| 1 | COURT OF APPEALS |
|----|---|
| 2 | STATE OF NEW YORK |
| 3 | MATTED OF TEVETDA |
| 4 | MATTER OF TEXEIRA, |
| 5 | Appellant, |
| 6 | -against- No. 142 |
| 7 | FISCHER, (papers sealed) |
| | Respondent. |
| 8 | |
| 9 | 20 Eagle Street |
| 10 | Albany, New York 12207 |
| 11 | September 16, 2015 |
| 12 | Before: |
| 13 | CHIEF JUDGE JONATHAN LIPPMAN ASSOCIATE JUDGE EUGENE F. PIGOTT, JR. |
| | ASSOCIATE JUDGE JENNY RIVERA |
| 14 | ASSOCIATE JUDGE SHEILA ABDUS-SALAAM ASSOCIATE JUDGE LESLIE E. STEIN |
| 15 | ASSOCIATE JUDGE EUGENE M. FAHEY |
| 16 | Appearances: |
| 17 | MICHAEL E. CASSIDY, ESQ. PRISONERS' LEGAL SERVICES OF NEW YORK |
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| 23 | |
| 24 | Vamon Cabiffuillan |
| 25 | Karen Schiffmiller Official Court Transcriber |

| 1 | CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Number 142, Texeira |
|----|--|
| 2 | v. Fischer. |
| 3 | Counselor, would you like any rebuttal |
| 4 | time? |
| 5 | MR. CASSIDY: Yes, please, Your Honor, two |
| 6 | minutes. |
| 7 | CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Sure, go ahead. |
| 8 | MR. CASSIDY: May it please the court, my |
| 9 | name is Michael Cassidy from Prisoners' Legal |
| 10 | Services of New York in Plattsburgh. I represent the |
| 11 | petitioner-appellant. |
| 12 | This case arises out of a Article 78 |
| 13 | challenge to a prison disciplinary hearing. And |
| 14 | there's no issue here as to whether or not his right |
| 15 | was rights were violated at the hearing. This |
| 16 | the both the Supreme Court and the |
| 17 | Appellate Division both agreed that his rights to |
| 18 | call a witness had |
| 19 | CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So what's the issue |
| 20 | here? |
| 21 | MR. CASSIDY: clearly been violated. |
| 22 | CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: The issue is |
| 23 | MR. CASSIDY: The issue is the appropriate |
| 24 | remedy. |
| 25 | CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Right. |

1 MR. CASSIDY: The - - - the courts below 2 remitted for a new hearing; and they did so under the 3 Third Department's choice of remedy framework, which 4 it's developed over the years. And - - - and that 5 framework involves the court's characterization of the source of the - - - of the right as either 6 7 Constitutional or regulatory. If it's - - -8 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: What is - - - what is 9 the source of it here? 10 MR. CASSIDY: The source here as a right to 11 call witnesses is Constitutional. In 1974, the 12 United States Supreme Court in Wolff v. McDonnell set 13 forth the basic procedural rights that prisoners have 14 in a prison disciplinary - - -15 JUDGE PIGOTT: To be a little hyperbolic, 16 let's assume instead of what was charged here that -17 - - that he was charged with murdering another inmate 18 - - - and don't send me over to county court yet - -19 - but if - - - if there's a - - - if there's a 20 hearing with respect to whether or not he did that or 21 some other equally nasty thing, and his right to call 22 a witness is - - - is abridged, is he not guilty? Do 23 we just expunge any charge that he may have against 2.4 him?

MR. CASSIDY: Well, if - - - if the prison

officials didn't conduct the hearing properly, yes.

JUDGE PIGOTT: Did exactly what happened here. No matter what the - - - the charge is, no matter what the crime is, no matter how serious it is with respect to the institution, gang warfare, I could think of a zi - - - a few things, we just wipe it out, and we say you didn't - - -

MR. CASSIDY: Yes.

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JUDGE PIGOTT: - - - you didn't allow him
to call the witness; it's as if it never happened.

MR. CASSIDY: Yes.

JUDGE PIGOTT: Okay.

MR. CASSIDY: This court in Hartje in 1987 made a very blanket rule along those lines for substantial evidence. The court said that - - - that prison officials, if they didn't pull together enough evidence to - - - to establish substantial evidence that the person was guilty, they wouldn't get another shot.

JUDGE PIGOTT: Wasn't there a presumption there that - - - that they didn't have substantial evidence because there wasn't substantial ev - - - it's not like they had some, you know, hidden under the desk and they didn't put it on. They - - - they just did not have it, and therefore you're done.

1 MR. CASSIDY: It could be the case either 2 way, yes. 3 JUDGE PIGOTT: But if - - - but if in a 4 situation li - - - as - - - as this one or some other 5 one, where there's a clear procedural violation, I -6 - - I'm having trouble understanding why regardless 7 of the severity of the crime the - - - the prison 8 system pays. 9 MR. CASSIDY: Well, one of the reasons is 10 that - - - that the - - - the - - - these rights 11 without some incentive to prison officials to do it 12 right - - - I mean, here we are thirty years after 13 Barnes, and I - - - I'm - - - I've been doing this 14 work since '91. I'm continuously amazed how often 15 prison officials get it wrong. And it's clear - - -16 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: What about - - - what 17 about judges, counsel? We get wrong too, sometimes, 18 and when we do, for example, when we exclude a - - -19 a defendant from a sidebar, then that doesn't mean 20 the trial is - - - or he doesn't get a trial. It 21 just means that he gets another trial, not - - -22 MR. CASSIDY: In the criminal context. 23 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Yeah, in the criminal 2.4 context.

25 MR. CASSIDY: Yes.

1 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: So, why - - - why is -- - why is a witness in a disciplinary proceeding 2 3 different than that? MR. CASSIDY: Well, one of the reasons I -4 5 - - I went into this in my reply brief in response to 6 respondent's arguments on that very point. The pro -7 - - the criminal law is a very different situation. 8 It's the highest standard of proof that we have. 9 Prison - - - the prison situation, the hearing, is 10 the exact opposite. It's the lowest standard you can 11 There's hardly any protections - - - any get. 12 procedural protections - - - that prisoners have. 13 They're extremely limited. 14 And if those - - - if those rights are 15 going to mean anything at all to the prisoners and -16 - - and to how our system is working here, they've 17 got to have some mechanism of enforcement. CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So how do we know 18 19 whether it's Constitutional or regulatory? 20 MR. CASSIDY: Well, I would argue that - -21 - that a - - - part of what the Third Department's 22 argument here about the characterization of the - - -23 of the source of the right, it - - - it takes away the focus on the - - - on the - - - the nature of the 2.4

right itself. If it's a violation of the right to

| 1 | call witnesses, that is a a basic right. And |
|----|---|
| 2 | they can they can violate it in numerable |
| 3 | different ways, like whether or not they're |
| 4 | it's a refusal, the how they followed up, in |
| 5 | certain situations |
| б | CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Does it matter the |
| 7 | reason why they didn't they didn't follow up |
| 8 | and allow the witness, like in this case where thea |
| 9 | theoretically, the the witness thought it |
| 10 | wasn't in this institution, it was in another |
| 11 | institution, and you know, it wasn't where the |
| 12 | the hearing officer said, gee, I'm not getting you |
| 13 | that witness no matter what. There was a rationale |
| 14 | as to why the witness wasn't why there wasn't |
| 15 | follow-up. |
| 16 | MR. CASSIDY: Well, there was no rationale |
| 17 | here either. |
| 18 | CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: No rationale |
| 19 | whatsoever? |
| 20 | MR. CASSIDY: No, the the as |
| 21 | the court the courts in already found |
| 22 | that there was a violation and I would argue that |
| 23 | once that violation is found |
| 24 | CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Automatically |

expunge.

| 1 | MR. CASSIDY: Yes. |
|----|--|
| 2 | JUDGE PIGOTT: Would it well, in |
| 3 | - in this case, when they when they did try to |
| 4 | get a hold of this guy and he said I was never at |
| 5 | that facility, he clearly misunderstood. |
| 6 | MR. CASSIDY: Right. |
| 7 | JUDGE PIGOTT: I think he thought they were |
| 8 | talking about where he was and and not when the |
| 9 | witness so it was it was accidental; it |
| 10 | was an oversight. But your your suggestion is |
| 11 | if they had gone ahead with a hearing at that point, |
| 12 | then it gets expunged. |
| 13 | MR. CASSIDY: Well, this wasn't really an |
| 14 | oversight, though, because the hearing officer |
| 15 | accused |
| 16 | JUDGE PIGOTT: No, I'm using that as an |
| 17 | example. I'm not using yours. I'm saying suppose it |
| 18 | is an oversight. Under your strict liability, so to |
| 19 | speak, rule, then then that would be expunged? |
| 20 | MR. CASSIDY: Well, if if he |
| 21 | yes. Yes |
| 22 | JUDGE PIGOTT: So |
| 23 | MR. CASSIDY: because |
| 24 | JUDGE PIGOTT: Okay. |
| 25 | MR. CASSIDY: we need some way to |

- to compel prison officials to follow these rules. 1 Otherwise, I mean, there is a vast difference between 2 3 expungement and remittal. JUDGE PIGOTT: If - - - if - - -4 5 MR. CASSIDY: Remittal - - -JUDGE PIGOTT: I know. If - - - if - - -6 7 if he wanted twelve witnesses and they gave him 8 eight, and - - - and he comes up and says, hey, I 9 needed four more, and they - - - they didn't - - -10 they didn't give them to me, expunge it. 11 MR. CASSIDY: Well, the - - - the first 12 question, though, they - - - I - - - I don't want to 13 assume - - - assume in your question whether or not he was entitled to those other four. He may not have 14 15 been. 16 JUDGE PIGOTT: Right. 17 MR. CASSIDY: But my - - - my point is that if - - - if the court determines that under this 18 19 particular factual scenario his right to witnesses 20 was violated because they didn't do what they should 21 have done - - - what the court had already explained 22 needed to be done in that situation, then it's a 23 violation of the right to call witnesses.

JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: But does it matter,

though, for example, counsel, whether the witness has

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| 1 | anything relevant to say? I mean, I can imagine a |
|----|---|
| 2 | scenario where a prisoner might just ask for two or |
| 3 | three witnesses and they may have nothing really to |
| 4 | provide in terms of relevance to the proceeding |
| 5 | MR. CASSIDY: Well, then it wouldn't be a |
| 6 | violation. |
| 7 | JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: It would not? |
| 8 | MR. CASSIDY: Right, it wouldn't be a |
| 9 | violation in the first instance. |
| LO | JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Okay. |
| L1 | MR. CASSIDY: What I'm saying is once the |
| L2 | court you've determined there is a violation - |
| L3 | |
| L4 | CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Then then it |
| L5 | doesn't matter |
| L6 | MR. CASSIDY: Then then |
| L7 | CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: The level of the |
| L8 | violation, what it is. It's a violation is a |
| L9 | violation is a violation. |
| 20 | MR. CASSIDY: Yes. There there |
| 21 | should be |
| 22 | CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay. |
| 23 | MR. CASSIDY: there should be a |
| 24 | bright line rule that expungement should be the |
| 25 | nenalty |

1 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, counselor, 2 thank you. 3 Counsel? You'll have your rebuttal, counsel. 4 5 MR. HOTVET: May it please the court. 6 Remittal was the appropriate remedy here because the 7 alternative, expungement, would not have been consistent with the balance of equities, the most 8 9 important of which was the seriousness of the 10 misconduct and DOCCS's corresponding need to maintain 11 a record of it. 12 This court - - - the Appellate Division may 13 be affirmed, therefore, on either of two grounds. 14 One, that the error here was regulatory as the Third 15 Department said, and the balance of equities supports the remedy. Or alternatively, disregarding whether 16 17 the error was regulatory or Constitutional, the remedy of remittal was proper, given the equities. 18 19 JUDGE PIGOTT: I worry about equity. 2.0 equities are we talking about? 21 MR. HOTVET: There are four equities here, 22 Your Honor, and they all weigh in favor of remittal. 23 These are the equities that the Appellate Divisions

The first one is the seriousness of the

have pointed out in - - - in deciding these cases.

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1 offense and DOCCS's corresponding ability to maintain an accurate record. The second one is the 2 3 intentionality of the hearing officer's error, whether it was inadvertent or outright. The third is 4 5 whether or not a fair hearing - - - rehearing - - can be had. And the fourth is the extent to which 6 7 the penalty is served. 8 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So even if you 9 violate someone's Constitutional rights or the - - -10 it comes from the Constitutional side, you just say, 11 well, it's fair and therefore, you - - - you remit? 12 Do you know what I'm saying? Is it that easy - - -13 MR. HOTVET: Yes, Your Honor. 14 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: - - - to say it's 15 Constitutional in nature but so what? We're just 16 going to - - - I look at the equities. Judge Pigott 17 said, you know, who's determining the equities? But 18 let's say, you know, the hearing officer is or 19 whoever is determining the equities. It doesn't 2.0 matter if it's Constitutional, remit? 21 MR. HOTVET: That's right, Your Honor. 22 Let's assume there was - - -23 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: But why - - - but why 2.4 is that? That's what I'm asking.

MR. HOTVET: Well, I don't want to demean

| 1 | the importance of an inmate's Constitutional rights. |
|----|---|
| 2 | CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Well, that's what I'm |
| 3 | asking you. How come? |
| 4 | MR. HOTVET: But while that's important in |
| 5 | other contexts like a 1983 action, it's not |
| 6 | productive in this context, the remedy context, and |
| 7 | for this reason. If the inmate gets a new hearing |
| 8 | that gives him all his rights, then he's not |
| 9 | prejudiced. The process has given |
| LO | JUDGE PIGOTT: Well, no one's prejudiced. |
| L1 | MR. HOTVET: But that's the point. |
| L2 | JUDGE PIGOTT: So? |
| L3 | MR. HOTVET: And since no one's prejudiced, |
| L4 | DOCCS should be able to keep a record |
| L5 | JUDGE RIVERA: What if he's prejudiced by |
| L6 | the time and delay? The witness no longer remembers. |
| L7 | The witness is no longer within the control of DOCCS. |
| L8 | MR. HOTVET: Yes, and that that was - |
| L9 | |
| 20 | JUDGE RIVERA: That's the key witness. |
| 21 | MR. HOTVET: And that's was your Barnes |
| 22 | case, Your Honor, and that's one of the equities. |
| 23 | That's the the third one, whether there's |
| 24 | reason to think a a fair rehearing can be had. |
| 25 | And if a witness |

1 JUDGE RIVERA: But it's not dispositive 2 under your argument, right? It could be outweighed -3 4 MR. HOTVET: No, but - - -5 JUDGE RIVERA: - - - by the other equities, 6 correct? 7 MR. HOTVET: But we think it should be up to the reviewing court that has all - - -8 9 JUDGE PIGOTT: I wish we - - - I wish we 10 knew enough. I - - - I mean, well, I'll say 11 personally I wish I knew enough about the prison 12 system, but it seems to me taking away two years of 13 good time is pretty serious. And - - - and - - - and 14 in any case where you're taking away that - - - that 15 - - - that amount of good time, I would think no 16 matter what, it ought - - - you know, something ought 17 to happen in - - - you know, favorably to the prisoner because he'd like to get that time back. 18 19 MR. HOTVET: Right, that's - - - that's 20 presupposing that he's innocent and he wins the 21 rehearing. JUDGE PIGOTT: We don't know if he's 22 23 innocent because he didn't get his witness. But my -2.4 - - my point - - -

MR. HOTVET: But he had a rehearing, Your

Honor, and that's the point. That error was cured in the rehearing. He had a rehearing here in July of 2013. He didn't challenge the rehearing. So as a practical matter, that rehearing gave him all the protections due process requires.

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So what's the rule -

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CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So what's the rule - I mean, what's your rule as to how you know
whether you get a remittal or whether you get an
expungement?

MR. HOTVET: Well, we - - - we - - - you can go with it - - - we defend on either of two grounds. You can conclude that this is not - - - this is only a regulatory error and the balance of equities favor remittal, and I will explain why it was only regulatory error in a minute. Or alternatively, if you assume it's a Constitutional error, we think that it doesn't make any sense - - -

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So it doesn't matter whether it's regulatory or Constitutional, it's still a balance of the equities in your mind?

MR. HOTVET: As a practical matter, yes.

JUDGE PIGOTT: Rehearing - - - maybe I
missed it. I - - - was he found guilty, and then, he
said wait a minute, you didn't bring this prisoner,
and they had another hearing, and then he was found

| 1 | guilty again? |
|----|--|
| 2 | MR. HOTVET: Yes. |
| 3 | JUDGE PIGOTT: Okay. |
| 4 | MR. HOTVET: He was found guilty the first |
| 5 | time. Supreme Court annulled the disciplinary |
| 6 | disposition but ordered a new hearing. A new hearing |
| 7 | was held in and ended in July of 2013 at the |
| 8 | midpoint of his SHU sentence. And he was found |
| 9 | guilty again, and he does not claim that there was |
| 10 | any error of any kind. |
| 11 | JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Did the witness that |
| 12 | he wanted, this Townsend (ph.) or Town (ph.), |
| 13 | whatever the man's name was was he then |
| 14 | did he get a a sufficient explanation or some |
| 15 | explanation about why that witness wasn't provided? |
| 16 | MR. HOTVET: Well, he the witness |
| 17 | testified in the second hearing. |
| 18 | JUDGE PIGOTT: I missed some |
| 19 | JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: The witness did |
| 20 | testify? |
| 21 | MR. HOTVET: Yeah. |
| 22 | JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Okay. |
| 23 | MR. HOTVET: The witness testified in the |
| 24 | second hearing. He |
| 25 | JUDGE RIVERA: Why is it a regulatory |

error?

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MR. HOTVET: It's a regulatory - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: Why does it not rise to a Constitutional error?

MR. HOTVET: It - - - it does not rise - - it's a regulatory violation because the hearing
officer did not provide a written reason for denying
a witness. The regulation has two sentences. This
is 254.5(a) and it has two sentences. And the first
sentence implements the Constitutional right
established in Wolff. You have a right to witnesses
unless it's irrelevant or - - - the second sentence,
however, goes beyond Wolff.

And the second sentence says you have a right to a written reason. Wolff didn't prescribe that. New York did it in its discretion. And you recognized this in your Laureano decision. We say the violation here - - - and the reason we didn't appeal the Supreme Court's decision to annul was because there's no question the hearing officer here didn't give a reason. He didn't give a written reason so it's a clear violation of the second sentence of 254.5(a).

You don't have to get to whether there was a violation of the first sentence, and you don't have

to get whether there was a violation of Wolff. 1 There was a clear violation here of the - - -2 3 JUDGE RIVERA: What - - - what would have been a violation of Wolff in this case? 4 5 MR. HOTVET: To deny a relevant witness. JUDGE RIVERA: So in other words, if the 6 7 witness said, yes, I'm ready to testify and the officer doesn't - - -8 9 MR. HOTVET: Right. JUDGE RIVERA: - - - doesn't facilitate 10 11 that testimony. MR. HOTVET: Right. And we think - - -12 13 it's a very close question, but we think that there's an argument to be made that there wasn't a 14 15 Constitutional violation here. Now I repeat, even if you decide there was, 16 17 we say it doesn't matter for the reasons I gave, because whatever - - - whether - - - even if there 18 19 was in the first hearing, it was absolutely cured by 2.0 the second hearing where he had all his witnesses. 21 There's no claim of Constitutional violation there. 22 So the process as a whole gave him all the 23 protections that due process required. 2.4 A couple of reasons why we think the

Appellate Division could have found there was not a

Constitutional violation, he's heard on - - - the 1 2 petitioner is heard on tape planning to assault Ivan. 3 His only defense at the hearing, however, is that the Ivan he was talking to on the telephone conversations 4 5 was not Ivan Tondro (ph.). It was another Ivan, Jamaican Ivan. He said, yeah, I was planning to 6 7 assault Jamaican Ivan, but not Ivan Tondro. 8 Now in light - - - and then secondly, in 9 light of the very limited testimony that petitioner 10 wanted from Tondro, he - - - he wanted Tondro to say 11 he, Tondro, didn't know him, the petitioner - - -12 there was no reason to think that Tondro had anything 13 to say that would help the petitioner's defense. So in that line of reasoning, it's 14 15 reasonable to conclude that there wasn't a 16 Constitutional violation. But it's a very, very 17 close hard question whether there was a Constitutional violation here. And for you to reach 18 19 it, violates the rule that you don't reach 20 Constitutional questions when there's another out. 21 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, counsel. 22 Anything else? 23 MR. HOTVET: I need to say why Barnes isn't 2.4 controlling because - - -

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Sure, go ahead.

MR. HOTVET: - - - their - - - their

primary case is Barnes. Barnes ordered expungement
in that case, but under the circumstances there,

Barnes did not hold that expungement was the proper
remedy for every violation of the right to witnesses,
whether Constitutional or regulatory.

And three, given the facts in Barnes, the remedy ordered there was consistent with the rule that permits courts to decide the remedy by balancing the equities. And there were two important equities in Barnes that explained why expungement was appropriate. And one was that the witness - - - it was two years after the fact, and the key witness had left prison, so you couldn't hold a meaningful rehearing.

And secondly, this court could understandably have serious questions about whether there was any misconduct. On the one hand, the inmate had suffered terrible injuries. He'd been hospitalized - - -

JUDGE PIGOTT: I don't know. I just don't understand how you balance Constitutional against something else. I mean, either is - - - there is a Constitutional violation or there isn't. You don't say, well, you know, he was denied his right of free

speech, but it was - - - it was kind of important to the public so we think it's okay that he was denied his - - his Constitutional right to free speech.

MR. HOTVET: Well, but the answer to that,

Your - - are - - - you know - - - you know, from
- - from the criminal practice that because there's a

Sixth Amendment violation in a hearing doesn't mean

the indictment in a trial - - doesn't mean that the

tri - - the indictment is quashed, all it means is

that there's a new trial.

JUDGE RIVERA: Well, I think the point is that there's a Constitutional floor, right? And that floor is that he gets to have these witnesses unless they're not relevant or otherwise or excluded under - - under the Supreme Court jurisprudence. Okay, fine. The fact that the hearing officer may or may not give him a reason is irrelevant to that. But the point is whether or not you denied him his witness. And that's the Constitutional violation. The rest of it is nice window dressing, but it doesn't matter. I take that to be his point.

MR. HOTVET: Well, unless you accept our argument that it wasn't a Constitutional violation.

But if you conclude there was a Constitutional vi - -

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JUDGE RIVERA: But the Constitutional
violation you're referring to is the failure to
inform him of why he's being denied the person, when

the point is, is he being denied the witness.

MR. HOTVET: No, the second sentence of the regulation isn't prescribed by Wolff. It's not a Constitutional violation. It's only a regulatory violation. So that you could affirm the Third Department on this case on the basis that the record establishes that the hearing officer didn't give him the reason that's required by the second sentence of the regulation, and therefore, it was a regulatory violation only.

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, counsel.

Thanks. We'll hear from your adversary with rebuttal.

MR. CASSIDY: Your Honors, the - - - the written statement requirement that's in the regulation that's not the Wolff, that this court recognized in Laureano, that wasn't at issue here, and that's not the issue. The issue is, as you said Your Honor, it's the denial of the witness. It's - - we weren't complaining about no written statement in the record. And even - - -

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: You didn't object on

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1 the second part? MR. CASSIDY: Right. It's - - - it's - - -2 3 it wasn't - - - this hasn't ever been about the written statement. The written statement is 4 5 something that the regulations have required above 6 and beyond, just like they require tape-recording 7 these hearings. 8 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: What was the prejudice 9 here, counsel, as - - - as was stated? Your client 10 got a hearing, where the witness did come in and 11 apparently wasn't favorable toward him. He still got 12 - - - you know, he - - - he was still considered to 13 have violated this regulation - - -14 MR. CASSIDY: Right. 15 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: - - - or gotten 16 involved in misconduct. So I'm - - - I'm - - - I'm 17 kind of not understanding the prejudice. MR. CASSIDY: Well, that - - - that came up 18 19 later after - - - I mean we were in the midst of 20 challenging whether or not remittal in the first 21 place was appropriate or not. So I - - - I would 22 argue that it's - - -23 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: But wouldn't it seem 2.4 that - - -25 MR. CASSIDY: - - - it's not.

1 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: - - - because of this 2 witness that was - - - your client said was so 3 important comes in and apparently doesn't testify 4 favorably toward him, isn't - - - isn't the - - -5 shouldn't we take that into account, because that 6 goes to the fairness of the proceeding? 7 MR. CASSIDY: I would argue no. The vast 8 majority of these prisoners - - - I don't know what 9 the percentage is, ninety-nine percent - - - they're 10 all found guilty. It's - - -11 JUDGE PIGOTT: But isn't it - - - isn't it 12 13 MR. CASSIDY: They've got these procedural 14 rules that they need to follow. 15 JUDGE PIGOTT: Isn't his point well taken if - - - if - - - if this was a criminal case and 16 17 let's say a confession was not suppressed, and then 18 the - - - an appellate court suppressed it, you - - -19 it doesn't dismiss it; it sends it back for a new 20 trial. 21 MR. CASSIDY: Yes, but a criminal matter is 22 an entirely different - - - entirely different 23 matter. 2.4 JUDGE PIGOTT: Well, I understand, but

we're still talking about the same Constitution.

- - - and for Constitutional violations in a criminal case, we say you don't get it expunged, so why would we say a Constitutional violation in a civil case gets expunged?

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MR. CASSIDY: Because in this - - - the situation is unique. And - - - and these are the only procedural protections they've got in this hearing. I - - - I would say that be - - - before we can put someone in solitary confinement, prison officials, it - - - they should be - - - it should be incumbent upon them to follow the rule of law, and observe these basic rights; and they're so basic and so easy to comply with. They should be required to do that, before - - - before someone is found guilty.

of my head that somebody's caught with a shiv,
because he's about to kill somebody, ends up, you
know, having that expunged from his record as if it
never happened because the constable stumbled. I - - I - - I don't get that. I mean, for the safe - - safety of other prisoners and everyone else, you
would want to have that - - that case heard. Maybe
he's innocent, but you just don't want to say, you
know, it's expunged so he can go back to his cell and
say, guess what? I get to keep my shiv.

| 1 | MR. CASSIDY: Well, if if there's |
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| 2 | evidence of of that, they're likely to be |
| 3 | charged criminally as well. Criminal charges are not |
| 4 | |
| 5 | JUDGE PIGOTT: Well, you expect that there |
| 6 | |
| 7 | MR. CASSIDY: uncommon within the |
| 8 | prison as well. But it's |
| 9 | JUDGE PIGOTT: Can you can you |
| 10 | can you use that in evidence? Can you ask the |
| 11 | prosecutor, you know, he was acquitted in prison of |
| 12 | this, now you're going to try to charge him |
| 13 | criminally? |
| 14 | MR. CASSIDY: I'm not I don't do |
| 15 | criminal law, so I'm not sure how that would go. |
| 16 | CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, counsel, thank |
| 17 | you both. |
| 18 | MR. CASSIDY: May I just make one further |
| 19 | comment? |
| 20 | CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: One quick point, go |
| 21 | ahead. |
| 22 | MR. CASSIDY: The equities that that |
| 23 | counsel of talked about, they they were |
| 24 | never at issue in Barnes. You can read Barnes inside |
| 25 | out, upside down; equities were not part of the |

| 1 | consideration |
|----|-------------------------------------|
| 2 | CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, counsel. |
| 3 | MR. CASSIDY: in the in the |
| 4 | decision. |
| 5 | CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Thanks. |
| 6 | (Court is adjourned) |
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CERTIFICATION

I, Karen Schiffmiller, certify that the foregoing transcript of proceedings in the Court of Appeals of Matter of Texeira v. Fischer, No. 142, was prepared using the required transcription equipment and is a true and accurate record of the proceedings.

Hour Laboffmills.

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