1	COURT OF APPEALS
2	STATE OF NEW YORK
3	
4	REMET CORPORATION,
5	Appellant,
6	-against-
7	No. 129 ESTATE OF PYNE, et al.,
8	Respondent.
9	
10	20 Eagle Street Albany, New York 12207
11	September 09, 2015
12	Before:
13	CHIEF JUDGE JONATHAN LIPPMAN ASSOCIATE JUDGE EUGENE F. PIGOTT, JR. ASSOCIATE JUDGE JENNY RIVERA
14	ASSOCIATE JUDGE JENNI RIVERA  ASSOCIATE JUDGE SHEILA ABDUS-SALAAM  ASSOCIATE JUDGE LESLIE E. STEIN
15	ASSOCIATE JUDGE EUGENE M. FAHEY
16	Appearances:
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23	
24	Sara Winkeljohn
25	Official Court Transcriber

1	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Number 129.
2	Counsel, you want any rebuttal time?
3	MR. CHESIN: Two minutes, please.
4	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Two minutes. Sure.
5	Go ahead, counsel.
6	MR. CHESIN: May it please the court, Scott
7	Chesin from Mayer Brown for appellant Remet
8	Corporation.
9	Your Honors, in 2002, Remet received a
10	letter from the New York State Department of
11	Environmental Conservation that was marked urgent,
12	stating that a reply was
13	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Does that require
14	action?
15	MR. CHESIN: Oh, absolutely. Yes.
16	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: When when you
17	receive that what do you that notice, what do
18	you have to do?
19	MR. CHESIN: Well, at the very least, what
20	the letter says on its face, on the very first page
21	it says, "prompt reply necessary", and on the very
22	last page it says that if you don't enter into a
23	consent decree within thirty days, this letter serves
24	as a demand for payment.
25	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So you're required to

1	do whatever they're telling you to do?
2	MR. CHESIN: You're required, at the very
3	least, to reply to the letter, and reply to the
4	letter doesn't mean just call them up, it means do so
5	in a reasonable
6	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: But if you don't
7	reply
8	MR. GINGOLD: And if you don't reply it
9	means you're required to pay the State for the
10	remediation.
11	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: For doing it.
12	MR. CHESIN: For
13	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: do doing
14	it.
15	MR. CHESIN: Yes.
16	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: The State will do it,
17	and you'll pay for it.
18	MR. CHESIN: The State the State will
19	do the remediation and and the and
20	and send a bill, with interest, according to the
21	letter, accruing from the date of the letter.
22	JUDGE RIVERA: Is that always certain,
23	there's no way to avoid that?
24	MR. CHESIN: Oh, there may be
25	JUDGE RIVERA: I mean payment to the State?

MR. CHESIN: There are opportunities that are granted by the statute for certain types of defenses to be raised. Those defenses are very limited. But at the very least, if you don't reply to the letter immediately, there are immediate consequences.

all of this that there was a lot of discussion about indemnification and little or no discussion of defense, and it was a defense and indemnification clause which I would have thought would have required Pyne to take it from the day that letter showed up all the way through and that you had little or nothing to do?

MR. CHESIN: The agreement gives Pyne that option, an option that the - - - that Pyne - - - that Mr. Pyne and then ultimately the Pyne Estate declined to exercise. In Section 8.3 of the - - - the relevant agreement, it spells out exactly what the procedures are for making a claim of indemnification and a claim for defense. It says when you, as the indemnified party, receive a communication from a third party that they're asserting some sort of claim against you, you have to promptly notify the indemnifying party of the nature of the claim; to the

extent feasible you're supposed to give an estimate of what the costs are going to be; and then you have to give the Pyne - - - Mr. Pyne or ultimately the Pyne Estate the opportunity to take over defense of the claim.

JUDGE PIGOTT: Did you do that?

MR. CHESIN: We - - - absolutely we did.

We did it on November 8th, 2002, in a letter that appears in the record at page 239, we cited the relevant section, we said do you want to take over defense of the claim. And what the statute - - - not statute, what the - - - what the agreement says is that Mr. Pyne then had thirty days to determine whether he was going to take over defense of the claim, and if he didn't, then the agreement gave Remet or Remet's predecessor in interest the option to pay, contest, or settle the claim on its own without giving up its claim for indemnity. That's what the - - - that's what the agreement says.

JUDGE STEIN: Does Remet have to actually pay out the money within the ten-year period in order to be indemnified?

 $$\operatorname{MR.}$$  CHESIN: Absolutely not. What the agree - - -

JUDGE STEIN: Why not?

2.1

1 MR. CHESIN: The agreement doesn't say that 2 claims - - - the - - - the agreement doesn't say that there's an obligation to indemnify for money expended 3 or money paid during the ten-year period. It says 4 5 that there is an obligation to indemnify and to 6 settle all claims that are made within the ten-year 7 period. This is Section 8.5 of the agreement. 8 JUDGE FAHEY: Are - - -9 MR. CHESIN: It's the - - -10 JUDGE FAHEY: Are - - - are the - - -11 environmental claims are defined very broadly in the 12 PSA. 13 MR. CHESIN: Yes. 14 JUDGE FAHEY: I - - - I think it's 8.5, but 15 what I'm wondering is if does that definition carry over to the phrase "environmental losses", which is 16 17 what I believe is used in the indemnification 18 agreement? 19 MR. CHESIN: No. It - - - it's very - - -20 it's peculiar. 2.1 JUDGE FAHEY: Um-hum. 22 MR. CHESIN: There's a definition of 23 environmental claims - - - it's in the definition 24 section in Section 1 - - - that phrase, it's defined, 25 but then it's never actually used throughout the rest

of the agreement. What the agreement does in the indemnification section, in 8.1, it says here are the types of losses that are subject to indemnification.

And it's very broad; it says all liabilities, damages, reasonable attorney's fees, reasonable investigatory costs, out-of-pocket costs, et cetera.

It says these are the - - - "so long as" - - - and I'll read it to you - - "those costs result from actions that Remet is required to take under or in connection with any environmental law." These are the things that are reimbursable or that the - - - that the indemnifying party can choose to lay out. So - - -

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JUDGE PIGOTT: Did Mr. Pyne, when - - - when he was alive, was he working with you on this?

MR. CHESIN: He absolutely was. When he - - Mr. Pyne never received the PRP letter directly,
the PRP letter was sent to Remet. Two weeks later we
sent a copy of it to Mr. Pyne copying his attorneys,
and initially Mr. Pyne participated with Remet and
with four of the five other PRPs in doing a limited
site investigation, in talking with the DEC, and
engaging in negotiations.

JUDGE FAHEY: Well, that's - - - what - - - what's interesting here is this really comes down to

does a - - - does a PRP letter constitute a suit, and in - - - in my research of it, it seems that there are fourteen states where a PRP letter does constitute a suit. What the Fourth Department - - - and - - - and you can comment, both parties can comment - - - it seems - - - the Fourth Department seems to have taken a position of California that - - - that - - - in essence that it - - - it - - - a letter does - - - is not equivalent to a suit, and until the filing of an action, there is no suit.

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MR. CHESIN: I - - - I would agree with nearly all of what you said but not all of what you said - - -

JUDGE FAHEY: It's okay. Tell me what you disagree with.

MR. CHESIN: - - - resp - - - respectfully. The issue that has come up broadly in other states is whether, when a party is - - - is insured under a standard comprehensive general liability - - - liability insurance policy, the receipt of a PRP letter is the equivalent to the filing of a lawsuit, and I - - I think by my count, I think it's act - - - it's fourteen states in total; I think it's eleven states that have said yes, it is the equivalent of filing a law suit and three states, including

California, that has said no, it's not the equivalent of filing a lawsuit.

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That's not the question here. The question here is narrower. The question here is when you receive a PRP letter - - or at the very least when you receive this PRP letter which says reply necessary, this is a demand for payment - - when you receive that is some action required.

JUDGE STEIN: So are you advocating the - 
- the - - - the test referred to, I think, in the

Third Department's decision in Borg-Warner, basically

that - - - that looks at the particular letter and 
- - and asks whether that letter indicates that

governmental action is probable and imminent and goes

beyond just asking for voluntary participation and

negotiation to actually demand that action be taken

to - - in the alternative, to face lawsuits or

possible action?

MR. CHESIN: We certainly would satisfy that test. I don't think it's necessary to adopt that test or any - - - or any test in particular. I think the - - - the holding in this case is very narrow or the - - - the necess - - - the correct holding I think is very narrow which is that this letter which we received, which directed us to

respond and which told us that it was a demand for payment, is sufficiently coercive to require some sort of a response. Whether it constitutes a lawsuit or not, I don't know.

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JUDGE FAHEY: Well, it could - - - you have two options, either a lawsuit or negotiation, one or the other is going to happen, but your response is involuntary, that's the way you understand, right?

MR. CHESIN: The response is involuntary, and - - - and that's the thing and then that's - - you know, I see my - - - my white light on - - - is on, so I'll - - - I'll close on this until I stand back up again - - - that's the larger consequence here. The holding of the Fourth Department which is way out on the - - - on the - - - as an outlier, well beyond anything else that - - - that has been addressed by certainly any high-state court that has addressed this question, is that when you receive not only any PRP letter but a particularly coercive type of PRP letter, no response is required and any response is purely voluntary. If that is the law in New York State, then that will put New York State well outside the mainstream on this recurring and important issue of law and it would compromise environmental regulation in this state to a

significant degree because it means that - - -1 2 JUDGE RIVERA: Well, you're - - - you're 3 not subject to criminal penalty if you don't respond. MR. CHESIN: No. But they're - - - but - -4 5 6 JUDGE RIVERA: It's a - - it's a risk 7 assessment on your part. If I don't respond, the 8 consequences are absolutely adverse to me so - - -9 MR. CHESIN: Absolutely. 10 JUDGE RIVERA: - - - there's no sense I'm 11 being coerced to respond. 12 MR. CHESIN: Right. And what I'm saying is 13 if this court were to affirm and the law in New York 14 State was when you receive a letter like this, it's 15 purely voluntary whether to respond, then not just someone covered by this type of indemnity clause but 16 17 anyone covered by the standard CJL insurance policy 18 is going to have a strong incentive not to respond to 19 such a letter and to force the State to file a 20 lawsuit or force the State to - - - to - - - to 2.1 engage in the cleanup on its own in order to make 22 sure that they can be defended by their insurance 23 companies. 24 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, counsel. 25

MR. CHESIN: Thank you.

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Thanks, counsel.

Counsel.

2.1

MR. GINGOLD: Good afternoon, Your Honors,
Neil Gingold appear - - appearing on behalf of the
Estate of James Pyne.

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Counsel, what's confusing about the notice that they got? It seems pretty strong, you know, in terms of they're required to do something or they're going to - - - they're going to pay the price or someone's going to pay the price.

MR. GINGOLD: Your Honor, it is important for this - - - this court to appreciate the fact this is not a, if you will, a Superfund case the - - - all of the cases that were - - - I should - - - should say out of fifty-three cases that the - - - that the Re - - Remet people provided to the court, thirty-five of them covered the Superfund statutes.

JUDGE PIGOTT: That's because there aren't cases like this. I had a lot of dealings with this when I was an Erie County attorney, and they're not kidding. Your opponent is right. They - - - they're not - - - these are civil lawsuits, these are notices of claim, and if you don't do it, they're going to clean it up. And the real problem is the potentially

1 responsible person, because where you have a 2 landfill, if you threw a tire in there, you can be 3 responsible for the whole thing. So you've got to get there, you've got to say I'm - - - I'm tangential 4 5 to this thing, you can't charge me all of this, and -6 - - and that's why you have the potentially 7 responsible people who have to respond, and Mr. Pyne 8 agreed, because that's the only way they would buy 9 this place, is that he would be responsible in the 10 event that this happened. 11 MR. GINGOLD: In - - - in deferen - - -12 JUDGE PIGOTT: It seems to me. 13 MR. GINGOLD: In deference, Your Honor, we 14 are dealing here with a manuscripted indemnification 15 provision in a - - - in a - - -16 JUDGE PIGOTT: Doesn't make any difference. 17 You signed it, and you agreed to indem - - - to 18 defend and indemnify and you - - - and so you have to 19 do that, and I was surprised that you'd say don't 20 talk to the DEC or you're going to somehow queer the 2.1 - - - the - - - the deal. 22 MR. GINGOLD: Your - - - Your Honor, the 23 manuscripted indemnification provision is limited. 24 There - - - there was a - - - there was a broad

environmental claim provision sub - - - subsequent

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within the - - - the - - - the provision of Section
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          8.1(a)(iii) subdivision (b). There was a provision
          that specifically indicated it's limited. It's
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          limited only to actions that are taken that are
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          absolutely required under the law. In - - - in
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          deferen - - - in deference to your characterization,
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          Judge, that all PRPs - - -
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                    JUDGE STEIN: Is that what it says,
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          required under the law?
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                    MR. GINGOLD: It - - -
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                    JUDGE STEIN: I didn't see that language in
12
          the provision.
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                    MR. GINGOLD: Well, it - - - it - - - it
14
          says as req - - - as req - - -
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                    JUDGE STEIN: That's your interpretation.
                    MR. GINGOLD: As - - - as required by - - -
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          as required under an - - - an environmental law.
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                    JUDGE RIVERA: Well, it doesn't say - - -
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          what it says is, "is required to take under or in
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          connection with any environmental law." It doesn't
2.1
          say absolutely required.
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                    MR. GINGOLD: Well, if - - - if you're
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          looking at - - -
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                    JUDGE RIVERA: How is this not in
25
          connection with any environmental law?
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1 MR. GINGOLD: If - - - if you're looking at 2 the - - - the - - - the entire provision, the - - -3 the - - - the part that precedes it is a very broad -4 5 JUDGE PIGOTT: What do you - - - what do 6 you think they meant? I mean, when - - - when Remet 7 was trying to buy this place, it was obviously a possible toxic area, and - - - and Pyne understood 8 9 that. And they said, you know, we'll buy this, but 10 we're not buying a pig in a poke, in the event 11 somebody comes over and tries to make us clean this 12 thing up, you're going to help us, right? And he 13 says, you bet, and then here's - - - and here's my 14 promise. 15 MR. GINGOLD: This - - - Your - - - Your 16 Honor, this is - - - that's not - - - that's not 17 actually what - - - what took place here. These - -18 - these parties, two sophisticated bus - - - business 19 people - - - two sophis - - - sophisticated business 20 entities, I should say - - - negotiated over an 2.1 extended period of time. Burmah Castrol, the - - -22 the purchaser, was very much aware after - - - after 23 24 JUDGE PIGOTT: It - - - Section 1 says,

"Environmental claims", and the relevant part is,

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          "any and all administrative regulatory judicial
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          action, suits, demands, demand letters, claims,
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          liens, notices of noncompliance, or violation of
          proceedings relating to the environmental law
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          including, without limitation" - - - and I could go
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          on.
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                    MR. GINGOLD: That's - - - that's the - - -
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          that's the definition - - -
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                    JUDGE PIGOTT: It's pretty - - -
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                    MR. GINGOLD: - - - of environmental claim.
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                    JUDGE PIGOTT: It's pretty clear - - -
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                    MR. GINGOLD: We - - - we are dealing - - -
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          we are dealing, however - - - we're dealing, however,
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          with a - - an indemnification claim which - -
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                    JUDGE PIGOTT: Did you escrow some money?
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                    MR. GINGOLD: Yes, 2.7 million dollars.
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                    JUDGE PIGOTT: For - - - for what?
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                    MR. GINGOLD: If - - - if Bur - - - Burmah
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          Castrol, within a ten-year period, absolute - - -
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          absolutely was required to remediate the site, then
2.1
          they had a right to - - -
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                    JUDGE PIGOTT: And so - - - so when - - -
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          so when the - - - when the DEC came in and gave them
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          this letter, what did - - - what did you take that to
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          mean?
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1 MR. GINGOLD: We - - - we - - - we took it 2 to mean that they were being advised that there might be a possibility down the road that they would be - -3 - they would - - - they would be considered - - -4 5 JUDGE PIGOTT: And wasn't it your requirement, then, to defend them in the event that 6 7 something happened, so you should have taken that 8 letter and said, don't worry, this is under - - -9 this is under our agreement, we will defend you? 10 MR. GINGOLD: Well, that - - - that was our 11 option. 12 JUDGE PIGOTT: What did - - - oh, you - - -13 so you didn't have to? 14 MR. GINGOLD: We didn't have to. 15 JUDGE PIGOTT: So could you take the 2.7 and - - - and - - - and cash it out because you don't 16 17 have to? MR. GINGOLD: The - - - the 2.7 million 18 19 dollars was set aside within a - - - within a fund. 20 It was there for an - - - an indefinite period of 2.1 time. 22 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: So - - -23 MR. GINGOLD: And it was available if - - -24 if - - - if the provisions under the indemnification 25 provision were met. Tho - - - those requirements req

1 - - - were only triggered if Burmah Castrol, or in 2 this case the current owners of Remet, had a - - - a 3 responsibility. JUDGE PIGOTT: But weren't you supposed to 4 5 defend them? MR. GINGOLD: We had the option to defend 6 7 them. It - - - the - - - the language in it - - -8 JUDGE PIGOTT: All right. So you chose not 9 to defend them. 10 MR. GINGOLD: Yes. 11 JUDGE PIGOTT: They then spend money 12 defending themselves, and then when they come to you 13 saying you didn't defend us so here's - - - here's 14 the bill, you say we didn't have to defend you. 15 MR. GINGOLD: That's - - - that's because they didn't meet the - - - the - - - the language 16 17 requirements as - - - as to a responsible party as -18 - - as opposed to a potentially responsible party. 19 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: What is - - - what's 20 the difference between those two terms? 2.1 MR. GINGOLD: Only a responsible party 22 under the - - - under CERCLA, the Comprehensive 23 Environmental Resp - - - Responsibility and Liability 24 Act.

JUDGE RIVERA: So to clarify, you're saying

1	the PRP letter doesn't trigger the indemnification
2	requirement. What would trigger
3	MR. GINGOLD: What would trigger?
4	JUDGE RIVERA: the requirement? Yes,
5	your responsibility. What would trigger that?
6	MR. GINGOLD: A a finding by a
7	a court or a jury that Remet was responsible would -
8	would trigger that
9	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So potentially
LO	responsible do just means well, it may happen,
L1	it may not? Is that your view?
L2	MR. GINGOLD: Exactly, Your Honor.
L3	JUDGE FAHEY: Negotiate a settlement.
L4	JUDGE RIVERA: So where does it court or -
L5	where does it say court or adjudicatory body?
L6	Where
L7	MR. GINGOLD: I'm I'm sorry?
L8	JUDGE RIVERA: Where does it say court or
L9	adjudicatory body? It seems to me you're importing
20	language into your agreement?
21	MR. GINGOLD: I I'm sorry,
22	Your Honor?
23	JUDGE RIVERA: Sorry. You said when I
24	asked what would trigger the indemnification
25	responsibility, you said an adjudicatory judicial

1 2 MR. GINGOLD: A - - - a - - - a judi - - -3 a judi - - -JUDGE RIVERA: - - - finding of liability, 5 and I said well, where is that language here because 6 I - - - I'm not seeing that language? 7 MR. GINGOLD: The - - - the lang - - - the 8 lang - - - the language is in CERCLA. There are four 9 respons - - - there are four responsible parties. 10 Current in - - - in - - - current owners and current 11 operators of a - - - of a site that receives 12 hazardous waste, hazardous substances, a former - - -13 former owner or operator. 14 JUDGE STEIN: Yeah. But the question is is 15 the language of the contract, and you keep referring 16 to orders of a court or findings of a jury and - - -17 and - - - and I'm not seeing that within the four 18 corners of this agreement. 19 MR. GINGOLD: But - - - but the - - - the -20 - - the langu - - -2.1 JUDGE STEIN: Even the indemnification 22 clause itself doesn't - - - it says - - - it says 23 required by or in connection, but it doesn't - - - it 24 doesn't say by a court or a jury as you're

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indicating.

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MR. GINGOLD: The - - - the section under -
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          - - under the upper part of that indemnification
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          provision at Section 8.1(a) - - -
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                    JUDGE RIVERA: Um-hum.
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                    MR. GINGOLD: - - - talks - - - talks about
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          an environmental claim very broadly. Down below that
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          is a - - - is - - - is limited language, it says
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          provided that.
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                    JUDGE RIVERA: But again, it says with any
          environmental law. That doesn't mention an
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          adjudicatory body. I mean - - -
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                    MR. GINGOLD: Well - - -
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                    JUDGE RIVERA: - - - I think that's - - -
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          that's what Judge Stein - - -
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                    JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Counsel, are you - - -
                    JUDGE RIVERA: - - - and I were referring
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          to.
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                    MR. GINGOLD: The - - - the en - - - the
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          environmental - - -
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                    JUDGE RIVERA: What - - - where's the
2.1
          language that there's - - -
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                    MR. GINGOLD: The environmental laws are
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          either - - - either enforced administratively by the
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          - - - the State of New York or by the EPA, as the
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          case may be, or - - -
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1	JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Just so I'm clear
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3	MR. GINGOLD: some some other
4	entity.
5	JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Just so I'm clear are
6	you saying that the definition of environmental law
7	in your agreement includes CERCLA? Is that what
8	you're saying?
9	MR. GINGOLD: CERLCA is the is the -
10	is between New York State's in inactive
11	hazardous waste site act which is Article 27 Title 13
12	of the Environmental Conservation Law. That does not
13	define what a responsible party is. The that
14	act does in fact refer to the utilization of CERCLA
15	for for the the case law and for
16	interpretation. And I I'm I'm
17	JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: So I'm uncl I'm
18	still unclear where what are you saying the
19	responsible party versus potentially responsible
20	party comes from?
21	MR. GINGOLD: Only only a responsible
22	party has absolute liability and responsibility under
23	the law. Be because someone is issued a
24	a ticket or someone is issued a

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yeah. But if they

1 say that if you don't do it, we're going to fix it 2 and you're going to have to pay for it - - -3 MR. GINGOLD: Yeah. Well, yes. But - - but only - - - if - - - if you will, only in the - -4 5 - in the law - - - only if they are ultimately found to be responsible. Because they're - - - they're 6 7 potentially responsible doesn't make that they're - -8 - doesn't mean that they're liable. 9 JUDGE PIGOTT: That's what I - - -10 MR. GINGOLD: The - - - the development - -11 12 JUDGE PIGOTT: That's why I keep going back 13 to the - - - to the defense part. I mean, you're 14 saying we had the option, so we're not going to 15 defend you. What does that mean, that - - - that if they - - - if they walk away, you're going to be 16 17 responsible for the whole thing? MR. GINGOLD: Only - - - only if they meet 18 the req - - - requirements under the - - -19 20 JUDGE PIGOTT: It's such nonsense to say, 2.1 you know, we're not going to defend you, good luck, 22 and - - - and by the way, if you get hit we're going to pay for it. That's - - - I never read a defense 23 24 indemnification contr - - - contract like that.

MR. GINGOLD: We - - -

1 JUDGE PIGOTT: Usually the horse and buggy, 2 you know. 3 MR. GINGOLD: Your Honor, this - - - this -- - this ind - - - indemnification provision was 4 5 written with a - - - with a specific proviso that 6 limited the environmental claim. And - - - and it's JUDGE PIGOTT: I think you're misreading 8 9 potentially responsible party. 10 MR. GINGOLD: And it's - - - it's the 11 indemnification claim that we're looking at. 12 JUDGE PIGOTT: What the - - - what the PRPs 13 are is I don't - - - I don't know how many went out 14 in this one, it looks like four or five - - - but, 15 you know, it - - - it's been known to send out 50, 16 200 saying, you know, we don't know what's in this 17 dirt but, you know, anybody that touched it may be 18 potentially responsible and you have to defend 19 yourself. Now, if you choose not to defend yourself, 20 you may find yourself stuck with the whole enchilada 2.1 or a substantial part that you don't want to. 22 MR. GINGOLD: But, Judge, only - - - only 23 your - - - there've been - - - maybe if you were 24 stuck with the whole enchilada, if you want to use

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that - - -

1 JUDGE PIGOTT: It's a legal term. 2 MR. GINGOLD: Yeah, that legal term. 3 only if they are ultimately found to be responsible. The - - - the - - - the party that sues them still 4 5 has to show that they are liable. 6 JUDGE STEIN: But that's a tact - - -7 that's a - - - that's a catch-22 in this 8 circumstance, isn't it, because if - - - if they sit 9 back and do absolutely nothing and wait to be sued by 10 the State, in the meantime the State can go ahead and 11 do the cleanup and if the State ultimately wins, you 12 got to pay the State. You - - - maybe you could have 13 resolved this a lot less expensively if you had 14 negotiated with them as they give you the option of 15 doing. That's one of the required actions that you 16 might take. 17 MR. GINGOLD: And - - - and, if you will, 18 they had the opt - - - they had every option in the 19 world to voluntarily negotiate with the - - - the 20 State of New York. Yes. 2.1 JUDGE STEIN: Well - - -22 MR. GINGOLD: It was - - - it was - - - it 23 was our - - -24 JUDGE STEIN: The letter says they were

required to do one or the other.

1 MR. GINGOLD: Your - - - Your Honor, the -2 - - the - - - the case law relative to the 3 interpretation of a suit and - - - and responsibility as - - - as regards this law, more of - - - as Judge 5 Pigott had indicated, ostensibly is - - - is tied 6 into Superfund litigation involving insurance 7 companies. And - - - and - - - and if you will, 8 those cases all look solely at whether or not the - -9 - the insurer has a responsibility to the insured to 10 provide them with def - - - defense responsi - - -11 def - - - defense coverage. It has nothing to do 12 with liability. 13 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay. 14 MR. GINGOLD: None of those cases - - -15 JUDGE STEIN: Is that what the Appellate 16 Division relied heavily on in - - - in ruling in your 17 favor here? 18 MR. GINGOLD: They - - - they - - - they 19 relied on the question of whether or not it was 20 voluntary. What - - - what was not - - - what was 2.1 not provided in any of those cases was a decision 22 from the court that the - - - the mere - - - the mere issuance of a PRP letter provides a - - - a - - - a 23

coverage for indem - - - indemnification for damages.

Those are - - - it's a separate and distinct issue.

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CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, counsel. 1 2 Thanks, counsel. 3 MR. GINGOLD: Thank you. 4 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Appreciate it. 5 MR. GINGOLD: Okay. 6 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Counsel, rebuttal. 7 MR. CHESIN: Just three quick - - - quick 8 points. When you receive a PRP letter, that doesn't 9 necessarily mean that you are responsible for 10 everything. What it does mean is that you're 11 responsible to defend yourself because, as I think 12 Judge Pigott understands - - -13 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yeah. Yeah. 14 your adversary's saying all fine and good, he - - -15 he has an option whether or not to defend you, and 16 his argument is until someone actually - - - a court 17 of law or - - - or someone determines officially that 18 you're responsible, he's making this distinction 19 between - - -20 MR. CHESIN: Right. 2.1 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: - - - potentially 22 responsible and responsible. What's your answer to 23 that? What makes you - - - when you get the PRP and 24 you got to do something, let's say, but he's saying I

have a choice not to defend, what - - - what is the -

- - the dispositive factor that - - - that shows that 1 2 you are at that point required to do something when there isn't a court of law or some final authority 3 4 saying you're responsible? Answer his argument. 5 MR. CHESIN: Sure. That argument is 6 precisely the opposite of the way the contract reads, 7 and the contract is very clear. 8 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Tell us. Yeah. 9 MR. GINGOLD: It's Section 8.3, it's on 10 page 214 of the record. It's the section entitled, 11 "Indemnification Procedures." 12 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: What does it say? 13 MR. CHESIN: It says two things. It says 14 when you get a notice that a third party is asserting 15 some sort of - - -16 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Right. 17 MR. CHESIN: - - - claim against you - - not that there's been a determination - - -18 19 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Right. 20 MR. CHESIN: - - - but that there's - - -2.1 has been an accusation. 22 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Right. 23 MR. CHESIN: You have to give prompt notice 24 to the other side and give them an opportunity to 25 defend themselves.

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Opportunity. That's what he says. Go ahead.

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 $$\operatorname{MR.}$  CHESIN: Right, an opportunity to take on the defense.

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Say they don't do it.
MR. CHESIN: Right.

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Then what happens?

MR. CHESIN: Then later in that paragraph it says, if within thirty days the indemnifying party declines or fails to respond or doesn't assume the defense, then the indemnified party shall have the right to pay, contest, or settle the claim without giving up its claim for indemnity, and that sentence refers to - - note it - - it refers to that communication, "as a notice of a claim of indemnity under this agreement".

And then the only question is timing. Then in 8.5, which is on page 215 of the record, it says that the obligation to indemnify lasts for ten years, except for claims for indemnification that were asserted prior to the end of the period. So we followed this to the letter. Within the period - - - we received a third-party communication saying we're asserting something against you, we sent it over to them.

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: You notified them.
Yeah.

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MR. CHESIN: We sent it over to them. We said in the letter, this is on page 240 of the record, we said do you want to assume - - -

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay. So they don't. Then what happened?

Then the said no, then we MR. CHESIN: proceeded to attempt to contest or settle the claim, which were two of our options that are right there in the contract. First we tried to contest it. We went to DEC, we said we didn't dump anything, take a look at the things that we produce, they're not the things that you find in that soil. That was unsuccessful. Then in 2008, we called them up and we said, so we're thinking of settling this claim rather than letting it get more serious. They said don't do it. Not only did they say don't do it, they said if you talk to them at all, then we're going to claim that you breached the contract and you have no indemnification whatsoever, and so we became a little gun shy with respect to trying to settle it, but we still tried to at least minimize our responsibilities.

We - - - at this point, that was when the - - - the State had already decided it was going to try

to select its own remedy and it put a number of 1 2 options out to the public and put them out for public 3 comment. And so we did what reasonable people would do and what's covered under 8.1 of the agreement, we 4 5 hired attorneys for reasonable fees, we hired en - -6 - environmental consultants for reasonable 7 investigatory fees, and then we commented on the 8 proposal. We said, look, we don't think we're liable 9 but if we're eventually going to be liable, this is 10 the remedy we think you should - - - you should 11 select. These are the things that a rational person 12 does when faced with a PRP letter, because 13 ultimately, if you are designated as a potentially -14 15 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So you - - - cutting 16 to the chase here. 17 MR. CHESIN: Yes. 18 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: You interpret what 19 you're saying is what happened as things that you 20 were required to do? 2.1 MR. CHESIN: There are things that we were 22 - - we were required - - -23 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Required. 24 MR. CHESIN: - - - number one, just because

it said so in the letter. I don't care what our

1 designation was, the letters was - - - it was an 2 official communication from the State of New York 3 saying a reply is necessary and also saying that we demand - - -4 5 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yeah. But it didn't 6 say you were required to pay, right? 7 MR. CHESIN: It - - - well, it said two 8 First it said we were required to respond. things. 9 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Right. 10 MR. CHESIN: And so far, what we've - - -11 what we have done and what we have billed them for is 12 our response. 13 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Right. 14 MR. CHESIN: The other thing that's said is 15 if you don't - - - not just if you don't respond. CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So because they 16 17 didn't do it, you did, you can charge them for what 18 you did? 19 MR. CHESIN: We could charge them for what 20 we did but then this, I suppose, is a good place to 2.1 end. 22 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yeah. 23 MR. CHESIN: Our claim for indemnification 24 is for two things and that was the subject of the 25 summary judgment opinion from the - - -

1 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Go ahead. 2 MR. CHESIN: - - - from the trial court. 3 We said we wanted number one, an order to the escrow agent to release funds to reimburse us for what we've 4 5 done. 6 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Right. 7 MR. CHESIN: Which our response cost. But 8 also we said we wanted an order, and this is what the 9 summary judgment order granted us, saying that they 10 are responsible for indemnifying us and for 11 reimbursing us when we eventually get a bill. We haven't yet, but we eventually will. And as to that 12 13 14 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So you're saying at 15 that point, you would be required - - -MR. CHESIN: Well - - - well, it - - -16 17 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: You're required to 18 contest it and when you get a bill you're required to 19 pay it and that's the - - -20 MR. CHESIN: Right. And I don't even think 2.1 the Pyne Estate is disputing that when we eventually 22 get a bill, we'll be required to pay it. As to that 23 all the - - - the only argument they make is a timing 24 argument. They say once we're required to, it's - -

1	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay. You're saying
2	in your
3	MR. CHESIN: going to be outside of
4	the ten-year period, and with respect to that, again,
5	that's just that's the opposite of the way the
6	agreement works. The agreement says you make a claim
7	during the ten-year period, you give your best
8	estimate of the costs, which is exactly what we've
9	done, and then that claim survives
10	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay.
11	MR. CHESIN: until it's finally
12	resolved.
13	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Thanks, counsel.
14	MR. CHESIN: Thank you.
15	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Thank you both.
16	Appreciate it.
17	(Court is adjourned)
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## CERTIFICATION

I, Sara Winkeljohn, certify that the

foregoing transcript of proceedings in the Court of

Appeals of Remet Corporation v. Estate of Pyne, et

al., No. 129 was prepared using the required

transcription equipment and is a true and accurate

record of the proceedings.

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