY: Well - - -2 MR. SUSSMAN: I don't see any provision 3 which - - - it does exist in other statutes. 4 JUDGE FAHEY: I say this. I think that - -5 - I've got a list of about eight cites in front of me, and one of them - - - including this community 6 7 college - - - where they brought suit in their own 8 name. So they do have a separate juridical 9 existence, at least it's - - - it's - - -10 MR. SUSSMAN: Yeah, but - - -11 JUDGE FAHEY: They've been out there using 12 the courts, you know. 13 MR. SUSSMAN: But a juridical existence, 14 respectfully, doesn't derive from a party's 15 arrogation of that status and their claim that they 16 have it, notwithstanding the structure of law, and 17 that's what I'm focused on. I'm focused on what is the legal structure here, and how do they defend, if 18 19 challenged, their juridical claim. 20 Orange County just sold the building by a -21 - - a majority - - - not a super majority - - - and 22 claimed, no - - - no court ever said we couldn't do 23 it, when County Law 215 exactly states you need a

super majority to sell county property. So they cite

the eight cases in which no one challenged it.

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doesn't matter. When they did it, it was wrong. 1 we have a similar situation here. 2 3 JUDGE RIVERA: So your argument regarding -- - let me get back to the transfer - - -4 5 MR. SUSSMAN: Sure. 6 JUDGE RIVERA: - - - of the property. Was 7 that presented below? 8 MR. SUSSMAN: Yeah, absolutely presented 9 below. It's in - - -10 JUDGE RIVERA: How - - - how is it 11 preserved? 12 MR. SUSSMAN: It was pre - - - it's in - -13 - as we pointed out in the brief, it's preserved in the brief. It was set forth below. We - - - we 14 15 cited to that in our reply brief exactly where it was set forth. 16 JUDGE RIVERA: The argument that the 17 transfer itself is void ab initio? 18 19 MR. SUSSMAN: Absolutely. At the point - -20 - at the point that the lawsuit was filed, there was 21 no knowledge that - - - because there was no resolution as I pointed out to the court earlier - -22 - there was no resolution. If one searches for 23 2.4 resolution about a property transfer, there was no

such resolution. There's no indication that it was

1	ever legally transferred from one to the other.
2	If you look at the 8 New York Code Rules
3	and Regulations 603.5, there's a requirement that
4	there be those resolutions. They don't exist. So
5	when I say
6	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay.
7	MR. SUSSMAN: Sorry.
8	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: You'll have your
9	rebuttal time.
10	MR. SUSSMAN: Thank you, Your Honor.
11	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Thanks, counselor.
12	Counselor?
13	MR. KAPLAN: Thank you, Your Honor.
14	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Counsel, isn't the
15	County really the the party-in-interest here?
16	MR. KAPLAN: No, clearly from a practical
17	aspect, number one, as you had mentioned, we are not.
18	We don't run the
19	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Let's talk about the
20	practical aspect.
21	MR. KAPLAN: Okay.
22	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Forget the statute
23	for a second.
24	MR. KAPLAN: The only evidence
25	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Aren't you ultimately

1 responsible for what happens there? 2 MR. KAPLAN: No, we are not responsible. 3 We don't have any input into the day-to-day operations. And in fact, this very court within the 4 5 last ten years has issued an order stating that community colleges are now entitled to more 6 7 independence from their local sponsor, especially with matters regarding financial - - -8 9 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: And what's the import 10 of being the local sponsor? 11 MR. KAPLAN: The import is basically that 12 we sponsor oper - - - or sponsor and create a 13 community college, and provide budgetary resources. 14 Interestingly in this case, my client - - - the 15 witness I produced, the former County attorney and former treasurer of Sullivan County, Mr. Ira Cohen, 16 17 testified that every time the County attempts to get 18 involved in the day-to-day operations, or even asks 19 the community college here to con - - - to consult 2.0 with the County about contracts, the community 21 college says you can't tell us what to do. 22 JUDGE PIGOTT: You can get that from the 23 highway department, trust me. 2.4 MR. KAPLAN: And - - -

JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Is that - - - is that

the test that we should apply that you don't involve yourselves, as the County, in the day-to-day operations, even though you may be the dominant party with regard to fiscal and other financial obligations?

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MR. KAPLAN: Well, Your Honor, I think even before you apply that test, there's several other layers, both statutory, as Your Honor pointed out, which state specifically and explicitly, not that the County or the sponsor, but the community college board of trustees, and the community college itself, shall have the care, custody and control of all of the buildings and equipment.

So if this case is about AEDs, the responsibility of the community college board of trustees is even higher with regard to personal property than real property. That's in the statute 6308 - - or, I'm sorry - - 6306(5). 6306(2) also says that the community college board of trustees shall be the party who is allowed to discharge any other duties that will basically allow them to run a community college. And that's exactly - - -

JUDGE PIGOTT: But - - - but couldn't - - - MR. KAPLAN: - - - what they do here.

JUDGE PIGOTT: - - - couldn't the argument

be - - - I mean, Mr. Sussman's suggesting that it's the Sullivan County Community College for a reason. It's Sullivan County's, delegated to the board of trustees are all the duties and functions that you outline. If you really have a complaint with respect to them, you can bring them in. I mean, you - - - you're ultimately responsible.

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But if you then want to pass on the liability to the community college saying, we're responsible, but they're the ones that are primarily responsible be - - - for all the reasons you - - - wouldn't we then have everybody in the lawsuit that we need?

MR. KAPLAN: Well, at that point - - - and again, I think your question was right on point. Why wasn't the easy route taken? Why not sue the party that actually owns the building? So, no, I would say no. And on top of which, if that was the case here, we would have moved for summary judgment under the same arguments, and the lower court and the Appellate Division both noted that no, it's the community college.

But even before you reach that issue, our main argument here is the land, the property where the incident actually occurred, is not held in trust.

JUDGE RIVERA: He says - - - he says the transfer was void.

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MR. KAPLAN: Yeah, and our position - - two positions. One, that was not preserved. It was
never mentioned anything about a statute being
violated, that the property was transferred in the
lower court. Only that the County of Sullivan owns
the property where this incident occurred. In fact,
there's no mention of the Dormitory Corp. in the
opposition papers at all, just that the County and
the community college are one in the same alter egos.
So our position is that issue was not preserved.

Number two, our position is that the plaintiffs here don't have standing to challenge that. A case I cited is exactly on point out of the Third Department, has never been overruled,

Adamkiewicz. I hope I'm saying that correctly. But that case says, in a similar situation, you sued the wrong party, a party you thought still owned the property, when in fact, they had transferred deed to the property before the accident. Well, guess what? You can't say the party that has the deed now, obtained it illegally or improperly, unless you have a property interest. And here the plaintiffs have no property interest.

And getting back again to the practical
aspects of it, as Your Honor asked, this property is
owned by a not-for-profit corporation. If any
entity's juridical existence is important here, it's
that entity, and not-for-profit corps have been

juridically defined many times - - -

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JUDGE FAHEY: These are a little unusual though, because they're - - really they fall under the category of quasi-independent public corporations. They're kind of unique creatures of the state. They're a little bit different than your standard 501(c)(3) type of corporations.

MR. KAPLAN: Correct, Your Honor, but again, it's also very different than a public corporation or a municipality.

JUDGE FAHEY: Well, it may be different from the thruway authority, say, but I - - - each one's usually - - - you got to look - - - you got to go back to the statute. I do think that they're right about that. But still to - - - to call - - - we're talking about a question of whether or not there was a duty and whether or not - - and it's got to be created by control, so - - - so we're back into that no matter how you approach it.

MR. KAPLAN: Correct. And I think it

always go back to the fact that we have no control 1 2 over this property. After this incident, AEDs were 3 installed in the Sullivan County - - - Sullivan 4 County Community College, not by the County of 5 Sullivan, but by Sullivan County Community College. And what do we think from a practical - - -6 7 practical aspect would happen if we tell the college 8 you have to do this, or you can take it another level 9 where the incident occurred, we tell the Dormitory 10 Corp., a not-for-profit corporation, that you have to 11 run your building this way. We don't have that 12 authority. We've never exercised that authority. 13 On top of which, if we dig deeper, aside 14 from the practical implementation of how the college 15 is run in the statutory set - - -16 JUDGE RIVERA: Well, the fact you - - - you 17 hold the purse strings, does that in any way affect 18 this relationship as to what the - - - the community 19 college can and cannot choose to do, or this 20 dormitory authority can and cannot choose to do? 21 MR. KAPLAN: No - - -22 JUDGE RIVERA: I mean, you can't function 23 without the funds.

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MR. KAPLAN: In fact, we don't have a lineitem veto over the community college. This court has stated you could approve the budget total but not the total budget, and basically eliminated any arguments because there was a pushback from a lot of counties as to having no control over the community college, and this very court said, that's okay; that community college independence is okay.

And this court has leaned more - - - on top of which, there are several Appellate Division cases - - - no cases that I found out of this court - - - that say specifically what I'm saying. The party that controls is in the custody, care and control - - - you can't get much stronger of a legal meaning than that - - is the party responsible here.

A lot of the cases cited where there's confusion, deal with jurisdictional issues and service of a notice of claim or a summons and complaint against a party. Not one of those cases cited say the county is responsible for an injury that occurs on land or arising out of the use - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: Let me go back to that preservation question. Let's say we disagree with you. Is then your fallback position that they don't have standing to raise the question? Is that the only argument then in response to his - - -

MR. KAPLAN: No, the - - -

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JUDGE RIVERA: - - - argument?

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MR. KAPLAN: The third argument I would have is that the County actually did one of the prescribed methods. They did the first prescribed method and deeded the property back to the sponsor, the County of Sullivan Industrial Development Agency, in 2002, which then immediately turned around, and for consideration, deeded the property over to the Sullivan County Community College Dormitory Corp.

So that is not our only position on that.

We actually think there are several layers, on top of which I interpret - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: Hold on, I'm sorry. I'm a little confused, if I can just go back. So 6306(4) says you hold it in trust. I'm sorry, where - - - where is the authority to transfer in whichever manner you want to transfer?

MR. KAPLAN: That's 603.5 of the Real Property Law.

JUDGE RIVERA: Oh, okay.

MR. KAPLAN: And under Section d it talks about disposal of the property, which the plaintiffs have argued we did - - - there's no resolution.

First of all, I would argue that that only deals with pieces of the property or buildings that were used by

1	the community college. Why would the statute require
2	the state board of trustees or the community college
3	to say that it's okay to dispose of a piece of
4	property
5	JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Are there regulations
6	or
7	MR. KAPLAN: that they don't use? I
8	I'm sorry.
9	JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Are there regulations
10	that govern the transfer of the property and are you
11	saying that you followed those regulations?
12	MR. KAPLAN: Absolutely. There's no
13	evidence in the record anywhere that we did not,
14	whether there's a resolution in the record or not.
15	On top of which, again
16	JUDGE RIVERA: So so on a summary
17	judgment motion, whose burden was it to show that?
18	MR. KAPLAN: It was our burden
19	JUDGE RIVERA: Show that it's not or to
20	- and you think you did that through the deed and so
21	forth?
22	MR. KAPLAN: Correct, yes. And again, that
23	on our summary judgment motion, that issue was never
24	challenged in the lower court.
25	JUDGE READ: So you never had an

opportunity to put in evidence?

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MR. KAPLAN: We're, again - - - we're not arguing that, because, again, we feel there's several layers before you would even get - - - reach that issue. There's nothing here - - proof other than some arguments by the plaintiffs that it wasn't done properly.

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, counsel.

MR. KAPLAN: Thank you, Your Honors.

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Counsel, rebuttal?

MR. SUSSMAN: Just to focus on this last issue, Your Honor, 6306(4) provides the authority for the vesting and holding of properties by the County as the sponsor for the community college. To answer Your Honor's question, Section 603.5 are the Rules of the State University, which are reported at 8 New York Code Rules and Regulations 603.5, provide the means of transfer and explain those means. There is no evidence - - not only in this record but in any public record - - that those - - any of those means were followed.

Most significantly, that the property was not needed for a purpose of the community college.

In fact, it was transferred for a purpose of the community college, which was to house students of the

1 community college. So I don't - - -JUDGE PIGOTT: You see, the post - - - the 2 3 post-accident repair that your counsel refers to that 4 you - - - that the community college put in the AEDs 5 and not the County, doesn't that add significant 6 weight? I mean, I know post-accident repair can't be 7 admitted for purposes of the repair, but it can be 8 for purposes of ownership and - - - and control. 9 MR. SUSSMAN: What - - - there's no - - -10 again, we're in a circular argument. I know I have 11 to - - - I have to - - - I have limited time. 12 JUDGE PIGOTT: You can add that, right? 13 MR. SUSSMAN: We're - - - the - - - the 14 board of trust - - - we're not arguing the board of 15 trustees doesn't have authority to do things. 16 - - the principal argument is the board of trustees 17 juridically is representative of the County, which exercises significant control, has indemnification 18 19 responsibility. Under County Law 53, these people 20 are all agents of the County. 21 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay. 22 MR. SUSSMAN: Thank you for your time. 23 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Thank you both. 2.4 Appreciate it.

(Court is adjourned)

## CERTIFICATION

I, Karen Schiffmiller, certify that the foregoing transcript of proceedings in the Court of Appeals of Branch v. County of Sullivan, No. 93, was prepared using the required transcription equipment and is a true and accurate record of the proceedings.

Hour Schoffmille.

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Date: May 14, 2015