| 1  | COURT OF APPEALS  |
|----|---|
| 2  | STATE OF NEW YORK   |
| 3  |   |
| 4  | PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK,                                    |
| 5  | Respondent,   |
| 6  | -against-   |
| 7  | No. 138 VINCENT IZZO,   |
| 8  | Appellant.  |
| 9  |   |
| 10 | 1320 Eagle Street Albany, New York 12207                            |
| 11 | September 11, 2015  |
| 12 |   |
| 13 | Before: CHIEF JUDGE JONATHAN LIPPMAN                                |
| 14 | ASSOCIATE JUDGE EUGENE F. PIGOTT, JR. ASSOCIATE JUDGE JENNY RIVERA  |
| 15 | ASSOCIATE JUDGE SHEILA ABDUS-SALAAM ASSOCIATE JUDGE LESLIE E. STEIN |
| 16 | ASSOCIATE JUDGE EUGENE M. FAHEY                                     |
| 17 | Appearances:  |
| 18 | ADAM BEVELACQUA, ESQ.  LAW OFFICE OF ADAM BEVELACQUA, LLC           |
| 19 | Attorney for Appellant 112 West 34th Street                         |
| 20 | 17th Floor<br>New York, NY 10120                                    |
| 21 | DAMIAN M. SONSIRE, ESQ.   |
| 22 | CHEMUNG COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE Attorneys for Respondent  |
| 23 | 226 Lake Street Elmira, NY 14902                                    |
| 24 |   |
| 25 | Penina Wolicki Official Court Transcriber                           |

| 1  | CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: 138, People v. Izzo.            |
|----|--|
| 2  | Counsel, you want any rebuttal time?                 |
| 3  | MR. BEVELACQUA: Two minutes, Your Honor.             |
| 4  | CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Two minutes. Sure,              |
| 5  | go ahead.  |
| 6  | MR. BEVELACQUA: May it please the court,             |
| 7  | I'm Adam Bevelacqua, and I represent Vincent Izzo,   |
| 8  | the appellant.                                       |
| 9  | The lower court in this case failed to give          |
| 10 | the proper weight to compelling mitigating evidence  |
| 11 | of both statutory rape and mental disability and     |
| 12 | developmental delay. Also, the lower court           |
| 13 | improperly scored points under risk factors 3 and 7, |
| 14 | therefore they improperly designated Mr. Izzo as a   |
| 15 | Level 2 sex offender.                                |
| 16 | As a Level 2 sex offender, versus a Level            |
| 17 | 1, he'll spend the rest of his life on the sex       |
| 18 | offender registry                                    |
| 19 | CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Tell us about the               |
| 20 | particular issues that you say they mishandled. What |
| 21 | about the webcam business?                           |
| 22 | MR. BEVELACQUA: Okay. Well, regarding                |
| 23 | risk factor 3  |
| 24 | CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yes.                            |
| 25 | MR. BEVELACQUA: this the court                       |

is supposed to determine the number of victims. Mr.

Izzo is registered for - - - the sex offender

registry lists him as having engaged in acts with two
teenagers.

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Right.

MR. BEVELACQUA: The court decided to find a third - - -

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Because of the webcam?

MR. BEVELACQUA: Because there was a particular - - - there's a - - - a passage in the grand jury testimony where someone he was texting with describes a webcam conversation. And it isn't very clear what happened on the webcam conversation.

JUDGE STEIN: But counselor, there's Penal Law Section 235.22, it sets forth a crime of disseminating indecent materials to a minor, which requires that the defendant intentionally depict or describe sexual conduct that is harmful to a minor through a computer communication system, in order to invite the minor to engage in sexual acts. And sexual conduct, as defined in that statute, includes physical contact with a person's clothed or unclothed genitals.

Under that section, isn't it at least

2.1

1 arguable that - - - that there was a sex offense 2 committed about - - - towards this young woman in - -- in the webcam? 3 MR. BEVELACQUA: Well, neither of the lower 4 5 courts found on that basis. And more importantly, 6 it's not just whether there's some evidence. There 7 must be clear and convincing evidence, which does not 8 exist in the grand jury testimony or the passage that 9 the People and the county court have relied on - - -10 JUDGE FAHEY: I thought you were arguing 11 that sexual conduct required actual physical contact? 12 MR. BEVELACQUA: That it requires contact 13 that rises to the level of a SORA-level sex offense. 14 Because that's generally what the - - -15 JUDGE FAHEY: So - - -MR. BEVELACQUA: - - - counting of victims 16 17 requires. 18 JUDGE FAHEY: - - - there - - - there can 19 never be a digital crime, then? Or a digi - - - you 20 can never meet the requirements - - - I guess it's 2.1 risk factor 3 - - - under a digital link? 22 MR. BEVELACQUA: If the sexual conduct was 23 something that was prohibited by a SORA-level sex offense - - -24

JUDGE FAHEY: Um-hum.

MR. BEVELACQUA: - - - then presumably that would be acceptable. That's what the language of the guidelines seems to suggest is that activity - - -JUDGE FAHEY: I think I see. I'm not exactly sure I do. But I think I understand your argument. Okay. MR. BEVELACQUA: Okay. The - - right. The language of the guidelines seems to suggest that even uncharged conduct can be counted, but only if it rises to the level and meets the elements of a SORA-level sex offense. 

2.1

In really all of the Appellate Division case law other than this case, that's essentially what they found. The person committed acts that would have satisfied a SORA-level sex offense, but that wasn't actually charged in the indictment, it was just that there was some other person or victim that was found later.

JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: But on that point, before you leave that point, counsel, your position is that the webcam - - assuming what was described, the testimony was clear or accurate, that would not be a sex offense? Is that - - is that your position?

MR. BEVELACQUA: Based on what is actually

| 1  | said in the testimony, it doesn't rise to the level   |
|----|---|
| 2  | of sexual conduct. And there's nothing in it that     |
| 3  | presents clear and convincing evidence of something   |
| 4  | that is sexual conduct.                               |
| 5  | JUDGE FAHEY: So you're asking us to remit             |
| 6  | for a downward departure hearing to county court?     |
| 7  | MR. BEVELACQUA: Well, I'm asking you to               |
| 8  | reverse. I this there's abundant factual              |
| 9  | record. There isn't really any contested facts,       |
| LO | especially regarding the downward departure issues of |
| L1 | statutory rape and                                    |
| L2 | CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Well talk about                  |
| L3 | the   |
| L4 | MR. BEVELACQUA: autism spectrum.                      |
| L5 | CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: statutory rape                   |
| L6 | exception. Why why is that something we should        |
| L7 | be considering?                                       |
| L8 | MR. BEVELACQUA: Well, the Fourth                      |
| L9 | Department has developed a very large body of cases - |
| 20 |   |
| 21 | CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Only the Fourth                  |
| 22 | Department, right?                                    |
| 23 | MR. BEVELACQUA: Well, but other                       |
| 24 | Departments have applied it. But its main the         |
| 25 | main case law is People v. Weatherely and progeny,    |

that's been developed in the Fourth Department. And it's completely consistent with People v. Gillotti, which this court decided. It's a subtype of downward departure based on a rather common issue of when there's a person who's in their early twenties — — late teens, early twenties, and they have sex with a teenager, especially if there's other mitigating factors which are listed.

This case - - -

2.1

JUDGE STEIN: Well, assuming that there is such an exception, aren't - - - aren't they usually closer in age than - - - than this defendant and -- and his victims?

MR. BEVELACQUA: My - - - my brief clearly goes over all the established case law from the Appellate Division; and this case squarely falls within the age differential - - -

JUDGE STEIN: Well, and - - - and also,

don't they usually deal with a couple - - - I'll put

that in quotes - - - relationship, you know, an

ongoing relationship?

MR. BEVELACQUA: I mean, in this case that's a - - a matter of perspective in that Vincent, who has mental issues that give him - - - that make him about the mental age of the people he

was speaking to, was communicating with them for a while, as friends. This was like a date, as he perceived it. They went, they, you know, watched movies, played video games. And then with one person there was oral sex, and another person he made out with them and felt them.

2.1

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So what's the significance of the developmental disability in terms of the relief that you're seeking?

MR. BEVELACQUA: Well - - -

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Why - - - why - - - how does that play into the points?

MR. BEVELACQUA: So it - - - it explains in a mitigating way why the statutory rape occurred in one - - - on one hand. And on the other hand, it's a mitigating factor all on its own, that's very compelling, because there are three expert reports that all converge to conclude that he is not a danger of recidivism, and that his condition is really developmental delay. It's not something where he's going to have a lifelong compulsion. He's not a pedophile or something like that. It - - he literally developed too slowly.

JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: So at twenty-one he - under your - - your theory, counsel, at twenty-

one he has the mental capacity or emotional capacity of a thirteen- or fourteen-year-old. So when - - - when does he become a twenty-one-year-old emotionally and - - and mentally?

2.1

MR. BEVELACQUA: That's a good question.

But I think for the issues of regarding downward departure, it's only relevant to look at whether or not he will progress and whether he has the capacity to.

JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Well, that's what I'm - - - I'm kind of asking that.

MR. BEVELACQUA: Oh, okay.

JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Because you're suggesting that there will be a progression. He won't be stuck in the thirteen, fourteen-year-old emotional state. So you're - - - because you're arguing that he is less of a danger to be a recidivist. If he doesn't progress, then what?

MR. BEVELACQUA: That's something that I'm not really sure how to speculate on if he doesn't progress after a certain point what would happen.

But the expert reports say that he was very responsive to therapy. He participated well. He does have the intelligence to engage in therapy, to better himself, to understand sexually and age-

appropriate - - - sexually age-appropriate behavior. 1 2 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: That goes all back to 3 why we should re - - - you want to reverse. But we could remit to the court to take a look at that? 4 5 MR. BEVELACQUA: That's one possibility. 6 The reason why I ask for a reversal is because one of 7 the issues that exists in all of the Appellate 8 Divisions regarding the application of People v. 9 Gillotti, is that there seems to be this idea that 10 even if somebody presents multiple compelling 11 mitigating factors, such that exist in this case, 12 under the third step, a court can just sort of wave 13 their hands, say like well, I don't want to give it 14 anyway. 15 There isn't really any sort of specific 16 application of that third step of Gillotti where 17 there's the balancing of the various factors, 18 balancing the aggravating and mitigating 19 circumstances. 20 JUDGE STEIN: You're saying that didn't 2.1 happen here. 22 That definitely - - -MR. BEVELACQUA: 23 JUDGE STEIN: Right? 24 MR. BEVELACQUA: - - - didn't happen here. 25

JUDGE STEIN: Okay. So wouldn't that be a

1 --- a reason, if we agreed with you, just to remit?
2 MR. BEVELACQUA: I don't know if that would
3 be good enough. I think there needs to be a - a more
4 ---

2.1

JUDGE STEIN: So you think we should just grant it, even though there's never been a - - - by another court - - - with the parties in front of them, that balancing? You think we should just reverse and assume that he should be entitled to - - to the downward departure?

MR. BEVELACQUA: I think the facts of the record make clear the arguments that we advanced in all of the lower courts, that the - - - the defense advanced in all of the lower courts. And a reversal with an explanation of why would pre - - - present very specific guidance to the lower courts about how the balancing of the totality of circumstances under the third step of Gillotti should function and how a court can determine whether somebody is a moderate risk or a low risk, based on the facts of the record.

And essentially, that's - - - that didn't happen in the way it should've in this case, but the record was fully developed in order to allow for that balancing to happen. And under SORA, you know, the appellate courts are given leeway to determine the

1 facts of the case. 2 JUDGE FAHEY: Listen, just - - - just one 3 final point. On this - - - on what you've referred to as the statutory rape exception, is that language 4 5 used in any specific case? 6 MR. BEVELACQUA: I - - - I was sort of - -7 8 JUDGE FAHEY: Or is that your language? 9 MR. BEVELACQUA: That was my shorthand for 10 not having to repeat the letter - - -11 JUDGE FAHEY: That - - - that's your - - -12 as I understand it, what you're arguing is, in 13 certain cases courts have exercised discretion when 14 the age difference between the parties involved is -15 - - is relatively small compared to some other cases. 16 But there is not a statutory rape 17 exception, but that's how you characterize the cases 18 where they exercise discretion to do that. 19 MR. BEVELACQUA: Under - - -20 JUDGE FAHEY: Am I right about that? 2.1 MR. BEVELACQUA: - - - under - - -22 JUDGE RIVERA: Or is that in line with the 23 quidelines? 24 MR. BEVELACQUA: - - - under risk factor 2 25 of SORA, there is a very specific statutory rape - -

| 1  | - that was what I was specifically                   |
|----|--|
| 2  | JUDGE FAHEY: I see                                   |
| 3  | MR. BEVELACQUA: just saying the                      |
| 4  | exception  |
| 5  | JUDGE FAHEY: Okay.                                   |
| 6  | MR. BEVELACQUA: under risk factor 2,                 |
| 7  | which is if the victim's lack of consent is due only |
| 8  | to age   |
| 9  | CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, counsel. We               |
| 10 | got it. Thanks. You'll get your rebuttal.            |
| 11 | Counselor?   |
| 12 | MR. SONSIRE: Damian Sonsire, Chemung                 |
| 13 | County District Attorney's Office, for the People.   |
| 14 | CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Counsel, this guy has           |
| 15 | a very immature, developmentally delayed persona.    |
| 16 | How does that isn't that something that should       |
| 17 | play into these a lot of these issues, in            |
| 18 | relation to the downward modification? Wouldn't we   |
| 19 | want to know how, really, that affects impacts       |
| 20 | on some of these points, that that he's being        |
| 21 | given?   |
| 22 | MR. SONSIRE: Well, Judge, first of all, I            |
| 23 | would say, he's he was a twenty-one-year-old         |
| 24 | man at that time. He was living                      |

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: But clearly, all the

1 - - - all the testimony says he doesn't behave like a 2 twenty-one-year-old guy. 3 MR. SONSIRE: He was living by himself, holding down a job, driving, going - - -4 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: But all the medical 5 testimony shows that apparently - - - do you dispute 6 7 the fact - - - that medical testimony that - - -8 MR. SONSIRE: No, I don't dispute it. 9 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: - - - he basically is 10 operating at the thirteen-, fourteen-year-old level? 11 MR. SONSIRE: I don't dispute that during 12 the pendency of this case, he was diagnosed with 13 Asperger Syndrome. I don't dispute that. 14 JUDGE STEIN: Well, you didn't have an 15 expert to contest any of the experts. 16 MR. SONSIRE: No, we did not. 17 JUDGE STEIN: So that - - - so that's - - -18 I mean, if - - - if the court found that testimony 19 credible, that's - - - you know, those are the facts 20 before us. 2.1 MR. SONSIRE: Certainly, if the case is 22 remitted for a fact-finding hearing, that's something 23 that we potentially may get into. When we - - - when 24 he pled guilty to the indictment, and then obviously

we went forward and now we're back for SORA, we

1 submitted on the papers. There was no request for a 2 hearing at that time. And if there had been a 3 request for a hearing, potentially, that's something 4 that we would have done, at that time, is to have him 5 evaluated ourselves, to make that determination from 6 the People's perspective, to present to the court. 7 So, but - - -8 JUDGE STEIN: You have the burden of proof 9 here. 10 MR. SONSIRE: No, I understand that. 11 JUDGE STEIN: Right? 12 MR. SONSIRE: By clear and convincing 13 evidence. Correct. 14 JUDGE STEIN: Okay, yeah. 15 MR. SONSIRE: So - - -16 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: And how did you meet 17 that burden with respect to the webcam incident? 18 MR. SONSIRE: Well, the webcam incident, 19 again, the testimony that was presented at the - - -20 the grand jury, the third victim, fourteen-year-old 2.1 girl, who he had no prior knowledge of and met over 22 the internet on Facebook, she testified that she - -23 - the defendant was touching himself outside of his 24 clothing. The prosecutor asked: Where? Below his

25

waist on his penis.

And when he was touching himself what was 1 2 he saying? He was saying how I could help him with 3 my hands to fix it and that I would be good at it. JUDGE STEIN: How does that make it a SORA 4 5 sexual offense? 6 MR. SONSIRE: I don't think it does make it 7 a SORA sexual offense. 8 JUDGE STEIN: And so you're saying it 9 doesn't have to. 10 MR. SONSIRE: Correct. I think the - - -11 defendant and my adversary is advocating for a bright 12 line rule that only a SORA sex offense would apply 13 under that risk factor. And we're advocating for 14 something somewhat more expansive. Obviously there 15 has to be some factual nexus, I think, between the SORA offense and what we're asking for, for a 16 17 separate victim, that may not "be eligible" for a 18 SORA level 130 crime or something under 265. 19 I think that there - - -20 JUDGE STEIN: So any conduct of a sexual 2.1 nature, would it have to be with a minor, or - - - or 22 would you say - - -23 MR. SONSIRE: No. 24 JUDGE STEIN: - - - the same thing if - - -25 if it was an adult?

MR. SONSIRE: Well, there are - - - there 1 2 are a number of cases that specifically - - - the 3 Clavette case, the Ramirez case from the Third 4 Department, where individuals are present when a sex 5 offense is happening, so - - -6 JUDGE STEIN: Okay, but this - - - we're -7 - - we're talking about over a webcam. There - - -8 the two people are not physically in the same 9 location at all. 10 MR. SONSIRE: Correct. Correct. 11 JUDGE STEIN: Okay. And - - - and so let's 12 just say that this victim, instead of being a minor, 13 was a twenty-year-old woman or a twenty-five-year-old 14 Would that still - - - would she be a victim? woman. 15 MR. SONSIRE: No, I don't think so. JUDGE STEIN: Why not? 16 17 MR. SONSIRE: Well, she would not be - - -18 I mean, first of all, it wouldn't even have been part 19 of the indictment, most likely. He was charged - - -20 the indictment charged on endangering and an 2.1 aggravated harassment. I don't think, if it was - -22 - I mean, you could potentially have an aggravated 23 harassment just on that, depending on their previous 24 relationship. We'll just assume for a moment, that

they're complete strangers, and this was happening.

1 If that was the case, then you may have 2 some type of case. Again, I think you - - - there 3 has to be some way for courts to be able to analyze this information and potentially to include those 4 "victims" in this risk factor. Because it can't just 5 6 be that if it's not SORA, we don't care. 7 JUDGE RIVERA: Is it because he was 8 inviting her to participate in some kind of sexual 9 conduct that - - -10 MR. SONSIRE: Well - - -11 JUDGE RIVERA: - - - makes that webcam 12 communication - - - for lack of a better phrase - - -13 something that fits within the guidelines - - -14 MR. SONSIRE: I - - -15 JUDGE RIVERA: - - - for scoring purposes? MR. SONSIRE: - - - I think it's because 16 17 there's a - - - in my mind, a factual nexus between 18 the SORA victims in the first dozen counts and this 19 girl. And the factual nexus is the fact that he was 20 contacting all of them on the internet, started with 2.1 Facebook, moved to phones and text messages, and then 22 did, in fact, invite them; which he was doing with 23 this girl. 24 JUDGE RIVERA: So the contact only matters

to the extent that it has some sexual aspect to it.

1 MR. SONSIRE: Certainly. 2 JUDGE RIVERA: The question is, what does 3 that mean for SORA purposes? What does that sexual conduct - - -4 5 MR. SONSIRE: If - - - if he's contacting 6 her and saying let's play baseball, we're not having 7 this conversation. But he's not. He's contacting 8 her and having - - -9 JUDGE RIVERA: He said let - - - I want to 10 have sex with you. 11 MR. SONSIRE: Very highly sexualized. 12 - - - he - - - and she testifies at grand jury that 13 he buys her fuzzy handcuffs, a kinky outfit. 14 JUDGE RIVERA: Um-hum. 15 MR. SONSIRE: When the case breaks and the 16 state police are investigating the case, the state 17 police investigator is texting the defendant from her 18 phone. He thinks he's communicating with her. 19 saying I have condoms. He's saying come over. 20 worry, you're not going to get pregnant. 2.1 So all of this, in - - - in totality, I 22 think, makes it very clear that this is a highly 23 sexualized conversation and contact with a fourteen-24 year-old girl.

JUDGE STEIN: But going to - - - to risk

| 1  | factor 7, which sort of follows from this, where     |
|----|--|
| 2  | - what is the clear and convincing evidence that     |
| 3  | these online relationships were started for the      |
| 4  | purpose of victimizing?                              |
| 5  | MR. SONSIRE: I think it's very simple.               |
| 6  | The first time he had contact with the first two     |
| 7  | victims, the thirteen-year-old girl and a fourteen-  |
| 8  | year-old girl, the first time they ever met face-to- |
| 9  | face, he sexually abused them.                       |
| 10 | JUDGE STEIN: And that's enough?                      |
| 11 | MR. SONSIRE: That's that's                           |
| 12 | yes. That's enough. He doesn't go to the mall to     |
| 13 | have pizza. He doesn't go                            |
| 14 | CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So he was he                    |
| 15 | was  |
| 16 | MR. SONSIRE: to the                                  |
| 17 | CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: he was grooming                 |
| 18 | them?  |
| 19 | MR. SONSIRE: Clearly. I mean, what                   |
| 20 | what else was he doing?                              |
| 21 | CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: With a thirteen or              |
| 22 | fourteen-year-old mind, he was grooming them?        |
| 23 | MR. SONSIRE: I again, Judge, I have                  |
| 24 | I don't dispute that during the pendency of          |
| 25 | this case  |

JUDGE STEIN: I thought these first two 1 2 talked online for like a month or two? 3 MR. SONSIRE: At least that long, correct. 4 JUDGE STEIN: So - - - so - - -5 MR. SONSIRE: So they're not strangers. 6 JUDGE STEIN: - - - but - - - but we don't 7 know if - - - if there's anything in - - - in those 8 e-mails or whatever they did that was related to sex, 9 do we? Or - - - we don't know the context. 10 MR. SONSIRE: We don't know that, no. 11 JUDGE STEIN: Okay. 12 MR. SONSIRE: No, we don't know that. 13 JUDGE STEIN: So how do we know - - - I 14 mean - - -15 MR. SONSIRE: We know because - - - I mean, 16 I think this argument becomes a lot more difficult if 17 he meets these girls and they go to a ball game, and 18 they have some popcorn together, or go to a movie or 19 something. 20 He sends a cab to a local park to pick up a 2.1 thirteen-year-old girl, to bring them to his house 22 and he has oral sex with her, first time they meet. 23 JUDGE PIGOTT: You - - - you - - -24 MR. SONSIRE: The other girl, he sends a 25 cab to a mall, brings them to her - - - his house.

| 1  | JUDGE PIGOTT: Different different                     |
|----|---|
| 2  | girls?  |
| 3  | MR. SONSIRE: Dif two different                        |
| 4  | girls.  |
| 5  | JUDGE PIGOTT: The point is that                       |
| 6  | didn't wasn't wasn't the expert testimony             |
| 7  | that he could not form the necessary intent to groom, |
| 8  | so regardless of what was going on, he did not have   |
| 9  | the intent to   |
| LO | MR. SONSIRE: That's what their experts                |
| L1 | said.   |
| L2 | JUDGE PIGOTT: And do you have anything                |
| L3 | that refutes that?                                    |
| L4 | MR. SONSIRE: No. We didn't we did                     |
| L5 | not I mean, again, we did not get into a              |
| L6 | a fact-finding hearing before the judge. We did not   |
| L7 | have our own experts evaluate him.                    |
| L8 | CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: But even the way he's            |
| L9 | doing this, the things that you're talking about,     |
| 20 | sending the taxi to the mall, this is not a           |
| 21 | sophisticated guy grooming these these                |
| 22 | MR. SONSIRE: I would dis                              |
| 23 | CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: young girls.                     |
| 24 | MR. SONSIRE: I would disagree,                        |
| 25 | Judge.  |

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: You think that this 1 2 all - - -MR. SONSIRE: This is a fairly 3 sophisticated - - -4 5 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: - - - within an 6 emotional calculated - - -7 MR. SONSIRE: Yes. 8 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: - - - investment in 9 grooming these young girls? 10 MR. SONSIRE: Yes. 11 JUDGE PIGOTT: If you - - - if you - - -12 MR. SONSIRE: Yes, I do. JUDGE PIGOTT: - - - if - - - if there was 13 14 somebody that every day was going by a fruit stand 15 and - - - and taking an apple, and you wanted to 16 charge him with three counts of petty larceny, and 17 somebody said they don't have the mental capacity - -18 - they didn't know they were stealing, they were just 19 taking an apple because they thought they were 20 entitled to it; you would lose the case because you 2.1 couldn't show the appropriate intent. 22 Here you can show all the facts that you 23 say add up to - - - to an intent to groom - - - all 24 the facts are there, but this - - - this person

cannot form the intent because of his mental

condition, and there was no evidence to refute that. 1 2 MR. SONSIRE: Well, I think there is some 3 evidence to refute that, because the record - - -JUDGE PIGOTT: I asked you and you said no. 4 5 You didn't think - - -6 MR. SONSIRE: Well, I - - - I'm thinking 7 about it more, Judge, and I'm - - -8 JUDGE PIGOTT: I see. MR. SONSIRE: - - - going back to the same 9 10 point that I made earlier. 11 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, go ahead. 12 MR. SONSIRE: This is a fellow that was 13 living by himself, was holding down a job, was taking 14 college-level classes, had a driver's license, had a 15 computer; was sophisticated enough to utilize the 16 computer to latch on to these girls and draw him 17 (sic) into his home. JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Counsel, are we only 18 19 dealing with grooming issue because there was some 20 contact or a lot of contact with these young ladies 2.1 before they actually meet? What if - - - what if 22 there had been one contact before they actually meet, 23 and then just - - -24 MR. SONSIRE: Well, they would be 25

strangers.

| 1  | JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: They would be                     |
|----|---|
| 2  | strangers.  |
| 3  | MR. SONSIRE: Right.                                   |
| 4  | JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Okay.                             |
| 5  | MR. SONSIRE: So, I mean, that risk factor.            |
| 6  | And they're not strangers, because there was some     |
| 7  | contact going back and forth. But I go back to the    |
| 8  | same point  |
| 9  | JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: But how much contact?             |
| LO | That's what I'm trying to get at. How much contact    |
| L1 | takes him out of the stranger category into the       |
| L2 | friend category, and then grooming category? That's   |
| L3 | that's what I'm trying to figure out?                 |
| L4 | MR. SONSIRE: There's a                                |
| L5 | JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Would it be three                 |
| L6 | times   |
| L7 | MR. SONSIRE: there's a body of case                   |
| L8 | law that we we really didn't get into in this         |
| L9 | case, because I think everybody agreed that they were |
| 20 | not, in fact, strangers.                              |
| 21 | JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: No, no, I understand              |
| 22 | that.   |
| 23 | MR. SONSIRE: There had developed                      |
| 24 | JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: But I'm just                      |
| 25 | assuming they were friends. I'm just trying to        |

figure out on the back end, how many contacts would 1 2 constitute grooming versus just he meets them, you 3 know, for the first time; they've had a few conversations, either over the internet or, you know, 4 5 they're Tweetering (sic) or whatever they do, and 6 then there's sexual contact? 7 MR. SONSIRE: Well, again - - -8 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Where's the grooming? 9 That's what I'm looking for? 10 MR. SONSIRE: Well, again, the - - - the 11 grooming is this - - - this contact. He is 12 developing a trusting relationship, trusting enough 13 for these girls, who are - - -14 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yeah, but he may not 15 MR. SONSIRE: - - - he doesn't know but for 16 17 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: - - - he may not be 18 19 capable of doing that. That's - - - that's what 20 we're saying, - - - that you're - - - you're 2.1 interpreting this but ignoring the medical testimony 22 that's come in. 23 MR. SONSIRE: I - - -24 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Don't we have to 25 assume that it's uncontested and that it's not so

obvious, you know, that that's what he's doing, and when you combine that with testimony that seems to make clear he's not capable of that kind of calculated conduct?

2.1

MR. SONSIRE: Well, I - - - again, Judge, I res - - - respectfully disagree, because I think the record shows that he is capable of that calculating conduct. And one of the major factors - - - CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Despite the medical -

MR. SONSIRE: Despite the medical. And one of the major factors I bring up is his term on interim probation. And what did he do while he was on interim probation that lasted all of four months? He purchased a computer, when he shouldn't have; got onto Facebook under an assumed name of Vincent Sevillion; and started contacting girls up at the Corning Community College.

JUDGE PIGOTT: It's intent to groom. I - 
- I understand all of that. One of the - - - one of

the concerns I have, if no one else is, we - - - we

slam these people routinely. These are tiring. We

don't like them - - I'm speaking as - - as

judges. You know, he was in jail for - - for bad

things, we're going to SORA - - we'll SORA 2, so

it's not a 3, and we're done. And we're not going to 1 2 waste our time with these things. 3 And every now and then, you know, you get a dolphin in the tuna net, and it - - - and you've got 4 5 to make sure that - - - that what we did was correct. 6 That's I think why we have all these questions and 7 why the dissent raised this grooming issue in their -8 - - in their - - -9 MR. SONSIRE: I understand, Judge. Again -10 11 JUDGE STEIN: Would you - - - just one 12 other thing. Would you agree that - - - that the 13 courts below did not engage in that third - - - you 14 know, step, weighing the process? 15 MR. SONSIRE: The lower court's decision -- - county court's decision - - - it was Judge Hayden 16 17 - - - it was a twelve-page decision, and it was 18 fairly well rounded. 19 JUDGE STEIN: Well, it was very extensive. 20 But did it - - -2.1 MR. SONSIRE: Yes. 22 JUDGE STEIN: - - - ever get to that step? 23 I mean, you know - - -24 MR. SONSIRE: He doesn't explicitly say in 25 a paragraph, the court is weighing these mitigating

1 factors, no. But I think in the overall dozen pages 2 of the decision, I think the court does go back and 3 forth. He specifically - - -4 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Would it be helpful 5 to have it sent back for that kind of weighing? 6 MR. SONSIRE: I'll leave that for you to 7 decide. Okay, fair enough. 8 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: 9 Counsel, rebuttal? 10 MR. SONSIRE: Thank you, Judges. 11 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Thank you. 12 Counsel, was there a weighing in terms of 13 the requirements here? 14 MR. BEVELACQUA: There - - - there was not. 15 And actually, the People - - -16 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: If you look at the 17 totality, did he do a weighing analysis? 18 MR. SONSIRE: They decided - - - the - - -19 the Appellate Division Third Department decided the 20 downward departure issue by saying there wasn't a 2.1 preponderance of the evidence of any mitigating 22 factor, which the People now concede in their brief, 23 was erroneous, and they've - - - they're asking for 24 you to weigh the third step. 25 So the Appellate Division committed error

just on that regard. But I think the issue of the dolphin in the net is actually important in the sense that there is this sort of issue of automatically labeling people that have been convicted of sex offenses and not really giving them the sort of protections under SORA that they might be entitled to in other areas of the criminal law, because SORA has been, you know, sort of classified as regulatory.

2.1

But the difference between Level 1 and

Level 2 is vast, and there are punitive aspects to

it, which I don't want to get into the punitive

regulatory issue today. But having clear guidance on

how to balance the totality of evidence, specifically

with downward departure is important.

JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: And what - - - what exactly - - - you said that on your initial case, counsel. What exactly would you suggest that we tell the courts about the balancing?

MR. BEVELACQUA: Well, I think Gil - - 
JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: That we haven't

already told them.

MR. BEVELACQUA: - - - I think Gillotti goes halfway, and I want to go another fifty percent.

I think - - - or I would ask this court to go another fifty percent, which is Gillotti makes clear that

downward departure is like a type of affirmative defense, where once the - - - once certain evidence has been proven by a preponderance, then there needs to be some sort of rebuttal by the People that is proven and that, like, negates the mitigating circumstances, and then under the totality proves - - under the totality of evidence proves that the person is not, in fact, a lower risk.

2.1

For example, if the defense proves that the offender is a low risk offender with these mitigating factors, by a preponderance of the evidence, then it is incumbent upon the People to either disprove it or advance other evidence that shows that they are, in fact, a moderate risk instead of a low risk.

JUDGE PIGOTT: Or - - the judge seemed to spend an awful lot of time on this case in - - in its rather thorough opinion. Is there something in the opinion that - - that you think is wrong?

MR. BEVELACQUA: In the county court opinion?

JUDGE PIGOTT: Yeah.

MR. BEVELACQUA: Most of that twelve pages is just reiterating the arguments of the two sides. Very little of it is actual analysis. Thank you.

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, counsel. Thank

| 1           | you. | Than | k you | ı bot | h.  | Appre  | ciate | it. |
|-------------|------|------|-------|-------|-----|--------|-------|-----|
| 2           |      |      | (Cour | rt is | ad: | journe | d)    |     |
| 3           |      |      |       |       |     |        |       |     |
| 3<br>4<br>5 |      |      |       |       |     |        |       |     |
|             |      |      |       |       |     |        |       |     |
| 6           |      |      |       |       |     |        |       |     |
| 7           |      |      |       |       |     |        |       |     |
| 8           |      |      |       |       |     |        |       |     |
| 9           |      |      |       |       |     |        |       |     |
| 10          |      |      |       |       |     |        |       |     |
| 11          |      |      |       |       |     |        |       |     |
| 12          |      |      |       |       |     |        |       |     |
| 13          |      |      |       |       |     |        |       |     |
| 14          |      |      |       |       |     |        |       |     |
| 15          |      |      |       |       |     |        |       |     |
| 16          |      |      |       |       |     |        |       |     |
| 17          |      |      |       |       |     |        |       |     |
| 18          |      |      |       |       |     |        |       |     |
| 19          |      |      |       |       |     |        |       |     |
| 20          |      |      |       |       |     |        |       |     |
| 21          |      |      |       |       |     |        |       |     |
| 22          |      |      |       |       |     |        |       |     |
| 23          |      |      |       |       |     |        |       |     |
| 24          |      |      |       |       |     |        |       |     |
| 25          |      |      |       |       |     |        |       |     |

| 1  | CERTIFICATION   |
|----|---|
| 2  |   |
| 3  | I, Penina Wolicki, certify that the                   |
| 4  | foregoing transcript of proceedings in the Court of   |
| 5  | Appeals of People of the State of New York v. Vincent |
| 6  | Izzo, No. 138 was prepared using the required         |
| 7  | transcription equipment and is a true and accurate    |
| 8  | record of the proceedings.                            |
| 9  |   |
| 10 | Donnie 1229   |
| 11 | Penina waieh.   |
| 12 | C: anothers.  |
| 13 | Signature:  |
| 14 | Accorded Names a Carcibana                            |
| 15 | Agency Name: eScribers                                |
| 16 | Address of Agency: 700 West 192nd Street              |
| 17 |   |
| 18 | Suite # 607   |
| 19 | New York, NY 10040                                    |
| 20 |   |
| 21 | Date: September 18, 2015                              |
| 22 |   |
| 23 |   |
| 24 |   |