1	COURT OF APPEALS
2	STATE OF NEW YORK
3	TIPALDO,
4	
5	Respondent,
6	-against- No. 143
7	LYNN, et al.,
8	Appellants.
9	20 Eagle Street Albany, New York 12207 September 16, 2015
11	
12	Before:
13	ASSOCIATE JUDGE EUGENE F. PIGOTT, JR. ASSOCIATE JUDGE JENNY RIVERA
14	ASSOCIATE JUDGE SHEILA ABDUS-SALAAM ASSOCIATE JUDGE LESLIE E. STEIN ASSOCIATE JUDGE EUGENE M. FAHEY
15	
16	Appearances:
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24	
25	Karen Schiffmiller Official Court Transcriber

1 JUDGE PIGOTT: Chief Judge Lippman is 2 recused in this case. So the case is Tipaldo v. 3 Lynn. 4 Ms. Ross, and then there were five. 5 MS. ROSS: Yes. JUDGE PIGOTT: We - - - we will hear this 6 7 case, of course. We still need four votes for a decision, so - - -8 9 MS. ROSS: So I understand. 10 JUDGE PIGOTT: All right. Would you like 11 any rebuttal time? 12 MS. ROSS: I will take three minutes, Your 13 Honor, please. JUDGE PIGOTT: Three minutes. 14 15 MS. ROSS: Thank you. 16 May it please the court, Marta Ross for the 17 City Department of Transportation. Your Honors, 18 there's only one claim here, and it's under the state 19 Civil Service Law. The conditions to sue are 20 explicit, and they were not satisfied here. 21 When the legislature first enacted the 22 Whistleblower Statute, of course, which did not exist 23 in common law, an integral part of the statute's enactment dealt with the - - - the requirement of the 2.4

internal report. And of course, that served to

1 balance the interests - - -JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Well, is there any 2 3 difference here because the - - - I guess, you're - -4 - you're saying the report has to go to the 5 appointing authority? MS. ROSS: Yes, Your Honor. 6 7 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: That that's the 8 requirement. So the appointing authority here is the 9 commissioner and his first deputy, correct? 10 MS. ROSS: Correct, Your Honor. 11 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: And they're the persons accused of the misconduct? 12 13 MS. ROSS: Yes, Your Honor. JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: And so does it make 14 15 common sense to report what you consider misconduct 16 to the individuals who you think have committed the 17 misconduct; for them to then report their own misconduct to the Department of Investigation or the 18 19 Inspector General? Does that make common sense? MS. ROSS: It - - - it - - - it does Your 20 21 Honor, and I know that my - - - my colleague refers to it also as absurd and as - - - and illogical. 22 23 can imagine a different policy choice being made. 2.4 But to require it, no, it's - - - it's not absurd for

JUDGE STEIN: What about the city law? I

mean, doesn't the city law effectively prevent a -
- a city employee from ever availing him or herself

of the Civil Service Law?

MS. ROSS: No, Your Honor. We - - - we

contend that - -
JUDGE STEIN: As you understand it, I mean.

2.4

MS. ROSS: Yes, the - - - the manual here - - - the handbook, which - - - which requires or - - - requires the - - - the reporting employee to, without undue delay in - - - or in an appropriate time to report any misconduct is not incompat - - - is not incompatible with the state statute. And that is because the - - - the manual's obligations to report to DOI in an appropriate time in no way diminish the obligations that the state law imposes to bring a private right of action and to require an internal report be made first. So we contend that - - -

JUDGE STEIN: But - - - but the city law requires that the employee go immediately to the IG as soon as they know of anything. And how does that fit in with the Civil Service Law requirement that you report first to - - - to the supervisor or whatever and - - - and then give reasonable time for - - - for some action to be had? How can those two

things be done at the same time? I don't understand. 1 2 MS. ROSS: They're - - - they're - - - the 3 - - - first of all, the city law, of course, does not 4 - - - deliberately and specifically does not afford a 5 private right of action. It affords many protections; and, in fact, the plaintiff here did - -6 7 JUDGE STEIN: But it does threaten possible 8 9 loss of job if you don't comply with it. 10 MS. ROSS: The - - - the - - - and again, 11 he - - - he got the benefit of the city law here 12 twice. He - - - he was - - - he was given the 13 protections. He was afforded the protections under 14 the city law. 15 JUDGE STEIN: But what you're saying then, 16 and that was my question is, is he - - - he has to 17 comply with the city law under threat of loss of his job. And if he does, then you say, he's out his 18 19 remedy under the state law. 20 MS. ROSS: Again, Your Honor, we contend 21 that both laws align. They're both completely 22 compatible, because the - - - the obligation - - -23 JUDGE RIVERA: Well, I - - - I think Judge 2.4 Stein's point is, how can it be compatible if the - -25 - the executive order and - - - and the handbook

1	tells him that he's got to report immediately with un
2	without undue delay, and the state law is
3	saying you first got to go to the appointing
4	authority and you've got to give them a reasonable
5	amount of time. It it does seem that there's
6	obvious tension there. That that it would be
7	the the most unique situation where the
8	employee could could satisfy both; and this is
9	not that situation.
10	MS. ROSS: The again, the protections
11	are different. In order plaintiff would like -
12	
13	JUDGE RIVERA: No, no, no I'm not talking
14	about the I'm talking about the requirements to
15	get the protections. I mean, I think that's Judge
16	Stein's question, and I'm asking the same thing. How
17	could he, under the facts of this case, have
18	satisfied both as you interpret both?
19	MS. ROSS: He could have apprised the
20	appointing authority, Commissioner Lynn or the
21	designee Malchow of his concerns.
22	JUDGE RIVERA: But when he did that, wasn't
23	that at the point in time when he should have gone to

25 MS. ROSS: If he would like a private - - -

the IG for DOT?

1 if he is seeking whistleblower status under the state 2 statute, the requirement is clear. He would need to 3 have had gone to the appointing authority - - -4 JUDGE RIVERA: But then that's the point 5 under - - -MS. ROSS: - - - or the designee in order 6 7 to bring a lawsuit. JUDGE RIVERA: But then - - - but then 8 9 that's - - - but that's the point, that it seems that 10 as written, the executive order and the employee 11 handbook ask him to choose between the job and 12 potentially a whistleblower action if he's retaliated 13 against. 14 MS. ROSS: He - - - Your Honor, he's 15 expected to - - - one is expected to know the law. 16 This - - - the - - - in order to sue for a - - -17 under the Civil Service Law, the requirement is 18 clear. JUDGE RIVERA: Upon your - - - the city 19 20 expected to know the law too. 21 MS. ROSS: And - - -22 JUDGE RIVERA: And if you have 23 intentionally chosen a procedure that undermines a 2.4 state law, doesn't that make it questionable exactly

what kinds of protections you're trying to give to

1	your employees?
2	MS. ROSS: Your Honor, the the manual
3	that that he refers to also talk it also
4	contemplates internal reporting. On page 207 of the
5	record
6	JUDGE FAHEY: You see I I thought
7	that the appoint notifying the appointing
8	authority, it could be the appointing authority or
9	his or her designee. And I thought that Keegan could
10	be arguably considered a designee here. So that he
11	would fulfill that requirement of 75-b by doing that.
12	The more difficult problem for the for the
13	petitioner here is the one day before he went to DOI
14	
15	MS. ROSS: Yes, absolutely, Your Honor.
16	JUDGE FAHEY: I think that's that's
17	more difficult probably because
18	MS. ROSS: Even even assuming
19	JUDGE RIVERA: But you've taken the
20	position that Lynn never chose a designee, so how
21	could he? And how would he know?
22	JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Or or the
23	designee was Malchow who was also one of the people
24	who has been accused of the misconduct. So how does
25	that work?

that work?

	MS. ROSS: The We don't have a
2	written designation in this case, but it was not
3	contested that if there were to be one, the first dep
4	would presumably be the person, because typically the
5	appointing authority would would designate the
6	the next highest in command.
7	JUDGE STEIN: But could we interpret the
8	City rules as a de jure or de facto designation of
9	the IG as the designee? Could
10	MS. ROSS: No, Your Honor.
11	JUDGE STEIN: Why not?
12	MS. ROSS: For a for a multitude of
13	reasons. First of all, there there is no
14	written designation to to that extent.
15	JUDGE STEIN: But where does it say
16	MS. ROSS: There's no evidence of it
17	JUDGE STEIN: it has to be a written
18	designee?
19	MS. ROSS: The the
20	JUDGE STEIN: Does it say it anywhere?
21	MS. ROSS: The charter the charter
22	lays out the organizations of agencies. And
23	typically one a designation is is in
24	writing. However
25	JUDGE PIGOTT: What about

1 MS. ROSS: - - - even putting that aside -2 3 JUDGE PIGOTT: I'm - - - I apologize, but what about the 1978 executive order? 4 5 MS. ROSS: The 1970 - - - well, the - - -6 the most recent executive order is exec - - -7 Executive Order 105 which completely revamped the 8 inspector general's system to specifically separate 9 the inspectors generals from the agencies that they 10 are to investigate. And - - - and that was a huge 11 change back in 1986. And it - - - it expressly made 12 it clear that DOI is a separate and independent 13 agency. 14 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Okay, so assuming 15 that's true, what about the good-faith language in 16 the - - - in the requirement - - - in the state 17 requirement that - - - that the reporting person or 18 the person reporting make a good-faith effort to 19 report the misconduct to the appointing authority? 20 Why wasn't the Appellate Division's decision 21 regarding this petitioner making a good faith, why -22 - - what's wrong with that? 23 MS. ROSS: A - - - a couple of reasons, 2.4 Your Honor. The - - - the good-faith requirement was

not met here because the conversation - - - assuming

1	the Keegan conversation could be focused on it
2	was at all not a conversation that was led to further
3	up to be further up the chain of command to
4	serve as a report to further disclosure within the
5	agency and of course the
6	JUDGE FAHEY: Well, but she she
7	he didn't go to her for advice like in the Brohman
8	case. It was that's not the situation.
9	MS. ROSS: No. He went to her to tell her
LO	he was going to DOI.
L1	JUDGE PIGOTT: What what about a
L2	situation that you have you have of sexual
L3	harassment where the boss and somebody is is
L4	involved to some degree and and at some point
L5	the subordinate has had enough. Does the subordinate
L6	then have to go to that person and say I am now
L7	blowing the whistle on you, so or or you
L8	have to exercise corrective action?
L9	MS. ROSS: That is what the statute
20	requires, Your Honor
21	JUDGE PIGOTT: So the so the so
22	the boss
23	MS. ROSS: until the legislature
24	-

JUDGE PIGOTT: Let me finish my thought on

this and you can correct me. 1 2 MS. ROSS: Yes, Your Honor. 3 JUDGE PIGOTT: Because the boss can say, 4 absolutely, I get it. You - - - we're - - - I'm 5 going to correct myself. And for the next six months 6 there's nothing but unsatisfactory reports but he or 7 she says nothing to the - - - to the subordinate and 8 absolutely lays off. Is - - - do you see any 9 problems with that? And all of a sudden now, the 10 subordinate is saying, I did what I was supposed to 11 do; and now I'm going to get fired, because I got six months of unsatisfactories? 12 13 MS. ROSS: The - - - in that - - - I'm not 14 exactly clear what the question is, Your Honor. 15 JUDGE PIGOTT: Well, I'm saying that - - that the subordinate did what the law says. You got 16 17 to - - -18 MS. ROSS: Yes. 19 JUDGE PIGOTT: You got to report it to your 20 superior. Well, the superior is the bad person. 21 MS. ROSS: Right. 22 JUDGE PIGOTT: So he or she does that, even 23 though it seems like a mistake, and the whole purpose 2.4 of that is so corrective action can be taken. So 25 corrective action's taken, unsatisfactories as far as

the eye can see, the subordinate's fired, and it's all okay. I - - - I have a problem with - - - with the Whistleblower's Statute saying that's okay.

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MS. ROSS: The - - - and again, the legislature has been approached for the last couple of decades to amend the statute to enact a futility exception; and again, and again, and again, the statute has not been amended. I know that - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: Counselor, your time is up, but let me just quickly ask you this if I may, getting back to the point Judge Abdus-Salaam was asking you about, on the good-faith effort to provide the appointing authority or the des - - designee information. Is - - is there any doubt in this case that the appointing authorities knew about these claims, these concerns, about the violation of the procurement process?

They certainly knew. Isn't the point of this statute to give them notice to either cure or to clarify and explain? And is there any doubt that in this case, on these facts - - - I'm not talking about any other case; just this case - - - that this appointing authority knew and in fact, tried to cure?

MS. ROSS: The appointing authority was approached by, in fact, Wally Davidowitz. And he

told the commissioner, hey, you didn't follow the 1 2 procurement rules. And so he was alerted to - - - to 3 the - - - to that situation. We - - - we can't know 4 what appropriate action could have happened if - - -5 if the plaintiff had gone up and followed the correct steps here in order to - - -6 7 JUDGE FAHEY: But - - - but isn't - - -8 isn't your argument that the AD was wrong, that they 9 created a futility exception, which is - - - which 10 isn't available in the law? 11 MS. ROSS: Correct. 12 JUDGE FAHEY: Okay. The way I read it 13 though, is it seems that what they said was Tipaldo 14 specifically satisfied the requirements by making a 15 good-faith effort in reporting the matter to his 16 superiors. You're saying, oh, well, wrong superior. 17 Well, okay. And then - - - but even though he did

make a good-faith effort, that seems uncontested in the record, and then he waited one or two days before complying with the next city requirement which is to go to the DOI.

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MS. ROSS: Which we said is not - - -JUDGE FAHEY: And you saying that's not a reasonable time.

MS. ROSS: Exactly, Your Honor.

JUDGE FAHEY: Well, let me just say this. 1 2 You know, it would've taken him twenty seconds to 3 negate that contract and to solve this problem. So 4 it - - - I don't know how much time you need, but - -5 - you know, you're advocating so - - - about what a 6 reasonable time is - - -7 JUDGE PIGOTT: Judge - - - Judge Abdus-8 Salaam? 9 JUDGE FAHEY: - - - but let me say, if I 10 was one, that would have been plenty of time to solve 11 that problem. I just really understand - - - I - - -12 I - - - it's hard for me to see, once you get past 13 the good-faith argument, why - - - how much time you 14 need to really respond. 15 JUDGE PIGOTT: Judge Abdus-Salaam? 16 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Your - - - your light 17 is on, counsel. But I was just interested in your -18 - - your position on the pre-judgment or pre-19 determination interest, because you didn't get a 20 chance to say anything about that, so I wanted to 21 give you an opportunity, or you can do it in your 22 rebuttal time. It's up to you. 23 MS. ROSS: Whatever the court prefers. 2.4 JUDGE PIGOTT: Why don't we wait for

rebuttal and we'll pick - - -

1 MS. ROSS: Okay, Your Honor. 2 JUDGE PIGOTT: - - - and we'll pick on your 3 opponent for a little while. MS. ROSS: Okay. Thank you. 4 5 MR. ROSENBERG: May it please the court, 6 I'm Lewis Rosenberg, and I've had the pleasure of 7 representing Mr. Tipaldo for many years. And we were 8 hoping that this would have been over long ago. 9 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Almost twenty now, 10 right? 11 MR. ROSENBERG: As a matter of fact, his 12 daughter was born when this occurred, and she started 13 college at Hunter this year. So that would be to sum 14 up - - -15 JUDGE PIGOTT: Well, let - - - let's put it 16 the other way. Let's suppose this - - - this whole 17 thing is - - - is nonsense that - - - that the reason 18 for getting the signs was legitimate, that the 19 emergency was necessary and, not your client, but 2.0 someone else in the - - - in the Department who's 21 always had a - - - a problem with the commissioner, 22 decides he's going to start his own little - - -23 little internecine war, and starts blowing the 2.4 whistle on something that's absolutely fabricated and

not - - - and not required at all.

1 MR. ROSENBERG: The law provides in those circumstances, Your Honor, that a court could award 2 3 costs and attorneys' fees against such a ploy. 4 JUDGE PIGOTT: No, the - - - the - - - the 5 statute requires that the person who thinks he or 6 she's going to do this go to the appointing 7 authority, so before they can start this little grass 8 fire, they got to talk to the commissioner. And at 9 that point, the commissioner would explain to him or 10 her that everything was copasetic and - - - and we 11 would avoid an entire lawsuit. MR. ROSENBERG: But that's not what 12 13 happened here, Your Honor. 14 JUDGE PIGOTT: I'm not suggesting yours. 15 I'm saying when - - - when we make a decision on 16 these cases, I - - - I understand you - - - you've 17 got to focus, but when we make a decision on these 18 cases, we got to think about, you know, the 19 government qua government, and they have a government 20 to run, and if - - - if people have got complaints, 21 the idea is take them to your superior. 22 MR. ROSENBERG: The City of New York 23 employed this man and instructed him what to do under these circumstances. Un - - - under the - - - under 2.4

the scenario that's proposed by the - - - by

corporation counsel, he'd have to get a - - - a 1 2 declaratory judgment as to which rule to follow. 3 JUDGE PIGOTT: No, he could have gone to 4 his superior and said, you shouldn't do this with 5 these signs. 6 MR. ROSENBERG: But he made a good-faith 7 effort to communicate by discussing this with one of his subordinates. It's obvious that the - - - in 8 9 this instance, with these facts - - -10 JUDGE PIGOTT: Let's assume for a minute -11 - - you mean, Ms. Keegan? 12 MR. ROSENBERG: Yes. 13 JUDGE PIGOTT: All right. Let's assume the 14 two of them got together and said, you know what? 15 Let's - - - let's dump the commish. And they decide 16 they're going to do the - - - do you understand the 17 point of not everybody is as - - - as pure of heart as your client. And when a - - - when a law is 18 19 drafted for everybody, the idea is that there's going 20 to be some jokers in the deck, and - - - and - - -21 and at the least, we ought to start at the appointing 22 authority level, and what would have been the harm to 23 your client if he'd started at that level?

MR. ROSENBERG: Well, the retaliation

probably would have been much quicker then. And - -

2.4

1 - and - - -2 JUDGE PIGOTT: How fast was it then? 3 MR. ROSENBERG: Well, it was pretty quick, but - - - but - - - and in addition to that, the 4 5 commissioner probably would have done a better job of covering his tracks and - - -6 7 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Well, isn't that why --- I mean, I don't know what the -- - the 8 9 motivation was for your client even going to the IG. 10 I'm not saying that I know exactly what it is, but at 11 least under the facts as I understand them, after the bid came in - - - the public bid came in - - - and 12 13 the amounts for signs was lower than the bid that the commissioner - - - or the contract that the 14 15 commissioner and the deputy commissioner entered 16 into, then they backdated a memo saying there was an 17 emergency, right? So that - - - that suggests that 18 they kind of knew something was up. 19 MR. ROSENBERG: No question about it. 20 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: As - - - as Judge 21 Rivera said, they had notice - - -22 MR. ROSENBERG: Oh, absolute notice. 23 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: - - - that there was a 2.4 problem here.

MR. ROSENBERG: The difference - - - the

1 disparity was 6,000 as compared to 1,800. So they -- - they knew there was something wrong. 2 3 JUDGE RIVERA: Let me ask you. I just want to clarify something in - - - in the record - - -4 5 something in his affidavits. He claims that there 6 are these meetings where Lynn and Malchow are 7 informed about this, and then that's when they act to try and cover some of this up. So was he himself 8 9 present in these meetings? 10 MR. ROSENBERG: No, he was excluded from 11 meetings. 12 JUDGE RIVERA: Okay. 13 MR. ROSENBERG: I mean - - -14 JUDGE RIVERA: So - - - so it's that he 15 hears from this either second- or third-hand that 16 these meetings have occurred? 17 MR. ROSENBERG: Well, he - - -18 JUDGE RIVERA: So he's hearsay to him that 19 Lynn and Malchow know about the complaints? 20 MR. ROSENBERG: Objectively, we - - - we 21 can determine because they co - - - they'd made an 22 attempt to cover it up, that they were aware that 23 their conduct was - - -2.4 JUDGE RIVERA: So based on subsequent 25 actions - - -

1	MR. ROSENBERG: Yes, yes.
2	JUDGE RIVERA: I understand what
3	you're saying. But he has not asserted at any point
4	in this case that he was physically present when
5	someone else, not not necessarily Mr. Tipaldo,
6	but someone else informed Lynn or Malchow about the
7	violations or the alleged violations, the appearances
8	of a violation of the procurement policies?
9	MR. ROSENBERG: The record is ab is
10	not clear on that point.
11	JUDGE PIGOTT: So even though he didn't
12	follow the procedure, they found out anyway, right?
13	MR. ROSENBERG: Oh, sure, they did.
14	JUDGE PIGOTT: So he could have followed
15	the procedure and this the the
16	retaliation would have been the same.
17	MR. ROSENBERG: Well, of course, but
18	but
19	JUDGE STEIN: Are you arguing that there
20	should be a futility exception; or are you arguing
21	that reporting to Keegan was proper? I'm I'm
22	not clear on what your argument is.
23	MR. ROSENBERG: Let's let's go back
24	to what the Appellate Division did.
25	JUDGE STEIN: Well, I know what the

JUDGE STEIN: Well, I know what the

1	Appellate Division did. Is that is that
2	MR. ROSENBERG: All right. And I I
3	think they did they did was proper. They
4	balanced the facts of this case to conform to the
5	statute's requirements. It's not
6	JUDGE FAHEY: Yeah, but you need to really
7	you need to really answer the judge's question,
8	because we that's what we want to know about.
9	JUDGE STEIN: Well, yeah, I understand
10	you're happy with it, but that's that wasn't
11	really the nature of your argument before the
12	Appellate Division, was it, or before the Supreme
13	Court, that there's a futility exception?
14	MR. ROSENBERG: No.
15	JUDGE STEIN: Okay. So so explain to
16	me
17	MR. ROSENBERG: Well, actually, we did use
18	that word in our brief. I I sifted through it
19	and and I did find that word in our brief, but
20	
21	JUDGE STEIN: But that wasn't really the -
22	the the thrust of it.
23	MR. ROSENBERG: That wasn't the guts of the
24	case.
25	JUDGE STEIN: Was it was it the good-

JUDGE STEIN: Was it - - - was it the good-

1	faith effort, is that
2	MR. ROSENBERG: Yes.
3	JUDGE STEIN: Okay, and and
4	MR. ROSENBERG: That was the principal
5	thing that we focused on.
6	JUDGE STEIN: Okay.
7	MR. ROSENBERG: And the demonstration of
8	good faith is complying with the City's own manuals
9	and regulations. I mean
10	JUDGE FAHEY: Can we just talk about the
11	pre-determination interest question a little bit
12	_
13	MR. ROSENBERG: Yes.
14	JUDGE FAHEY: which seems a
15	significant issue here. Labor Law Section 740(5)
16	lists a specific has an enumerated list of
17	remedies; and then there's the Bello case which
18	applies to, I guess, 77
19	MR. ROSENBERG: Yes.
20	JUDGE FAHEY: of the Civil Service
21	Law. But you aren't relying on either one of those.
22	I don't think they support your position. You're
23	relying on the expanded reading that I think the
24	court gave to a civil rights case. Is that right?
25	MR. ROSENBERG: Yes, Aurecchione.

1 JUDGE FAHEY: Is that how you say it? 2 MR. ROSENBERG: I don't - - -3 JUDGE FAHEY: [Archer-one]? 4 MR. ROSENBERG: [Archer-ron-e]. 5 JUDGE FAHEY: [Archer-ron-e], okay. 6 JUDGE RIVERA: Aurecchione. 7 MR. ROSENBERG: You would know better than 8 me. Aurecchione. Anyway, that's - - - that's how it 9 would sound mellifluously. 10 JUDGE FAHEY: Does that statute specifically - - - the Human Rights Statute in 11 12 Executive Law 24 - - 2974(c)(3)(I), create a right 13 to pre-determina - - - determination interest or it's 14 just the reading of an expanded remedy? There is no 15 specific enumerated right there - - -16 MR. ROSENBERG: No. 17 JUDGE FAHEY: - - - either, is there? 18 MR. ROSENBERG: No, there isn't. And the 19 Appellate Division adopted those - - - that 2.0 reasoning. Now, there's something else. The - - -21 the legislative history, we've - - - we've aler - - -22 alluded to that. The legislative history in the 1984 23 bill jacket and in a 2002 amendment to 740 of the - -2.4 - of the Labor Law, alludes to a complete remedy, 25 making the person whole. And that's the language

that the - - - that this court - - - that the - - -1 2 that the - - - that was used in Aurecchione by Judge 3 Ciparick, and it - - - it's very consistent with the 4 legislative history here. 5 JUDGE FAHEY: Yeah, in the Greenberg case too, in the Workman's Comp case, similar language was 6 7 used. 8 MR. ROSENBERG: Yes. 9 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: So you're saying that 10 that language in the bill jacket, Mr. Rosenberg, 11 affects what the statute itself says, which is - - this is 740 - - -12 13 MR. ROSENBERG: Yes. 14 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: "Relief in any action 15 brought against - - - or pursuant to subdivision four 16 of this section, this court may order relief as 17 follows," or the court may order relief as follows, 18 and then there are five separate - - -19 MR. ROSENBERG: Yes. 20 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: - - - types of relief 21 that - - -22 MR. ROSENBERG: Right. 23 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: - - - are listed. 2.4 you're saying, beyond that, there's this making 25 someone whole.

1	MR. ROSENBERG: I'm I'm saying that
2	this is an equitable remedy
3	JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Right.
4	MR. ROSENBERG: because injunctive
5	relief is included.
6	JUDGE FAHEY: How?
7	JUDGE RIVERA: Are you saying this reflects
8	an attempt to make someone whole?
9	MR. ROSENBERG: Yes.
10	JUDGE RIVERA: And that the word
11	"remuneration" should be read broadly to ensure that
12	you make someone whole.
13	MR. ROSENBERG: Exactly.
14	JUDGE PIGOTT: All right. So to make
15	to make your client whole, you had Dr. Bynoe testify,
16	right?
17	MR. ROSENBERG: Yes.
18	JUDGE PIGOTT: All right. And she came up
19	with the present value of his lost wages as of 2008
20	or something?
21	MR. ROSENBERG: Yes.
22	JUDGE PIGOTT: All right.
23	MR. ROSENBERG: She discounted in
24	other words, what she did was
25	JUDGE PIGOTT: So that takes

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1
                    MR. ROSENBERG: - - - segment a piece at a
 2
          time, but - - -
 3
                    JUDGE PIGOTT: So you - - - you could get
 4
          interest after that judgment but you can't get
 5
          interest before that because that's already - - -
                    MR. ROSENBERG: Well - - -
 6
 7
                    JUDGE PIGOTT: - - - that's already
          calculated in.
 8
 9
                    MR. ROSENBERG: No, the - - - the - - - it
10
          was a discount. It wasn't applied plus - - -
                    JUDGE PIGOTT: Of course, it is. That - -
11
12
13
                    MR. ROSENBERG: - - - it was a minus.
14
                    JUDGE PIGOTT: Of course, it is, I mean,
15
          that's - - - that's what they do. And they say the
16
          present value of - - - of the lost wages, if the lost
17
          wages that he suffered were paid to him today, he
          should get a check for 662,000 dollars, and then he's
18
          made whole. Now if they don't pay it today, you get
19
20
          interest at nine - - - well, I don't know what the
21
          city interest - - -
                    MR. ROSENBERG: Well, they didn't pay it at
22
23
          all, so - - -
2.4
                    JUDGE PIGOTT: I understand, but what I'm
25
          saying is that - - -
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1	MR. ROSENBERG: But
2	JUDGE PIGOTT: you don't say, you
3	know, we we figured the present value of
4	of what he was supposed to be paid as of today and
5	now we're going to go back and give him interest.
6	MR. ROSENBERG: It was the present value as
7	of the time the benefit was conferred.
8	JUDGE PIGOTT: Right as of 2008, when
9	you had the hearing.
LO	MR. ROSENBERG: Yes.
L1	JUDGE PIGOTT: Right.
L2	MR. ROSENBERG: And
L3	JUDGE PIGOTT: So there's no interest
L4	before that. I mean, that's already calculated into
L5	the into the lost wages.
L6	JUDGE FAHEY: I thought you were asking for
L7	pre-determination interest.
L8	MR. ROSENBERG: Exactly.
L9	JUDGE FAHEY: So that's pre-determination.
20	That's before
21	MR. ROSENBERG: Before that. Before that.
22	JUDGE FAHEY: This is before that.
23	JUDGE PIGOTT: On what?
24	MR. ROSENBERG: Each of the each of
25	the amounts that he was deprived of for the period of

time - - -1 2 JUDGE PIGOTT: She computed that, didn't 3 In other words, if he was supposed to be paid she? 100 dollars on the - - - in 2000, she said 100 4 5 dollars in 2008 would 175 dollars, so you owe him 175 dollars. You don't say, okay, take that 175 and give 6 7 me interest back from 2000, because you've got 8 present day, right? 9 MR. ROSENBERG: Her calculations assumed as 10 a model a - - - a salary schedule based on those two 11 comparatives. 12 JUDGE PIGOTT: But I - - - my - - - my 13 understand - - - in any case where people have lost 14 wages, you've got to figure out how do you compensate 15 them? And so you get these economists who do the cost of living and - - - which is what she did, and 16 17 she says he's out 662,000 dollars. MR. ROSENBERG: But that's based upon what 18 - - - what these amounts would have added up to had 19 20 they - - -21 JUDGE PIGOTT: But it's the - - -22 MR. ROSENBERG: Well - - -

JUDGE PIGOTT: - - - but it's today's

value. It's not - - - it's not the 100 dollars in

2000, it's what the value of 100 dollars would be in

23

2.4

1 2008. 2 MR. ROSENBERG: It's - - -3 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: But even if that's true, is he entitled or is the employee entitled to 4 5 be compensated for not having that money - - -6 MR. ROSENBERG: Right. 7 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: - - - to spend? MR. ROSENBERG: That's the whole idea. 8 9 mean, he - - - he - - - as an example - - -10 JUDGE RIVERA: Because the employer has the 11 money and - - -MR. ROSENBERG: He's working with it. 12 13 JUDGE RIVERA: - - - and is profiting off 14 it. 15 MR. ROSENBERG: He's using it. In - - - in 16 1996, when this occurred - - - this is a little 17 aside; it's not in the record, but it may be - - it'll illustrate this point - - - Mr. Tipaldo was 18 19 living in the a two-family house. The owner of the 20 house was on the ground floor, an elderly woman, and 21 he and his wife and then his children lived in the -- - in the second floor. And she wanted to sell that 22 23 house, and he wanted to buy it. And he couldn't 2.4 qualify to buy that, because he'd been deprived of

the money that he would have earned had - - - had

1	this raise that was promised to him been given to
2	him. And that house has appreciated dramatically
3	_
4	JUDGE PIGOTT: Is that an element of
5	damages?
6	MR. ROSENBERG: What's that?
7	JUDGE PIGOTT: Is that an element of
8	damages?
9	MR. ROSENBERG: No, but the the
10	illustration as to why
11	JUDGE PIGOTT: That's my
12	MR. ROSENBERG: interest should be
13	applied.
14	JUDGE PIGOTT: But that's my point.
15	MR. ROSENBERG: Is why
16	JUDGE PIGOTT: You can't you can't do
17	all of that.
18	MR. ROSENBERG: No, you can't do that.
19	JUDGE PIGOTT: I mean, all you can do is
20	give him
21	MR. ROSENBERG: But we attempt to do it by
22	by applying interest to it.
23	JUDGE PIGOTT: All you do is give him the
24	money he is entitled to. And they're saying it
25	he may have been entitled to 30,000 dollars in 2000.

That in today's dollars is 660,000, so you got - - -1 MR. ROSENBERG: Well - - -2 3 JUDGE PIGOTT: - - - you can't pay him the 4 30; you got to pay him the 660. 5 JUDGE RIVERA: I understood your argument 6 to be that - - - that doing that solely then deprives 7 him of the - - - the accumulation of funds that he would have had - - -8 9 MR. ROSENBERG: Yeah. 10 JUDGE RIVERA: - - - had he been paid on 11 time. 12 JUDGE RIVERA: Exactly. 13 JUDGE PIGOTT: That's never been - - -14 every personal injury case in this state, the - - -15 you know, talks about lost wages and they want to make the person whole, which is what your argument 16 17 was. 18 MR. ROSENBERG: Right. JUDGE PIGOTT: You want him to be whole. 19 20 You want the money that he would have been entitled 21 to had they not done this. And that's what this lady She said this is it, so - - -22 said. 23 JUDGE FAHEY: See, you got a - - - you got 2.4 the judgment for the non-jury trial for 175,000 25 dollars in back pay.

1 MR. ROSENBERG: Well, that was the - - -2 yes. 3 JUDGE FAHEY: Let's take it step by step. 4 MR. ROSENBERG: Okay. JUDGE FAHEY: What was the date of that? 5 6 MR. ROSENBERG: 2007, I believe. 7 JUDGE FAHEY: All right. And then - - -8 then it was appealed, went up, and then it went back 9 to the Appellate Division in 2010, in the subsequent 10 appeal, the trial court - - - did they give you - - -11 they gave you pre-determination interest, right? Or 12 they didn't? 13 MR. ROSENBERG: The Appellate Division did. The - - - the trial judge did not. 14 15 JUDGE FAHEY: The appellate court did. 16 right. 17 MR. ROSENBERG: Did not - - -18 JUDGE FAHEY: So it was sent back, another 19 2010 it comes back up on the second trial trial. 20 which they affirm for whatever the wage claim is, and 21 plus they grant pre-determination interest which 22 would be interest - - - are you arguing for interest 23 prior to the 2007 determination? The original 2.4 determination. Are you saying that we go back to

25

when?

MR. ROSENBERG: Well, as he - as he - - -1 the segments that he lost, that he lost. 2 3 JUDGE FAHEY: So the date - - - you're saying that it goes back to the day that he was fired 4 5 from the job. MR. ROSENBERG: The day he's - - - yes. 6 7 The day he's fired from - - -JUDGE FAHEY: Straightforward, is it some 8 9 day around whatever that was. 10 MR. ROSENBERG: But - - -11 JUDGE FAHEY: So - - - now wait a minute. 12 In every PI case that I've ever seen, when you're 13 calculating the wages, it's exactly as Judge Pigott 14 says. It goes back - - - that's what they're 15 calculating. They're - - - they're making you whole 16 after as of the day of the verdict. Your interest 17 runs forward from the date of the verdict. 18 MR. ROSENBERG: In a personal injury case, 19 that's true. 20 JUDGE PIGOTT: Well - - -21 MR. ROSENBERG: There is no - - -22 JUDGE FAHEY: You're saying there's a 23 separate rule for this - - -2.4 MR. ROSENBERG: Yes.

JUDGE PIGOTT: But wait.

1	JUDGE FAHEY: which is not even as -
2	in the personal injury case
3	JUDGE RIVERA: But there are certainly
4	- there are certain we've we've granted
5	pre-determination interest as you've already pointed
6	out in a couple of cases, but in the federal
7	system under Title VII, back wages can, on occasion,
8	include pre-determination interest.
9	MR. ROSENBERG: And it's not in other
10	words, it's not a black and white rule. It's not in
11	every case. It's it's discretionary. It's
12	another applica
13	JUDGE RIVERA: Because the legislature,
14	what
15	JUDGE PIGOTT: Bynoe
16	JUDGE RIVERA: the legislature
17	intended to do.
18	JUDGE PIGOTT: I'm sorry, Judge. Bynoe,
19	when she first testified, she was computing your lost
20	wages from March 4th, '97 through December 31st,
21	2004. And during that time, she determined that he
22	lost 242,000 and change.
23	MR. ROSENBERG: Right.
24	JUDGE PIGOTT: She then calculated the
25	present value of the lost wages by adding compounded

interest at nine percent of 81,000 and change for a 1 2 total of 324,000. Then in September of 2008, when 3 you did - - - after you went back and got the thing 4 on damages, she computed it at 388,000 in wages 5 without interest and calculated a nine percent interest of 275 and that added up to 662. So she 6 7 gave you interest in your - - - in the judgment. 8 MR. ROSENBERG: Exactly. 9 JUDGE PIGOTT: All right. So you're not 10 asking for - - -11 MR. ROSENBERG: We're not asking for any 12 more - - -13 JUDGE PIGOTT: - - - us to go back and 14 compute more - - -15 MR. ROSENBERG: No, no, we're not asking 16 for any more interest than - - - than she calculated 17 and that's what the Appellate Division ruled that she 18 - - - we were entitled to. 19 JUDGE PIGOTT: Got you. I think your time 20 is expired. 21 MR. ROSENBERG: Oh. 22 JUDGE PIGOTT: We'll hear from Ms. Ross. 23 Thank you, sir. 2.4 MR. ROSENBERG: Thank you. 25 MS. ROSS: To answer your question, Judge

1 Stein, there was never any argument by plaintiff that 2 Keegan was the designee. That was solely something 3 that the Appellate Division held, and - - - and at no 4 point was that an argument that plaintiff made that 5 the sole interpretation of the term designee was meant to refer to DOI. 6 JUDGE STEIN: Right, and I think your - - -7 8 your adversary clarified that. 9 MS. ROSS: Yes. I - - - I just want - - -10 just wanted to clarify it. 11 JUDGE STEIN: Um-hum. 12 MS. ROSS: And in terms of - - -13 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: What's your position 14 on the pre-judgment interest, counsel? You never got 15 a chance to - - - to speak about that - - -16 MS. ROSS: Yes, Your Honor. 17 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: - - - when you were up 18 before. So what are your - - -19 MS. ROSS: Our argument is - - - is simple, 20 Your Honor. It's - - - it's that the remedies here 21 are - - - are numerous, they're specific, and they 22 don't include interest. And - - -23 JUDGE RIVERA: But what does other 2.4 remuneration cover? Because it - - - it must mean 25 more than the list.

1	MS. ROSS: It it does not
2	include interest. It it it includes
3	-
4	JUDGE RIVERA: But why not? I understand
5	that's your argument.
6	MS. ROSS: Yes.
7	JUDGE RIVERA: Why why would it not?
8	MS. ROSS: Yes, Your Honor. Because
9	interest would not fall interest would need to
10	be specifically mentioned as in the federal
11	Whistleblower Law, which specifically was amended
12	actually in 2012
13	JUDGE RIVERA: But we've we've said
14	in other cases
15	MS. ROSS: to include interest.
16	JUDGE RIVERA: that you it need
17	not be specifically mentioned. If the intent of the
18	statute and the purpose is to make someone whole,
19	then why why doesn't the inclusion of such a
20	broad category of relief and this cat this
21	- what is very expansive other remunerations
22	suggests that that's indeed what this statute
23	intends.
24	MS. ROSS: The remuneration would not cover
25	interest because any time interest is is

1	mentioned in a statute it is specifically mentioned
2	as a separate remedy and and would not fall
3	under an "other remuneration" category. But
4	but beyond that, Your Honor, as the Greenberg
5	JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Is that true for the
6	Workers' Compensation Law?
7	MS. ROSS: The
8	JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Because we said in
9	Greenberg that you could get interest?
10	MS. ROSS: Yes, Your Honor, because you
11	found that the statute there was more akin to the
12	- to the state's Human Rights Law, which had broad
13	remedial provisions.
14	JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: But it didn't mention
15	interest, did it?
16	MS. ROSS: No, it didn't. No, it didn't,
17	Your Honor. But you also recognized in Greenberg
18	that strict construction is is necessary in
19	- in the circumstances
20	JUDGE FAHEY: Let me ask it this way.
21	You're not you're not arguing that there's a
22	double calculation of interest, are you?
23	MS. ROSS: No, Your Honor.
24	JUDGE FAHEY: You all right, so
25	you're just saying that they shouldn't get interest

1 and that we don't have the power to give them interest because this is not a statutorily enu - - -2 3 enumerated under 740; but - - - but it's not a double 4 calculation problem, where they're getting an 5 interest twice for the same time period. MS. ROSS: Yes, that is correct. 6 7 JUDGE PIGOTT: Did you object when Bynoe 8 gave this testimony? 9 MS. ROSS: I am not sure about that, Your 10 Honor. Okay. 11 JUDGE PIGOTT: I - - - I don't know either. 12 MS. ROSS: I would have to - - - I would have to go 13 back and check the record. 14 JUDGE RIVERA: So I'm sorry; let me go 15 What - - - what is your position on - - - on back. the intent of other remuneration? What would that 16 17 cover? MS. ROSS: My - - - my feeling is that it 18 19 would cover mis - - - ministerial costs and not 2.0 something as - - - as significant as interest, Your 21 Honor. 22 JUDGE PIGOTT: I see your time has expired. 23 Would you like to conclude? 2.4 MS. ROSS: Your Honor, of course, since we 25 believe the action should be dismissed in full, this

court need not each - - - reach interest, and we feel very strongly that if the legislature wanted to enact a futility exception, it would have, and the statute's pre-conditions are clear and were not met in this case, and so the action should be dismissed. JUDGE PIGOTT: Thank you so much. (Court is adjourned)

CERTIFICATION

I, Karen Schiffmiller, certify that the foregoing transcript of proceedings in the Court of Appeals of Tipaldo v. Lynn, No. 143, was prepared using the required transcription equipment and is a true and accurate record of the proceedings.

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Date: September 23, 2015