1	COURT OF APPEALS
2	STATE OF NEW YORK
3	
4	JACQUELINE EL-DEHDAN,
5	Respondent,
6	-against- No. 90
	SALIM EL-DEHDAN, (Papers Sealed)
7	a/k/a SAM REED,
8	Appellant.
9	
10	20 Eagle Street
11	Albany, New York 12207 September 10, 2015
12	Before:
13	CHIEF JUDGE JONATHAN LIPPMAN ASSOCIATE JUDGE EUGENE F. PIGOTT, JR.
14	ASSOCIATE JUDGE JENNY RIVERA ASSOCIATE JUDGE SHEILA ABDUS-SALAAM
15	ASSOCIATE JUDGE LESLIE E. STEIN
16	ASSOCIATE JUDGE EUGENE M. FAHEY
17	Appearances:
	DONNA ALDEA, ESQ.
18	BARKET MARION EPSTEIN & KEARON, LLP Attorneys for Appellant Salim El-Dehdan
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20	
21	KARINA E. ALOMAR, ESQ. ALOMAR & ASSOCIATES, PC
22	Attorneys for Respondent Jacqueline El-Dehdan 60-89 Myrtle Avenue, Second Floor
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23	
24	Karen Schiffmiller
25	official Court Transcriber

1	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Number 90.
2	Counselor, do you want any rebuttal time?
3	MS. ALDEA: Yes, Your Honor, two minutes,
4	please.
5	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Two minutes, sure, go
6	ahead.
7	MS. ALDEA: Your Honors, may it please the
8	court, my name is Donna Aldea and together with Alex
9	Klein, we represent the appellant.
LO	Your Honors, this is a case where the
L1	defendant stands before you, having already been
L2	incarcerated for fifteen days for allegedly violating
L3	an order and being held in contempt
L4	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yeah, but this is a
L5	separate order, right, that we're dealing with now?
L6	MS. ALDEA: It is a sep
L7	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: I I get I
L8	get you on the fairness issues. He's been
L9	incarcerated in relation to an order that never
20	existed
21	MS. ALDEA: Yes. Initially.
22	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: We get that. But
23	what about the second order and the contempt and
24	civil versus criminal and all of that?

MS. ALDEA: So they are related, the two

1	orders, is where I want to start, because
2	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: In what sense?
3	MS. ALDEA: The same misrepresentations
4	- and I when I say that, I'm not imputing bad faith;
5	it doesn't really matter. There are material
6	misrepresentations in other words, falsehoods -
7	that were put before the the court
8	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: On the 2010?
9	MS. ALDEA: Correct. The same ones that
10	furnished the basis for the finding that the property
11	is actually that he should have deposited the
12	money for the properties, those are the same ones
13	- the fir the same misrepresentations that
14	furnish the basis for the first contempt
15	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: In 2008, yeah.
16	MS. ALDEA: also furnish the basis
17	for the decretal paragraph in that same order that
18	said, and ordered that the defendant deposit the
19	proceeds of the sale
20	JUDGE STEIN: But that
21	MS. ALDEA: of those properties.
22	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: What's the
23	misrepresentation?
24	MS. ALDEA: The misrepresentation is, Your
25	Honor, first of all, the properties themselves were

1 actually sold prior to the equitable distribution 2 inquest actually being - - - being held at all. 3 JUDGE PIGOTT: And that's because he knew it was coming, and he wanted to do this to - - - to 4 5 frustrate the court. MS. ALDEA: Your Honor, that may be. 6 7 may be. And I'm not - - - you know, I'm not actually talking about in terms of his conduct; we're just 8 9 dealing with the issue of whether it's a contempt and 10 the standards for there. I don't know what his 11 motivations are. There wasn't actually a determination to determine what his motivations are. 12 13 JUDGE PIGOTT: What - - - sorry. JUDGE STEIN: But did he ever move to set 14 15 aside the second order, regardless of how it was 16 obtained? 17 MS. ALDEA: Yes, Your Honor, he did. JUDGE STEIN: He did. 18 MS. ALDEA: So that second order - - -19 20 actually what happened after he was incarcerated for 21 purportedly violating a restraining order that had 22 actually been X-ed out on the order to show cause, he 23 had an attorney that came in - - - a new attorney; 2.4 actually our firm came in at that point - - - and we

looked at the order, we got a copy of it from the

clerk's office. It was clear that the provision had been crossed out.

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And so the attorney came in and said, listen, you put him in on this nonexistent order. That was a motion to vacate that entire order. So what Justice Prus did at that point is he came in and said, okay, I'm releasing him; you're right; there was no order here. What he didn't specifically do, though, is find that that ordered paragraph, that immediate - - I guess it would be injunctive, although partially - - it's kind of unclear what it was - - that that paragraph that ordered him to deposit the proceeds of the funds, he didn't explicitly vacate that.

So after - - - without ruling on whether or not that should be vacated as all - - - at - - - as - - - as well, because counsel moved to vacate the whole order, Justice Prus - - on the next day, appellee's counsel came in - - - the wife's counsel came in and said, well, wait a second; there's still that one paragraph out there that he be required to deposit the funds.

The problem is that that order was procured based on the same misrepresentations. He couldn't have been asked to deposit the funds from those

1	properties unless there was a restraining order
2	precluding him from transferring the property.
3	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So the later one was
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5	MS. ALDEA: And there was not.
6	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: dependent on
7	the first one?
8	MS. ALDEA: Correct, Your Honor. And
9	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: That's your argument?
10	MS. ALDEA: And that's exactly what counsel
11	argued. That's part of my argument.
12	JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Do you do you
13	have an argument, also, counsel, that this second
14	order was ambiguous because it both ordered him to
15	turn over the funds, as well as then come in and
16	- and argue against whether he should turn over the
17	funds?
18	MS. ALDEA: Correct, Your Honor.
19	JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: So which which
20	part of that order was he supposed to adhere to or
21	comply with?
22	MS. ALDEA: That's the problem.
23	JUDGE PIGOTT: Well, why wouldn't he just
24	turn the funds over and then go argue that they got
25	to give it back, because he's the one that took the

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          funds in the first place that he was supposed to give
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          to the attorney?
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                    MS. ALDEA: Well, the - - - the - - -
 4
                    JUDGE PIGOTT: They just turned the tables
 5
          on him.
                    MS. ALDEA: Well, the reason for that is,
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 7
          of course, he didn't have the funds at that point - -
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 9
                    JUDGE PIGOTT: He didn't - - -
10
                    MS. ALDEA: - - - because we're talking
11
          over a year - - -
12
                    JUDGE PIGOTT: He didn't say that, though.
13
                    MS. ALDEA: - - - after the fact.
14
                    JUDGE PIGOTT: He didn't say that, did he?
15
                    MS. ALDEA: He didn't have an obligation
16
          to, Your Honor.
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                    JUDGE PIGOTT: Well, that's the - - - that
18
           - - - that - - -
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                    MS. ALDEA: That's the problem.
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                    JUDGE PIGOTT: You know, at some point,
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          this - - - this - - - this funniness gets serious
22
          when you start talking about the court and processes
23
          and what people are entitled to. And it seems to me
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          that he's doing everything he possibly can to make a
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joke out of - - - out of the court system and what

they're trying to do in this case.

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And so it - - - I - - - I understand where
the - - - where the courts get a little ticked off
that people are arguing, well, there were misrep - - he wasn't there. If he'd been there when he was
supposed to, he could have straightened anything out.
If he'd moved to vacate timely, he could have
straightened it out. If he'd showed up at the
referee hearing, he could have straightened it out.

There were so many opportunities, it seemed to me, that he could have cleared this up, instead of people being in - - - in Albany in the Court of Appeals arguing the niceties of some of these orders

MS. ALDEA: Well - - - well - -
JUDGE PIGOTT: - - - as meritorious as they
may be.

MS. ALDEA: Well, Your Honor, I think part of the problem is - - - I - - - I mean, I certainly don't agree. I think this record is a little bit of a mess. I would note that he went through several lawyers. And, you know, I mean, just putting on - - I'm going to use the language in the record - - - one of the lawyers actually didn't read the order that his client was being held in contempt for. The

first lawyer actually moved to be relieved and thereafter, our client - - - it's in the record - - - had said that he never got notice of the subsequent proceedings and he was unrepresented.

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The second lawyer that came in, came in on a contempt action with an order to show cause that had been signed that had a paragraph X-ed out. He shows up in court and he says, oh, can I have time to file papers? And the judge says no, we're holding this hearing right now; let's go. And he was clearly unprepared, so much so that the client got thrown in jail.

So how much of this is the fault of the client and how much of it is the fault of the system? I don't disagree with Your Honor that this record is something of a mess. However, to go back to the prior question, in this case, what is required preliminarily for a finding of civil contempt is that the - - the order on its face be a lawful, unequivocal order, that it be clear and unambiguous.

JUDGE STEIN: What's unequivocal about turn this over? I mean, is it - - - isn't the only thing missing from that saying "pending the determination of this motion, you should turn this over"? But that's - - I mean, every - - I shouldn't say, but

1 yes - - - every order to show cause that has a TRO in 2 it, has a similar, what you're calling, an ambiguity. 3 It says show cause why you shouldn't have to, and in 4 the meantime, do it. 5 MS. ALDEA: Except here - - -JUDGE STEIN: That's what this did and - -6 7 8 MS. ALDEA: Except here's the problem. 9 That language was not there, so there was nothing 10 temporary about it. He was deprived to - - -11 JUDGE STEIN: But - - - but you could have 12 challenged that later on. It the meantime, it says 13 to do it. MS. ALDEA: But Your Honor - - - but Your 14 15 Honor, the problem with it is that he wasn't even 16 given notice of that order to show cause. And the 17 court's rules specify that if you're going to move 18 for a temporary order like that requiring the deposit 19 of funds - - - which actually is a due process issue, 20 because you're asking him to give up his property 21 without a hearing; a million dollars of his property 22 without a hearing. If you're going to do that in an 23 order - -2.4 JUDGE STEIN: Did he ever ask for a

hearing? When did he ask for a hearing on that

issue? Did he - - -

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MS. ALDEA: Well, he didn't have to, Your Honor, because here's the problem. If we interpret that as being a temporary provision as Your Honor has done and we're just missing the language, then as soon as he came to court on March 3rd to respond to - - it was really a contempt motion - - - to respond to the contempt motion, that temporary provision terminated, because it would end at the moment - - it would end at the moment that he actually came to show cause as to why it should not be provided.

Now, on that date, if Your Honor's looking at the record - - -

JUDGE STEIN: To show cause; I - - - I've seen end - - - when the motion is determined, not on the initial return date.

MS. ALDEA: But - - - but when he came to court on that date, Your Honor, what happened is that the court started by saying in the record, we have several issues before us, so I'm going to take them one at a time. He then addressed the contempt issue, and never went on to ever hold a hearing, make a determination, anything, on the question of whether or not the money should be deposited or the proceeds were available.

JUDGE STEIN: I guess my question is, isn't
there some obligation then on his part to say, okay,
well, wait a minute; am I still required to turn this
money over?

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MS. ALDEA: Well, Your Honor, whatever the obligation may be, what I would note is this; the obligation in finding a person guilty of civil contempt and throwing him in prison indefinitely for failing to pay money, for failing to comply with the monetary judgment, is entirely on the party that is seeking the contempt.

JUDGE STEIN: Can you address the Fifth Amendment issue?

MS. ALDEA: Yes, Your Honor. So Fifth
Amendment issue, actually, this - - - it's a sort of
interesting issue. This is a joint criminal and
civil proceeding. And there's no question that the
Fifth Amendment on its face says that in any criminal
proceeding whatever, the party has a right against
compelled self-incrimination. He has the right to
refuse to testify. He has the right not to take the
stand at all.

JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Counselor, did your client - - -

MS. ALDEA: This is a criminal proceeding.

JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Did you client have any obligation to ask to bifurcate these two contempt proceedings? There was a civil contempt and a criminal contempt. So did he have any obligation to ask the court to bifurcate, hold the criminal contempt first and hold the civil contempt in - - - in abeyance.

MS. ALDEA: I don't believe that he had that obligation. He may have had that opportunity and he certainly didn't do it. I'm not arguing that he asked for the bifurcation. However, the attorney didn't have - - - I mean, really, if you're counsel representing a client, this attorney came in, Judge Henderson - - I'm sorry; Judge Prus had already said on the record twice that the element of willfulness has to be established both for criminal and civil contempt. He said that twice.

So the attorney came in thinking, okay, we've got a hearing. The element of willfulness is required for both criminal and civil contempt. My client, since we're in a criminal proceeding, is not going to be compelled to testify against him - - - against himself - - - is not going to be compelled to testify, and so the wife, the plaintiff, will have to prove all of these allegations, including

willfulness.

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Now, interestingly, what happens is, if the element of willfulness is for both civil and criminal contempt, as indeed it should be, and as this court held that it is, there's no reason to move to bifurcate, because at that point, the obligation or the burden of proof of showing that he was able to comply - - in other words, that he had the ability to comply with the order - - would have still been on the party seeking contempt - -

JUDGE PIGOTT: Well, would it - - -

MS. ALDEA: - - - on Ms. El-Dehdan.

JUDGE PIGOTT: Would it be - - - would it be that he had the ability or at some point had the ability? Because we - - - we still have to go back to the point where he - - -

MS. ALDEA: That's - - -

JUDGE PIGOTT: - - - he transferred this in

MS. ALDEA: Your Honor, that's an essential question. It is a key question. And it actually goes to the heart of this, which is interesting. The - - the question of when he had the obligation is the divergence between civil and criminal contempt.

That's the difference - - - the key difference

between the two. For a criminal contempt - - -1 JUDGE FAHEY: You don't think willfulness 2 3 is a distinction at all, then? 4 MS. ALDEA: No, Your Honor, I don't, 5 because this court said twice that willfulness - - -6 the only difference between them is the level of 7 willfulness required, not whether willfulness is an element of civil contempt. 8 9 JUDGE FAHEY: Yeah, the - - - you - - - you 10 may be right that there's - - - there are - - - there 11 is language in some of our decisions, but there's 12 never been a test promulgated by this court that 13 reflects willfulness and - - - and the statute itself 14 only uses the word "willful" in the criminal statute. 15 And the civil tests that have been applied when we set out the three, four steps, whatever they are, 16 17 never include willfulness. So the inclusion of that phrase, in and of 18 itself, doesn't seem to me to be dispositive of the 19 2.0 issue. 21 MS. ALDEA: Well, actually, Your Honor, the 22 inclusion of the phrase is necessary to protect the 23 statute against a Constitutional infirmity. 2.4 JUDGE FAHEY: Well, that's your Fifth

Amendment argument. I don't know if I agree with

you, but go ahead.

MS. ALDEA: And the other part of it is that actually what this court did, when you look at the decisions carefully and your parse - - - you actually walk through them, the court actually said that for civil contempt, the element of willfulness - - - the way that the court sort of defined it - - - is actually included in the word "disobey", because "disobey" implies that you're - - -

JUDGE FAHEY: So you could be more or less willful than - - -

MS. ALDEA: Correct, Your Honor. And I think in the criminal context, willfulness is - - - and a lot of commentators have said, even the Appellate Division in an actually very well-reasoned opinion, although I don't agree with the ultimate outcome - - but the Appellate Division noted that the part of the difference, or one way to interpret it - - and I think this is the way the court did it - - there is a mens rea requirement obviously for a criminal contempt. There has to be. And that element, willfulness, is - - is akin to intentional.

But to get back to Judge Pigott's question

1 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Are you - - -2 MS. ALDEA: - - - because - - -3 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Finish up, counsel. 4 Go ahead. 5 MS. ALDEA: Just this one - - -6 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Answer that quest - -7 8 MS. ALDEA: - - - just this one answer. 9 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Go ahead. 10 MS. ALDEA: The key difference between the 11 civil and the criminal contempt with respect to the 12 timing is this. In the criminal con - - in 13 contempt context, what it is being punished - - - and 14 it is a punishment - - - is the failure to obey with 15 the court - - - a court's order. That means that in 16 this context, when that order was initially issued, 17 even if it was a temporary order, the defendant had 18 an obligation to comply with it. A failure to comply 19 would make him guilty of a criminal contempt. 20 So at the hearing you would say, you had 21 the ability to comply with it then, you had a lawful 22 order then; you failed to do so, you're guilty of 23 criminal contempt. On a civil contempt - - - and 2.4 this is why the referee was absolutely spot-on - - -

on the civil contempt, the difference is that we are

1 not punishing the party who's unable to pay. 2 Instead, the purpose of civil contempt is to try to 3 get them, by putting them in prison, to actually pay 4 the debt. 5 JUDGE RIVERA: So the difference is the 6 nature of the sanction? 7 MS. ALDEA: Excuse me, Your Honor? 8 JUDGE RIVERA: You're saying the difference 9 is the nature of the sanction? 10 MS. ALDEA: Completely different. The best 11 way that it was worded is in civil contempt, you are 12 putting the contemptor in with the keys to the jail 13 cell in his own pocket. In order for that remedy to be effectuated - - - in order for the purpose to be 14 15 effectuated - - - you have to prove that his pockets 16 are not empty. Because if you put him in jail with 17 empty pockets, if you haven't proven that element, 18 then what happens is, you're completely obliterating 19 the whole purpose of civil contempt in the first 20 place. 21 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, counsel. 22 Thanks, counsel. 23 MS. ALDEA: Thank you. 2.4 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: You'll have your

rebuttal. Let's hear from your adversary.

MS. ALOMAR: May it please the court,

Karina Alomar on behalf of the respondent Jacqueline

El-Dehdan.

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Your Honors, I respectfully request that this court affirm the decision of the Second Department. The Second Department was correct when it found that by clear and convincing evidence it was proved that the appellant in this case knew of a lawful mandate, that the - - - a lawful mandate existed.

JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: So are you suggesting that willfulness is not a part of civil contempt?

You said by clear and convincing evidence, so are you saying that his conduct did not have to be willful for the civil contempt?

MS. ALOMAR: Yes, I am saying that. It's my position that if there is an order of the court, a litigant is required to obey that order of the court when he had knowledge of that order, and that if it prejudices the rights of the other litigants, then there is civil contempt. And in this case - - -

JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: The order also has to be a lawful mandate of the court.

MS. ALOMAR: And this was a lawful mandate of the court.

JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: And how is that when you have the underlying order was - - - obviously there was no order permitting him or requiring him to deposit funds. That was stricken from the order, right?

MS. ALOMAR: Actually, Your Honor, that is incorrect. Although there was - - although we later determined that there was no 2008 order in existence which prohibited from him from sell - - - from transferring any property, he was present in court in January of 2009. And in January of 2009, Justice Prus of the Supreme Court, on the record, told him that he was not to transfer property. So the fact that an order is not placed in writing, but

JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: But he had already transferred the property by then, hadn't he?

MS. ALOMAR: No, he had not. He trans - - he transferred the property in March of 2009. When
we were in court in 2009, Justice Prus stated to him
that we should try and settle the case, but he said,
if you don't want to settle, you're entitled to a
hearing on your arguments that you were divorced in
Lebanon and that she is entitled to nothing of the
marital estate. And he goes, but I'm telling you, in

the meantime, do not transfer any property; do you understand me? And Mr. Sam Reed said, I understand, Your Honor; I cannot transfer any properties.

And then after that took place on the record in January of 2009, he failed to appear in February, and then he went ahead and transferred the property.

So my position - - -

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JUDGE FAHEY: So - - - so it's the transfer of title in '09 and then it's the requirement to deposit the proceeds from the transfer or the sale that the contempt is based on in January 2010.

MS. ALOMAR: Correct.

JUDGE FAHEY: All right.

MS. ALOMAR: In January of 2010, I incorrectly cited the 2008 order rather than citing the 2009 directive on the record. However, the point is, is that the court ordered him to deposit money into my escrow account for the purpose of safeguarding marital property, and he failed to comply with that lawful mandate.

And the appellant comes to court and he says to the court, I was ordered to divest myself of my property, but the - - - but he forgets to - - - to mention, it was not his property. This was property

of the marital estate and it was for the court to determine how that marital estate was to be divided and he went ahead and he prejudiced the rights of the plaintiff by transferring - - - by transferring the property and then failing to comply with the court's directive, which was done in order to safeguard the property.

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And after he's been found in civil contempt, and he's been given the keys to his jail, because all he had to do to purge himself was to deposit the money, he still failed to deposit the money, resulting in the court issuing an order for his arr - - a warrant for his arrest, which warrant is still outstanding, because he's - - he's still - - he's a fugitive, in essence.

So he - - - now he comes to court and he says, you know, Your Honors, please help me.

Meanwhile, he's continued to prejudice the rights of this court. Justice Prus had all of the right in the world to issue this order. The - - - the Supreme

Court stands as a court of equity, the domestic relations - - -

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yeah, but in terms of equity, this is kind of a mixed issue, where in the one sense, you have someone who could be viewed as

1	defying the orders of the court, and in another
2	sense, you have someone who served time incarcerated
3	on an order that didn't exist. And then the second
4	time, in 2010, there's no hearing that gives him any
5	kind of an ability to defend himself, so I I
6	think the fairness issue cuts both ways.
7	Well, I understand that you're saying, gee,
8	you know, he ought to do; he doesn't do it. But, you
9	know, the the tables are are kind of
10	balanced here that
11	MS. ALOMAR: Your Honor
12	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: I mean, is that
13	fair to to this to
14	MS. ALOMAR: It is fair, and I'll explain
15	why. This defend
16	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Tell me tell me
17	why.
18	MS. ALOMAR: This defendant
19	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: For 2008, there's
20	nothing fair about that, right? Being incarcerated
21	on an order that doesn't exist?
22	MS. ALOMAR: Well, Your Honor, you're
23	right, it wasn't fair to to incarcerate him
24	based on the 2008. But had I argued the 2009 court's
25	directive on the record, he should he would

have been incarcerated, because he did exactly what the court told him not to do. He sold property and we don't know where it is.

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: In 2010, it wouldn't it have been better to have a hearing?

MS. ALOMAR: He could have reques - - - he could have requested a hearing. He could've - - this defendant could have made an application to the court to set aside the 2010 order, but under the Section 245 - - - 234 of the Domestic Relations Law, courts are empowered to issue an order of restraint to prohibit the - - - the secretion of marital assets.

And I would note most importantly, Your Honor, that in 2009, the New York State Legislature saw the danger that families faced in a divorce proceeding and how one spouse could dissipate assets. As a result, the legislature enacted a new section to 236(b) of the - - - of the Domestic Relations Law where a spouse is automatically restrained from transferring assets other than in the ordinary course of business - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: So - - -

MS. ALOMAR: - - - upon the commencement of an action.

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1 JUDGE RIVERA: So just to be clear. You're 2 arguing - - - I understand your point about the 3 court's authority and the legislative intent, but 4 you're arguing that despite what your adversary says, 5 her client did have opportunities to challenge this 6 order before it got to the point of contempt. 7 MS. ALOMAR: Absolutely. Ms. - - -JUDGE RIVERA: Before he's found in 8 9 contempt. Let me put it that way. 10 MS. ALOMAR: Absolutely. 11 JUDGE RIVERA: Okay, so can you just one 12 again - - - I know it may sound repetitive, but 13 please be repetitive - - - lay out when those 14 opportunities existed. 15 MS. ALOMAR: Okay, the order to show cause 16 was filed in January of 2010. We appeared in court 17 on March 3rd of 2010. He was incarcerated for fifteen days and he was released in March - - -18 19 JUDGE RIVERA: He had already sold the 2.0 properties by then. 21 MS. ALOMAR: He had already sold the 22 property by then. However, from March until I filed 23 my order to show cause in August of 2010 to hold him 2.4 in contempt, we had appeared in court on several

occasions, and Mr. El-Dehdan had - - - had argued on

those numerous occasions that the - - - the divorce should be set aside, that the decision of the referee should be set aside, and he could have, at that moment in time, made an application to set aside the January 2010 order.

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In addition, once I filed my motion for contempt in Jan - - in August of 2010, Mr. Reed could have made a cross-motion to set aside the decision of the - - - the order of the court. He did not. Instead, he chose to flout the court's decision. He was defiant. And he should not be rewarded for being defiant. He had all of the ample opportunity in the world to say, this order was wrong, it should be - - - it should be vacated, but he made a choice not do so.

And we would be setting very dangerous precedent if we were to allow him to do what he is trying to do what he is trying to do because what we would be telling - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: I'm sorry. What happens when he's sent to the referee? Is he allowed at that point to raise the underlying issue?

MS. ALOMAR: No, he isn't, because at that

- - he never made an application to set aside the

January 2010 order. So at that point in time, when

we go before the referee, he is not allowed to 1 2 collaterally attack the order of the court. And that 3 was - - -4 JUDGE PIGOTT: When - - - when was that? Ι 5 - - - I - - -6 MS. ALOMAR: That was in February of 2011, 7 Your Honor. 8 JUDGE PIGOTT: Okay. 9 MS. ALOMAR: And it - - - and my position 10 would be that the Supreme Court was very eloquent when it stated in Madju v. Sykes (ph.) that orders of 11 12 the court are not to be argued at a contempt hearing, 13 because if we do that, we are fostering an 14 experimentation - - -15 JUDGE STEIN: But he didn't get a cha - - -16 well, you - - - you talked about his opportunities, 17 but once - - - once he gets a hearing, is there - - is there a problem with the fact that he doesn't know 18 19 whether he's going to be found in civil or criminal 20 contempt? And in deciding whether to assert his 21 Fifth Amendment rights, it could make a difference? 22 MS. ALOMAR: No, Your Honor. There - - -23 he - - - there isn't. The court - - - the court in 2.4 the United - - - in the United States v. United Mine

Workers of America determined that issue. And in the

- - - in United States v. United Mine Workers of

America, the Supreme Court held that it was

appropriate to hold joint civil and criminal contempt

proceedings, as long as all of the - - - the

defendant was afforded all of the rights to a

criminal defendant. And this defendant, in this

situation, he could have made a request to bifurcate

and he didn't.

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But more importantly, the courts of both
the State of New York and the Supreme Court have held
that there is - - - that the fact that a person
invokes the Fifth Amendment on a criminal proceeding
does not mean that they - - - that a civil proceeding
has to be stayed, or that the - - - the invocation of
the Fifth Amendment in the civil proceeding will not
result in an adverse inference, because you're not
supposed to use the Fifth Amendment as a way of - - of relieving yourself of your burden of providing
evidence, which is what Mr. Reed did in this case.

He could have come - - - he could have come to court and he could have said to - - - in the court proceeding that he did not have the money and provide evidence that he did not have the money. Instead, he made the choice of using a self-serving statement saying I don't have any money, yet failing to show

1 that he really didn't have any money. He could have 2 answered the questions as to what he did with the 3 money, but he didn't. So he should not now be rewarded when he's 4 5 found in civil contempt. He has the ability right now to purge himself from contempt by depositing the 6 7 money, but he hasn't. And in fact, it's been five 8 years. He has deposited zero money. He took the 9 entire marital estate because we were - - - this - -10 - this 750,000 that he was to deposit in my account 11 only constituted one of the properties. There was 12 another property that he transferred without 13 consideration, and there was a tran - - - a drycleaner that he transferred to his sister. So we 14 15 standing five - - -JUDGE RIVERA: He claims he doesn't have 16 17 the money. MS. ALOMAR: He doesn't - - - he claims he 18 19 doesn't have the money, but I'm sure if at some - - -2.0 JUDGE RIVERA: Did he do anything more than 21 claim he doesn't have the money? 22 MS. ALOMAR: No, he didn't. He - - - he 23 just claimed I don't have the money and that is it. 2.4 JUDGE RIVERA: And when I say that, I mean,

did he show that he didn't have the money?

1 MS. ALOMAR: No, he didn't. 2 JUDGE RIVERA: Forget about what he may 3 have done with the money. 4 MS. ALOMAR: No, Your Honor, he did not 5 provide any type of evidence to show that he did not have the money. He did not provide his bank account 6 7 and show that it was used in any - - - in any which 8 way. 9 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, counselor, 10 thanks. 11 MS. ALOMAR: Thank you. CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Counsel, rebuttal. 12 13 MS. ALDEA: Yes, Your Honor. There are a few factual issues here. There's one very serious 14 15 legal issue. The first thing is that counsel has 16 argued that Judge - - - Judge Prus, that actually 17 even though there was a problem with the restraining order, she should have moved instead to find him 18 19 guilty of contempt for failing to comply with a - - -20 an oral order that Judge Prus - - or directive that 21 Judge Prus made on the record in January of 2009. 22 First of all, Judge Prus rejected that. 23 Secondly - - -JUDGE PIGOTT: Let's think about this - - -2.4 25 MS. ALDEA: - - - this defendant was not

held in contempt on either of those things. 1 2 JUDGE PIGOTT: Let's think about this in 3 terms of mat - - - of matrimonial, because this 4 sounds so common, and it's very - - - as - - - as 5 your opponent points out under - - - under 236 now, 6 that there's an automatic freeze on all the assets 7 once - - -8 MS. ALDEA: Correct. 9 JUDGE PIGOTT: - - - once one's contem - -10 - there's a reason why that was imposed. And when he said back in - - - in 2008 or whatever, you know, 11 12 that I - - - that I'm going to en - - - engage in 13 equitable distribution on this and don't sell this 14 property, I think your client understood what was 15 going on. And I think he then did exactly what he 16 should not have done. 17 And now we're fighting over dots - - - dots and commas and things of that nature over whether or 18 19 not this guy, who has not help - - - helped in any 20 way in this matrimonial - - - I'm sorry he went to 21 jail and he shouldn't have; he's out - - - but what 22 are - - but what are we supposed to do here? You 23 know - - -

MS. ALDEA: Well, Your Honor - - -

JUDGE PIGOTT: At some point, when he says,

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1	yes, I got the order. Yes, I know I was I
2	- and yes, I have not complied. I'm not telling you
3	about my money. What what does a court then
4	do?
5	MS. ALDEA: But but Your Honor,
6	before we
7	JUDGE PIGOTT: No, what does a court then
8	do?
9	MS. ALDEA: The court has to comply because
10	it's not the
11	JUDGE PIGOTT: What does the court then do?
12	He's standing there saying, I've got the order, I've
13	not complied with it, I'm taking a Fifth on where my
14	money is. What does a court then do?
15	MS. ALDEA: The court has to determine if
16	it's a lawful order. The court has to determine if
17	it was procured by fraud because there are unclean
18	hands here
19	JUDGE PIGOTT: No, you're not he's
20	not raising that. He's standing there saying I'm not
21	complying and I haven't.
22	MS. ALDEA: But but Your Honor,
23	that's not what was ever said.
24	JUDGE PIGOTT: Wait, wait. I know,
25	you're saying that, oh, well, she didn't do this, she

didn't say this, she did - - - she - - - on - - - you 1 2 know. I get all that. 3 It's a matrimonial. There's a fact here that he did not comply. And they say, where is your 4 5 money? He says, I'm not telling you. Now, what is a 6 court supposed to do? Do you say, well, I'm sorry, 7 spouse, but he's not telling you; this case is dismissed. Is that what we're supposed to do? 8 9 MS. ALDEA: No, Your Honor. But I think 10 there are other ways to collect - - -11 JUDGE PIGOTT: What are we supposed to do? 12 MS. ALDEA: I think there are other ways -13 - - first of all, there are other ways to collect 14 money. 15 JUDGE PIGOTT: Help me out. MS. ALDEA: One thing that wasn't done here 16 17 is that counsel - - - and this was part of the referee's decision - - - never moved actually to 18 19 finally settle the other judgment on the divorce, 2.0 which would then have entitled her to go and collect 21 the assets that were ordered. 22 But there's a more fundamental problem, 23 which is that the equitable distribution - - - when 2.4 we talk about where the unclean hands started, and I

25

think this is - - -

JUDGE STEIN: But how do you - - - how does she collect the - - - the money if he says he doesn't have it, but won't tell you - - won't give any proof as to that?

MS. ALDEA: Well, even for the purpose of the contempt proceeding in this case, if she wanted to try to do a contempt proceeding, I mean, the - - - the requirement still has to be that there is a lawful order. And that order - - initially, what she said is that even in the order on its face, it's - - it's a temporary provision at best, which would have expired at the moment that a hearing was held which he never got.

JUDGE STEIN: That's questionable.

MS. ALDEA: She never moved for a hearing on that, and there's a factual misrepresentation in this point - - on this point about whether or not there was an opportunity to hold this hearing. She said that he came in and he never tried to have a hearing on this. That's absolutely untrue. He came in and he specifically said on March 3rd that he wanted to vacate the entire order, which included that provision.

The court threw him in jail and never addressed the second claim, nor did it issue another

1	order saying you have to deposit this money or let's
2	have a hearing to find out if we have this money.
3	That's her burden if she wants to collect. There
4	could have been, potentially, a subpoena issued to
5	the bank to find out what his bank records were.
6	There could have been orders issued by the court to
7	make a determination as to whether he had the assets
8	She didn't do any of that. Instead, she
9	wanted to throw him in jail. And that's problematic
10	here. More than that
11	JUDGE RIVERA: It's her burden to prove he
12	doesn't have the money or he does have the money?
13	MS. ALDEA: Yes, it is, Your Honor.
14	JUDGE RIVERA: It's his? Okay.
15	MS. ALDEA: And that's exactly where
16	willfulness comes in.
17	JUDGE RIVERA: So let me just understand.
18	Is the the one the March 3rd, when he
19	comes I and says I want to challenge the order, is
20	the only time he's done that?
21	MS. ALDEA: No, Your Honor.
22	JUDGE RIVERA: You said there were several
23	opportunities.
24	MS. ALDEA: There were, and in fact
25	JUDGE RIVERA: Okay.

JUDGE RIVERA: Okay.

MS. ALDEA: - - - he - - - he did it again. 1 2 So then what happens is that he comes back in. 3 Counsel said he made a decision not to challenge this. In fact, he comes back in and - - -4 5 JUDGE RIVERA: I'm sorry; what does that mean, "he made a decision". What does that mean? 6 7 MS. ALDEA: Counsel has said that he made a 8 decision not to challenge - - -9 JUDGE RIVERA: The "he" being? 10 MS. ALDEA: - - - that - - - I'm sorry, Mr. 11 Reed. 12 JUDGE RIVERA: Okay. 13 MS. ALDEA: Made a decision not to 14 challenge the order. In fact, after March, he came 15 back in on August 11th, 2010, when the oral 16 application was made to hold him in contempt, and at 17 that point on the record, there was an argument that 18 the order was procured by misrepresentation and had 19 been vacated. At that point, the court adjourns the 20 case to allow defendant to respond, but has 21 apparently already made up his mind, because he was 22 so upset, he had to let him out of jail the first 23 time - - -2.4 JUDGE RIVERA: So you're saying - - - the 25

point that you're actually on the contempt motion - -

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MS. ALDEA: On the contempt motion.

JUDGE RIVERA: Right. At that time, he should have been able - - - the court should have entertained - - -

MS. ALDEA: Well, it was - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: - - - his request.

MS. ALDEA: Yes, and it was prior to the response on the contempt. Then the next time that it happens is that on October 5th, 2010, Mr. Reed moved to vacate the orders, including the provision that's at issue here. On - - - when that's decided - - - on December 6th, 2010, he - - Justice Prus actually said on the record, no, no, no, you have to hold - - - you have to raise these claims that the order was procured by fraud as a defense to the contempt. And that's in the record on page 185 and 189.

And counsel at that point on the record -
- this is a quote - - - says "Whoa, whoa, these are

not defenses; the order should have never issued",

which is exactly what we're saying here. And Justice

Prus basically tells him, no, no, you raise this as a

defense when you get to the contempt. Now he gets

before Judge - - - before Referee Henderson on the

contempt and she says - - -

1	JUDGE RIVERA: But did ne did ne ever
2	submit did he ever submit papers on this?
3	MS. ALDEA: Yes, he did, Your Honor.
4	JUDGE RIVERA: When did he do that?
5	MS. ALDEA: And in fact, counsel
6	specifically told him told Justice Prus on the
7	record, read the papers, because that's what we're
8	arguing, and Justice Prus said, it sounds like a
9	defense to the contempt. But
10	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, okay, counsel.
11	We're we're finished. Thank you both.
12	MS. ALDEA: Okay.
13	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Appreciate it.
14	MS. ALDEA: Thank you.
15	(Court is adjourned)
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CERTIFICATION I, Karen Schiffmiller, certify that the foregoing transcript of proceedings in the Court of Appeals of El-Dehdan v. El-Dehdan, No. 90, was prepared using the required transcription equipment and is a true and accurate record of the proceedings. Hour Laboffmills. Signature: Agency Name: eScribers Address of Agency: 700 West 192nd Street Suite # 607 New York, NY 10040 Date: September 17, 2015